Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes Help us establish new Lexicons of Arguments
Psychology - Economics
History - Politics
Law - Social Sciences
Art Theory - Others

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 43 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Common Sense Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Danto III 95
Common Sense/Nietzsche/Danto: for Nietzsche, the common sense itself is an interpretation and nothing that is opposed to interpretations. The common sense is metaphysics that has become everyday for him, (...) a fantasy of error and misbelief, (...) without the slightest concordance with reality. But: ---
Danto III 96
NietzscheVsParmenides/NietzscheVsPlato/Danto: Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 844). In the interests of life, we are forced to approve the common sense as set of beliefs and to reject all that is at odds with it.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Conceptualism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VII 125
ConceptualismVsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries - Problem: Poincaré's "impredicative" definition: Definition impredicative definition/Poincaré: the specification of a class through a realm of objects, within which that class is located. (R3: had been set up to avoid this problem)

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Dialectic Hegel
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 75
Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality. Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention.
      It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it.
---
I 76
Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind. Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection.
---
I 77
HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance.       This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony.
"General irony of the world".
---
Wright I 21
Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections. ---
Wright I 154
G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Dialectic Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. ---
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Definition "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
---
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
---
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.

Essence Hobbes
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 245
Essence/Appearance/HobbesVsPlato/Hobbes/Adorno: the relationship of essence and appearance is reversed in opposition to the Platonic tradition: what is appearance there, becomes essence, namely, the body world, and vice versa, that which is essence there, becomes appearance, namely the way of the mental conception, or even mental activity.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Forms Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 51
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his strategy is to postulate a single entity, along with a variety of relationships between individuals and that entity. ((s) Relation: participation, entity: form). On the other hand, another approach would be:
VsPlato: to assume many different properties instead of a variable relation, each for a quantity: e.g. the property to have a weight of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach facilitates many things that are difficult to explain for Plato: he shows what distinguishes objects (whereas Plato rather shows what they have in common). This is because the different masses do not overlap here.
PlatoVsVs: Problem: the new approach does not show what the objects have in common.
(>Determinates, determinables).

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Generality Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical exercise of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of general statements and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? The concrete individual is always familiar to us from the sensory experience. But the general?
Generality/Knowledge/AristotelesVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the general comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. They derive from induction and are to be intuitively understood.

Good Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner, I, 164
Good/Something Good/Aristotle/Bubner: one of the most difficult problems: what role does good play in his metaphysics, practical or metaphysical good?
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes:
1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Something Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of the good as the highest: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "holy". No practical benefit is to be achieved with the idealization of good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of activities of all kind.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.

Practice/Aristotle: No action is done for its own sake, with the exception of the game.
(s) Then victory is one step outside of the game.
Aristotle: otherwise, the goals would hinder the flow of practice only by virtue of their plurality through competition, blockades, undecidable alternatives, etc.. An order becomes necessary.
No for-the-sake-of-which is isolated, it rather points to a bigger one. The hierarchy, however, would be in vain if there was not a supreme good, which in turn can still be realized in practice.
I 166
The Highest Good/Aristotle: the unity of a successful life. All the actors agree, because everyone wants to be happy. Of course this is interpreted differently.
      Lust, honor, money are external determinations.
      The sovereign form, on the other hand, lies in the philosophical way of life, i.e. in enlightened self-reflective practice.
Thus the problem of the highest knowledge posed by Plato, which legitimates the rule of the philosophers' king, is solved.

Good Hegel
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 182
Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of ​​the good under the caption of the idea of ​​"recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand.
I 184
Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of ​recognition", which in its turn is split into the
"idea of ​​truth" and the
      "idea of ​​the good".
      Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of ​​the good" in practical action.
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience".

I 185
Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it.
I 186
Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good.
      The executed good would be the abolition of otherness.
With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed.
Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of ​​truth and the idea of ​​good is abolished.
Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality.
After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection.
I 187
Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression!

Idealism Kant
 
Books on Amazon
Strawson V 211
Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. - StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. - And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. - N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. ---
Stra V 213
Definition Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) ---
Stra V222
Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. - StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". ---
Stroud I 129f
Definition Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. ---
Stroud I 130
Definition Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. - KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. ---
Adorno XIII 58
Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. In this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Ries II 27
Idealism/NietzscheVsIdealism/NietzscheVsSokrates, VsPlato: VsEquation Reason = Being.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
Ideas Epicurus
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 229
Ideas/EpicurusVsPlato/Epicurus/Adorno: also this is one of the great discoveries of Epicurean philosophy, although we can scarcely trace it back clearly to its sources: it has probably given an account of it - and this is, in turn, very antiplatonic - that there is no idea in which there are no traces of the sensual. From this also follows in ethics the specifically materialistic element of Epicurus.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Individuals Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Danto III 173
Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy, where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... ---
Danto III 174
... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules.
Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial".
NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,...
---
Danto III 175
...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Interpretation Benacerraf
 
Books on Amazon:
Paul Benacerraf
Field I 22
Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965) Thesis: Identification of mathematical objects with others is arbitrary - E.g. numbers with quantities. - E.g. real numbers with Dedekind cuts, Cauchy sequences, etc. - There is no fact that decides which is the right one. - Field ditto.
I 22
Indeterminacy of reference/Field: is not a problem, but commonplace.
I 25
For Benacerraf it is about identity, not about reference - otherwise he might falsely be refuted with primitive reference: "Numbers" refers to numbers but not to quantities - But that is irrelevant.
I 25
BenacerraffVsPlatonism: locus classicus - VsBenacerraf: based on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
Field I 25
BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): if without localization and interaction we cannot know whether they exist. VsBenacerraf: indispensability argument.

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984


Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Knowledge Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 118
Knowledge/Aristotle: the knowledge available outside of scientific evidence establishes the connection of science theory with general ontology.
I 119
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and Epagogé (nowadays controversial whether to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantifications and individual cases. In Aristotle, no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
I 149
Knowledge/Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: to know truly and definitively requires the certainty that the knowledge has come to its full extent, by even recognizing that which explains already existing knowledge. Such certainty cannot be determined from outside, it must be found in knowledge itself.

Knowledge Newell, A./Simon, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Allen Newell/Herbert A. Simon Computerwissenschaft als empirische Forschung (1976) in Dieter Münch (Ed.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

I 74
Knowledge/Search/Recognition/Menon/Socrates: How do you want to search that of what you do not know what it is? And if you find it, how do you recognize that it is what you did not know?
Solution/Plato: The Famous Theory of Recollection.

Knowledge/Finding/Recognizing/Newell/SimonVsPlato: today much easier explanation: to represent a problem means,
1. a test for a class of symbol structures (solutions) and
2. a method for generating symbol structures.

Why do we not immediately produce an expression that describes the solution? We do that when we wish and dream.
But: knowing how we would test something if we had it does not mean we know how it is developed.
There are move procedures, but there is no procedure for winning moves.
There must be a problem area prior to the move process.
Definition moves/move/Newell/Simon: moves are transformations of problem area situations.
Symbolic systems: they guarantee that they can represent problem areas and have move procedures.

Knowledge Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 35
Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object.
   The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good).
Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason).
Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine.
The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic).
---
119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge.

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
V 99ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein - VsPlatonism (universals) - pro nominalism (Vs Properties in themselves).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Language Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 323
Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship, is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language. ---
Horwich I 457
Language/Putnam: if only noise, then nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. - Instead: Correctness: makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities. ---
Putnam III 124
Language/intensional/Davidson: E.g. the new Minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. - How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? - The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. - Similarly to the use of color predicates.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Mathematics Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Thiel I 23 ff
Mathematics/Tradition/Thiel: Aristotle, Kant and Plato accept an object, an area of mathematics. More important to them is the question of how the human behaves in relation to this object. Differentiation invent/discover/Plato: Euthydemos: geometers, arithmetic artists and astronomers are like hunters, they are exploring what is already there.
---
I 24
AristotleVsPlato: he had joined the Kratylos and Heraclitus inasmuch as there could be no science of the sensible after him, since everything was in flux. Thus, objects cannot even be defined. Plato: There are always many of the same kind of the mathematical objects, while the idea is always only one.
Thiel: one may think of the four-time appearance of the isosceles triangle in the square.
---
I 25
Aristotle's Plato: denies an existence of the mathematical objects independent of the bodies. They exist on or in objects and can be isolated by abstraction. Mathematical objects are not themselves concrete, real objects. But they also have no "separated being". Each number is always only number of something.


