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Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Counterpart Theory Plantinga Schwarz I 57
Counterpart / Counterpart theory / PlantingaVsLewis / PlantingaVsCounterpart theory: (1974(1),115f,1987(2),209): According to Lewis, then all things strictly speaking would have all their properties essential, since there is no possible value in which they (not just any substitutes) have other properties. For example, if it were one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then another world would be real, and none of us would be there. Similar to Kripke:

KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, when we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we're not talking about Humphrey, but someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(3),44f).

Counterpart / counterpart theory / SchwarzVsKripke / SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections are misunderstood by Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands exactly for the quality that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. Humphrey has this trait by virtue of his character. (1983d(4),42).
The real problem is how does Humphrey win the election in the world?
Plantinga: Humphrey would have won, if the corresponding world (the facts) had the quality of existence.
Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with the intuitions Kripke and Plantinga refer to.


1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press
2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical
Perspectives, 1: 189–231
3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
4. D- Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Plant I
A. Plantinga
The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Possible Worlds Plantinga Schwarz I 68
Def Possible worlds/Plantinga:d defines as maximum possible facts. ("magic ersatzism")
Schwarz I 69
Facts as abstract entities about whose structure not much can be said. At any case, they are no real universes or constructions of real things. Existence/"existence"/Plantinga: (>"there is"): is a fundamental property that cannot be further analyzed. Other facts do not exist, but could exist.
Def maximum/Subject/Plantinga: a fact is maximum if its existence implies either its existence or non-existence for any other fact.

Possible worlds/Plantinga: are maximum possible facts. For example, that "in" a world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the facts had the property of existence.
VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of talking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor a picture or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys.

LewisVsPlantinga:
1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality even though there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities? Plantinga's facts make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what qualities exist. Plantinga thus presupposes modality in the characterization of worlds. ((Lewis 1986e(1),§3,4)
2. Plantingas states of affairs make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what properties exist. Plantinga thus already assumes modality in the characterization of worlds.
3. We also want to talk not only about worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(2),262, 272). This is a non-qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. So if in modal realism we have countless merely possible things, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things.


1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979]

Plant I
A. Plantinga
The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Propositions Bigelow I 180
Propositions/Bigelow/Pargetter: would also exist if the human did not exist! As well as combinations of individuals and universals. (> existence/human/thinking/language). However, they have no structure, unlike combinations of individuals and universals.
Proposition/Plantinga: (Pl. 1974,1984): abstract and essentially representational entities. LewisVsPlantinga. (Lewis 1986a, p 174-91,1986c).

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Skepticism Rorty Rorty VI 225
PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs).
Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous - (Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects ((s) > Skepticism/Berkeley). Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist. - PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure.
RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation - RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear.
I 448
Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped. Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting.

Rorty I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen.
VI 223ff
Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem. Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together - statements only make sense in a situation.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Idealism Peirce Vs Idealism Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty: sees a gap between coherence and correspondence. It is bridged by Def Reality/Peirce: "what is designated as existing in the end". Because it reduces coherence to correspondence without metaphysics or further empirical study. It is a simple reformulation (re-analysis) of "reality".
RortyVsPeirce: I no longer think (as I did before) that is right.
PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have the error in common that "correspondence" is a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of world that must be ontologically homogeneous.
Correspondence/Idealism: everything that corresponds to a representation has to be a representation itself (inspired by Berkeley). Therefore VsSkepticism: the world only consisted of representations anyway. >Representation/Peirce.
Horwich I 448
Correspondence/Physicalism: the correspondence relation must be causal. Therefore VsSkepticism. Fodor: that's as good as saying that the correspondence theory corresponds to the reality. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory.
Solution/PericeVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: the correspondence relation can easily connect different relata ontologically, there is no problem of "ontological homogeneity".
Antirealism/PlantingaVsPeirce: does raise problems of ontological homogeneity: if objects owe their structure and if they could not exist without showing it, they also owe their existence to our creativity.
RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation:
E.g. Peirce: "if there are stones, they will end up showing their structure"
E.g. idealist: "if we had no study, there would be no stones".(1)


1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kripke, S. A. Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. V 251/252
Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description.
Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent).
What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world).
You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event.
1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r".
2. partly by cause or effect
3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check
4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above).
5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later
6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted.
7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls.
8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army.
V 253
Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke):
Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth.
Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement.
Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow.

