Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 46 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Common Sense Nietzsche Danto III 95
Common Sense/Nietzsche/Danto: for Nietzsche, the common sense itself is an interpretation and nothing that is opposed to interpretations. The common sense is metaphysics that has become everyday for him, (...) a fantasy of error and misbelief, (...) without the slightest concordance with reality. But: ---
Danto III 96
NietzscheVsParmenides/NietzscheVsPlato/Danto: Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 844). In the interests of life, we are forced to approve the common sense as set of beliefs and to reject all that is at odds with it.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Conceptualism Quine XI 136
Intuitionismus/Quine/Lauener: he compares it with ancient conceptualism: universals are created by the mind.
VII (f) 125
ConceptualismVsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries - Problem: Poincaré's "impredicative" definition: Definition impredicative Definition/Poincaré: the specification of a class through a realm of objects, within which that class is located.
VII (f) 126
Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond conditions of belonging to elements that can be expressed.
Cantor's proof: would entail something else: It appeals to a class h of those elements of class k which are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer.
VII (f) 127
But this is how the class h is specified impredicatively! h is itself one of the partial classes of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism.
The same fate strikes Cantor's proof of the existence of supernumerary infinity.
QuineVsConceptualism: this is a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: e.g. the proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit.

VII (a) 14
Universals Dispute/Middle Ages/Quine: the old groups reappear in modern mathematics: Realism: Logicism
Conceptualism: Intuitionism
Nominalism: Formalism.
Conceptualism/Middle Ages/Quine: holds on to universals, but as mind-dependent.
ConceptualismVsReduceability Axiom: because the reduceability axiom reintroduces the whole platonistic class logic.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Dialectic Hegel Bubner I 75
Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality. Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention.
      It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it.
---
I 76
Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind. Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection.
---
I 77
HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance.       This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony.
"General irony of the world".
---
Wright I 21
Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections. ---
Wright I 154
G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Dialectic Plato Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. ---
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Definition "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
---
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
---
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Essence Hobbes Adorno XIII 245
Essence/Appearance/HobbesVsPlato/Hobbes/Adorno: the relationship of essence and appearance is reversed in opposition to the Platonic tradition: what is appearance there, becomes essence, namely, the body world, and vice versa, that which is essence there, becomes appearance, namely the way of the mental conception, or even mental activity.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Forms Bigelow I 51
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his strategy is to postulate a single entity, along with a variety of relationships between individuals and that entity. ((s) Relation: participation, entity: form). On the other hand, another approach would be:
VsPlato: to assume many different properties instead of a variable relation, each for a quantity: e.g. the property to have a weight of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach facilitates many things that are difficult to explain for Plato: he shows what distinguishes objects (whereas Plato rather shows what they have in common). This is because the different masses do not overlap here.
PlatoVsVs: Problem: the new approach does not show what the objects have in common.
(>Determinates, determinables).

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Generality Aristotle Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical exercise of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of general statements and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? The concrete individual is always familiar to us from the sensory experience. But the general?
Generality/Knowledge/AristotelesVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the general comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. They derive from induction and are to be intuitively understood.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Good Aristotle Bubner, I, 164
Good/Something Good/Aristotle/Bubner: one of the most difficult problems: what role does good play in his metaphysics, practical or metaphysical good?
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes:
1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Something Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of the good as the highest: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "holy". No practical benefit is to be achieved with the idealization of good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of activities of all kind.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.

Practice/Aristotle: No action is done for its own sake, with the exception of the game.
(s) Then victory is one step outside of the game.
Aristotle: otherwise, the goals would hinder the flow of practice only by virtue of their plurality through competition, blockades, undecidable alternatives, etc.. An order becomes necessary.
No for-the-sake-of-which is isolated, it rather points to a bigger one. The hierarchy, however, would be in vain if there was not a supreme good, which in turn can still be realized in practice.
I 166
The Highest Good/Aristotle: the unity of a successful life. All the actors agree, because everyone wants to be happy. Of course this is interpreted differently.
      Lust, honor, money are external determinations.
      The sovereign form, on the other hand, lies in the philosophical way of life, i.e. in enlightened self-reflective practice.
Thus the problem of the highest knowledge posed by Plato, which legitimates the rule of the philosophers' king, is solved.

Good Hegel Bubner I 182
Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of ​​the good under the caption of the idea of ​​"recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand.
I 184
Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of ​recognition", which in its turn is split into the
"idea of ​​truth"
and the
"idea of ​​the good".
Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of ​​the good" in practical action.
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience".

I 185
Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it.
I 186
Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good.
      The executed good would be the abolition of otherness.
With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed.
Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of ​​truth and the idea of ​​good is abolished.
Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality.
After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection.
I 187
Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression!


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Idealism Kant Strawson V 211
Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. - StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. - And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. - N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. ---
Stra V 213
Definition Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) ---
Stra V222
Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. - StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". ---
Stroud I 129f
Definition Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. ---
Stroud I 130
Definition Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. - KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. ---
Adorno XIII 58
Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. In this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism Nietzsche Ries II 27
Idealism/NietzscheVsIdealism/NietzscheVsSokrates, VsPlato: VsEquation Reason = Being.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
Ideas Schopenhauer Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

I 55
Ideas/Schopenhauer: not subject to the sentence from the ground - to be recognized only by aesthetic perception = losing oneself to the object. ---
I 77
Idea/Schopenhauer: A central link between the views and multiplicity of the individual things of the imaginary world. As objects for a subject, the ideas themselves are determined by the conceptual; as objectivizations of the will, they themselves determine the imagination. As immediate objectivization they have more reality than the things of the world of appearances. ---
I 79
Idea: free from causality - not the effect of will, but its appearance. ---
I 80
The supreme idea: the human being. ---
I 84
Idea/SchopenhauerVsPlato: because Schopenhauer equates will with Kant's thing per se, the ideas in his system cannot take on the highest metaphysical rank they have in Plato - like Plato: the transient things are only by participation in the ideas, therefore they have a lower degree of reality than these - ideas/Plato: equality, size, unity, similarity (= epistemological categories).

Ideas Epicurus Adorno XIII 229
Ideas/EpicurusVsPlato/Epicurus/Adorno: also this is one of the great discoveries of Epicurean philosophy, although we can scarcely trace it back clearly to its sources: it has probably given an account of it - and this is, in turn, very antiplatonic - that there is no idea in which there are no traces of the sensual. From this also follows in ethics the specifically materialistic element of Epicurus.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Individuals Nietzsche Danto III 173
Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy, where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... ---
Danto III 174
... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules.
Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial".
NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,...
---
Danto III 175
...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Interpretation Benacerraf Field I 22
Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965) Thesis: Identification of mathematical objects with others is arbitrary - E.g. numbers with quantities. - E.g. real numbers with Dedekind cuts, Cauchy sequences, etc. - There is no fact that decides which is the right one. - Field ditto.
I 22
Indeterminacy of reference/Field: is not a problem, but commonplace.
I 25
For Benacerraf it is about identity, not about reference - otherwise he might falsely be refuted with primitive reference: "Numbers" refers to numbers but not to quantities - But that is irrelevant.
I 25
BenacerraffVsPlatonism: locus classicus - VsBenacerraf: based on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
Field I 25
BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): if without localization and interaction we cannot know whether they exist. VsBenacerraf: indispensability argument.

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984


Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Knowledge Aristotle Bubner I 118
Knowledge/Aristotle: the knowledge available outside of scientific evidence establishes the connection of science theory with general ontology.
I 119
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and Epagogé (nowadays controversial whether to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantifications and individual cases. In Aristotle, no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
I 149
Knowledge/Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: to know truly and definitively requires the certainty that the knowledge has come to its full extent, by even recognizing that which explains already existing knowledge. Such certainty cannot be determined from outside, it must be found in knowledge itself.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Knowledge Newell, A./Simon, H. Münch III 74
Knowledge/Search/Recognition/Menon/Socrates: How do you want to search that of what you do not know what it is? And if you find it, how do you recognize that it is what you did not know?
Solution/Plato: The Famous Theory of Recollection.

Knowledge/Finding/Recognizing/Newell/SimonVsPlato: today much easier explanation: to represent a problem means,
1. a test for a class of symbol structures (solutions) and
2. a method for generating symbol structures.

