Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Colour Carnap VI 126
Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity.
VI 102
Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> Unit Sets.
VI 152
Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity) - then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass
VI 181
GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Conjunction Fraassen I 83
"Conjunction-objection" / PutnamVsFraassen: a conjunction of theories must transfer truth, but not empirical adequacy. - PutnamVspositivism / therefore there is no positivist substitute for the concept of truth. - PutnamVsacceptability - PutnamVsRorty - PutnamVsPeirce? - Two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate in itself. - Problem: the conjunction of two theories need not be believed. - Example: one is a correction of the other.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Empiricism Goethe Carnap VI 181
GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all.
But these laws are of much more complicated form.
Carnap VI 180
Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed.
VI 181
Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception.


Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
History Pareto Brocker I 103
History/Pareto: Pareto (...) saw the essential driving force of history in the affects of humans. These are generally not very changeable. Politics and political sociology would have to take this legality into account if they did not want to lose their reference to reality. See Power/Pareto, Terminology/Pareto, Emotions/Pareto. VsPareto: Pareto has been accused of naturalizing social reality and mystifying the irrational. He undoubtedly had anthropological structures in mind that are upstream of consciousness.
ParetoVsPositivism: In this aspect of his work, however, Pareto shows himself above all as a representative of the intellectual movement of the fin de siècle, to which George Sorel, Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud, among others, belonged. This movement was described as a "revolt against positivism" (Hughes 1977, 33) (1) because it brought into play the spontaneity and feelings of the masses against the rationality of planning and progress.
VsPareto: However, it is not without a certain irony that Pareto himself raised social affects to the scientific object and wanted to surpass positivism by means of the hermeneutic process.
((s) See also Anomalous Monism/Davidson: there are no psychological laws.)
Brocker I 109
History/Progress/Pareto: Pareto shaped the concept of the social elite. According to Pareto, every given society is inherent in a fundamental conflict: that between the ruling elites on the one hand, and the opposing elites on the other. The opposing elites are striving for a change of power and thus an exchange of the ruling elites. This leads to a constant "circulation of the elites" (2)((§ 2042), the actual driving force of social structural change. "History is a cemetery of the elite." (3) See Progress/Pareto.

1. Hughes, Henry Stuart, Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930, New York
2. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 2042
2.Ebenda § 2053.


Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
History Spivak Brocker I 713
History/Historiography/Narration/Spivak: Thesis: In the historiography of the entire colonial period up to the present, uprisings were repeatedly condemned as aimless and unorganized acts of violence and shifted into the criminal terrain. In the absence of any institutional confirmation, it was not possible for the subalterns (see Classes/Gramsci) to represent themselves or to assert their interests. The independence of the resistance fighters was presented as the sole success of the national elite. (1) Solution/Spivak: a narrative of the "story from below", e.g. the project of the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group, see Guha (2).
Brocker I 714
SpivakVs: Spivak again criticizes the construction of a smooth, subversive and resistant subaltern subjectivity that does not exist in this form. Rather, this is still due to the view of a rather classical-Marxist approach. Spivak calls this tendency positivistic. SpivakVsPositivism: Spivak denies the possibility of neither the production of subaltern consciousness or will as a positive presence from the colonial archives.
Problem: the trap consists in an attempt to carry out a Marxist analysis in such a way that the former class struggles are simply replaced by the uprisings of the subalterns. (3)
Problem: with this, the subalterns are again instrumentalized as insurgent agents of socio-political transformation within a bourgeois-humanist model.
Solution/Spivak: instead, this should be about a new focus that is interested in locating and inscribing the heterogeneous subject positions.


1. Vgl. G. Ch. Spivak, IN other Words. Essays in Cultural Politics, New York/London 1988 S. 245.
2. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgery in Colonial India, Delhi 1983.
3. Vgl. Ileana Rodriguez, “Reading Subalterns across Texts, Disciplines and Theories. From Representation to Recognition”, in: I. Rodriguez (Ed.), The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader 2001, S. 5f.


Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolSpiv I
Gayatri Ch. Spivak
Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Law Dworkin Rawls I 349
Laws/rules/Dworkin, R./Rawls: whether our rights and duties as citizens or also rules of the game are connected with moral duties is a question that can be determined independently of the content of these rules. This also applies if the standards used by judges and others to interpret the law remind of or are identical with the principles of law and justice. For example, in a well-ordered society, the two principles of justice (See Principles/Rawls) may be applied by courts to interpret the parts of the Constitution that deal with freedom of thought and consciousness as well as the protection of equal rights (See Ronald Dworkin, "The Model of Rules", University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 35 (1967) esp. pp. 21-29.) Rawls: then there is still a difference between what law dictates and what justice demands. For example, the rule of keeping a promise determined by conventions is not to be confused with the principle of fiduciary duty (which is a special case of the principle of fairness).
I 350
This principle is only hypothetical. All we need is for it to be followed. We assume that a fair practice exists.
Brocker I 595
Law/DworkinVsHart, H. L. A./Dworkin: Hart Thesis: Law and morals form two independent systems of norms. A principle of moral only becomes part of positive law through an ultimately conventional rule of cognition. See Law/Hart: Division of legal rules: a) Rules of action, b) Rules for the creation of rules. (1) Dworkin: Thesis: Any attempt at conceptual definition and description of law inevitably involves us in normative questions of justification.
DworkinVsHart/DworkinVsPositivism/DworkinVsLegalPositivism: law should not be reconstructed as a system of rules. In particular, it cannot be understood as a system of primary and secondary rules (rules via rules). ((s) Background: H. L. A. Hart was influenced by rules of the late Wittgenstein when setting up a system. (See Rules/Hart, Law/Hart).
Jurisprudence/Dworkin: When judges decide on rights and duties, they consider not only rules but also objectives and principles. While objectives such as the promotion of social welfare belong primarily to the level of legislation, principles are particularly relevant at the level of finding justice. (2)
Brocker I 596
Law/DworkinVsHart: 1. law cannot be distinguished from other norms by means of a conventional rule of cognition. There is no such rule. The dispute among lawyers does not even stop at the foundations and limits of law. 2. Law is not logically independent of morality: moral content comes into law in the form of principles. (3)
Brocker I 598
3. Dworkin criticizes the idea of strong judicial discretion as it follows from Hart's rule model.

1. Hart, H. L. A., Der Begriff des Rechts. Mit einem Postskriptum von 1994 und einem Nachwort von Christoph Möllers, Berlin 2011.
2. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 56f.
3. Ibid. p. 304
Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Dworkin I
Ronald Dworkin
Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Legal Positivism Dworkin Brocker I 594
Legal Positivism/DworkinVsLegal Positivism/DworkinVsUtilitarianism/Dworkin:[Legal] positivists and utilitarians are united by their opposition to the idea of natural, morally predetermined rights for the state. Positivists reject them because they attribute all normative facts of the law to social facts such as legislation and judicial further training in law. Utilitarians deny them because their last criterion is the social (overall) benefit. Against both perspectives, Dworkin wants to defend a law-based theory to which his book title refers.
Brocker I 596
Legal Positivism/DworkinVsPositivism/DworkinVsHart, L. H. A.: Dworkin rejects a system of rules like Hart's: see Rules/Hart, Law/Hart: instead, one must distinguish between law and principles. ((s) Thus Dworkin is influenced by Kant). Rules are either valid or not - however, principles can collide without at least one of them having to be invalid. Principles/Dworkin: have a certain weight and indicate in which direction arguments point. (1)
Brocker I 599
DworkinVsPositivism: no description of law is possible that does not include judgmental judgements. For illustration, Dworkin introduces the character of the talented judge Hercules, who knows all the important institutional facts of law and its history, as well as all principles and goals. This allows him to make an accurate assessment of the law in an overall context. Justification/Dworkin: thesis: the justification of law in a matter of best available arguments is substantial in nature. Dworkin therefore sees no problem in the fact that his ideal judge is an isolated hero who apparently interprets the law monologically.
VsDworkin: siehe Michelman 1986 (2), 76; Habermas 1994 (3).
Jurisdiction/Dworkin: Responsible judges, according to Dworkin, do not succumb to the temptation to seek reasons and points of view outside the law just because so far no article of the constitution, no legal text and no explicit judgment provide authoritative information on a difficult case.
Brocker I 600
Legal PositivismVsDworkin: a positivist could argue that Dworkin only wants the American legal system to appear in the most positive light possible, but his approach is unsuitable for giving general assessments of legal systems, such as today's Iranian legal system. Dworkin's approach is unsuitable because it already presupposes that a legal system must embody rational contents such as the idea of individual rights
Brocker I 601
against the state. However, this is not a conceptual characteristic of law, but a fragile and in fact not generally recognised achievement of legal history.