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Mathematics Thiel
 
Books on Amazon
Thiel I 10
Mathematik/Gegenstand/Thiel: Der Gegenstand fällt nicht mit der Frage "Was ist Mathematik?" zusammen. Denn bei letzterem geht es über die Art zu denken.
I 13
Alte Definitionen von "Mathematik" 19. Jahrhundert: sie sei "letzten Endes" Wissenschaft von den Zahlen. Mathematik/Bolzano: sie sei die Wissenschaft von den Größen.
20. Jahrhundert Paul Lorenzen (1962) "im Wesentlichen nichts anderes als die Theorie des Unendlichen selbst." auch Weyl, 1926
Dritte Auffassung: Empiristen: sie haben Schwierigkeiten mit der Unendlichkeit. Im strengen Sinn im 20. Jahrhundert nicht mehr so vertreten. Es wird Geltung zugestanden, Gehalt freilich abgesprochen.
Thiel I 23 ff
Mathematik/Tradition/Thiel: Aristoteles, Kant und Platon nehmen einen Gegenstand, einen Bereich der Mathematik an. Wichtiger erscheint ihnen die Frage, wie sich der Mensch dazu verhält. Unterscheidung Erfinden/Entdecken. Platon: Euthydemos: Geometer, Rechenkünstler und Astronomen sind wie Jäger, sie erforschen, was schon da ist.
I 24
AristotelesVsPlaton: dieser habe sich dem Kratylos und dem Heraklit insofern angeschlossen, als es auch nach ihm keine Wissenschaft vom Sinnlichen geben könne, da alles im Fluss sei. So sei von Gegenständen nicht mal eine Definition möglich. Platon: von den mathematischen Ggst. gibt es stets viele der gleichen Art, während die Idee jeweils immer nur eine ist.
Thiel: man wird an das viermalige Auftreten des gleichschenkligen Dreiecks im Quadrat denken dürfen.
I 25
AristotelesVsPlaton: leugnet eine von den Körperdingen unabhängige Existenz der mathematischen Gegenstände. Sie existieren an oder in Gegenständen und sind durch Abstraktion isolierbar. Mathematische Gegenstände sind. nicht selbst konkrete, wirkliche Gegenstände. Sie haben aber auch kein "abgetrenntes Sein". Jede Zahl immer nur Zahl von etwas.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Memory Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 153
Memory/Pinker: thoughts are not stored as a whole, but composed of terms. ---
I 157
Not every statement can be assigned to a memory space: too much energy loss. ---
I 158
Memory/Pinker: 1. "episodic" or autobiographical, 2. "semantic" or general knowledge memory - wired according to different patterns. ---
I 177
Memory/Pinker: not sound chains but delimited words are stored. ---
I 180
PinkerVsPlaton: no impression in wax, no "resistance" - there are indelible memories.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Nominalism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Nominalism Adorno
 
Books on Amazon
XII 107
Nominalism/Adorno: Prehistory: Aristotle's critique of Plato. Concept/Plato/Adorno: for Plato, the concepts were independent and being-in-itself and indestructible and eternal, namely, the ideas.
AristotelesVsPlato/Adorno: these concepts should instead be mediated and fulfilled with concrete and factual.
Kant/Adorno: he has also transferred this critical motive to the concept of God in opposition to the reification.
---
XIII 56
Nominalism/Adorno: Nominalism is the view, which in principle views the concepts as abbreviations of the matters covered by them, and denies the concepts - in any case tendentially - the independence against what they contain among themselves. This western view belongs to Kant himself. In the consequence of nominalism, the subjective moment of the concept of idea prevails.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Numbers Black
 
Books on Amazon
II 125
Numerals/ Numbers/ names / Black: unlike names for physical objects: E.g. "two people came in" here "two", is an adverb - it can be transformed into "another and another" - that s not possible for "red" - BlackVsFrege: the shows that numbers are no special objects - BlackVsPlatonism

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Philosophy Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 49
Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Danto: cannot capture any states of affairs - as opposed to science - there are no philosophical states of affairs - hence their sentences cannot be true or false. ---
Hintikka I 51
WittgensteinVsPlato: his thesis of the scientific collection of forms is precisely the confusion between science and philosophy. ---
Apropos Wittgenstein II 95
Philosophy/Wittgenstein: is no field of competing theories.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Philosophy Dewey
 
Books on Amazon
Suhr I 38
Definition Philosophy/Dewey: the reflection on what the knowledge requires of us. Knowledge requires thinking not contemplation. ---
Suhr I 153
Philosophy/Dewey: The philosophical fallacy: the fallacy is the denial of uncertainty and danger to what the philosophers declare as true reality, and the shifting from all that means danger into a world of pretense. (DeweyVsPlaton). Thus, from what is actually the object of an action, becomes a prior reality: the good becomes an in-itself! (Coincidence with Nietzsche: Twilight of the Idols).
---
Suhr I 154
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: 1. The true world is attainable for the wise.
2. The true world is unattainable for now, but promised f+ the wise, the virtuous, the pious (reward).
3. The true world is unattainable, unprovable, not promisable, already thought as comfort.
4. Is the real world unattainable? In any case, it is unattained.
(Gray morning, first yawning).
5. The "true world" is an idea that is not useful for anything. Bright day
6. The true world is abolished (noon, moment of the shortest shadow, end of the longest error, climax of humanity, INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Dew I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Platonism Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 8
Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics.
---
I 14
FieldVsPlatonism: has to answer the fictionalist in his language - cannot rely on his "initial plausibility". ---
I 152
Definition Priority thesis/PT/Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. - Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. - Definition Gödelian Platonism/Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation - FregeVsGödel - WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. ---
I 153
Definition weak Priority thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. ---
l 159
Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. ---
I 186
Definition Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. - Definition Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. ---
l 189
Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. ---
I 192
Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects. ---
II 332
Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. ---
II 334
Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. ---
III 31
Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? ---
III 90
Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. ---
III 96
1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of power quantifiers).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Politics Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 176
Politics/Aristotle: as long as man lives together with others, he cannot concentrate on the idle show, but must choose the "second best way" of the political actor.
I 179
Practice/Aristotle: must perform an ordering performance within the contingency. The objective is never given, but must be actively introduced into the practical situation.
      The possibilities for action must be structured.
Def Prohairesis/Aristotle: the selection of the most appropriate means.
Politics/Aristotle: Politics only means realizing on a large scale what every concrete process of action already performs in the small scale.
I 188
Politics/Zoon Politikon/Aristotle: this property is attributed to man because of his speech! Political institutions are to be understood from an ethics point of view.
Politics is not simply a ruling order, (VsPlato) with a good ruler like in Hobbes or Max Weber.
The ruler is not a large-scale housekeeper.
A common goal is to be investigated.
Politics/Aristotle: Starting point: village, which does not only exist due to everyday life needs.
      In the polis, the character of "self-sufficiency" replaces the elementary natural conditionality.
Objective: Eudaimonia, the "good life", in this highest of all objectives, the practice structure returns, as it were, reflexively to itself.
Problem: Contradictory towards the natural: on the one hand, the essence of practice as a goal has been politically entered into its own telos, and this legitimates talk of man as a political entity by nature.
On the other hand, the natural conditions have been overcome thanks to a self-sufficient practice.
Nothing but practice itself, no nature defines the good. This self-determination means freedom.


Properties Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 60
Name/property/relation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the names of properties and relations are themselves properties and relations - the number of the names must be the same as that of the objects - ((s)> not enough names ...) ---
I 207
Properties/object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the properties, without which an object could not exist, may not be attributed in a description of the object - ((s) elsewhere/other author: one must be able to abstract from properties.) ---
II 189
Properties/WittgensteinVsPlaton: Looks for constituents of a mixture, such as if the properties would be constituents of things. ---
II 285
Properties/Notation/Wittgenstein: one could e.g. characterize all objects in the room on how far they differ from a chair - this is not a statement about the objects, but about the grammar - ((s)> Chisholm: "to live opposite from Schmidt": no property.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Quantities Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
Quantities/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: with them we are going to refer to the core area of metaphysics. Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: emerge from the confrontation that certain things can be something and something else at the same time. That is only a superficial contradiction.
Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example:
a) two things are equal by both having a mass.
b) they differ at the same time because they have different masses.
Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities.
Solution/Plato: Participation in forms. Allows gradual treatment.
We are a moving a little away from Plato.
Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and vary the relation between this entity and the individuals who own it.
---
I 50
The entity explains what individuals have in common. The relation explains the different degrees. Nominalism/Berkeley/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is Berkeley's nominalism: a platonic, abstract form is replaced by a special individual, a "paradigm". (Terminology).
Commonality: individuals have commonality when they resemble the same paradigm.
Similarity: is, of course, also gradual, like gradual participation in forms in Plato.
Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual.
Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual).
Problem: Degrees of a relation.
Solution: Similarity and participation are an attempt.
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is wrong.
BigelowVsPlato: it does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of quantity).
---
I 264
Quantities/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Question: What should we allow as basic equipment? Forces, for sure. Thesis: there are essential connections between fundamental forces and the fundamental causal relation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must therefore also be part of the basic equipment of our world.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Reality Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
I 217f
Matter / material world / outer world / reality / reality / Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality! - I 232 involuntary perception is a moment of reality.
Danto I 202
LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared.
I 202
Berkeley - Schopenhauer: only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents.
  I 206
World / reality / Berkeley / Danto: there is nothing but ideas - but we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. - BerkeleyVsPlaton: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science / Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Reality Deutsch
 