Why do we not immediately produce an expression that describes the solution? We do that when we wish and dream.
But: knowing how we would test something if we had it does not mean we know how it is developed.
There are move procedures, but there is no procedure for winning moves.
There must be a problem area prior to the move process.
Definition moves/move/Newell/Simon: moves are transformations of problem area situations.
Symbolic systems: they guarantee that they can represent problem areas and have move procedures.


Allen Newell/Herbert Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search“ Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 19 (1976), 113-126


Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Knowledge Plato Bubner I 35
Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object.
   The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good).
Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason).
Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine.
The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic).
---
119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Kripke’s Wittgenstein Putnam V 99ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein - VsPlatonism (universals) - pro nominalism (Vs Properties in themselves). See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Language Putnam Rorty I 323
Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship, is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language. ---
Horwich I 457
Language/Putnam: if only noise, then nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. - Instead: Correctness: makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities.
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Putnam III 124
Language/intensional/Davidson: E.g. the new Minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. - How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? - The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. - Similarly to the use of color predicates.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Mathematics Aristotle Thiel I 23 ff
Mathematics/Tradition/Thiel: Aristotle, Kant and Plato accept an object, an area of mathematics. More important to them is the question of how the human behaves in relation to this object. Differentiation invent/discover/Plato: Euthydemos: geometers, arithmetic artists and astronomers are like hunters, they are exploring what is already there.
---
I 24
AristotleVsPlato: he had joined the Kratylos and Heraclitus inasmuch as there could be no science of the sensible after him, since everything was in flux. Thus, objects cannot even be defined. Plato: There are always many of the same kind of the mathematical objects, while the idea is always only one.
Thiel: one may think of the four-time appearance of the isosceles triangle in the square.
---
I 25
Aristotle's Plato: denies an existence of the mathematical objects independent of the bodies. They exist on or in objects and can be isolated by abstraction. Mathematical objects are not themselves concrete, real objects. But they also have no "separated being". Each number is always only number of something.


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Mathematics Thiel Thiel I 10
Mathematics/Object/Thiel: The object does not coincide with the question "What is mathematics? The latter is about the way of thinking.
I 13
Old definitions of "mathematics" 19th century: she was "ultimately" science of numbers. Mathematics/Bolzano: it is the science of the quantities.
20th century Paul Lorenzen (1962) "essentially nothing other than the theory of the infinite itself." Also Weyl, 1926
Third view: Empiricists: they have difficulties with infinity. In the strict sense in the 20th century it is no longer represented this way. Validity is conceded, but the content is denied.
Thiel I 23 et seq.
Mathematics/Tradition/Thiel: Aristotle, Kant and Plato adopt an object, an area of mathematics. More important to them seems to be the question of how the human relates to it. Distinguishing between inventing and discovering. Plato: Euthydemos: Geometers, mathematicians and astronomers are like hunters, they explore what is already there.
I 24
AristotleVsPlato: he had joined Kratylos and Heraclitus to the extent that even after him there could be no science of the sensual, since everything was in flux. Thus, a definition of objects is not even possible. Plato: there are always many of the same kind of mathematical objects, while the idea is always only one.
Thiel: one will be allowed to think of the four-time occurrence of the isosceles triangle in a square.
I 25
AristotleVsPlato: denies the existence of mathematical objects independent of body things. They exist on or in objects and can be isolated by abstraction. Mathematical objects are not themselves concrete, real objects. But they also have no "separated being". Each number is always only the number of something.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Memory Pinker I 153
Memory/Pinker: thoughts are not stored as a whole, but composed of terms. ---
I 157
Not every statement can be assigned to a memory space: too much energy loss. ---
I 158
Memory/Pinker: 1. "episodic" or autobiographical, 2. "semantic" or general knowledge memory - wired according to different patterns. ---
I 177
Memory/Pinker: not sound chains but delimited words are stored. ---
I 180
PinkerVsPlaton: no impression in wax, no "resistance" - there are indelible memories.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Nominalism Rorty I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Nominalism Adorno XII 107
Nominalism/Adorno: Prehistory: Aristotle's critique of Plato. Concept/Plato/Adorno: for Plato, the concepts were independent and being-in-itself and indestructible and eternal, namely, the ideas.
AristotelesVsPlato/Adorno: these concepts should instead be mediated and fulfilled with concrete and factual.
Kant/Adorno: he has also transferred this critical motive to the concept of God in opposition to the reification.
---
XIII 56
Nominalism/Adorno: Nominalism is the view, which in principle views the concepts as abbreviations of the matters covered by them, and denies the concepts - in any case tendentially - the independence against what they contain among themselves. This western view belongs to Kant himself. In the consequence of nominalism, the subjective moment of the concept of idea prevails.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Numbers Black II 125
Numerals/ Numbers/ names / Black: unlike names for physical objects: E.g. "two people came in" here "two", is an adverb - it can be transformed into "another and another" - that s not possible for "red" - BlackVsFrege: the shows that numbers are no special objects - BlackVsPlatonism

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Philosophy Wittgenstein Danto I 49
Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Danto: cannot capture any states of affairs - as opposed to science - there are no philosophical states of affairs - hence their sentences cannot be true or false. ---
Hintikka I 51
WittgensteinVsPlato: his thesis of the scientific collection of forms is precisely the confusion between science and philosophy. ---
ad Wittgenstein II 95
Philosophy/Wittgenstein: is no field of competing theories.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Philosophy Dewey Suhr I 38
Definition Philosophy/Dewey: the reflection on what the knowledge requires of us. Knowledge requires thinking not contemplation. ---
Suhr I 153
Philosophy/Dewey: The philosophical fallacy: the fallacy is the denial of uncertainty and danger to what the philosophers declare as true reality, and the shifting from all that means danger into a world of pretense. (DeweyVsPlaton). Thus, from what is actually the object of an action, becomes a prior reality: the good becomes an in-itself! (Coincidence with Nietzsche: Twilight of the Idols).
---
Suhr I 154
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: 1. The true world is attainable for the wise.
2. The true world is unattainable for now, but promised f+ the wise, the virtuous, the pious (reward).
3. The true world is unattainable, unprovable, not promisable, already thought as comfort.
4. Is the real world unattainable? In any case, it is unattained.
(Gray morning, first yawning).
5. The "true world" is an idea that is not useful for anything. Bright day
6. The true world is abolished (noon, moment of the shortest shadow, end of the longest error, climax of humanity, INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
Platonism Field I 8
Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics.
---
I 14
FieldVsPlatonism: has to answer the fictionalist in his language - cannot rely on his "initial plausibility". ---
I 152
Definition Priority thesis/PT/Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. - Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. - Definition Gödelian Platonism/Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation - FregeVsGödel - WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. ---
I 153
Definition weak Priority thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. ---
l 159
Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. ---
I 186
Definition Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. - Definition Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. ---
l 189
Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. ---
I 192
Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects. ---
II 332
Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. ---
II 334
Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. ---
III 31
Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? ---
III 90
Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. ---
III 96
1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of power quantifiers).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Platonism Quine XII 44
Platonic Idea/Quine: not the same as a mental idea.
XI 136
Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism.
XI 155
CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about choosing a language.
VII(f) 125
Conceptualism VsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries. Problem: Poincaré's impredicative definition:
Def Impredicative Definition/Poincaré/Quine: the specification of a class by a realm of objects within which this class is located.
VII (f) 126
Classes/Platonism/Quine: when classes are considered pre-existing, there is no objection to picking one of them by a move that presupposes their existence. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, however, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Of course, this should not be interpreted in terms of time.
VII (f) 127
Platonism/Conceptualism/Quine: both allow universals and classes as irreducible. Conceptualism: allows fewer classes. But rests on a rather metaphorical reason: "Origin".