1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, S. 58-64
2. Michelman, Frank I., »The Supreme Court 1985 Term – Foreword. Traces of Self-Government«, in: Harvard Law Review 100/1, 1986, 4-77.
3. Habermas, Jürgen, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt/M. 1994, S. 272-276.


Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Dworkin I
Ronald Dworkin
Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Meaning Putnam I (a) 16
Meaning/Putnam: not in the head: Proof: linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria - ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others) - PutnamVsTarski : understanding of the reference must be added - this must be independent of recognition - (realistic position). ---
I (g) 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning - otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered - positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. ---
I (e) 141ff
Meaning/Putnam: results from the deletion of quotes. >Disquotation. ---
I (k) 258
Term transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Positivism Ayer I 291f
AyerVsPositivism: protocol sentences show no facts - they are never clear - therefore unsuitable as a basis.

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Positivism Black II 203
Protocol Sentence/ BlackVsPositivism: continues to verify - this will never come to an end.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Positivism Fraassen I 3
Logical Positivism/Fraassen: added a linguistic component or a meaning theory and a language theory to empiricism - FraassenVsPositivism - (pro empiricism).
Positivism: however, is right that ontological and epistemic problems are actually linguistic - in particular, modality.
---
I 13f
Positivism/Theory/Observation/Language/Theoretical Terms/Fraassen: Grover MaxwellVsPositivism: distinction theory/observation cannot be drawn. "Theoretical entities"/Fraassen: category error: only terms are theoretical.
1. Can language even be divided in theoretical/non-theoretical?
2. Can objects and events be divided into observable/non-observable?
Maxwell: denies both - Fraassen ditto - also in everyday language there are theoretical terms - observable:
For example, a flying horse is observable - seeing-as: prehistoric men see no tennis ball because they can not see it "as".
---
I 16
Observability/Maxwell/Fraassen: observability is gradual (e.g. by distance).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Positivism Husserl I 108
HusserlVsPositivism: the elimination of the subject removes responsibility and reason. Life world: is the applicable common horizon. From the phenomenological perspective it shows the world not as a series of objects, but as a universal horizon.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Positivism Popper I 116f
Positivism/Popper: understands the problem of demarcation naturalistic, as fixed border - positivist radicalism: the laws of nature are not traceable to elementary experience sets. >Demarcation.
I 117
Wittgenstein: after his criterion of meaning the laws of nature are meaningless, that means no legitimate sentences. PopperVsCarnap: failure to dismiss metaphysics through reviews. Instead, Popper: it has a heuristic value. (E.g. Speculative atomism).
I 127
Log records/Popper: no preferred position. They appear in science only as psychological statements. PopperVsPositivismus: positivism does not wish that there should still be meaningful problems except the problems of "positive" empirical science. He wants to see the so-called philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. That will be always feasible. There is nothing easier to uncover a problem as a pseudo-problem. One only needs to take the concept of "meaning" narrow enough.
---
Flor II 473
PopperVsLogical positivism: Science as a process emphasized more than the characterization of formal traits at theories that are regarded as scientific products.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Positivism Putnam I (a) 41
PutnamVsPopper/PutnamVsMach: VsPositivismus: is idealistic, does not correspond to reality.
I (a) 44
PutnamVsPositivismus: according to him truth is not trans-theoretical - it is only a trans-theoretical concept, "leads to successful prediction" - >Prediction. Putnam: instead: Realism: must adhere to logic of truth transfers. >Realism.
I (a) 45
From the fact that two theories lead to successful predictions, it does not follow, that their conjunction leads to that - reason: the predicate, which plays the role of truth ("leads to prediction") does not have the characteristics of truth.
I (a) 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the significance - otherwise the concept of gravity would change if a 10th Planet would be discovered - also the positivists demand that the theory is also dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the scheme of theory and prediction would collapse. ---
I (h) 215
Truth/Positivism: which degree of confirmation one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose - Putnam: that is relativism - it has no answer to the enemy that says, "in my system the P is not rational". >Rationality/Putnam.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Positivism Wright I 152
Positivism/Wright, G. H.:can be characterized in different ways: a) associated with a phenomenalist or sensualist epistemology; and
b) modern positivism: associated with a verification theory of meaning.
c) associated with a "scientist" and "technological" conception of knowledge and its uses.
Mill: has more of a positivist in the first sense of the word than Comte.
Comte: his positivism is above all science theory (cf. Comte, A., Cours de philosophie positive, Avertissement de l' Auteur, 1830). Comte's ultimate goal was to be an advocate of the "positive" scientific spirit in the study of social phenomena. This was coupled with a strong belief in the usefulness of scientific knowledge for social reforms. (1830, lecon I, 8).
Wright, G. H.: it is perhaps not uninteresting that Comte, as a herald of a technological understanding of knowledge, can be compared to Francis Bacon. Both of them contributed significantly to the creation of a certain "scientistic climate of opinion", but almost nothing at all was contributed to the actual scientific progress. (G. H. von WrightVsBacon, G. H. von WrightVsComte.)
---
I 21
Positivism/VsPositivism/Wright, G. H.: the anti-positivist methodology of the nineteenth century can be associated with an older Aristotelian tradition, a tradition that had been replaced three centuries earlier by a new spirit in science theory, above all by Galileo.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Realism Boyd Horwich I 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: ---
Horw I 493
Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner".
N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation.
Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism.
Ad. 3. Vs:
---
Horw I 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism.
Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth.
---
Horw I 494
Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true.
M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically.
---
Horw I 495
Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically
b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community