Schwarz I 55
Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it?
Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa:
Schwarz I 56
For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay.
Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for
Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world.
Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246)
I 57
KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42).
The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world?
Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence.
Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions.
Schwarz I 223
Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily.
Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22).
((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless.
Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light.
If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out.
This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world.
I 224
Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f)
I 225
A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties.
A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation,
Schwarz I 226
which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2)


1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65:
113–126.
2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193
7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342
10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Plantinga, A. Lewis Vs Plantinga, A. Bigelow I 181
Representation/Proposition/Structure/LewisVsPlantinga: his (unstructured) propositions make representation something magical. Solution/PlantingaVsLewis: Representation is taken as a basic term and is completely understandable and not magical.
Bigelow I 228
Accessibility/Lewis: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. Similarity/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is that in relation to certain laws! Thus laws are already presupposed with the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1), 1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(1): Causality instead of Similarity)
I 231
BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The most accessible world needs not to be the most similar world.


Schwarz I 68
Def Possible world/Plantinga: as maximum possible facts (st.o.a.). ("magic substituteism")
Schwarz I 69
Maximum possible facts as abstract entities, about whose structure there is not much to say. In any case, they are not real universes or constructions of real things. Existence/"exist"/Plantinga: (>"there is"): is a basic property that cannot be further analyzed. Other maximum possible facts do not exist, but could exist.
Def maximum/maximum possible facts/Plantinga: a maximum possible fact is at its maximum if its existence for any other maximum possible fact implies either its existence or non-existence.
Possible World/Plantinga: are maximum possible facts. Example: that "in" a possible world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the maximum possible fact had the quality of existence.
VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of speaking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor an image or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys.
LewisVsPlantinga: 1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality, although there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities?
2. Plantingas maximum possible facts make a reduction of modal truths to truth about what things with what characteristics there are, impossible. Plantinga thus requires modality in the characterization of the possible world. (1986e(2),§3,4)
3. We also want to talk not only about possible worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(3),262 272). This is a non qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. So if we have countless merely possible things in modal realism, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things.


1. Frank Jackson [1977]: “Statements about Universals”. Mind, 86: 427–429
2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
3. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979]