V 126
Platonism/Quine: is opened by form words, not by color words! Reason: a union of color spots has the same color, but a union of spots of a certain shape does not necessarily have the same shape.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Politics Aristotle Bubner I 176
Politics/Aristotle: as long as man lives together with others, he cannot concentrate on the idle show, but must choose the "second best way" of the political actor.
I 179
Practice/Aristotle: must perform an ordering performance within the contingency. The objective is never given, but must be actively introduced into the practical situation.
      The possibilities for action must be structured.
Def Prohairesis/Aristotle: the selection of the most appropriate means.
Politics/Aristotle: Politics only means realizing on a large scale what every concrete process of action already performs in the small scale.
I 188
Politics/Zoon Politikon/Aristotle: this property is attributed to man because of his speech! Political institutions are to be understood from an ethics point of view.
Politics is not simply a ruling order, (VsPlato) with a good ruler like in Hobbes or Max Weber.
The ruler is not a large-scale housekeeper.
A common goal is to be investigated.
Politics/Aristotle: Starting point: village, which does not only exist due to everyday life needs.
      In the polis, the character of "self-sufficiency" replaces the elementary natural conditionality.
Objective: Eudaimonia, the "good life", in this highest of all objectives, the practice structure returns, as it were, reflexively to itself.
Problem: Contradictory towards the natural: on the one hand, the essence of practice as a goal has been politically entered into its own telos, and this legitimates talk of man as a political entity by nature.
On the other hand, the natural conditions have been overcome thanks to a self-sufficient practice.
Nothing but practice itself, no nature defines the good. This self-determination means freedom.



Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Properties Wittgenstein Hintikka I 60
Name/property/relation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the names of properties and relations are themselves properties and relations - the number of the names must be the same as that of the objects - ((s) Cf. the problem, that there are not enough names ...). ---
I 207
Properties/object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the properties, without which an object could not exist, may not be attributed in a description of the object - ((s) elsewhere/other author: one must be able to abstract from properties.) ---
II 189
Properties/WittgensteinVsPlaton: Looks for constituents of a mixture, such as if the properties would be constituents of things. ---
II 285
Properties/Notation/Wittgenstein: one could e.g. characterize all objects in the room on how far they differ from a chair - this is not a statement about the objects, but about the grammar - ((s)> Chisholm: "to live opposite from...": no property. >Properties/Chisholm.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Quantities Bigelow I 49
Quantities/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: with them we are going to refer to the core area of metaphysics. Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: emerge from the confrontation that certain things can be something and something else at the same time. That is only a superficial contradiction.
Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example:
a) two things are equal by both having a mass.
b) they differ at the same time because they have different masses.
Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities.
Solution/Plato: Participation in forms. Allows gradual treatment.
We are a moving a little away from Plato.
Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and vary the relation between this entity and the individuals who own it.
---
I 50
The entity explains what individuals have in common. The relation explains the different degrees. Nominalism/Berkeley/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is Berkeley's nominalism: a platonic, abstract form is replaced by a special individual, a "paradigm". (Terminology).
Commonality: individuals have commonality when they resemble the same paradigm.
Similarity: is, of course, also gradual, like gradual participation in forms in Plato.
Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual.
Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual).
Problem: Degrees of a relation.
Solution: Similarity and participation are an attempt.
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is wrong.
BigelowVsPlato: it does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of quantity).
---
I 264
Quantities/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Question: What should we allow as basic equipment? Forces, for sure. Thesis: there are essential connections between fundamental forces and the fundamental causal relation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must therefore also be part of the basic equipment of our world.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Reality Berkeley I 217f
Matter / material world / outer world / reality / reality / Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality! - I 232 involuntary perception is a moment of reality.
Danto I 202
LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared.
I 202
Berkeley - Schopenhauer: only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents.
  I 206
World / reality / Berkeley / Danto: there is nothing but ideas - but we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. - BerkeleyVsPlaton: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science / Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Reality Deutsch I 105
Kriterium für Wirklichkeit: etwas, dass zurückstoßen kann, existiert. Aber auch Dr. Johnson und stieß nicht direkt gegen den Stein. Er stieß nur einige Nerven an usw.
I 107
Def Wirklichkeit/Deutsch: wenn eine Größe nach der einfachsten Erklärung komplex und autonom ist, dann ist sie wirklich.
I 111
Theorie: je fundamentaler eine Theorie ist, desto umfassender sind die Beobachtungen, die für sie eine Rolle spielen. Die physikalische Wirklichkeit ist also in mehrfacher Weise selbstähnlich. Schließlich muss nicht alles, was wirklich ist, leicht zu identifizieren sein.
I 119
Simulation:Ein Wirklichkeitssimulator vermittelt dem Rezipienten indirekt sowohl interne als auch externe Erfahrungen, aber er lässt sich nicht so programmieren, dass er eine bestimmte interne Erfahrung simuliert. Roulette-Bsp .Tennis-Bsp.-Rahmenbedingungen festgelegt, Spielverlauf muß offen sein.Das setzt voraus, dass die abstrakten Gesetze selbst und nicht nur ihre Vorhersagekraft in der virtuellen Realität simuliert werden können.
I 190
Leben = Simulation: beide Verkörperung von Theorien über die Umwelt Was nur in den Gesetzen der klass. Physik vorkommt, existiert nicht in der Wirklichkeit.
Echte Wirbelstürme und Schmetterlinge gehorchen den Gesetzen der Quantentheorie, nicht denen der klassischen Mechanik!
I 225/26
Platons scheinbare Widerlegung, dass die Methoden der Naturwissenschaft zu mathematische Wahrheit führen könnten: wir können nichts über vollkommene Kreise wissen, weil wir nur zu unvollkommenen Kreisen Zugang haben. DeutschVsPlaton: dann könnten wir auch nur ungenaue Werkzeugmaschinen bauen, weil man die ersten mit ungenauen Werkzeugen bauen lässt. Also gäbe es keine Möglichkeit der Selbstkorrektur.

Deutsch I
D. Deutsch
Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997
German Edition:
Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000

Relation-Theory Bigelow I 55
Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big.
Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here.
Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations.
Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves.
---
I 56
Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects.
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves.
BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways.
---
I 57
Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all?
Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained.
Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur.
Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level.
2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things?
Ad 1. Example Mass
Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). ---
I 58
Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". Entailment/N.B.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity.
Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete.
Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others.
Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2.
Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things.
It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume.
For example, compare the pairs
"a, b"
"c, d"
"e, f"
between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length.
Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs.
---
I 59
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities).
Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components
(1) Individuals
(2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes:
Mass/Volume/Proportions/N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other.
Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another.
Level 1: Objects
Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level.
Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg.
N.B.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc.
Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet...
---
I 60
...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField).
Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941, 1966) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic")
Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit.
Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato.
---
I 61
Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example.
Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings.
Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,...
---
I 62
...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations.
BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels).
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Relativism Putnam VII 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Williams II 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards.
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I (i) 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language.
I (i) 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Religious Belief Epicurus Adorno XIII 222
Religious Belief/Epicurus/Adorno: Epicurus gives the reason that the universality of their assumption speaks for the existence of God. The reduction of the objective concept of truth to subjective opinion in this already neutralized, compliant, late-Greek consciousness forces Epicurus to join the general ruling more or less in a conformist way. EpicurusVsPlato/Adorno: if there is no longer an objective concept of reason - as the Platonic has prototypically shaped it - the average value of belief is very easily hypostatized instead.
This is found in the Hobbesian form of materialism, in which religion is recommended as a state-preserving means, that is, as a for-another, and not as an in-itself.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Science Heidegger Rorty II 65
Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality - Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. ---
Figal I 107f
Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Figal I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Science Aristotle Bubner I 120
Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation.
Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal?
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé.
Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively.
I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..."
Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries.
Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively.
I 147
Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization.
The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Second Nature McDowell I 19
Definition second nature/McDowell: Nature includes the second nature acquired by conceptual skills whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons. Second nature(s): internalised background of norms borrowed from nature.
I 109/110
Second nature/McDowell: it cannot float freely above the possibilities that belong to the normal human organism. >Education.
I 114
Second Nature/McDowell: Our education updates some of the potentials with which we were born. But: Animal/Human/McDowell: this is not an adding to our animal nature. No admixture.
I 118
Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: There are rules of nature, whether one is receptive to it or not. This is the result of proper upbringing. "Naturalism of second nature","Naturalized Platonism". Naturalized Platonism/McDowell: the structure of the space of reasons has autonomy.
But it cannot be derived from truths about humans.
It is not unbridled: not isolated from the "merely human". (Instead: sensitivity through education).
I 121
McDowellVsPlatonism: any platonism means that the norms are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein's Quietism recognizes this as a pseudo-problem. Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhuman. This does not raise any real questions about norms.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Sophism Plato Bubner I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: uses the same reasons to plead the incompleteness of dialectic, precisely because it has to do with the intersubjective speech practise. ---
I 42
PlatoVsSophists: unmethodic. ---
Bubner I 98
Sophism/Plato/Bubner: also the sophist cannot easily be disproved by empirical comparison. Its speeches must be examined to see if its terms match. ((s)> coherence theory/Plato).