M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today.
Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism.
Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths.

Boyd I
Richard Boyd
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Reality Genz II 13
Natural Laws/Weinberg: are as real as chairs.
WeinbergVsPositivism.
Reality/Weinberg: what is not under our control. It is not about reality itself,...
---
II 14
...but the reality of the laws of nature. Genz pro: this is the central thesis of this book. ---
II 115
Reality/Genz: a medium that is present everywhere, but has no measurable velocity, is real, but its reality is not a material one, but a summary of observable effects in the concept of a theory. Such a medium is the > field. ---
II 116
Field/Acceleration/Genz: Acceleration in opposition to the field can be observed. Newton had also assumed this from his empty space, but that would not have been true. The accelerated observer is embedded in a heat radiation that increases with increasing acceleration.
---
II 337
Reality/Terms/Theory/Genz: Thesis: it is the theories that give the terms a reality that expresses itself through correlations of basic sentences. For example, bubble chamber: interprets the electron as the set of properties of a trace of droplets.
Theory: indicates the conditions under which an electron is generated.
Electron: interpolated in the language of theory between basic sentences that are in an if-then context.
Understanding/Genz: this may include the existence of the electron.
---
II 338
But we will never understand elementary particles as we understand macroscopic objects. Elementary particles/Genz: they have properties that macroscopic objects do not have! If electrons were like chairs, they could not have the properties that are characteristic of them.
---
II 339
Reality/Genz: is one of the laws, not an opinion. This reality is not one of the wordings by certain terms, but the interrelationships between base sentences, which imply the laws.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Theoretical Terms Putnam I (a) 48
Theoretical Terms/th.t./PutnamVsPositivism: the theoretical terms do not have different meanings in different theories - the semantic concepts are trans-theoritical - VsCarnap: the purely syntactical positivism cannot express that a formal language is successful when they correspond to a reasonable degree of probability to situations.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Theories Putnam VI 389
Theory/Putnam: earlier theories are limiting cases of later theories. - This is convergence. - That explains also why theoretical terms retain their reference.
VI 392
Ideal Theory/Putnam: if we can see the fulfillment-relation as unintended, it is useless to say that even the ideal theory "in reality" could be wrong. ---
I (a) 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the meaning. - Otherwise, the term gravity would change if a 10th planet was discovered. - In addition, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse.
I (b) 63
Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference.
I (c) 97
Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Verstehen (Sociology) Habermas IV 183
Verstehen/Weber/Habermas: (WeberVsPositivism SimmelVsPositivism) Habermas: The lifeworld term common in Verstehen follows everyday concepts, which initially only serve the narrative representation of historical events and social conditions. HabermasVsVerstehen: The investigation of the functions that communicative action takes over for the preservation of a structurally differentiated life world is detached from this horizon.
Solution/Habermas: methodical differentiation of system and environment.
IV 223
Verstehen/Habermas: when a "Verstehen" allows society to merge into the lifeworld, it binds itself to the perspective of the self-interpretation of the culture examined in each case; this internal perspective hides everything that (...) has an effect from the outside. A) In particular, approaches based on a culturalist concept of the lifeworld become entangled in the misconceptions of "hermeneutic idealism" (this term originates from A. Wellmer).
B) Its downside is a methodical descriptivism that denies itself justified claims with regard to explainability. (1)
C) This applies above all to the phenomenological, linguistic and ethnomethodological variants of Verstehen, which generally do not go beyond the reformulations of a more or less trivial everyday knowledge. (HabermasVsVerstehen).