Books on Amazon
I 105
Kriterium für Wirklichkeit: etwas, dass zurückstoßen kann, existiert. Aber auch Dr. Johnson und stieß nicht direkt gegen den Stein. Er stieß nur einige Nerven an usw.
I 107
Def Wirklichkeit/Deutsch: wenn eine Größe nach der einfachsten Erklärung komplex und autonom ist, dann ist sie wirklich.
I 111
Theorie: je fundamentaler eine Theorie ist, desto umfassender sind die Beobachtungen, die für sie eine Rolle spielen. Die physikalische Wirklichkeit ist also in mehrfacher Weise selbstähnlich. Schließlich muss nicht alles, was wirklich ist, leicht zu identifizieren sein.
I 119
Simulation:Ein Wirklichkeitssimulator vermittelt dem Rezipienten indirekt sowohl interne als auch externe Erfahrungen, aber er lässt sich nicht so programmieren, dass er eine bestimmte interne Erfahrung simuliert. Roulette-Bsp .Tennis-Bsp.-Rahmenbedingungen festgelegt, Spielverlauf muß offen sein.Das setzt voraus, dass die abstrakten Gesetze selbst und nicht nur ihre Vorhersagekraft in der virtuellen Realität simuliert werden können.
I 190
Leben = Simulation: beide Verkörperung von Theorien über die Umwelt Was nur in den Gesetzen der klass. Physik vorkommt, existiert nicht in der Wirklichkeit.
Echte Wirbelstürme und Schmetterlinge gehorchen den Gesetzen der Quantentheorie, nicht denen der klassischen Mechanik!
I 225/26
Platons scheinbare Widerlegung, dass die Methoden der Naturwissenschaft zu mathematische Wahrheit führen könnten: wir können nichts über vollkommene Kreise wissen, weil wir nur zu unvollkommenen Kreisen Zugang haben. DeutschVsPlaton: dann könnten wir auch nur ungenaue Werkzeugmaschinen bauen, weil man die ersten mit ungenauen Werkzeugen bauen lässt. Also gäbe es keine Möglichkeit der Selbstkorrektur.

Deu I
D. Deutsch
Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000

Relation-Theory Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 55
Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big.
Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here.
Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations.
Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves.
---
I 56
Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects.
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves.
BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways.
---
I 57
Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all?
Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained.
Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur.
Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level.
2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things?
Ad 1. Example Mass
Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). ---
I 58
Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". Entailment/N.B.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity.
Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete.
Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others.
Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2.
Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things.
It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume.
For example, compare the pairs
"a, b"
"c, d"
"e, f"
between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length.
Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs.
---
I 59
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities).
Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components
(1) Individuals
(2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes:
Mass/Volume/Proportions/N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other.
Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another.
Level 1: Objects
Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level.
Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg.
N.B.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc.
Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet...
---
I 60
...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField).
Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941, 1966) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic")
Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit.
Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato.
---
I 61
Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example.
Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings.
Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,...
---
I 62
...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations.
BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels).
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Relativism Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Horwich I 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. ---
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. ---
I 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Religious Belief Epicurus
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 222
Religious Belief/Epicurus/Adorno: Epicurus gives the reason that the universality of their assumption speaks for the existence of God. The reduction of the objective concept of truth to subjective opinion in this already neutralized, compliant, late-Greek consciousness forces Epicurus to join the general ruling more or less in a conformist way. EpicurusVsPlato/Adorno: if there is no longer an objective concept of reason - as the Platonic has prototypically shaped it - the average value of belief is very easily hypostatized instead.
This is found in the Hobbesian form of materialism, in which religion is recommended as a state-preserving means, that is, as a for-another, and not as an in-itself.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Science Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty II 65
Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality - Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. ---
Figal I 107f
Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hei I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Science Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively.
I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..."
Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries.
Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively.
I 147
Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization.
The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge.

Sophism Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: uses the same reasons to plead the incompleteness of dialectic, precisely because it has to do with the intersubjective speech practise. ---
I 42
PlatoVsSophists: unmethodic. ---
Bubner I 98
Sophism/Plato/Bubner: also the sophist cannot easily be disproved by empirical comparison. Its speeches must be examined to see if its terms match. ((s)> coherence theory).

Subjects Hegel
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 184
Subject/object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of cognition, Hegel determines the subject/object relationship on two sides: theory and practice. (Following AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "Radical separation of reason from experience". ---
I 185
Subject/object/antiquity/Bubner: the whole ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing of this at all.

Unconscious Freud
 
Books on Amazon
Searle I 197
Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. ---
Rorty V 47
Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational).
2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged.
---
V 47/48
Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I.
---
V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. ---
V 61
Definition Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Universals Armstrong
 
Books on Amazon
III 82
Universals/Armstrong: must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world - false: to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs) - what universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined - but a posteriori: from discovery - no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones.
III 88
Stages/Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G) - 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation) - 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: his e.g. with a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uiU necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U (s) because of simple emerging properties) - Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances - the kind of "property" has an instance - Place pro universals in this sense. (so.)
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.
II 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single U instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together - but it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy - solution: thesis of truth maker is the individual instantiation itself -> 96 II, II 102.
II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
II 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical U is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Universe Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 104
Universe/Classes/Sets/Model/"all"/Field: as the universe of all classes is too large to form a countable model, it is too big to form a class and therefore too large, to form any (over-countable) model. ---
II 335
Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "There's only one universe") - Problem: /PutnamVsPlatonism: How can we make it at all possible to pick out the "full" (universal) universe and to make it face a partial universe, and accordingly the standard-element-relation in contrast to a non-standard-element-relation? (Putnam 1980) - Putnam: Thesis: we cannot do that - i.e. that the "incomplete content" of the concepts "quantity" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all set theoretical theorems.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


The author or concept searched is found in the following 43 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Benacerraf, P. Field Vs Benacerraf, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 24
VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself.
I 25
Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities.
I 26
Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I ​​I understand Benacerraf).
I 27
VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7).
I 29
Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Benacerraf, P. Lewis Vs Benacerraf, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 231
Example (2) if most mathematicians accept "p" as an axiom, then p.
I 232
VsPlatonism: he has a problem if he cannot explain (2). This is a reformulation of the famous problem of Benacerraf in "Mathematical truth". (see above). (>Benacerraf here departs from a causal theory of truth).
Field: our current approach does not depend on that, though.
I 233
Knowledge/Mathematics/Field: our approach does not depend on the givenness of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Instead: Reliability Theory/Knowledge/Field: the view that we should be skeptical if the reliability of our knowledge is not explainable in principle.
Mathematics/LewisVsBenacerraf: (Lewis, 1986, p.111 12): Benacerraf's case is not a problem for mathematics because most mathematical facts necessarily apply.
Reliability Theory/Lewis: then we also need an explanation of the reliable relationship, e.g., between facts about electrons and our "electron" belief states and we even have them! In this case, it is the causal approach, according to which the "electron" beliefs counterfactually (>counterfactual conditionals, counterfactual conditional) depend on the existence and nature of electrons.
Explanation/Lewis: now it's precisely the contingent existence and nature of electrons, which makes the question of their existence and nature meaningful.
Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on non-contingent things. E.g. nothing can counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. Nothing meaningful can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist.
Stalnaker I 41
Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of general semantics. We should interpret existence statements about numbers, functions and sets with the same truth-conditional semantics as propositions about tables, quarks, etc.
I 42
Knowledge/Mathematics/Reality/Stalnaker: On the other hand, we should also expect that the access to our mathematical knowledge is continuous to the to everyday knowledge. The procedures by which we evaluate and justify mathematical statements should be explained by a general approach to knowledge, together with a representation of mathematical knowledge. Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Thesis: he gives natural semantics, but does not allow plausible epistemology. ((s) that does not explain how we come to knowledge).
Combinatorial Approach/Combinatorial/Terminology/Benacerraf: Example conventionalism, example formalism: they show mathematical procedures, but do not tell us what the corresponding confirmed mathematical statements tell us.
Benacerraf/Stalnaker: he himself does not offer any solution.
Reference/Benacerraf: Thesis: true reference needs a causal link.
Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Solution/LewisVsBenacerraf: pro Platonism but Vs causal link for reference.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.

NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.

NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Conceptualism Quine Vs Conceptualism
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
VII 126
Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond expressible conditions of membership of elements. ((s) VsPlatonism: Quasi requires that there should also be classes without such conditions, as classes should be independent of speakers.)
Cantor's proof: would lead to something else: He namely appeals to a class h of those members of the class k that are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer.
VII 127
But thus the class h is specified impredicatively! h is in fact itself part of the subclass of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism.
The same fate also applies to Cantor's proof of the existence of hyper-countable infinities.
QuineVsConceptualism: which is indeed a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: Ex proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit.
ConceptualismVsReducibility Axiom: because it reintroduces the entire Platonist class logic.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Descartes, R. Freud Vs Descartes, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty V 60
FreudVsPlaton/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: das Unbewusste, unser Gewissen, ist nichts Unveränderliches, nicht einmal ein zentraler Teil. Alle Teile sind gleichberechtigt. Mechanisierung, Verfahren, uns selbst zu verändern.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R. Stegmüller Vs Descartes, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 370
Wissen/Erkenntnistheorie/Descartes/Stegmüller: Descartes war unzufrieden mit dem Status, der dem Wissen in seiner Zeit zukam. Den wollte er mit seinem methodischen Zweifel stärken.
IV 371
(i) ich kann ohne Widerspruch die Existenz meines Körpers bezweifeln, nicht aber die meines Bewusstseins als Träger meiner Zweifel. (ii) Cogito-Prinzip: unbezweifelbar wegen der Tatsache, dass ich seine Wahrheit klar und deutlich erkenne.
(iii) Gott als vollkommenes Wesen kann nicht betrügen. Sinnestäuschungen rühren nicht von Gott, sie entstehen im komplizierten physiologischen Wahrnehmungsapparat.
Wissen/Erkenntnistheorie/VsDescartes/Stegmüller:
1. der Status der allgemeinen Regel bleibt unklar. Sie wird zumindest durch die Möglichkeit eines täuschenden Gottes bedroht.
Problem: entweder die Regel ist absolut sicher, dann ist sie auch nicht durch einen deus malignus bedroht, oder sie ist nicht völlig sicher, dann bedroht sie jedes Denken.
2. Cogito-Argument: beruht auf der Einsicht in den Selbstwiderspruch "Ich denke jetzt nicht".
IV 372
Das ist aber eine andere Klarheit als die der Mathematik und auch der des Gottesbeweises. Aus dem Cogito-Argument lässt sich die Autorität des klaren und deutlichen Denkens nicht ableiten! 3. Daraus, dass ich zunächst mit Gewissheit nur auf mich als denkendes Wesen schließen kann, folgt nicht, dass mein Bewusstsein eine denkende Substanz und ein von meinem Körper verschiedenes Ding ist.
IV 373
MackieVsDescartes/Stegmüller: zwei Punkte: 1. Descartes behauptet, Vollkommenheit sei ein positiver, Unvollkommenheit ein negativer Begriff, der den ersteren voraussetzt.
IV 374
Andererseits gibt er selbst zu, dass ich die Unendlichkeit Gottes nicht verstehen kann und sich in meinem Geist keine eigenständige Idee von Vollkommenheit findet. Dann kann ich aber ein positives Verständnis meiner eigenen Unvollkommenheit gewinnen, aus dem ich umgekehrt den negativen Begriff der Vollkommenheit bilde. Ich bin im ständigen Wandel und bin mir dessen bewusst.
Ich könnte auch sagen, dass der rein negative Begriff der Freiheit von allen Mängeln mir als einziger zur Verfügung steht für die Vorstellung der Allwissenheit.
2. MackieVsPlato/MackieVs ideale Formen:
Bsp absolute Gerade: Derartige Vorstellungen könnten nicht aus der Sinneswahrnehmung stammen, da keine reale Strecke vollkommen gerade ist. Sie müssten dann aus der direkten nicht sinnlichen Vertrautheit mit idealen Wesenheiten stammen.
Wir können aber sehr wohl die Vorstellung von einer gekrümmten Strecke haben, die aus der Wahrnehmung gewonnen ist!
Dann können wir uns auch denken, dass diese Strecke weniger gekrümmt ist. Ich kann mir dann den Begriff eines Grenzfalls machen, der nicht weiter von Krümmung befreit sein könnte.
Die Vorstellung der Vollkommenheit lässt sich also hinsichtlich ihres Inhaltes völlig vom Material der Sinneswahrnehmung und dem Verständnis der Negation her erklären.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Dialectic Martin Vs Dialectic
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 186
MartinVsDialektik/VsPlaton: weder ist Nicht Sein eine Form von Sein noch Sein eine Form von Nicht Sein. Dennoch die Kette von An und Abwesenheiten von etwas sind wesentlich und vervollständigend füreinander. Der Begriff eines Endes ist der Begriff einer Grenze wo etwas ist und etwas nicht ist. .
Ebene/Stufen/Ordnung/Martin: das muss man nicht mit zwielichtigen höheren Stufen des Seins erklären, das ist bloß gut für theoretische Übungen an der Tafel.
Alles in Begriffen der 1 Stufe abzuwickeln ist schwierig, aber es kann durchgeführt werden. Abwesenheit 1 Stufe macht "allgemeine Tatsachen" oder "allgemeine Zustände" überflüssig.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism.)
Truth/Putnam: is a property - PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (Mirror of Nature): truth no property.
---
I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
---
I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions (WB) was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). ---
I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (DS). ---
I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
I 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
---
I 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Wright Vs Field, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 43
Anti-Platonismus/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): behauptet, daß modale Überlegungen meine Version des AP untergraben. Weil ich Mathematik und die Existenz von mathematischen Entitäten (mE) als konsistent, und Konsistenz als modalen Grundbegriff (Möglichkeit) nehme, wäre ich darauf festgelegt, daß ich es für falsch halte, daß es mE gibt daß die Existenz von mE "kontingent falsch" sei. ((s)"Es hätte genauso gut auch mE geben können, also empirische Frage").
kontingent/Wright/HaleVsField: ist nicht logisch, und also etwas anderes als "weder logisch wahr noch logisch kontradiktorisch". Und das macht Fields Position absurd.
WrightVsField: worauf soll Fields "Kontingenz" kontingent sein? Bsp nach Field enthält die WiWe keine Zahlen aber sie hätte welche enthalten können. Aber gibt weder eine Erklärung dafür warum nicht, noch gäbe es eine Erklärung, wenn es doch Zahlen gäbe.
FieldVsVs: wenn das Argument gut wäre, gälte es genauso gegen den (nicht logischen) Platonismus, für den Mathematik hinter die Logik zurückreicht. Dann wäre die Leugnung der ganzen Mathematik logisch konsistent und daher "kontingent". Aber das ist eine Verwechslung der verschiedenen Bedeutungen von "möglich". Analog:
Bsp wenn die Existenz von Gott logisch konsistent ist, und es keinen gibt, so ist es kontingent falsch, daß es einen gäbe.
Problem: der Atheist hat keinen Zugang dazu, worauf das kontingent sein soll. Es gäbe weder eine Erklärung für die Existenz noch für die Nichtexistenz. Es gibt keine für Gottes Existenz günstigen Bedingungen und keine ungünstigen. (>Anselm, 2. ontologisches Argument).
WrightVsField: hat aber noch interessantere Argumente: 1. ohne die Annahme, daß die Mathematik aus notwendigen Wahrheiten besteht, ist die Sichtweise, daß Mathematik konservativ (konservierend, s.o.) sei, ungerechtfertigt.
I 44
analog: ohne die Annahme, daß die Mathematik wahr ist, sei die Annahme, daß sie konsistent sei, ungerechtfertigt. Rechtfertigung/FieldVsWright: man kann jeden Glauben durch einen stärkeren Glauben rechtfertigen, aus dem er folgt. (>stärker/schwächer).
Wright und Hale müßten zeigen, daß der Platonismus bessere Gründe für die notwendige Wahrheit der Mathematik hat als der Anti Platonismus für die Annahme hat, daß Mathematik konservativ (oder konsistent) ist. Und es ist nicht sicher, daß das stimmt.
WrightVsField: 2. jeder, der beides vertritt:
a) daß die Existenz von mE "kontingent falsch" ist und
b) daß Mathematik konservativ ist,
kann keinen Grund angeben, nicht an mE zu glauben!
Def Konservativität/Mathematik/Field: bedeutet, daß jede intern konsistente Kombination von nominalistischen Aussagen auch konsistent mit der Mathematik ist. DF Ordnung.
Dann kann keine Kombination nominalistischer Aussagen ein Argument gegen den Glauben an Mathematik (Ontologie) liefern.
WrightVsField: wie kann es dann überhaupt einen Grund geben, nicht an Mathematik zu glauben? Er hat keinen Beweis für seinen eigenen Nominalismus. Daraus folgt, daß Field nicht Nominalist sein kann, sondern Agnostiker sein muß.
FieldVsWright: dieser verkennt die Relevanz, die ich der Frage der Verzichtbarkeit und Unverzichtbarkeit zubillige.
Konservativität: zeigt nicht von sich aus, daß es keinen Grund geben kann, an Mathematik zu glauben.
Um VsPlatonismus Erfolg zu haben, müssen wir auch zeigen, These daß Mathematik verzichtbar ist in Wissenschaft und Metalogik. Dann haben wir Grund, nicht buchstäblich an Mathematik glauben zu müssen.
I 45
Wenn das gelingt, können wir hinter den Agnostizismus gelangen.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the ML is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

Horwich I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic, ML) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptancy).