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Subjects Hegel Bubner I 184
Subject/object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of cognition, Hegel determines the subject/object relationship on two sides: theory and practice. (Following AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "Radical separation of reason from experience". ---
I 185
Subject/object/antiquity/Bubner: the whole ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing of this at all.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Unconscious Freud Searle I 197
Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. ---
Rorty V 47
Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational).
2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged.
---
V 47/48
Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I.
---
V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. ---
V 61
Definition Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Universals Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world - false: to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs) - what universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined - but a posteriori: from discovery - no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones.
III 88
Stages/Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G) - 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation) - 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: his e.g. with a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uiU necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U (s) because of simple emerging properties) - Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances - the kind of "property" has an instance - Place pro universals in this sense. (so.)
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single U instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together - but it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy - solution: thesis of truth maker is the individual instantiation itself -> 96 II, II 102.
Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical U is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Universe Field I 104
Universe/Classes/Sets/Model/"all"/Field: as the universe of all classes is too large to form a countable model, it is too big to form a class and therefore too large, to form any (over-countable) model. ---
II 335
Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "There's only one universe"). Problem:PutnamVsPlatonism: How can we make it at all possible to pick out the "full" (universal) universe a nd to make it face a partial universe, and accordingly the standard-element-relation in contrast to a non-standard-element-relation? (Putnam 1980).
Putnam: Thesis: we cannot do that - i.e. that the "incomplete content" of the concepts "quantity" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all set theoretical theorems.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 44 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Benacerraf, P. Field Vs Benacerraf, P. I 24
VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself.
I 25
Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities.
I 26
Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I ​​I understand Benacerraf).
I 27
VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7).
I 29
Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Benacerraf, P. Lewis Vs Benacerraf, P. Field I 231
Example (2) if most mathematicians accept "p" as an axiom, then p.
I 232
VsPlatonism: he has a problem if he cannot explain (2). This is a reformulation of the famous problem of Benacerraf in "Mathematical truth". (see above). (>Benacerraf here departs from a causal theory of truth).
Field: our current approach does not depend on that, though.
I 233
Knowledge/Mathematics/Field: our approach does not depend on the givenness of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Instead: Reliability Theory/Knowledge/Field: the view that we should be skeptical if the reliability of our knowledge is not explainable in principle.
Mathematics/LewisVsBenacerraf: (Lewis, 1986, p.111 12): Benacerraf's case is not a problem for mathematics because most mathematical facts necessarily apply.
Reliability Theory/Lewis: then we also need an explanation of the reliable relationship, e.g., between facts about electrons and our "electron" belief states and we even have them! In this case, it is the causal approach, according to which the "electron" beliefs counterfactually (>counterfactual conditionals) depend on the existence and nature of electrons.
Explanation/Lewis: now it's precisely the contingent existence and nature of electrons, which makes the question of their existence and nature meaningful.
Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on non-contingent things. E.g. nothing can counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. Nothing meaningful can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist.
Stalnaker I 41
Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of general semantics. We should interpret existence statements about numbers, functions and sets with the same truth-conditional semantics as propositions about tables, quarks, etc.
I 42
Knowledge/Mathematics/Reality/Stalnaker: On the other hand, we should also expect that the access to our mathematical knowledge is continuous to the to everyday knowledge. The procedures by which we evaluate and justify mathematical statements should be explained by a general approach to knowledge, together with a representation of mathematical knowledge. Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Thesis: he gives natural semantics, but does not allow plausible epistemology. ((s) that does not explain how we come to knowledge).
Combinatorial Approach/Combinatorial/Terminology/Benacerraf: Example conventionalism, example formalism: they show mathematical procedures, but do not tell us what the corresponding confirmed mathematical statements tell us.
Benacerraf/Stalnaker: he himself does not offer any solution.
Reference/Benacerraf: Thesis: true reference needs a causal link.
Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Solution/LewisVsBenacerraf: pro Platonism but Vs causal link for reference.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R. New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.

NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.

NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Conceptualism Quine Vs Conceptualism VII (f) 126
Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond expressible conditions of membership of elements. ((s) VsPlatonism: Quasi requires that there should also be classes without such conditions, as classes should be independent of speakers.)
Cantor's proof: would lead to something else: He namely appeals to a class h of those members of the class k that are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer.
VII (f) 127
But thus the class h is specified impredicatively! h is in fact itself part of the subclass of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism.
The same fate also applies to Cantor's proof of the existence of hyper-countable infinities.
QuineVsConceptualism: which is indeed a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: Ex proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit.
ConceptualismVsReducibility Axiom: because it reintroduces the entire Platonist class logic.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Descartes, R. Freud Vs Descartes, R. Rorty V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equal. Mechanization, procedures to change ourselves.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R. Stegmüller Vs Descartes, R. Stegmüller IV 370
Knowledge/Recognition Theory/Descartes/Stegmüller: Descartes was dissatisfied with the status of knowledge in his time. He wanted to strengthen it with his methodical doubt.
IV 371
(i) I can without contradiction doubt the existence of my body, but not that of my consciousness as the bearer of my doubts. (ii) Cogito Principle: indisputable because of the fact that I recognize his truth clearly and unambiguously.
(iii) God as a perfect being cannot deceive. Sensory illusions do not stem from God, they arise in the complicated physiological perceptual apparatus.
Knowledge/Recognition Theory/VsDescartes/Stegmüller:
1. The status of the general rule remains unclear. It is at least threatened by the possibility of a deceiving God.
Problem: either the rule is absolutely safe, then it is not threatened by a deus malignus, or it is not completely safe, then any thinking threatens it.
2. Cogito argument: based on the insight into the self-contradiction "I don't think now".
IV 372
But that is a different clarity than that of mathematics and also that of the proof of God. From the Cogito argument the authority of clear and distinct thinking cannot be deduced! 3. From the fact that at first I can only conclude with certainty that I am a thinking being, it does not follow that my consciousness is a thinking substance and a thing different from my body.
IV 373
MackieVsDescartes/Stegmüller: two points: 1. Descartes claims that perfection is a positive term, imperfection a negative one, which presupposes the former.
IV 374
On the other hand, he himself admits that I cannot understand the infinity of God and that there is no independent idea of perfection in my mind. But then I can gain a positive understanding of my own imperfection, from which I in turn form the negative concept of perfection. I am in constant change and am aware of it.
I could also say that the purely negative concept of freedom from all shortcomings is the only one available to me for the idea of omniscience.
2. MackieVsPlato/MackieVs ideal forms:
Example: absolute straight line: such ideas could not come from the sensory perception, because no real distance is completely straight. They would then have to originate from the direct not sensual familiarity with ideal beings.
However, we can very well have the idea of a curved line, which is gained from perception!
Then we can also imagine that this stretch is less curved. I can then imagine a borderline case that could not be further freed from curvature.
The idea of perfection can thus be explained in terms of its content entirely from the material of sensory perception and the understanding of negation.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Dialectic Martin Vs Dialectic Arm II 186
MartinVsDialektik/VsPlaton: weder ist Nicht Sein eine Form von Sein noch Sein eine Form von Nicht Sein. Dennoch die Kette von An und Abwesenheiten von etwas sind wesentlich und vervollständigend füreinander. Der Begriff eines Endes ist der Begriff einer Grenze wo etwas ist und etwas nicht ist. .
Ebene/Stufen/Ordnung/Martin: das muss man nicht mit zwielichtigen höheren Stufen des Seins erklären, das ist bloß gut für theoretische Übungen an der Tafel.
Alles in Begriffen der 1 Stufe abzuwickeln ist schwierig, aber es kann durchgeführt werden. Abwesenheit 1 Stufe macht "allgemeine Tatsachen" oder "allgemeine Zustände" überflüssig.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation Putnam VII 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism).
Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.
---
Horwich I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
Horwich I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true).
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Horwich I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme).
Horwich I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
Horwich I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
Williams II 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
Williams II 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Wright Vs Field, H. Field I 43
Anti-Platonism/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): claims that modal considerations undermine my version of the anti-platonism. Because I take mathematics and the existence of mathematical entities (mE) as consistent, and consistency as the modal basic concept (possibility), I would be bound to think that it is wrong that there are mathematical entities - that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent wrong". ((s) "There could just as well have been mathematical entities, i.e. empirical question").
Contingent/Wright/HaleVsField: is not logical, and thus something other than "neither logically true nor logically contradictory". And that makes Field's position absurd.
WrightVsField: where should Fields "contingency" be contingent on? For example, according to Field, the actual world contains no numbers, but it could have contained some. But there is neither an explanation for why not, nor would there be an explanation if there were numbers.
FieldVsVs: if the argument were good, it would be equally valid against (nonlogical) platonism, for which mathematics goes back behind logic. Then the denial of all mathematics would be logically consistent and therefore "contingent". But this is a confusion of the different meanings of "possible". Analog:
For example, if the existence of God is logically consistent, and there is none, then it is contingent wrong that there would be one.
Problem: the atheist has no access to what the contingent is supposed to be on. There would be neither an explanation for the existence nor for the non-existence. There are no favorable conditions for God's existence and no unfavorable ones. (>Anselm, 2. Ontological argument).
But WrightVsField: has even more interesting arguments: 1. without the assumption that mathematics consists of necessary truths, the view that mathematics is conservative (preserving) is unjustified.
I 44
Analog: without the assumption that mathematics is true, the assumption that it is consistent is unjustified. Justification/FieldVsWright: You can justify any belief by a stronger belief from which it follows. (>Strength of Theories).
Wright and Hale would have to show that Platonism has better reasons for the necessary truth of mathematics than Anti-Platonism has for assuming that mathematics is conservative (or consistent). And it is not certain that this is true.
WrightVsField: 2. Anyone who represents both:
a) that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent false" and
b) that mathematics is conservative,
can give no reason not to believe in mathematical entities!
Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that any internally consistent combination of nominalistic statements is also consistent with mathematics.
Then no combination of nominalistic statements can provide an argument against belief in mathematics (ontology).
WrightVsField: how then can there be any reason at all not to believe in mathematics? He has no proof of his own nominalism. It follows that Field cannot be a nominalist, but that he must be an agnostic.
FieldVsWright: this one misjudges the relevance that I attribute to the question of renunciability and indispensability.
Conservativity: does not automatically show that there can be no reason to believe in mathematics.
To succeed with VsPlatonism, we must also show that mathematics is dispensable in science and meta logic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics.
I 45
If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Black Vs Frege, G. II 124
Numbers/BlackVsPlato/BlackVsFrege: false Platonism: imagining them as "extraordinary" or "special", "eternal" objects.
II 125
Grammatically, however, the names of numbers (numerals) differ in important aspects from the name of physical objects. E.g. "Two people came in": Here "two" is public. Adverb.
This can be transformed into "one and one: "a man came in and then another."
This is not possible in the case of "red". (> Paraphrase).
BlackVsFrege: These grammatical facts show that numbers are no "special kinds of objects".
Frege: the great Frege, however, made no elementary mistake by accepting it anyeay, but he was never really satisfied with it.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Prior Vs Frege, G. I 50
Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument.
The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0).
But a number!
The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values.
Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals.
Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else.
Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.)
Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2-1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing".
That is to correspond to the fact that 2-1 is not only "> 0", but the number 1!
I 51
And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3-1) 1 is the number 1, because 3-1 is the number 2.
There are no different truths.
PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false.
Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid.
But we have said above that sentences denote nothing.
Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (Wittgenstein II 94): There is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning)
Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless.
We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each φ and each ψ if exactly one thing φs and no thing ψs, then more things are φ-ing than are ψ-ing. Def "more than".
I 51/52
Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink".
Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference!
That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either).
Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?).
Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity."
Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous.
But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone!
PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "the false thing".
Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension".
I 53
PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects).

Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names.
Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns.
And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions)
I 166
but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name).
PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation.
This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Kant Bubner Vs Kant I 80
Kant: defended himself against contemporary transcendental philosophy with the essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenen vornehmenen Ton in der Philosophie" ((1796) KantVsJacobi). Kant invents a position for his polemics that deals "enthusiastically instead of critically" with philosophy. He attributes this enthusiasm to Plato. Opposite position: attributed to Aristotle.
BubnerVsKant: both positions cannot be historically proven. Kant had very little knowledge of antiquity.
I 88
KantVsPlato: the mathematician Plato is not a good metaphysicist. An unfathomable confusion of view and concept.
"Intellectual view" erroneously brings together immediacy and discursivity.
There was no explanation of how the two came together.
"Undemocratic esotericism" is only understandable for members of a "club" > connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau's equality demands.
I 89/90
BubnerVsKant: the accusation of confusion can only be upheld if one accepts the Kantian premises. In reality Plato's text is different: the Phaidon praises the "flight into the Logos" as a way out of the immediateism of the pre-Socratics, the "second best journey" renounces the unbroken gaze and seeks the mirror of things in the speeches. The synthetic construction of logic is the access to the world to which we must confine ourselves. Plato is by no means inferior to Kant in his contempt of the "noble tone".
I 108
Synthesis/Kant: while the other syntheses find something else, which leads them by their doing to a unity ((s)so nevertheless??) which is again distinguished from it, the highest Synthesis has to do only with itself. Synthesis/VsKant: his followers have uncovered the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this chain of thought.
I/Fichte: action of the settling I
I/Hegel: vitality of the mind in constant self-mediation. (As an absolute principle).
I 109
"Intellectual View"/Bubner: the idea introduced by Kant's successors VsKant to bring together immediacy and reflexivity. BubnerVs: hermaphroditic. The anonymous author of the "Eldest System Program" follows this model.
They demand from the philosopher the aesthetic talent that breaks down the barrier to art production.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Nominalism Carnap Vs Nominalism Quine XI 155
CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about the choice of a language.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Nominalism Field Vs Nominalism I 67
FieldVsNominalism: I do think that ME like numbers, functions, sets etc. are dispensable, but I do not claim the dispensability of any entity that some self-proclaimed nominalist rejects E.g. spacetime regions.
I 68
Because we have causal knowledge of of Sp.t.r., in the case of ME, we must postulate mysterious connections to a Platonic realm beyond time and space. E.g. A knowledge about an absolute infinity of objects in that realm. Sp.t. does not bring epistemic problems with it, even if we do not stand in a causal relation with each tiger.
I 69
FieldVsPlatonism: its entities are in principle inaccessible. Reference/Relation/Knowledge/Field: Problem: a) How do words stand for things? b) more fundamental: how do beliefs stand for things? Problem: in the broad sense: ME do not only stand in no causal, but also in no physical relation with us. Sp.t.: no problem: we can point to many of them! And refer to them with index words ("here", "now", etc.).