1.J. Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt 1970.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Boyd, R. Putnam Vs Boyd, R. Williams II 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far:
Williams II 493
Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way".
Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation.
Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here.
Ad. 3) Vs:
Williams II 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism.
Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept.

Putnam I (c) 80
Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976).
Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer
(2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises).
I (c) 81
Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained.
Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true.
Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case.
PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1!
I (c) 82
Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether.
With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference.
I (c) 85/86
Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations:
I (c) 86
Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements:
p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable

"~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p).

"p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q

"p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this).
I (c) 87
Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement.
Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all.
We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically:
~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist)
u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist)
p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist)
p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist)
So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.)
The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)).
E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false.
Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Carnap, R. Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. Skirbekk I 16
Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence.
Carnap VI 177
Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified!
VI 178
Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy".
VI 181
GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all.
But these laws are of a much more complicated form.
VI 71
Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself.
Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical.
(s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger.
VI 72
A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity.
VI 78/79
Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour).
(BergsonVsCarnap).





Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
Carnap, R. Stegmüller Vs Carnap, R. Stegmüller IV 342
StegmüllerVsPositivism: because of the laws of nature contained in the statements, statements by natural scientists cannot be verified!
IV 343
Planning must also be based on assumptions that are not verifiable at the moment of planning. Criteria/sense criterion/Theology/VsCarnap/Stegmüller: instead of a questionable criterion of meaning, we have to look at the definitions of God and ask whether our intuitive prior understanding is sufficient.
Theologians make claims of validity independent of criteria of meaning.
Example: an incorporeal person can at least be thought of!
Example: likewise that something was created from nothing does not represent mental difficulties!
IV 344
For example a problem forms only the concept of the necessary being.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Kant Vollmer Vs Kant I 25
VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity!
I 84
Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms.
Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences.
I 103
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge.
He cannot answer the following questions:
How are our categories created?
Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories?
Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others?
Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems:
Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution?
Why can we understand each other?
How is intersubjective knowledge possible?
Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!)
Can they be scientifically justified?
I 193
Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible.
I 196
Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false).
For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws.
I 197
Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to
a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes.
2. Anticipations of Perception
a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes
3. Analogies of Experience
a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances.
4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions).
I 199
VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs).
Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause!
Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs).
Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation.
Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine.
Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them.
VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact.
Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE.
EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct.
2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success.
Kant does not make this distinction.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm.
I 304
Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer).
I 305
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena.
I 306
Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized!
II 48
Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Positivism Austin Vs Positivism Husted III 247
Logical positivism/Language: Language has only two functions 1) means to describe reality, 2) means to express feelings, preferences, evaluation etc. (emotive, descriptive). AustinVsPositivism: speech acts are useful, but cannot be attributed to either of the two categories.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Positivism Danto Vs Positivism I 142
DantoVspositivism: what made him fail is that theory and observation is nowhere so sharply and clean divided, as he claimed. Observations are saturated by theory. All perception is guided by theory. (> Duhem).