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Black Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
II 124
Numbers/BlackVsPlato/BlackVsFrege: false Platonism: imagining them as "extraordinary" or "special", "eternal" objects.
II 125
Grammatically, however, the names of numbers (numerals) differ in important aspects from the name of physical objects. E.g. "Two people came in": Here "two" is public. Adverb.
This can be transformed into "one and one: "a man came in and then another."
This is not possible in the case of "red". (> Paraphrase).
BlackVsFrege: These grammatical facts show that numbers are no "special kinds of objects".
Frege: the great Frege, however, made no elementary mistake by accepting it anyeay, but he was never really satisfied with it.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Frege, G. Prior Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 50
Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument.
The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0).
But a number!
The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values.
Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals.
Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else.
Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.)
Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2 is 1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing".
That is to correspond to the fact that 2 1 is not only "> 0", but the number (blue) 1!
I 51
And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3 1) 1 is the number 1, because 3 1 is the number 2.
There are no different truths.
PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false.
Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid.
But we have said above that sentences denote nothing.
Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94) there is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning)
Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless.
We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each  and each  if exactly one thing t and no thing t, then s more things than s. Def "more than". (Special character)
I 51/52
Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink".
Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference!
That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either).
Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?).
Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity."
Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous.
But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone!
PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "teh false thing".
Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension".
I 53
PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects).

Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names.
Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns.
And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions)
I 166
but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name).
PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation.
This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Kant, I. Bubner Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon
I 80
Kant: wehrte sich mit dem Aufsatz "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) gegen zeitgenössische Transzendentalsphilosophie. KantVsJacobi). Kant erfindet für seine Polemik eine Position die "Enthusiastisch statt kritisch" mit der Philosophie umgeht. er führt diese Schwärmerei auf Platon zurück. Gegenposition: wird Aristoteles zugeschrieben.
BubnerVsKant: beide Positionen sind nicht historisch zu belegen. Kant hatte sehr wenig Kenntnisse über die Antike.
I 88
KantVsPlaton: der Mathematiker Platon tauge nicht zum Metaphysiker. Undurchschaute Verwechslung von Anschauung und Begriff.
"Intellektuelle Anschauung" bringe fälschlich Unmittelbarkeit und Diskursivität zusammen.
Es gebe keine Aufklärung darüber, wie beides zusammenkomme.
"Undemokratische Esoterik" nur verständlich für Mitglieder eines "Klubs" >Verbindung zur zeitgenössischen Diskussion über die Französische Revolution. Verstößt gegen die Rousseauschen Gleichheitsforderungen.
I 89/90
BubnerVsKant: der Vorwurf der Verwechslung lässt sich nur aufrechterhalten, wenn man die Kantischen Prämissen akzeptiert. In Wirklichkeit ist Platons Text anders: die Phaidon preist die "Flucht in den Logos" als Ausweg aus dem Immediatismus der Vorsokratiker, Die "zweitbeste Fahrt" verzichtet auf den ungebrochenen Blick und such in den Reden den Spiegel der Dinge. Der synthetische Aufbau der Logik ist der Zugang zur Welt, auf den wir uns beschränken müssen. Platon steht in seiner Verachtung des "vornehmen Tons" Kant keineswegs nach.
I 108
Synthesis/Kant: während die anderen Synthesen irgendetwas anderes vorfinden, das sie durch ihr Tun zu einer davon nochmals unterschiedenen Einheit ((s)also doch??) führen, hat es die oberste Synthesis nur mit sich selbst zu tun. Synthesis/VsKant: seine Nachfolger haben die Schwäche aufgedeckt, dass es für den obersten Punkt dieser Gedankenkette keine Evidenz gibt.
Ich/Fichte: Tathandlung des sich setzenden Ich
Ich/Hegel: Lebendigkeit des in steter Selbstvermittlung begriffenen Geistes. (Als absolutes Prinzip).
I 109
"Intellektuelle Anschauung"/Bubner: von Kants Nachfolgern VsKant eingeführte Vorstellung die Unmittelbarkeit und Reflexivität zusammenbringen soll. BubnerVs: zwitterhaft. Diesem Modell folgt der anonyme Autor des "Ältesten Systemprogramms".
Sie verlangen vom Philosophen die ästhetische Begabung, die die Barriere zur Knst Produktion niederlegt.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Nominalism Carnap Vs Nominalism
 
Books on Amazon
Quine XI 155
CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: metaphysische Pseudodiskussion. Lösung: es geht um die Wahl einer Sprache.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Nominalism Field Vs Nominalism
 
Books on Amazon
I 67
FieldVsNominalism: I do think that ME like numbers, functions, sets etc. are dispensable, but I do not claim the dispensability of any entity that some self-proclaimed nominalist rejects E.g. spacetime regions.
I 68
Because we have causal knowledge of of Sp.t.r., in the case of ME, we must postulate mysterious connections to a Platonic realm beyond time and space. E.g. A knowledge about an absolute infinity of objects in that realm. Sp.t. does not bring epistemic problems with it, even if we do not stand in a causal relation with each tiger.
I 69
FieldVsPlatonism: its entities are in principle inaccessible. Reference/Relation/Knowledge/Field: Problem: a) How do words stand for things? b) more fundamental: how do beliefs stand for things? Problem: in the broad sense: ME do not only stand in no causal, but also in no physical relation with us. Sp.t.: no problem: we can point to many of them! And refer to them with index words ("here", "now", etc.).

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Objectivism Putnam Vs Objectivism
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 325
Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "there is only one universe"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we manage at all to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and to oppose this to a partial universe, and in accordance with this the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-member standard relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here from the perspective of "one universe").
Putnam: thesis we cannot do that. That is, that the "incomplete content" of the terms "set" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all theoretical conclusions.
PutnamVsObjectivism: concluded the same anti-objectivist methodological consequences such as the Platonism of perfection: although the standard Platonism has incorporated this idea that we have a set-theoretical universe, this is not really part of Platonism per se.
PutnamVsPlatonism/Field: if he's right, this standard Platonism cannot be maintained.
Field: Putnam is right: the "anti-objectivist" methodology is the right conclusion, whatever the ontological consequences are. The "Platonism of perfection" shows us this.
---
II 338
PutnamVsObjectivism/Set Theory/Field: (Putnam 1980 first half): thesis: even if we assume that part of the standard Platonism, who says that there is only one universe, Problem: then there is nothing in our conclusion practices, which could determine the specific truth value of typical undecidable sentences.
---
II 339
This can be easily extended to the relation of semantic consequence in logic 2nd order. In short: (ia) Nothing in our practices determines that the term "set" picks out the entire set-theoretical universe V and not any suitably closed part of V.
(ib), even if the entire set-theoretical universe V could be picked out, there would be nothing in our practice that could determine that our term "e" picks out, the element relation E on V unlike any other relation on V that obeys our axioms.
(ii) The indeterminacy in (ia) and (ib) is sufficient to allow the truth value of typical undecidable sentences of the set theory to be undetermined. ((ib) alone would also be sufficient, often also (ia) alone),
Undecidable sentences/Field: which are covered by this scheme? What are the semantic facts that are determined by our conclusion practices? How is the semantics of "quantity" and "e" defined by our practice far enough to allow the quantifier "only a finite number of" to be sufficiently defined. And with that, how the truth will be determined by F-decidable, but otherwise by undecidable sentences, also for the number theory.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Plato Armstrong Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Arm III 90
ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlato: Universals are abstractions. But not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers:
III 91
Abstract/Quine: calls Platonic universals "abstract". (In a different sense than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions). Abstraction/Armstrong: a relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction.
Arm III 126
Universals/ArmstrongVsPlato: contingent, just like particulars! That means they do not exist precisely uninstantiated. Therefore, it does not seem plausible at all that if a non-existent U came to existence (Tooley), it would have a certain relation to others or, according to the law of excluded third, would not have. Conclusion: Tooleys ingenious examples do not prevent us from understanding uninstantiated laws as disguised counterfactual conditionals, whose truth or falsity depends entirely on the actual, i.e. on instantiated laws (higher level!). The "law" which is assumed to apply thereafter may never apply. Nevertheless, it may be specified.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Plato Kant Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 86
KantVsSchlosser: (KantVsPlato): The decline of apriorism has been expanded to unbridled theory claims.
I 88
KantVsPlato: The mathematician Plato is not suitable to be a metaphysician. Unrealized Mistake between intuition and concept.
"Intellectual intuition" brings immediacy and discursivity erroneously together.
There is no clarification on how to get the two together.
"Undemocratic esotericism" only natural for members of a "club"> connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau’s demands for equality.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Plato Maturana Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
I 139
Höhlengleichnis//MaturanaVsPlato: wir sind nicht wie die Menschen im Höhlengleichnis, eher wie biologische Sonden im Labor: wir bestimmen und verwenden jene Realitätsbereiche, in denen wir leben.