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Objectivism Putnam Vs Objectivism Field II 325
Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "there is only one universe"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we manage at all to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and to oppose this to a partial universe, and in accordance with this the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-member standard relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here from the perspective of "one universe").
Putnam: thesis we cannot do that. That is, that the "incomplete content" of the terms "set" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all theoretical conclusions.
PutnamVsObjectivism: concluded the same anti-objectivist methodological consequences such as the Platonism of perfection: although the standard Platonism has incorporated this idea that we have a set-theoretical universe, this is not really part of Platonism per se.
PutnamVsPlatonism/Field: if he's right, this standard Platonism cannot be maintained.
Field: Putnam is right: the "anti-objectivist" methodology is the right conclusion, whatever the ontological consequences are. The "Platonism of perfection" shows us this.
Field II 338
PutnamVsObjectivism/Set Theory/Field: (Putnam 1980 first half): thesis: even if we assume that part of the standard Platonism, who says that there is only one universe, Problem: then there is nothing in our conclusion practices, which could determine the specific truth value of typical undecidable sentences.
Field II 339
This can be easily extended to the relation of semantic consequence in logic 2nd order. In short: (ia) Nothing in our practices determines that the term "set" picks out the entire set-theoretical universe V and not any suitably closed part of V.
(ib), even if the entire set-theoretical universe V could be picked out, there would be nothing in our practice that could determine that our term "e" picks out, the element relation E on V unlike any other relation on V that obeys our axioms.
(ii) The indeterminacy in (ia) and (ib) is sufficient to allow the truth value of typical undecidable sentences of the set theory to be undetermined. ((ib) alone would also be sufficient, often also (ia) alone),
Undecidable sentences/Field: which are covered by this scheme? What are the semantic facts that are determined by our conclusion practices? How is the semantics of "quantity" and "e" defined by our practice far enough to allow the quantifier "only a finite number of" to be sufficiently defined. And with that, how the truth will be determined by F-decidable, but otherwise by undecidable sentences, also for the number theory.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Plato Armstrong Vs Plato Arm III 90
ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlato: Universals are abstractions. But not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers:
III 91
Abstract/Quine: calls Platonic universals "abstract". (In a different sense than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions). Abstraction/Armstrong: a relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction.
Arm III 126
Universals/ArmstrongVsPlato: contingent, just like particulars! That means they do not exist precisely uninstantiated. Therefore, it does not seem plausible at all that if a non-existent U came to existence (Tooley), it would have a certain relation to others or, according to the law of excluded third, would not have. Conclusion: Tooleys ingenious examples do not prevent us from understanding uninstantiated laws as disguised counterfactual conditionals, whose truth or falsity depends entirely on the actual, i.e. on instantiated laws (higher level!). The "law" which is assumed to apply thereafter may never apply. Nevertheless, it may be specified.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Plato Kant Vs Plato Bubner I 86
KantVsSchlosser: (KantVsPlato): The decline of apriorism has been expanded to unbridled theory claims.
I 88
KantVsPlato: The mathematician Plato is not suitable to be a metaphysician. Unrealized Mistake between intuition and concept.
"Intellectual intuition" brings immediacy and discursivity erroneously together.
There is no clarification on how to get the two together.
"Undemocratic esotericism" only natural for members of a "club"> connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau’s demands for equality.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Plato Maturana Vs Plato I 139
Cave Parable/MaturanaVsPlato: we are not like the people in the cave parable, rather like biological probes in the laboratory: we determine and use those realms of reality in which we live.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Plato Pinker Vs Plato I 180
Memory/PinkerVsPlato: ever since he coined the metaphor of impression in soft wax, we always assumed the neural medium must have some internal resistance against the retention of information. But actually there are indelible memories.   Of course, there is one important restriction of memory (to save costs, e.g. in the form of computation time) but that is not a by-product!
I 181
If such laws exist in consciousness, they should be found in other information processing systems as well, and in reality! E.g. frequency of books requested in libraries: those that have been requested more frequently in the past are also in greater demand in the present.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Plato Rorty Vs Plato VI 254
Knowledge/Platon/Rorty: Knowledge will set us free. But you have to answer the question: why should I be moral. RortyVsPlaton: with that he has saddled us with a distinction between true and false self.
VI 255
       Plato suggests to us that we know something of which evil people have no idea.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Plato Wittgenstein Vs Plato Danto I 51
WittgensteinVsPlato/Danto: would have considered Plato's thesis of the forms accurately as the type of confusion that the philosophy repeatedly lapses into. Philosophy is simply not science according to Wittgenstein.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Plato Verschiedene Vs Plato Vaihinger I 194ff
Arnobius/Vaihinger: (300 A.D.) E.g. fiction of a human being who grew up in complete solitude from birth to refute Plato's theory of knowledge. ArnobiusVsPlato.





Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Plato Martin Vs Plato Arm II 186
MartinVsDialectics/VsPlato: neither is not being a form of being nor being a form of not being. Yet the chain of presence and absence of something is essential and completing for each other. The concept of an end is the concept of a border where something is and is not something.
Levels/Stages/Order/Martin: one does not have to explain this with dubious higher stages of being, it is only good for theoretical exercises on the blackboard.
To deal with everything in terms of the 1st level is difficult, but it can be done. Absence of 1st level makes "general facts" or "general states" superfluous.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Plato Bigelow Vs Plato I 49
Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities. Solution/Plato: participation in forms: Allows gradual treatment.
We differ slightly from Plato:
Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and the relation between that entity and the individuals who own it varies.
I 50
Properties/Gradual/Degree/Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual).
Problem: degrees of relation.
Solution: similarity and participation are an attempt.
Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is incorrect.
BigelowVsPlato: but does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of the quantity).
I 51
VsPlato: Assuming many differnet properties instead of a variable relation, each for one quantity: E.g. to have the property having a mass of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach makes much of what is hard for Plato to explain easier: he shows what distinguishes objects (while Plato rather shows what they have in common). Def Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently pronounced them. E.g. mass.
Def Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (at the same time). E.g. a mass of 2.0 kg.
I 51
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: with Plato, all things have a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the contrary, want relations of things to each other. BigelowVsPlato: that allows us to explain different types of differences between objects, namely, that they have different relational properties which other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things may be different in different ways.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Plato Hegel Vs Plato Bubner I 42
PlatoVsSophists: unmethodical. HegelVsPlato: directed the same accusation against him. Do not come beyond the sophistic reasoning. "The dialectic to dissolve the particular and to produce the General is not the true dialectic. (s) stands with the only negatives). The "external reflection" had to yield to the "thing itself".But this makes the voluntary self-task of the reflection necessary! The total mediation must also include mediating itself. (Hegel. logic)
---
I 77
HegelVsPlato: stopped halfway. He was moving undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectic, that means the smooth reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability stating a relationship of incompatibility. This is a translation task (of the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be done through the Socratic irony. "General irony of the world".

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Plato Aristotle Vs Plato Bubner I 23
AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king.
Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects.
Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it.
 I 119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
 I 120
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
 I 164
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.
I 184
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". ---
Kanitscheider II 35
Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe.
Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position).
"Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number".
II 36
Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement.
First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified.
World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time.
AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius:
Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help".
Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum.
II 37
Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Plato Chisholm Vs Plato III 59
Necessity/Plato/Chisholm: can only be seen when one turns away from growth and decay and towards the absolute and eternal, the unchangeable. AristoteleVsPlato/Chisholm: one must look at the particulars in order to learn something about the necessity. From this we learn what it means, for example, to be blue. The same goes for red, and then we learn that red and blue cannot be in the same place at the same time.
Induction/Aristotle:
1. Perception of individuals 2. Abstraction: what does it mean for a thing to be blue, or to be a human being.
3. intuitive grasp of relations between properties.
III 60
4. with the intuitive knowledge we have the truths of reason and attribute necessities. Intuitive induction/Terminology/Chisholm: we better call induction like that in Aristotle, because it differs from the later concept.
A priori/Chisholm: the proposition on the properties (that a thing is not blue when it is red) and the universal generalization are known a priori. So they differ from the induction by enumeration.
On the other hand:
Enumerative induction/Chisholm: this is about justifying the conclusion.
III 61
Intuitive induction: here the connection between individual examples and conclusion is much less strong. It may be enough to imagine a single thing. Essence/Husserl: can be exemplified even with fantasy situations.
III 62
Necessity/Tradition/Chisholm: once we acquire some concepts, (i.e. once we know what it means that something has these attributes) we will be able to know according to this traditional conception what it means for a proposition or fact to be necessary. A priori/Tradition/Chisholm: this is what the tradition called the a priori.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Plato Nominalism Vs Plato Rorty II 124
Def Nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all beings are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater extent to the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismVsPlato/Rorty: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Plato Meixner Vs Plato I 104
Exemplification/E./Meixner: the actual (strong, not Meinongean) exemplification has still two forms: the predicative exemplification, in which the exemplified entity y is a predicative universal (U), i.e. a single-digit or multi-digit U, and the type exemplification, in which the exemplified entity is a non-predicative U, i.e. a type-object. Predicative Exemplification: can be traced back to the actuality of instantiation facts.
Type Exemplification/Meixner: reminiscent of Plato's "Participation": "x is sufficiently similar to the idea (the type object)".
Today: when we think of "beauty" we think of a certain universalism, namely the property of being beautiful (= o1[o1 is beautiful]).
Plato: thought on the other hand of a certain type object; the idea of beauty.
Participation/Plato: For example, Diotima participates in beauty because it is different from beauty.
Meixner: undoubtedly, beauty is now sufficiently similar to beauty (timeless), because it is even identical to it. Thus follows Plato's original interpretation of type exemplification,
I 105
that the beauty EXEM T the beauty. It follows that the sentence "Beauty is beautiful" is true! This is the most famous Platonic self-predication. The fact that beauty is beautiful, justice just, ugliness ugly and injustice unjust could perhaps still be accepted.
MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: if bravery is supposed to be brave and dirtiness dirty (quite apart from the fact that the idea of dirtiness no longer suits the upscale society of beauty, justice, etc.).
It becomes completely implausible with the type object human being: according to Plato's original theory, the type object human being would be a human being itself. (Because of self-identity, not only similarity).
Solution/Meixner: each type object (TO) should have a unique property.
x EXEM T y = y is a TO and y EXEM P is the y corresponding property.
The corresponding property is known to us, namely "the y corresponding property is a one-digit universal and is a fact and actual".
Question: is there a better alternative to this exemplification theory? (So not type exemplification as "predicative exemplification turned into non-predicative" as it were?).
I 106
Exemplification/Plato/Meixner: originally: mirroring from more or less great distance, where in the borderline case image and original coincide. Participation: here another alternative already suggests itself.
Concatenation: also exemplification as concatenation is at least indicated in Plato.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Platonism Field Vs Platonism III 105
1st Order Theory/Conclusion/Field: for each 1st order theory there is a better one that seems to be intuitively true if the original is, and this one is more expressive (stronger).
III 106
This applies to nominalistic as well as for Platonic theories. Therefore, it cannot be used as an argument for the inadequacy of N0 if Platonic 1st order theories cannot be regarded as inadequate as well. Conclusion: if you’re set on 1st order theories, there is no obvious way to decide whether one is good enough to deliver the consequences needed in practice and to exclude the "recherché" consequences (with Gödel sentence).
FieldVsPlatonism: So the above argument is not an objection to Platonism.
2nd order theory: is, of course, definitely a remedy for this problem. But we have seen that N (which is 2nd order) has all the consequences that the Platonistic ML 2nd order has, and therefore it is difficult to see what the benefits of Platonism should be in the context of the 2nd order logic.