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Positivism Fodor Vs Positivism II 107
Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages ​​can be constructed so that they have any desired property.
II 108
When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem.
II 109
Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica. This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic.
II 110
FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply.
II 112
Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, ​​semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally.
II 113
Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously.
II 117
Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before.
Fodor/Lepore IV 49
Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Positivism Husserl Vs Positivism I 108
HusserlVspositivism: elimination of the subject removes responsibility and reason.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Positivism Putnam Vs Positivism Fraassen I 83
Conjunction/theory/science/unified science/Fraassen: Problem: "conjunction-objection" (first probably by Putnam): a conjunction of theories must receive truth, but not empirical adequacy.
Fraassen I 222 FN 5
Conjunction/theories/Putnam: his "conjunction-objection" was an argument for that there is no positivist substitute for the notion of truth. (Reference and understanding, 1978). In another context: Putnam: This argument states that an approach that says that what we are looking for is a kind of acceptability, without the property of deductive unity (deductive closure) to not meet the standards of scientific practice.
Fraassen I 83
Two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate for themselves. Putnam: this is what the anti-realism needs to take.
Fraassen: it depends on a logical point with regard to truth and adequacy, which needs to be clarified:
Problem: in the scientific practice the conjunction of two believed (accepted) theories does not need to be believed (accepted). E.g. the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory.
Fraassen I 84
could not be put in accordance with the special theory of relativity (SR). One is a correction of the other. Conjunction/logic: of theories. A theory is a corpus of sentences. Each assertion (statement) A can be regarded as little theory, and there is a family of models F(A) in which A is true.
F(T): the family of models in which the theory T is true, consists of precisely these models that exist to F(A) for every statement A, which are part of T.
Definition logic/Fraassen: is the study of the functions that lead from statement (premises) to statements (conclusions) and receive truth.
Truth/theory/Fraassen: because of the intimate relationship between the truth of a theory and the truth of their sentences, the sentence logic, which we all love, leads to a logic of theories.
Truth/Fraassen: is (as opposed to empirical adequacy) no global property of theories ((s) not all sentences must be true. Question: But has the theory as a whole to be empirically adequate?).
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: contrast is (unlike truth) a global property of theories. That is, there is no general pattern of statements (statements) so that when all statements (propositions) of the theory each have this characteristic in themselves, then the theory is empirically adequate.
This can only be explained by the fact that theories are families of models, of which each has a particular family of substructures that correspond to possible phenomena (empirical substructures).
Problem: because empirical meaning (empirical import) of a theory cannot be syntactically isolated, we need to define empirical adequacy directly without empirical detour.
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen. Therefore, it makes no sense to ask about the empirical adequacy of individual statements, or about a logic of syntactical features of premises to conclusions that include empirical adequacy.
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: from a single statement it can only be determined in relation to a theory: contains F(A) at least one of the models,
Fraassen I 85
which has this privileged status in the world? Problem: unlike with the truth, here the answer "yes" can be in relation to a theory and "no" in relation to another theory.
---
Putnam I (a) 46
PutnamVsPositivism: one can easily construct a positivist theory that leads to successful predictions that no scientist could accept. ---
I (c) 78
RealismVsPositivism: must leave it unexplained, that "electron calculi", "spacetime calculi" and "DNA calculi" correctly predict observable phenomena when there are no electrons, curved spacetime and no DNA molecules in reality.
I (c) 79
The positivist has as a reply reductionist theories and theories of explanation, etc. ---
I (h) 215
Truth/Positivism: what definition of "degree of confirmation" one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose.
I (h) 216
Ultimately, then, it is completely subjective. ((s) But not yet, when purposes are social). PutnamVsPositivism: so it ends as relativism. He can only avoid deductive inconsistency by agreeing that judgements are not rational.
He has no response to the philosopher who says:
VsPositivism: "I know what you mean, but positivism is not rational in my system."