Mat I
U. Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Plato Pinker Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
I 180
Memory/PinkerVsPlato: ever since he coined the metaphor of impression in soft wax, we always assumed the neural medium must have some internal resistance against the retention of information. But actually there are indelible memories.   Of course, there is one important restriction of memory (to save costs, e.g. in the form of computation time) but that is not a by-product!
I 181
If such laws exist in consciousness, they should be found in other information processing systems as well, and in reality! E.g. frequency of books requested in libraries: those that have been requested more frequently in the past are also in greater demand in the present.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Plato Rorty Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 254
Knowledge/Platon/Rorty: Knowledge will set us free. But you have to answer the question: why should I be moral. RortyVsPlaton: with that he has saddled us with a distinction between true and false self.
VI 255
       Suggests to us that we know something of which evil people have no idea.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Plato Wittgenstein Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 51
WittgensteinVsPlato/Danto: would have considered Plato's thesis of the forms accurately as the type of confusion that the philosophy repeatedly lapses into. Philosophy is simply not science according to Wittgenstein.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Plato Verschiedene Vs Plato Vaihinger I 194ff
Arnobius/Vaihinger: (300 n.Chr.) Bsp Fiktion eines von Geburt an in völliger Einsamkeit aufgewachsenen Menschen, um Platos Erkenntnistheorie zu widerlegen. ArnobiusVsPlato.





V I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Plato Bigelow Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities. Solution/Plato: participation in forms: Allows gradual treatment.
We differ slightly from Plato:
Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and the relation between that entity and the individuals who own it varies.
I 50
Properties/Gradual/Degree/Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual).
Problem: degrees of relation.
Solution: similarity and participation are an attempt.
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is incorrect.
BigelowVsPlato: but does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of the quantity).
I 51
VsPlato: Assuming many differnet properties instead of a variable relation, each for one quantity: E.g. to have the property having a mass of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach makes much of what is hard for Plato to explain easier: he shows what distinguishes objects (while Plato rather shows what they have in common). Def Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently pronounced them. E.g. mass.
Def Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (at the same time). E.g. a mass of 2.0 kg.
I 51
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: with Plato, all things have a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the contrary, want relations of things to each other. BigelowVsPlato: that allows us to explain different types of differences between objects, namely, that they have different relational properties which other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things may be different in different ways.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Plato Hegel Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 42
PlatoVsSophists: unmethodical. HegelVsPlato: directed the same accusation against him. Do not come beyond the sophistic reasoning. "The dialectic to dissolve the particular and to produce the General is not the true dialectic. (s) stands with the only negatives). The "external reflection" had to yield to the "thing itself".But this makes the voluntary self-task of the reflection necessary! The total mediation must also include mediating itself. (Hegel. logic)
---
I 77
HegelVsPlato: stopped halfway. He was moving undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectic, that means the smooth reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability stating a relationship of incompatibility. This is a translation task (of the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be done through the Socratic irony. "General irony of the world".
Plato Aristotle Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 23
AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king.
Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects.
Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it.
 I 119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
 I 120
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
 I 164
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.
I 184
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". ---
Kanitscheider II 35
Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe.
Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position).
"Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number".
II 36
Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement.
First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified.
World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time.
AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius:
Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help".
Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum.
II 37
Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Plato Chisholm Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
III 59
Necessity/Plato/Chisholm: can only be seen when one turns away from growth and decay and towards the absolute and eternal, the unchangeable. AristoteleVsPlato/Chisholm: one must look at the particulars in order to learn something about the necessity. From this we learn what it means, for example, to be blue. The same goes for red, and then we learn that red and blue cannot be in the same place at the same time.
Induction/Aristotle:
1. Perception of individuals 2. Abstraction: what does it mean for a thing to be blue, or to be a human being.
3. intuitive grasp of relations between properties.
III 60
4. with the intuitive knowledge we have the truths of reason and attribute necessities. Intuitive induction/Terminology/Chisholm: we better call induction like that in Aristotle, because it differs from the later concept.
A priori/Chisholm: the proposition on the properties (that a thing is not blue when it is red) and the universal generalization are known a priori. So they differ from the induction by enumeration.
On the other hand:
Enumerative induction/Chisholm: this is about justifying the conclusion.
III 61
Intuitive induction: here the connection between individual examples and conclusion is much less strong. It may be enough to imagine a single thing. Essence/Husserl: can be exemplified even with fantasy situations.
III 62
Necessity/Tradition/Chisholm: once we acquire some concepts, (i.e. once we know what it means that something has these attributes) we will be able to know according to this traditional conception what it means for a proposition or fact to be necessary. A priori/Tradition/Chisholm: this is what the tradition called the a priori.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Plato Nominalism Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty II 124
Def Nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all beings are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater extent to the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismVsPlato/Rorty: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Plato Meixner Vs Plato
 
Books on Amazon
I 104
Exemplifikation/E./Meixner: die eigentliche (starke, nicht meinongsche) E. hat noch zwei Formen: die prädikative E., bei der die exemplifizierte Entität y eine prädikative universal (U), also eine ein- oder mehrstellige U ist, und die Typenexemplifikation, wie die exemplifizierte Entität eine nichtprädikative U , also ein Typenobjekt ist. prädikative E.: lässt sich zurückführen auf die Aktualität von instantiation facts.
Typen-E/Meixner: erinnert an Plato’s "Teilhabe": "x ist der Idee (dem Typenobjekt) hinreichend ähnlich".
Heute: denken wir bei "Schönheit" an eine gewisse Universalie, nämlich die Eigenschaft, schön zu sein (= o1[o1 ist schön]).
Plato: dachte dagegen an ein gewisses Typenobjekt; die Idee der Schönheit.
Teilhabe/Platon: Bsp Diotima hat Teil an der Schönheit, weil sie von der Schönheit verschieden ist.
Meixner: zweifellos ist die Schönheit nun der Schönheit (zeitlos) hinreichend ähnlich, denn sie ist ja sogar identisch mit ihr. Mithin folgt nach Platons ursprünglicher Deutung der Typen E,
I 105
dass die Schönheit EXEM T die Schönheit. Daraus folgt, dass der Satz "Die Schönheit ist schön" wahr ist! Das ist die berühmteste Platonische Selbstprädikation. Dass die Schönheit schön, die Gerechtigkeit gerecht, die Hässlichkeit hässlich und die Ungerechtigkeit ungerecht ist, damit könnte man sich vielleicht noch abfinden.
MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: wenn die Tapferkeit tapfer sein soll und die Schmutzigkeit schmutzig (ganz abgesehen davon, dass die Idee der Schmutzigkeit nicht mehr zu der gehobenen Gesellschaft von Schönheit, Gerechtigkeit usw. passt).
Vollends unplausibel wird es beim Typenobjekt Mensch: nach Platons ursprünglicher Theorie wäre das Typenobjekt Mensch selbst ein Mensch. (Wegen Selbstidentität, nicht nur Ähnlichkeit).
Lösung/Meixner: jedem Typenobjekt (TO) sollte eine Eigenschaft eindeutig entsprechen.
x EXEM T y = y ist ein TO und y EXEM P die y entsprechende Eigenschaft.
Die entsprechende Eigenschaft kennen wir bereist, nämlich "die y entsprechende Eigenschaft ist eine einstellige Universalie und ist ein Sachverhalt und aktual".
Frage: gibt es eine bessere Alternative zu dieser Exemplifikationstheorie. (Also nicht TE als gleichsam "ins Nichtprädikative gewendete prädikative E"?).
I 106
Exemplifikation/Plato/Meixner: ursprünglich: Abspiegeln aus mehr oder minder großer Distanz, wobei im Grenzfall Abbild und Original zusammenfallen. Teilhabe: hier deutet sich schon eine andere Alternative an.
Verkettung: auch E. als Verkettung ist bei Plato schon zumindest angedeutet.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Platonism Field Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
III 105
1st Order Theory/Conclusion/Field: for each 1st order theory there is a better one that seems to be intuitively true if the original is, and this one is more expressive (stronger).
III 106
This applies to nominalistic as well as for Platonic theories. Therefore, it cannot be used as an argument for the inadequacy of N0 if Platonic 1st order theories cannot be regarded as inadequate as well. Conclusion: if you’re set on 1st order theories, there is no obvious way to decide whether one is good enough to deliver the consequences needed in practice and to exclude the "recherché" consequences (with Gödel sentence).
FieldVsPlatonism: So the above argument is not an objection to Platonism.
2nd order theory: is, of course, definitely a remedy for this problem. But we have seen that N (which is 2nd order) has all the consequences that the Platonistic ML 2nd order has, and therefore it is difficult to see what the benefits of Platonism should be in the context of the 2nd order logic.

