Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causality Searle I 287/88 (Note)
Causality/identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Causality/Armstrong). SearleVsPlace: E.g. a liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. ---
II 93
Causality/Searle: causality is not an external instance, only more experiences.
II 101f
Causality: e.g. pressure cooker: we can infer from steam to pressure. Through seeing there is no inference on physical objects. SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience.
II 152ff
Causality/SearleVsHume: causality is real and directly observable. ---
I 157
Logical causality: logical causality is not inference, but intentional content and an experience condition. There are not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. ---
II 179
Causality: causality is part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. ---
Danto I 299
Causality/Searle: causality only arises through interpretation.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Dispositions Armstrong II 1 f
Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability.
Place III 113
Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong.
Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them.
II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong.
II 6
Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations.
II 6
Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause).
Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties.
II (c) 90
Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions.
ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions.
Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property?
II (c) 90/91
Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong.
II 92
but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary.
II 93
Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong.
II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
Place III 108
Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure.
Place III 109
Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties.
Place III 119
Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement.

Martin III 163
Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. -
Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners.
Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation.
II 174
Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Dispositions Place Armstrong II 1 f
Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability.
Place III 113
Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong.
Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them.
Armstrong II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties.
Armstrong II 6
Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations.
Armstrong II 6
Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause).
Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties.
Armstrong II (c) 90
Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions.
ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions.
Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property?
Armstrong II (c) 90/91
Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong.
Armstrong II 92
the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary.
Armstrong II 93
Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
Place III 108
Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure.
Place III 109
Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties.
Place III 119
Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement.

Martin III 163
Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. -
Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners.
Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation.
II 174
Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Induction Armstrong III 50
Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational.
III 52
Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation.
III 58
Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same.
II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Induction Place Armstrong III 50
Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational.
Armstrong III 52
Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation.
Armstrong III 58
Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same.
Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Linguisticism Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism.
Place III 107
Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist.
Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief.
An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka).
II 106
Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true".

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Linguisticism Place Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism.
Place III 107
Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist.
Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief.
An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka).

Armstrong II 106
Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true".

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Linguisticism Martin Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism.
Place III 107
Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist.
Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief.
An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka).

Armstrong II 106
Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true".

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Microstructure Armstrong Place I 29
Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers.
Place I 30
The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional.
Place I 29
Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions.
II (b) 39
Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori.
Place II 58
Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure.
Place II 60
Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties.
Place II 62
PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Microstructure Place Place I 29
Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers.
Place I 30
The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional.
Place I 29
Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions.
Armstrong II (b) 39
Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori.
Place II 58
Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure.
Place II 60
Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties.
Place II 62
PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Nominalism Armstrong II (b) 34
Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals.

II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals.
II (c) 97
Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical"
II (c) 97
Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Nominalism Place Armstrong II (b) 34
Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals.

Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals.
Armstrong II (c) 97
Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical"
Armstrong II (c) 97
Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Particulars Armstrong II (b) 34
Properties/relations/Armstrong: For Place properties are particulars and therefore unrepeatable. - ArmstrongVsPlace: properties are universals and repeatable. >Universals/Armstrong.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Parts Armstrong Martin II 145
Part-Whole Relationship/Martin: (instead of >supervenience). - Parts: as part of the whole, they are not really separated - interdependence: brings forth a mass of dispositions that are never realized - Whole: consists of the parts in their correlation and their stability and the degrees of their stability. >Part-of-Relation, cf. >Mereology.
Martin III 164 ff
Part/Whole: MartinVsPlace: collection of parts weak description of what the whole has more - there is no correlation and interaction of the parts that make them parts of this machine.
Martin III 176
Problem: then the separateness of the whole is lost which they need to produce the emergence in causally active way - Solution/Martin: instead of parts: assume properties, properties of the whole consist of properties of the parts - liquid (viscosity) is not a causal effect of the mobility of the molecules against each other, it is made of them.
Martin III 168
Constitution is not causation.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Supervenience Armstrong Martin II 132
Supervenience/Martin: we can assume"cum" instead of supervenience. MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa). - Not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa. - Rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect.
Solution/Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. Salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change. >Dispositions, >Properties.

Martin III 167
Supervenience/Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd. >Microstructure, >Parts, cf. >Mereology.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Truthmakers Armstrong Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Truthmakers Place Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

Armstrong II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
Armstrong II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Truthmakers Martin Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals.
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.

Armstrong II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
Armstrong II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.

Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176

Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Place, U.T. Searle Vs Place, U.T. I 287
Note: occasionally my views are not accepted due to a misguided conception of the relationship between cause and identity: so writes PlaceVsSearle: (Place 1988(1)): "According to Searle states of mind are both identical with, and causally dependent on the corresponding brain states. I say: you cannot have it both ways. Either they are identical or there is a causal relationship between them."
SearleVsPlace: he is thinking of cases such as the following: e.g. these footprints may causally depend on the shoes of the intruder; but they cannot at the same time be identical to these shoes.
But how about this one: e.g. the liquid state in which the water is there, may be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules; and it can also be a property of the system, which consists of these molecules. There is something going very well. And so my present state of consciousness may be caused by the behavior of the neurons in my brain. This condition itself is simply a higher-level property of my brain. You can after all have both. Cf. >causality/Place.


1. U. T. Place,Thirty Years On “Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 208-219

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Supervenience Martin Vs Supervenience Arm II 73
Eigenschaften/Dispo/MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: nicht bloß strukturell, diese nicht allein für Dispo verantwortlich. Terminologie: statt "kategorisch" (disp) besser "qualitativ".
Martin: These: Vorteil, über Eig auf elementarer Basis zu sprechen (Elementarteilchen?), es gibt keine Debatte über Reduktion auf noch tiefere Ebene. (Nicht makroskopisch, nicht strukturell).
Eig/MartinVsSupervenienz: die Diskussion auf struktureller oder makroskopischer Ebene wird davon verdorben, daß man sich fragt, ob es Eig auf höherer Ebene gibt, das ist ontologisch
irreführend.
II 144
Teil/Ganzes/Ontologie/Martin: es muß selbst für den ontologisch Zurückhaltenden evident sein, daß die einfacheren Teile ,Eig, oder Rel gehen, auch die komplexeren Ganze folgen,
II 145
die aus den einfacheren bestehen. MartinVsSupervenienz: diesen Ausdruck sollte man vermeiden und direkt auf die Teil Ganzes Beziehung gehen. (Martin erwähnt nicht den Ausdruck >Mereologie).
Teile: als Teil des Ganzen sind sie nicht wirklich getrennt.
Wechselbeziehung: bringt eine Masse von Dispo, die niemals realisiert sind.
Ganzes: besteht aus den Teilen in ihrer Korrelation. Und deren Stabilität und den Graden dieser Stabilität.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983