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Positivism Loar Vs Positivism Avramides I 137
Attribution/Propositional Attitude/Theory/Loar: Thesis: the epistemology of attribution of belief and desire must be separated from its explanation. LoarVsPositivism: without the separation one succumbs to the errors of positivism, phenomenalism, behaviorism and semantic instrumentalism in relation to science. (Loar 1981 p.128).
LoarVsPositivism/Avramides: his mistake: to try to formulate truth conditions in terms of document conditions.
AvramidesVsLoar: Thesis: now "a priori constitutive connections between attribution of attitudes (propositional attitudes) and language behavior" are exactly what I propose. (Loar 1981 p.128).
In addition, I have proposed not to separate precisely between the epistemology of the attribution of desires and beliefs from their explanation. ((s) Well, so not after all!).
Do I now fall into the "positivist trap" of Loar? I do not think so.
AvramidesVsLoar: his mistake is to think that only positivism can combine an approach to psychology with semantics.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Positivism Apel Vs Positivism Danto II 315
K. O. Apel/Lübke: language-pragmatic criticism of positivism. ApelVsPositivism.

Ape I
K. O. Apel
Transformation der Philosophie: Band I. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik Frankfurt/M. 1994

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Positivism Stegmüller Vs Positivism Stegmüller IV 342
StegmüllerVsPositivism: because of the laws of nature contained in the statements, statements by natural scientists cannot be verified!
IV 343
Planning must also be based on assumptions that cannot be verified at the planning stage. (>plan, planning).

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Positivism Versus Fodor II 103
FodorVsPositivism: (formal language basic) ingored linguistics - FodorVsOxford: ingored linguistics

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Empiricism Pro Fraassen I 13
Fraassen: FrassenVsPositivism - Fraassen per empiricism - I 10 - Fraassen per anti-realism: a good theory need not be literally true.
I 20
FraassenVsBest Explanation.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Idealism Pro Horwich I 492
Idealism: per: Kuhn: the scientific community states the simple facts - KuhnVsPositivism)

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Positivism Versus Quine XII 10
QuineVsPositivism - Quine: per more radical empiricism - instead VsLogical Empiricism: no analytic truths.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Empiricism, Logical Versus Quine2 XII 10
QuineVsPositivism - Quine: per more radical empiricism - but VsLogical Empiricism: no analytic truths.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Positivism Fraassen, B. van I 3
Empiricism / Fraassen: per empiricism, but not in the linguistic form of the positivists.
FraassenVsPositivism.
I 11
Positivism: (thesis: the meaning of the theoretical terms stzems from the observable) that matches in the observational consequences with empiricism.
Idealism Kuhn, Th. Horwich I 492
Positivism / theory: the observation language must be theory-neutral. Likewise, the methodological principles.   IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory-neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community fixes the "facts".

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Two Dogmas Quine, W.V.O. EMD II 111
Two Dogma"s/Quine/Dummett: These wesentlich verifikationistischer Ansatz, VsPositivismus: die Verifikation eines Satzes kann nicht als bloßes Vorkommnis eine Folge von Sinnausdrücken verstanden werden. Eine solche Repräsentation ist nur annähernd korrekt für eine beschränkte Klasse von Sätzen an der Peripherie. Alle anderen Sätze involvieren Inferenzen, im Grenzfall der mathematischen Sätze nichts als Inferenzen. Bedeutung: für nichtï·"periphere Sätze ist das Erfassen der Bedeutung nicht die Fähigkeit zu erkenne, was sie verifiziert, sondern ein Erfassen der inferentiellen Beziehungen mit anderen Sätzen.
Fod/Lep IV 37
Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: These unsere Aussagen stehen nicht einzeln, sondern als Gesamtkorpus vor dem Tribunal der Erfahrung. - IV 39 TD: These man kann einen nicht-reduktionistischen Pragmatismus haben. (Fodor/Lepore: das ist eins der so überraschenden Dinge in TD).

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Observability Maxwell, G. Fraassen I 14
Grover MaxwellVsCarnap/MaxwellVsPositivismus: (1962 -žThe Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities-œ): (locus classicus): These die Unterscheidung Theorie/Beobachtung kann nicht gezogen werden.
I 17
Beobachtbarkeit/Maxwell: These es gibt nichts prinzipiell unbeobachtbares, weil ich Elektronenaugen hätte haben können (>MöWe)

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980