I 112
Model Theory/MT/Explanation/Field: Do we also need a nominalistic analogy to the Platonic MT? This is a verbal question. It depends on whether we understand modal logic itself as an analogue to platonistic model theory. If so, then model theory is like physics and we can use the previous considerations. And we have to use them, because the applicability of metalogic cannot be explained not solely from conservativeness. If the logic is not modal.
If, on the other hand, we do not consider modal logic like that, then the model theory is like the proof theory: we do not need a nominalistic analogue of the model theory, because it does not serve as an explanation.
Then it only serves to find out about possibility and impossibility. Then we do not need to assume the truth of the statements (VsPlatonism).

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Platonism McDowell Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
I 121
McDowellVsPlatonism: every Platonism has the consequence that the standards are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein’s quietism recognizes this as false problem.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Platonism Prior Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
I 52
Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension".
I 53
PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as an extension. For truth value and classes are both logical constructions, and very similar ones at that! And no "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Platonism Putnam Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
I 112
Platonism/Mathematics/Putnam: the Platonists claims a mysterious "ability to capture mathematical objects". PutnamVsPlatonism: which neural process could eventually be described as the perception of a mathematical object? Why of a mathematical object and not of another? Why should we be able to capture the correct object neurally and not capture the wrong item neuronal (neural)?
I do not doubt that some axioms are built into our concept of rationality: for example, "Each number has a successor".
Now, if, for example, the axiom of choice is in abeyance, Skolem gives us reason to assign the corresponding truth value only in the context of a theory previously adopted.
Convention/Mathematics/Poincaré: Convention yes, arbitrariness no.


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Platonism Ryle Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
I 68
Action and Understanding/Ryle: are roughly speaking just different practices of the same craft. The spectator finds what the originator invented. The originator leads and the viewer follows, but the path is the same. ---
I 69
Two reservations: 1. The ability to perform and evaluate an operation does not necessarily include the ability to work out a criticism or lesson. E.g. a ship's boy is likely to be able to execute a node and to recognize a wrong one, but he is probably not able to describe it alone with words.
2. The ability to evaluate an action does not require the same degree of skill as the ability to perform it. E.g. you do not need to be a genius to recognize a genius. E.g. a good theater critic may be a moderate actor.
---
I 70
Imitation/Understanding/RyleVsPlatonism/Ryle: Unfortunately the program of imitation of Plato has never been quite successful. E.g. I am, after all, a Plato reader of the twentieth century, something that Plato has never been. Understanding must be imperfect. (Because it is a skill).
---
I 73
Partial understanding and misunderstanding: E.g. One cannot say that someone only partly knows that Sussex is an English county. Either one knows it or not. But one can partially know the counties of England, and partially not.
On the other hand, it is customary to say that someone can do something only in part, i.e. He had a certain ability to a limited extent. As it was to be expected, this also applies to understanding.
---
I 74
An ability to learn is something else than to get to know a situation, or to acquire knowledge. "half-trained" is a meaningful expression, but "half-notified" is not.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.

IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Platonism Conceptualism Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 111
ConceptualismVsPlatonism: which criterion of the existence we apply is a question of what aspect of the classification process, we want to single out: the objects or the ability to classify.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Platonism Schiffer Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 107
SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus.
I 152
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction).
2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious:
SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own).

I 234
Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties.
Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as
E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he
believes".
Platonic realism: E.g.
(a) Mother Teresa is modest
after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here:
1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object
2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio
referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa)
Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation.
3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective
"modest".
I 235
Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term.
Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation
Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest).
Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is.
((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.)
Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest".
Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.:
1. Between names and object.
2. Between predicate and property.
Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Platonism Benacerraf Vs Platonism
 
Books on Amazon:
Paul Benacerraf
Field II 324
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: Standardargument: wenn es Objekte gibt so wie der Platonismus sie annimmt, wie sollten wir einen epistemischen Zugang zu ihnen haben? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: gebrauchte damals ein Argument gegen die Kausaltheorie des Wissens.
PlatonismusVsBenacerraf: griff daher die Kausaltheorie an.
Field: aber Benacerrafs Einwand geht viel tiefer und ist von der Kausaltheorie unabhängig.
Benacerraf: These: eine Theorie kann zurückgewiesen werden, wenn sie von der Annahme eines massiven Zufalls abhängig ist. Bsp die zwei Aussagen:
II 325
(1) John und Judy haben sich jeden Sonntag nachmittag im letzten Jahr zufällig an verschiedenen Orten getroffen, (2) sie haben kein Interesse aneinander und würden nie planen sich zu treffen, auch gibt es keine andere Hypothese zur Erklärung.
ad (2): soll eine Erklärung durch irgendeine „Korrelation“ unmöglich machen.
Wenn (1) und (2) sich auch nicht direkt widersprechen, stehen sie doch in starker Spannung zueinander. Ein Glaubenssystem, das beide vertritt, wäre höchst verdächtig.
Pointe: dann ist aber auch der Platonismus höchst verdächtig! Denn er postuliert eine Erklärung für die Korrelation zwischen unseren mathematischen Glaubenseinstellungen und mathematischen Tatsachen. (>Zugang, > Zugänglichkeit) Bsp warum wir nur dann dazu tendieren zu glauben, dass p, wenn p (für ein mathematisches p). Und dafür müssen wir wiederum einen mysteriösen kausalen Zusammenhang postulieren, zwischen Glauben und mathematischen Objekten.
PlatonismusVsVs/Field: kann sich darauf berufen, dass es starke logische Verbindungen zwischen unseren mathematischen Überzeugungen gibt. Und in der Tat, in der modernen Zeit kann man sagen dass wir
a) dazu tendieren, verläßlich zu schließen, und dass die Existenz mathematischer Objekte dem dienen oder
b) dass wir p als Axiom nur akzeptieren, wenn p.
FieldVsPlatonismus: das erklärt aber die Verläßlichkeit wieder nur durch irgendwelche nicht- natürlichen geistigen Kräfte.
VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. er „beweist zu viel“: wenn sein Argument gültig wäre, würde es alles a priori Wissen unterminieren (VsKant). Und insbesondere logisches Wissen unterminieren. („Beweist zu viel“).
BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Lösung: es gibt eine fundamentale Trennung zwischen logischen und mathematischen Fällen. Außerdem kann man „metaphysische Notwendigkeit“ der Mathematik nicht dazu gebrauchen, Benacerrafs Argument zu blockieren.
FieldVsBenacerraf: obwohl sein Argument überzeugen VsPlatonismus ist, scheint es nicht überzeugend VsBalaguer zu sein. II 326
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): anderer Ansatz, (einflußreiches Argument):
1.
Bsp es gibt verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die natürlichen Zahlen auf Mengen zu reduzieren: Def natürliche Zahlen/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 ist die leere Menge und jede natürliche Zahl >0 ist die Menge, die als einziges Element die Menge die n-1 ist, enthält.
Def natürliche Zahlen/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: jede natürliche Zahl n ist die Menge, die als Elemente die Mengen hat, die die Vorgänger von n sind.
Tatsache/Nonfaktualismus/Field: es ist klar, dass es keine Tatsache darüber gibt, ob Zermelos oder von Neumanns Ansatz die Dinge „richtig darstellt“. Es gibt keine Tatsache die entscheidet, ob Zahlen Mengen sind.
Das nenne ich die
Def strukturalistische Einsicht/Terminologie/Field: These: es macht keinen Unterschied, was die Objekte einer gegebenen mathematischen Theorie sind, so lange sie in den richtigen Relationen zueinander stehen. D.h. es gibt keine sinnvolle Wahl zwischen isomorphen Modellen einer mathematischen Theorie. …+…