I 112
Model Theory/MT/Explanation/Field: Do we also need a nominalistic analogy to the Platonic MT? This is a verbal question. It depends on whether we understand modal logic itself as an analogue to platonistic model theory. If so, then model theory is like physics and we can use the previous considerations. And we have to use them, because the applicability of metalogic cannot be explained not solely from conservativeness. If the logic is not modal.
If, on the other hand, we do not consider modal logic like that, then the model theory is like the proof theory: we do not need a nominalistic analogue of the model theory, because it does not serve as an explanation.
Then it only serves to find out about possibility and impossibility. Then we do not need to assume the truth of the statements (VsPlatonism).

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Platonism McDowell Vs Platonism I 121
McDowellVsPlatonism: every Platonism has the consequence that the standards are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein’s quietism recognizes this as false problem. >Quietism.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Platonism Prior Vs Platonism I 52
Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension".
I 53
PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as an extension. For truth value and classes are both logical constructions, and very similar ones at that! And no "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Platonism Putnam Vs Platonism I (d) 112
Platonism/Mathematics/Putnam: the Platonists claims a mysterious "ability to capture mathematical objects". PutnamVsPlatonism: which neural process could eventually be described as the perception of a mathematical object? Why of a mathematical object and not of another? Why should we be able to capture the correct object neurally and not capture the wrong item neuronal (neural)?
I do not doubt that some axioms are built into our concept of rationality: for example, "Each number has a successor".
Now, if, for example, the axiom of choice is in abeyance, Skolem gives us reason to assign the corresponding truth value only in the context of a theory previously adopted.
Convention/Mathematics/Poincaré: Convention yes, arbitrariness no. >Conventions, >ontology.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Platonism Ryle Vs Platonism I 68
Action and Understanding/Ryle: are roughly speaking just different practices of the same craft. The spectator finds what the originator invented. The originator leads and the viewer follows, but the path is the same. ---
I 69
Two reservations: 1. The ability to perform and evaluate an operation does not necessarily include the ability to work out a criticism or lesson. E.g. a ship's boy is likely to be able to execute a node and to recognize a wrong one, but he is probably not able to describe it alone with words.
2. The ability to evaluate an action does not require the same degree of skill as the ability to perform it. E.g. you do not need to be a genius to recognize a genius. E.g. a good theater critic may be a moderate actor.
---
I 70
Imitation/Understanding/RyleVsPlatonism/Ryle: Unfortunately the program of imitation of Plato has never been quite successful. E.g. I am, after all, a Plato reader of the twentieth century, something that Plato has never been. Understanding must be imperfect. (Because it is a skill).
---
I 73
Partial understanding and misunderstanding: E.g. One cannot say that someone only partly knows that Sussex is an English county. Either one knows it or not. But one can partially know the counties of England, and partially not.
On the other hand, it is customary to say that someone can do something only in part, i.e. He had a certain ability to a limited extent. As it was to be expected, this also applies to understanding.
---
I 74
An ability to learn is something else than to get to know a situation, or to acquire knowledge. "half-trained" is a meaningful expression, but "half-notified" is not.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.

IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Platonism Conceptualism Vs Platonism Arm II 111
ConceptualismVsPlatonism: which criterion of the existence we apply is a question of what aspect of the classification process, we want to single out: the objects or the ability to classify.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Platonism Schiffer Vs Platonism I 107
SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus.
I 152
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction).
2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious:
SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own).

I 234
Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties.
Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as
E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he
believes".
Platonic realism: E.g.
(a) Mother Teresa is modest
after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here:
1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object
2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio
referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa)
Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation.
3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective
"modest".
I 235
Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term.
Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation
Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest).
Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is.
((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.)
Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest".
Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.:
1. Between names and object.
2. Between predicate and property.
Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Platonism Benacerraf Vs Platonism Field II 324
BenacerrafVsPlatonism/Field: standard argument: if there are objects as Platonism accepts them, how should we have an epistemic access to them? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: used an argument against the causal theory of knowledge at the time.
PlatonismVsBenacerraf: therefore attacked causal theory.
Field: but Benacerraf's objection goes much deeper and is independent of causal theory.
Benacerraf: Thesis: a theory can be rejected if it is dependent on the assumption of a massive chance. For example the two statements:´
II 325
(1) John and Judy met every Sunday afternoon last year at different places by chance, (2) they have no interest in each other and would never plan to meet, nor is there any other hypothesis for explanation.
ad (2): should make an explanation by some "correlation" impossible.
Even if (1) and (2) do not contradict each other directly, they are in strong tension with each other. A belief system that represents both would be highly suspicious.
N.B.: but then Platonism is also highly suspicious! Because it postulates an explanation for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and mathematical facts. (>Access, > Accessibility) For example, why do we only tend to believe that p, if p (for a mathematical p). And for this we must in turn postulate a mysterious causal relationship between belief and mathematical objects.
PlatonismVsVs/Field: can claim that there are strong logical connections between our mathematical beliefs. And in fact, in modern times, we can say that we
a) tend to conclude reliably and that the existence of mathematical objects serves that purpose; or
b) that we accept p as an axiom only if p.
FieldVsPlatonism: but this explains reliability again only by some non-natural mental forces.
VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. he "proves too much": if his argument were valid, it would undermine all a priori knowledge (VsKant). And in particular undermine logical knowledge. ("Proves too much").
BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Solution: there is a fundamental separation between logical and mathematical cases. Moreover, "metaphysical necessity" of mathematics cannot be used to block Benacerraf's argument.
FieldVsBenacerraf: although his argument is convincing VsPlatonism, it does not seem to be convincing VsBalaguer. II 326
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): other approach, (influential argument):
1.
For example, there are several ways to reduce the natural numbers to sets: Def natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and each natural number >0 is the set that contains the set that is n-1 as the only element.
Def natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: every natural number n is the set that has as elements the sets that are the predecessors of n.
Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or Neumann's approach "presents things correctly". There is no fact that determines whether numbers are sets.
That is what I call the
Def Structuralist Insight/Terminology/Field: Thesis: it makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. …+…