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Plantinga, A. Mackie Vs Plantinga, A. Stegmüller IV 367
Proof of the existence of God/Plantinga: new concept: "Maximal excellence": omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
"Unsurpassable greatness": maximal excellence in every possible world.
Argument: "There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatnessis exemplified."
What is necessary or impossible, cannot vary between worlds. This is based on the system S5 of modal logic.
Def S5/modal logic/Stegmüller: is distinguished in that it allows for consecutive (iterated) modalities in statements. However, they always coincide with a single modality, namely the last member of this sequence. Ex. MNNMp: Mp.
MackieVsPlantinga: 1. works with "world marked" properties ((s)> world-indexed;> R. Stalnaker, Ways a world may be, Oxford 2003). Thereby, a world becomes dependent on another world. That is, the different possible worlds are no longer independent.
IV 368
Thus his system no longer covers the full range of logical possibilities! Therefore, one must not say: system S5 is the appropriate logic for logical possibilities and necessities, even if appropriate for worlds with "world marked" properties. But Plantinga has to make use of a fact that is only valid in S5: that in a sequence of modal operators all may be eliminated but the last one. 2. As Plantinga noted himself, a counterargument by the name of "non-maximality" can be formulated : the property that there is no maximally great being. ((s) So, a property of a world, not of a being.).
Argument: there is a possible world that exemplifies non-maximality (thus, maximal greatness is non-nichtexemplified). But if maximal greatness is not exemplified in each world, it is not exemplified at all, it is then impossible.
The two premises: "maximality is possibly exemplified" and "non-maximality ....." can not simultaneously be true.
3. We have no reason to prefer the first premise.
4. Plantinga's decision for the first one does not even resemble the flip of a coin! Because we have the third option, to suspend from judgment entirely!
5. Due to the principle of Ockham we should then prefer the simpler one (non-maximality).
Stegmüller IV 478
Theodicy/evil/possible worlds/Plantinga: "cross world depravity": every being that commits at least one reprehensible act in each possible world suffers from this property.
IV 479
If it is possible that each created and free being suffers from this severe form of depravity, even God could not have created a world which didn't contain anything morally bad. MackieVsPlantinga: this option would only exist if God had to pick from a limited number of people. But earlier we saw the logical possibility of people freely choosing the good. The restriction of a selection of possible persons adopted by Plantinga is thus logically contingent.
But how could there be logically contingent facts before the creation and existence of any creatures with freewill that an almighty God would have to accept? His omnipotence is indeed only limited by the logically impossible.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Plantinga, A. Chisholm Vs Plantinga, A. I 85
Names/Essence/Plantinga/Chisholm: ... if I know a proposition like the one that this person is smartly dressed, I know a proposition which contains the essence of someone.
I 86
Proposition/Properties/Facts/ChisholmVsPlantinga: but if we want to assume that all properties are pure or high-quality and if all the facts or propositions are abstract or eternal objects, then there is no fact and no proposition that is expressed through "this man is smartly dressed". Possible World/Po.wo./Existence/Plantinga: Question: "Does ’Socrates is wise’ exist in worlds in which Socrates does not exist?".
Possible world/ChisholmVsPlantinga: such a proposition does not even exist in worlds where Socrates exists.
Sentence/Chisholm: declarative sentences express an attribution, not an acceptance of propositions.
Simons I 275
Mereological Essentialism/Middle Path/Intermediate Position/Plantinga: Thesis: 1. for each x and y: if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessary so that x is a part of it at one time or another.
ChisholmVsPlantinga.
Simons: this is nothing but WME:
WME (N)(x N(E!y > (Et)[x ≤≤t y]))

2. For each x. y and t, if x has y as part to t, then x necessarily has y as part to t.
New: this is temporally rigid mereological essentialism:
TRME (N)((t)(y ≤≤t x > N(E!y > y ≤≤t x)]).
This allows mereological variation, but with the limitation that an object at no time could miss any part it updated at the time. It can only have additional parts.
SimonsVs: 1. that seems too one-sided.
2. The time should not be essential for an object.
Simons: it should be allowed for objects to start and end at other times than when they do
actual.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Plantinga, A. Meixner Vs Plantinga, A. I 126
Facts/states of affairs/Plantinga: generally abstract entities (MeixnerVs). Possibility/Plantinga: used for the definition of keeping the states of affairs.
Concrete/abstract/state of affairs/MeixnerVsPlantinga: some states of affairs are certainly concrete entities: no state of affairs could be more concrete than a maximum consistency.
Possibility/MeixnerVsPlantinga: if the concept of possibility is already used to define the content of states of affairs,
I 127
then the concept of the possible world can no longer contribute so much to characterize the concept of possibility. States of affairs/Meixner: how many are there now? Obviously, every non-empty set of possible worlds, which is different from the total set of worlds, defines a different states of affairs, namely the states of affairs that exists exactly in these possible worlds par excellence. So if
n(W) is the number of possible worlds, then
2 exp n(W)-2 is the minimum number of states of affairs.
States of affairs/Meixner: i.e. the number of non-empty sets of worlds that are different from the total set of worlds.
But there is room for further states of affairs: e.g. those which exist in all worlds par excellence, and those which do not exist there par excellence.
n*: rough states of affairs, is expressed by all logically par excellence true sentences
u*: is expressed by all logically wrong sentences.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
mereolog. Essentia Plantinga, A. Simons I 275
Mereological Essentialism/Middle Way/Intermediate Position/Plantinga:
Thesis 1.
for each x and y: if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessary so that x is a part of it at one time or another.
ChisholmVsPlantinga.
Simons: this is nothing but WME:
WME (N)(x ‹‹ y › N(E!y › (Et)[x ‹‹t y]))

Thesis 2.
For each x. y and t, if x has y as part to t, then x necessarily has y as part to t.
New: this is temporally rigid mereological essentialism:
Mereological Essentialism/intermediate position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That's my position.
ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary.
Simons: thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!).

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987