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Proof Theory Deflationism Vs Proof Theory
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 100
VsDeflationismus: Problem: wie rechtfertigt man die Nützlichkeit des Schließens auf metalogischer Ebene statt auf der Objekt Ebene? Beweistheorie: hier insbesondere gibt es gar keine Objektebene!
Objektebene: hier machen die Aussagen keine Referenz auf Sätze oder Formeln. Oder abstrakte Analoga davon wie Propositionen). Und damit auch nicht auf Axiome, Schlußregeln oder Ableitungen.
Problem: wie können wir dann die Anwendbarkeit (Nützlichkeit) von beweistheoretischem Schließen zeigen?
I 101
DeflationismusVsBeweistheorie: da diese mit mathematischen Entitäten arbeitet, kann der Deflationist nicht annehmen, daß wir überhaupt Wissen von ihr erhalten. Wie kann der Deflationist dennoch ihre Nützlichkeit zeigen? 1. wir müssen die normalen Definitionen beweistheoretischer Begriffe zurückweisen und welche ohne Referenz auf mathematische Entitäten (mE) finden.
a) wir brauchen eine hinreichend kraftvolle Theorie aktualer Inskriptionen, ohne Modalität: mit einer solchen Theorie könnten wir Begriffe wie "e ist eine wohlgeformte Inskription", "e und f sind typ identische Inskriptionen" , "d ist (eine Inskription, die) eine Ableitung (enthält in bezug auf System F)",
sowie verschiedene Prädikate von Inskriptionen, die diese strukturell beschreiben (z.B. von einem bestimmten Inskriptions Typ A zu sein). Das könnte in Logik 1. Stufe ausgeführt werden.
b) wir müssen eine modale Extension schaffen: in der wir z.B. "A ist ableitbar" verstehen als "es ist möglich, daß es eine Ableitung gibt, deren letzte Zeile eine A-Inskription ist".
VsPlatonismus: also nicht: "es existiert aktual ein bestimmter Typ abstrakter Sequenzen abstrakter Analoga der Symbole.
Field: damit soll kein neuer Typ von Möglichkeit neben logischer Möglichkeit eingeführt werden außer wenn wir sie aus strikter logischer Möglichkeit plus anderen akzeptablen Begriffen definieren können.
Problem: 1. logische Möglichkeit ist gänzlich anti essentialistisch. (?). ((s) Nimmt nichts als wesentliches Substrat an? Als Wesen, als Entität?)
Field: das bringt ein Problem für die Übersetzung von Sätzen, wo "ableitbar" im der Reichweite des Quantors liegt. (s) "Es gibt etwas, (eine Entität) das ableitbar ist".
Field: Bsp "er äußerte eine ableitbare Inskription" wäre immer falsch in einer naiven Übersetzung.
I 102
Lösung: substitutionale Quantifikation. (ungleich Kripke/Wallace). 2. Problem: die Konsistenz mit axiomatischer Beweistheorie ist nicht hinreichend für Beweisbarkeit im normalen Sinn: Unvollständigkeits Theoreme liefern Fälle von unbeweisbaren Formeln, wo die Behauptung, daß es einen Beweis gibt konsistent ist mit der Beweistheorie.
Lösung: für die Beweisbarkeit von A ...Existenz eines Beweises kompatibel sein mit einer (nominalistischen oder platonistischen) Beweistheorie die in einer kraftvollen Logik aufgestellt ist, die Ableitungen ausschließen kann, die nicht echt endlich sind. z.B. eine Logik mit einem Quantor "es gibt nur endlich viele" oder mit substitutionalem Quantor.
stärker/schwächer/(s): stärker: eine Logik, die unendliche Ableitungen ausschließt.

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Relativism Plato Vs Relativism
 
Books on Amazon
Putnam V 163
PlatonVsProtagoras (relativist): Protagoras: when I say X, I should actually say "I think X". No view has the same meaning for me as for anyone else.
PlatonVsRelativism: Recourse: if every statement X means: "I think X", then you have to insert infinitely:
(1) I think that I think that snow is white
V 164
PutnamVsPlaton: in this form the argument is not much good. Protagoras might agree, but it does not follow that his analysis must be indefinitely applied to itself, but only that it could! Plato, however, had noticed something very deep. Relativism, modern form: every culture, and every discourse has its own views, standards, requirements, and truth (and justification) is relative in relation to them.
Of course, it is naturally assumed that the question of whether X is relatively true to them, is something "absolute", in turn!

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Tichy, P. Armstrong Vs Tichy, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Arm III 90
ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers:
III 91
Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation.
III 97
ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!.
III 98
Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: ​​be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Various Authors Derrida Vs Various Authors
 
Books on Amazon
Derrida I 50
DerridaVsLogozentrismus: Zwiespalt zwischen dem »Sagen-wollen« und dem unbeabsichtigt durch die Art der Beschreibung Kundgegebenen. Derrida versucht einen Punkt zu finden außerhalb: das »Exorbitante«. »Lichtung des Seins« usw.. RicoeurVsHeidegger: das ist eine Rückkehr der Metapher in einem sich nicht mehr als metaphysisch verstehenden Denken.
DerridaVsRicoeur: dreht diese Kritik um. Indem die Metapher verschleißt, zieht sie sich zurück. Wiederkehr in veränderter Gestalt.
Derrida I 88 (?)
Vs Derrida: er übersieht, dass »Verschleiß« wieder eine Metapher ist. - Das Denken in seinem Bezug zur Metapher ist nicht festzustellen oder zu identifizieren!
I 139
DerridaVsMarx: zu sehr von Aufklärung abhängig. Derrida dekonstruiert Marx und führt den Begriff "Messianik" im Unterschied zum Messianismus ein.
I 150
DerridaVsMauss: bemerkt nicht den Widerspruch zwischen Gabe und Tausch, weil zwischen Gabe und Gegengabe jeweils ein Aufschub liegt. Daher spricht Mauss nicht von der Gabe sondern in Wirklichkeit vom zirkulären Tausch.
Habermas I 194
Derrida: kritisiert die Herrschaft des Logos, der stets dem gesprochenen Wort innewohnt. DerridaVsPhonozentrismus: verkappte Gestalt des Logozentrismus des Abendlandes. Die Metapher vom Buch der Natur als schwer zu dechiffrierende Handschrift
Habermas I 203
Jaspers: »die Welt ist die Handschrift einer anderen, niemals völlig lesbaren Welt; allein die Existenz entziffert sie.«. DerridaVsPlatonisierung der Bedeutung.
Habermas I 234
DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalismus), Vs Strukturalistische Ästhetik.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Platonism Field, Hartry
 
Books on Amazon
I 44
Um VsPlatonismus Erfolg zu haben, müssen wir auch zeigen, These: dass Mathematik verzichtbar ist in Wissenschaft und Metalogik. Dann haben wir Grund, nicht buchstäblich an Mathematik glauben zu müssen.
I 45
Wenn das gelingt, können wir hinter den Agnostizismus gelangen.
I 186
Def moderater Platonismus/mP/Field: die These, dass es abstrakte Objekte wie Zahlen gibt. Dann glaubt man vermutlich auch, dass es Relationen physikalischer Größe zwischen Gegenständen und Zahlen gibt. (aber nur abgeleitet): Bsp "Masse in Kilogramm" ist dann Relation zwischen einem gegebenen physikalischen Objekt und der reellen Zahl 15,2.
Bsp "Abstand in Metern" ist eine Relation zwischen zwei Objekten ((s) auf der einen Seite) und der reellen Zahl 7,4.
Der Unterschied zum Hochleistungsplatonismus (HLP) liegt in der Haltung zu diesen Relationen:
mP: These das sind konventionelle Relationen, die von grundlegenderen Relationen, die zwischen physikalischen Gegenständen allein bestehen, abgeleitet sind.
Def Hochleistungs-Platonismus/Field: leugnet das und nimmt die Relationen zwischen Gegenständen und Zahlen als nackte Tatsache, die nicht in anderen Begriffen erklärbar ist.
Aufgebläht könnte man das als "platonistische Teilhabe" erklären.
II 332
Standard-Platonismus: These mathematische Theorien wie Mengenlehre oder Theorie der reellen Zahlen sind über verschiedene mathematische Bereiche, oder zumindest über bestimmte Strukturen, denn es gibt keine Notwendigkeit anzunehmen, daß isomorphe Bereiche (d.h. Bereiche mit derselben Struktur) mathematisch ununterscheidbar wären. Damit sollen "Bereiche" nicht als Mengen angenommen werden.
II 333
Def -"latonismus der Vollkommenheit": (plenitude): postuliert eine Menge mathematischer Objekte. These wann immer wir eine konsistente rein-mathematische Theorie haben, dann gibt es mathematische Objekte, die die Theorie erfüllen unter einer Standard-Erfüllungsrelation. Platonismus der Vollkommenheit/PdV: legt aber auch nahe, These dass wir alle Quantoren über mathematische Entitäten so betrachten können,
I 334
dass sie implizit beschränkt sind durch ein Prädikat, dem alle anderen Prädikaten von mathematischen Entitäten untergeordnet sind: "überwölbendes" Prädikat: ist dann zwischen den verschiedenen mathematischen Theorien verschieden. Diese Theorien konfligieren dann nicht mehr.
II 335
Universum/Standard-Platonismus/Field: (These: "Es existiert nur ein Universum"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonismus: wie schaffen wir es überhaupt, das "volle" (umfassende) Universum herauszugreifen und einem Teiluniversum gegenüberzustellen, und entsprechend die Standard-Elementbeziehung im Gegensatz zu einer Nicht-.Standard-Elementbeziehung? (Putnam 1980). (Hier aus der Perspektive von "Universum" gestellt).
Putnam: These das können wir eben nicht.
Nominalism Rorty, R.
 
Books on Amazon
II 124
Def nominalism / Rorty: the thesis that all beings are nominal and all necessities de dicto. No description applies to a greater extent the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismusVsPlato / Rorty: nature can not be dissected at its joints.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Science Platon
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 51
WittgensteinVsPlaton: seine These: von der wissenschaftlichen Erfassung der Formen ist genau die Verwechslung von Wissenschaft und Philosophie.