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Proof Theory Deflationism Vs Proof Theory Field I 100
VsDeflationismus: Problem: wie rechtfertigt man die Nützlichkeit des Schließens auf metalogischer Ebene statt auf der Objekt Ebene? Beweistheorie: hier insbesondere gibt es gar keine Objektebene!
Objektebene: hier machen die Aussagen keine Referenz auf Sätze oder Formeln. Oder abstrakte Analoga davon wie Propositionen). Und damit auch nicht auf Axiome, Schlußregeln oder Ableitungen.
Problem: wie können wir dann die Anwendbarkeit (Nützlichkeit) von beweistheoretischem Schließen zeigen?
I 101
DeflationismusVsBeweistheorie: da diese mit mathematischen Entitäten arbeitet, kann der Deflationist nicht annehmen, daß wir überhaupt Wissen von ihr erhalten. Wie kann der Deflationist dennoch ihre Nützlichkeit zeigen? 1. wir müssen die normalen Definitionen beweistheoretischer Begriffe zurückweisen und welche ohne Referenz auf mathematische Entitäten (mE) finden.
a) wir brauchen eine hinreichend kraftvolle Theorie aktualer Inskriptionen, ohne Modalität: mit einer solchen Theorie könnten wir Begriffe wie "e ist eine wohlgeformte Inskription", "e und f sind typ identische Inskriptionen" , "d ist (eine Inskription, die) eine Ableitung (enthält in bezug auf System F)",
sowie verschiedene Prädikate von Inskriptionen, die diese strukturell beschreiben (z.B. von einem bestimmten Inskriptions Typ A zu sein). Das könnte in Logik 1. Stufe ausgeführt werden.
b) wir müssen eine modale Extension schaffen: in der wir z.B. "A ist ableitbar" verstehen als "es ist möglich, daß es eine Ableitung gibt, deren letzte Zeile eine A-Inskription ist".
VsPlatonismus: also nicht: "es existiert aktual ein bestimmter Typ abstrakter Sequenzen abstrakter Analoga der Symbole.
Field: damit soll kein neuer Typ von Möglichkeit neben logischer Möglichkeit eingeführt werden außer wenn wir sie aus strikter logischer Möglichkeit plus anderen akzeptablen Begriffen definieren können.
Problem: 1. logische Möglichkeit ist gänzlich anti essentialistisch. (?). ((s) Nimmt nichts als wesentliches Substrat an? Als Wesen, als Entität?)
Field: das bringt ein Problem für die Übersetzung von Sätzen, wo "ableitbar" im der Reichweite des Quantors liegt. (s) "Es gibt etwas, (eine Entität) das ableitbar ist".
Field: Bsp "er äußerte eine ableitbare Inskription" wäre immer falsch in einer naiven Übersetzung.
I 102
Lösung: substitutionale Quantifikation. (ungleich Kripke/Wallace). 2. Problem: die Konsistenz mit axiomatischer Beweistheorie ist nicht hinreichend für Beweisbarkeit im normalen Sinn: Unvollständigkeits Theoreme liefern Fälle von unbeweisbaren Formeln, wo die Behauptung, daß es einen Beweis gibt konsistent ist mit der Beweistheorie.
Lösung: für die Beweisbarkeit von A ...Existenz eines Beweises kompatibel sein mit einer (nominalistischen oder platonistischen) Beweistheorie die in einer kraftvollen Logik aufgestellt ist, die Ableitungen ausschließen kann, die nicht echt endlich sind. z.B. eine Logik mit einem Quantor "es gibt nur endlich viele" oder mit substitutionalem Quantor.
stärker/schwächer/(s): stärker: eine Logik, die unendliche Ableitungen ausschließt.

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Relativism Plato Vs Relativism Putnam V 163
PlatonVsProtagoras (relativist): Protagoras: when I say X, I should actually say "I think X". No view has the same meaning for me as for anyone else.
PlatonVsRelativism: Recourse: if every statement X means: "I think X", then you have to insert infinitely:
(1) I think that I think that snow is white
V 164
PutnamVsPlaton: in this form the argument is not much good. Protagoras might agree, but it does not follow that his analysis must be indefinitely applied to itself, but only that it could! Plato, however, had noticed something very deep. Relativism, modern form: every culture, and every discourse has its own views, standards, requirements, and truth (and justification) is relative in relation to them.
Of course, it is naturally assumed that the question of whether X is relatively true to them, is something "absolute", in turn!

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Tichy, P. Armstrong Vs Tichy, P. Arm III 90
ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers:
III 91
Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation.
III 97
ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!.
III 98
Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: ​​be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Various Authors Derrida Vs Various Authors Derrida I 50
DerridaVsLogocentrism: conflict between the "will to say" and the unintentional by the nature of the description given. Derrida tries to find a point outside: the "exorbitant". "Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical.
DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this critique around. By wearing out the metaphor, it withdraws. Return in a changed form.
Derrida I 88 (?)
Vs Derrida: he overlooks that "wearing out" is again a metaphor. The thinking in its relation to the metaphor cannot be determined or identified!
I 139
DerridaVsMarx: is too dependent on enlightenment. Derrida deconstructs Marx and introduces the term "messianic" in contrast to messianism.
I 150
DerridaVsMauss: does not notice the contradiction between gift and exchange, because there is a delay between gift and exchange. Therefore Mauss does not speak of the gift but in reality of the circular exchange.
Habermas I 194
Derrida: criticizes the rule of the Logos, which is always inherent in the spoken word. DerridaVsPhonocentrism: is a disguised figure of the logo centrism of the Occident. The metaphor of the Book of Nature is a manuscript hard to decipher.
Habermas I 203
Jaspers: "The world is the handwriting of another, never completely readable world; existence alone deciphers it. DerridaVsPlatonization of meaning.
Habermas I 234
DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalism), Vs Structuralist Aesthetics.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Platonism Field, Hartry I 44
To succeed in VsPlatonism, we must also show, thesis: that mathematics is dispensable in science and metalogic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. (>Indispensability argument).
I 45
If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism.
I 186
Def moderate platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. Then one probably also believes that there are relations of physical size between objects and numbers. (But only derived): Example "mass in kilogram" is then relation between a given physical object and the real number 15,2.
Example "distance in meters" is a relation between two objects ((s) on one side) and the real number 7,4.
The difference to high-performance platonism (HPP) lies in the attitude to these relations:
Moderate Platonism: Thesis: These are conventional relations derived from more fundamental relations existing between physical objects alone.
Def High Performance Platonism/Field: denies that and takes the relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact that cannot be explained in other terms.
Inflated one could explain this as "platonistic participation".
II 332
Standard Platonism: Thesis: Mathematical theories such as set theory or the theory of real numbers are about different mathematical domains, or at least about certain structures, because there is no need to assume that isomorphic domains (i.e. domains with the same structure) would be mathematically indistinguishable. Thus, "regions" should not be assumed as sets.
II 333
Def "Platonism of perfection": (plenitude): postulates a set of mathematical objects. Thesis: Whenever we have a consistent purely mathematical theory, there are mathematical objects that fulfill the theory under a standard-fulfillment relation. Platonism of perfection: but also suggests that we can consider all quantifiers about mathematical entities in this way,
I 334
that they are implicitly limited by a predicate to which all other predicates of mathematical entities are subordinated: The "overarching" predicate: is then different between the different mathematical theories. These theories then no longer conflict.
II 335
Universe/Standard Platonism/Field: (Thesis: "Only one universe exists"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we even manage to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and confront it with a sub-universe, and accordingly the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-standard element relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here placed from the perspective of "Universe").
Putnam: Thesis: We simply cannot do that.
Nominalism Rorty, R. II 124
Def nominalism / Rorty: the thesis that all beings are nominal and all necessities de dicto. No description applies to a greater extent the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismusVsPlato / Rorty: nature can not be dissected at its joints.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Science Platon Danto I 51
WittgensteinVsPlaton: seine These: von der wissenschaftlichen Erfassung der Formen ist genau die Verwechslung von Wissenschaft und Philosophie.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005