Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 40 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A-not B Error | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 55 A-not B Error/Developmental psychology/Piaget/Upton: Piaget placed two cloths side by side in front of infants aged nine to 12 months. (…) their attention was attracted to an interesting toy, which was then hidden under one of the cloths (location A). Infants older than nine months typically found the toy. After a number of trials the toy was then hidden under the other cloth (location B). Piaget found that, despite watching the toy being hidden in the new location (B), infants. Expalantion/Piaget: under the age of 12 months would continue to look for the toy under the first cloth (location A). According to Piaget, this was evidence that infants do not understand that objects can exist independently of their own actions. The infant connects the rediscovery of the object in location A with his or her own actions in lifting the cloth. The infant is assumed to reason that ‘if I wish to find the toy again I must do what I did before’. BaillargeonVsPiaget: This evidence is clearly incompatible with the findings of researchers such as Baillargeon (2002)(1), which suggest that the understanding that objects continue to exist even when not visible develops in the first few months of life. >A-not-B error/Psychological theories. 1. Baillargeon, R. (2002) The acquisition of physical knowledge in infancy: a summary in eight lessons, in Goswami, U (ed.) Handbook of Child Cognitive Development. Oxford: Blackwell. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| A-not B Error | Piaget | Upton I 55 A-not B Error/Developmental psychology/Piaget/Upton: Piaget placed two cloths side by side in front of infants aged nine to 12 months. (…) their attention was attracted to an interesting toy, which was then hidden under one of the cloths (location A). Infants older than nine months typically found the toy. After a number of trials the toy was then hidden under the other cloth (location B). Piaget found that, despite watching the toy being hidden in the new location (B), infants. Expalantion/Piaget: under the age of 12 months would continue to look for the toy under the first cloth (location A). According to Piaget, this was evidence that infants do not understand that objects can exist independently of their own actions. The infant connects the rediscovery of the object in location A with his or her own actions in lifting the cloth. The infant is assumed to reason that ‘if I wish to find the toy again I must do what I did before’. BaillargeonVsPiaget: This evidence is clearly incompatible with the findings of researchers such as Baillargeon (2002)(1), which suggest that the understanding that objects continue to exist even when not visible develops in the first few months of life. >A-not-B error/Psychological theories, cf. >Development stages, >Object permanence. 1. Baillargeon, R. (2002) The acquisition of physical knowledge in infancy: a summary in eight lessons, in Goswami, U (ed.) Handbook of Child Cognitive Development. Oxford: Blackwell. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| A-not B Error | Psychological Theories | Upton I 55 A-not B Error/Psychological theories/Upton: according to Piaget the infant is assumed to reason that ‘if I wish to find the toy again I must do what I did before’. BaillargeonVsPiaget: This evidence is clearly incompatible with the findings of researchers such as Baillargeon (2002)(1), which suggest that the understanding that objects continue to exist even when not visible develops in the first few months of life. Other authors: Why would children aged eight to nine months, who understand that objects still exist when hidden, continue to search for an object in the wrong place when they have watched that object being hidden in a specific location? >Object permanence, >R. Baillargeon, >J. Piaget. A number of explanations have been put forward for this intriguing behaviour, including the fragility of infant memory (Harris, 1989)(2), habit perseveration (Diamond, 1985)(3), and changes in neurological functioning (Munakata, 1998)(4). However, none of these has been found to explain the A-not-B error adequately. According to Smith et al. (1999)(5), this is because the search for a single causal factor is mistaken. Arguing from a dynamic systems perspective, they assert that this behaviour can only be explained by considering multiple causes. The ability to search for the toy under the correct cloth is the result of a number of skills coming together at once. These different skills, such as knowledge of the task, perceptual and motor abilities, unfold over time at different rates. According to Smith et al. (1999)(5), it is the real-time integration of all these skills that will allow an infant to search in the right place, not the development of a single mental structure such as ‘understanding of object permanence’. >Object permanence/Developmental psychology, >Knowledge/Developmental Psychology. 1. Baillargeon, R. (2002) The acquisition of physical knowledge in infancy: a summary in eight lessons, in Goswami, U (ed.) Handbook of Child Cognitive Development. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Harris, P.L. (1989) Object permanence in infancy, in Slater, A. and Bremner, J.G. (eds) Infant Development: Recent advances. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Diamond, A.D. (1985) Development of the ability to use recall to guide action as indicated by infants’ performance on AB. Child Development, 56: 868–83. 4. Munakata, Y .(1998) Infant perseveration and implications for object permanence theories: a PDP model of the AB task. Developmental Science, 1(2): 161–84. 5. Smith, L.B., Thelen, .E, Titzer, R. and McLin, D. (1999) Knowing in the context of acting: the task dynamics of the A-not-B error. Psychological Review, 106(2): 235–60. Available online at www.indiana.edu/~cogdev/labwork/SmithThelen1999.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011). |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Ability | Klahr | Slater I 64 Abilities/Children/problem-solving/circumstances/VsPiaget/Klahr: We need to consider - more than Piaget did - the types of inferences a child can draw from his or her knowledge of daily environmental conditions. We need to investigate when children are able to build a purpose-resource chain by notiving relevant features of the environment and organizing a wide range of facts, constraints, and simple inferences in so systematic manner. The TOH (Tower of Hanoi) provides an ideal context in which to explore these issues. VsPiaget: we must guard against the problem of false positive interpretations (i.e., attributing an ability to the child that she or he does not have). >Problem solving/developmental psychology/Klahr. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Animism | Piaget | Upton I 78 Animism/magical thinking/Piaget/Upton: Piaget (1923)(1) believed that children’s mental reasoning at this stage was limited by magical thinking and animism. Animism is the belief that objects have lifelike qualities and are therefore capable of having feelings, intentions and emotions. For example, a preoperational child may explain the rain by saying that the clouds are sad and are crying. According to Piaget, this limits children’s understanding of how the world works and so reduces their ability to think logically. It also means that they find it difficult to tell the difference between reality and fantasy. VsPiaget: Woolley (1997)(2) disagrees with the idea that children’s thinking is more magical than that of adults. Adults have been found to be just as likely as Upton I 79 children to engage in magical thinking, especially when they do not have the knowledge to explain phenomena. Adults invent speculation to fill gaps in their knowledge, much as children do. It is therefore the social context that determines whether or not adults or children engage in magical thinking. >Magical thinking/Piaget, >Psychological theories on magical thinking, >Philosophical theories on magical thinking. 1. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. 2. Woolley, J.D. (1997) Thinking about fantasy: are children fundamentally different thinkers and believers than adults? Child Development, 68: 991–1011. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Classes | Piaget | Slater I 58 Mathematics/sets/classes/subclasses/counting/children/development/Piaget: In a typical investigation of this capacity, Piaget might present children with a collection of seven toy oaks, and three toy pines, and ask the children to count each type of tree. Then he would ask the child if there were more oaks than pines, and the child would answer correctly. Then came the crucial question: “Are there more oaks or more trees? Surprisingly, children under eight years old typically say that there are more oaks than trees! Piaget interpreted this result as indicating that children at this age are unable to fully understand the logic of class inclusion. VsPiaget: However, as soon as one introduces small variations in the task (such as varying the relative size of the subsets, using more than two subsets, using other terms for the superset – i.e., “forest” rather than “trees” – then the age at which most children can pass the task varies widely, from six years old to ten years old. >Method/Piaget. Cf. >Development stages, >Understanding/Psychology. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Developmental Psychology | Slater I 60 Context/VsPiaget/developmental psychology: the research in cognitive development “beyond Piaget” includes an extremely detailed description of the context in which children’s thinking is being investigated. Cf. >Method/Piaget: as soon as one introduces small variations in the task the results vary widely. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Continuity | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 3 Continuity/Discontinuity/Developmental psychology/Upton: Question: is psychological development a continuous path or is it a discontinuous stage-based process? A. Continuous process: In continuous change, development is gradual and cumulative. Changes are quantitative in nature and the underlying processes that drive change are the same over the course of the lifespan. In this view, one behaviour or skill builds upon another, such that later development can be predicted from what occurred early in life. B. Discontinuous change: here, development occurs in distinct, usually abrupt stages. Each stage is qualitatively different from the last. E.g., a caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. Skills/abilities/developmental psychology: question: are psychological skills and abilities in childhood qualitatively different from those of adults, or are children merely mini adults, who simply lack the knowledge that comes with experience? One area in which this debate has been of primary concern is cognitive development. Discontinuity: a proponent of this view is >Jean Piaget. Stages/Piaget: Thesis: organisation. This gives rise to qualitative differences in thinking and reasoning at each stage. This, in turn, means that a child’s view of the world is different from that of an adult. Continuity/psychological theories: E.g. information-processing models of cognitive development: have proposed (…) that cognitive change occurs because of an increase in quantitative advances, not qualitative differences. A child’s ability to engage in more sophisticated reasoning processes is believed to stem from a change in their capacity to handle information. This increased capacity, along with improved processing speeds, makes processing more efficient.( Information-processing VsPiaget). Continuity modelsVsPiaget, PiagetVsContinuitiy models, PiagetVsInformation processing models). >Stages of development. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Discontinuity | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 3 Discontinuity//Continuity/Developmental psychology/Upton: Question: is psychological development a continuous path or is it a discontinuous stage-based process? A. Continuous process: In continuous change, development is gradual and cumulative. Changes are quantitative in nature and the underlying processes that drive change are the same over the course of the lifespan. In this view, one behaviour or skill builds upon another, such that later development can be predicted from what occurred early in life. B. Discontinuous change: here, development occurs in distinct, usually abrupt stages. Each stage is qualitatively different from the last. E.g., a caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. Skills/abilities/developmental psychology: question: are psychological skills and abilities in childhood qualitatively different from those of adults, or are children merely mini adults, who simply lack the knowledge that comes with experience? One area in which this debate has been of primary concern is cognitive development. Discontinuity: a proponent of this view is >Jean Piaget. Stages/Piaget: Thesis: organisation. This gives rise to qualitative differences in thinking and reasoning at each stage. This, in turn, means that a child’s view of the world is different from that of an adult. Continuity/psychological theories: E.g. information-processing models of cognitive development: have proposed (…) that cognitive change occurs because of an increase in quantitative advances, not qualitative differences. A child’s ability to engage in more sophisticated reasoning processes is believed to stem from a change in their capacity to handle information. This increased capacity, along with improved processing speeds, makes processing more efficient.( Information-processing VsPiaget). Continuity modelsVsPiaget, PiagetVsContinuitiy models, PiagetVsInformation processing models). >Stages of development. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Egocentrism | Piaget | Upton I 78 Egocentrism/Piaget/Upton: [a] limitation to logical thinking at [the age of two and three years] is egocentrism, the inability to distinguish between your own perspective and someone else’s. Piaget and Inhelder (1969)(1) studied children’s egocentrism using their ‘three mountains task’ (…). In this task the child walks around the model of the mountains in order to familiarise themselves with what the mountains look like from different perspectives. The child is then seated at the table and a researcher places a doll in different locations around the table. At each location the child is asked to select the doll’s view from a number of photos. Piaget found that preschool children are unable to choose the correct photo. Interpretation/VsPiaget: Piaget’s experiments such as the three mountain task are reliable ((s) reproducible). But authors disagree with Piaget’s interpretation: Woolley (1997)(2) disagrees with the idea that children’s thinking is more magical than that of adults. >Magical thinking/Piaget, >Psychological theories on magical thinking, >Magical thinking/Philosophy. Adults have been found to be just as likely as Upton I 79 children to engage in magical thinking, especially when they do not have the knowledge to explain phenomena. Adults invent speculation to fill gaps in their knowledge, much as children do. It is therefore the social context that determines whether or not adults or children engage in magical thinking. 1. Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1969) The Psychology of the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 2. Woolley, J.D. (1997) Thinking about fantasy: are children fundamentally different thinkers and believers than adults? Child Development, 68: 991–1011. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Egocentrism | Psychological Theories | Upton I 79 Egocentrism/Social context/Psychological theories/Upton: There is (…) evidence that the social context has an impact on young children’s egocentrism. In a classic experiment, Hughes (1975)(1) repeated the three mountains task using a situation he thought would be more familiar (and therefore more socially relevant) to the child – a ‘naughty boy’ hiding from a policeman. In this task, children are shown a board with two barriers. Toy policemen are placed at the end of each barrier and the child is asked to place a model boy in the layout where the policemen can’t see him. HughesVsPiaget: Hughes found that 90 per cent of children aged three to five could complete the task successfully, concluding that it was lack of understanding of the situation rather than egocentrism that caused the problems for Piaget’s participants. >Egocentrism/Piaget, >J. Piaget, >VsPiaget, >Stages of development. 1. Hughes, M. (1975) Egocentrism in preschool children. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Edinburgh. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Equilibrium | Rawls | I 456 Equilibrium/Rawls: I use the term intuitively(1). The term stability, which I use for this purpose, is actually one of the quasi-stability: when an equilibrium is stable, all variables return to their equilibrium after a disturbance. In terms of quasi stability, there are only a few(2). Quasi-stable society: is a well-ordered society that is quasi-stable in terms of its institutions and the sense of justice of its citizens. If, for example, certain circumstances mean that institutions can no longer be regarded as fair, they should be able to be reformed as the situation requires, and justice has been restored. >Justice/Rawls. I 457 Three conditions must be fulfilled for a society in an equilibrium: 1. The system is to be identified and internal and external forces must be distinguishable. 2. Different states of the system and their characteristic features are to be identified. 3. The laws linking the different states shall be specified. Depending on their nature, some systems do not have a state of equilibrium, others have many. I 458 Sense of justice: the sense of justice of citizens in a society plays a decisive role. Moral learning/tradition: we can distinguish between two main currents: 1) One originates from Hume to Sidgwick and can be found today in social learning theories. Thesis: missing social motives are gained through learning. >D. Hume, >H. Sidgwick. A variant of this thesis assumes that moral standards are acquired before any understanding. >Morals, >Emotivism. I 459 2) The second traditional thesis comes from Rousseau and Kant, it is rationalistic and is sometimes represented by J. St. Mill and, more recently, by J. Piaget: Moral learning is therefore not so much a question of filling gaps as a free development of our innate and intellectual abilities after natural disposition. >Morals, >Morals/Kant, >Morality/Piaget, >Innateness. I 460 See footnotes 3-7. 1. See W. R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, 2nd. Ed. (London, 1960), chs. 2-4,19-29. 2. See Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New York, 1957), p, 18. 3. See J.-J. Rousseau, Emile (London, 1908) esp. pp. 46-66 (in bk. II), 172-196 (in bk. IV); 4. See also Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, Pt. II, The Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. 5. See also J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment oft he Child (London, 1932). 6. See also Lawrence Kohlberg, „The Development of Moral Thought“, Vita Humana, vol. 6 (1963). 7. For VsPiaget see: M. L. Hoffman, „Moral Development“ (1970) pp. 264-275, and for VsKohlberg: pp. 276-281. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Imitation | Slater | Slater I 76 Imitation/Piaget/MeltzoffVsPiaget/Slater: The first detailed account of the development of imitation throughout infancy was given by Piaget, a brief account of which was described earlier. Meltzoff and Moore’s findings are a clear demonstration that Piaget’s account was wrong, on at least two counts. Piaget suggested that the ability to imitate a gesture that the infant can feel but cannot see, such as lip movements, appeared around 8–10 months but Meltzoff and Moore’s findings suggest that this ability is present soon after birth. Piaget also suggested that the capacity for represention appeared towards the end of infancy, around 14–18 months. However, Meltzoff and Moore’s findings gave evidence that a representation of the human face, in both the visual and proprioceptive modalities, is also available at birth, necessitating a radically different account of infant development in that “The ability to act on the basis of an abstract representation of a perceptually absent stimulus becomes the starting point for psychological development in infancy and not its culmination” Meltzoff and Moore (1977(1), p. 77). Problem: neonatal imitation is not easy so score. >Gestures/developmental psychology. For the importance of the capacity for imitation see >Social development/Slater. 1. Meltzoff, A.N. & Moore, M. K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198, 75-78 Alan M. Slater, “Imitation in Infancy. Revisiting Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Knowledge | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 55 Knowledge/Developmental psychology/Upton: The idea of knowledge as an enduring mental structure that exists independently of behaviour dominates in the study of cognitive development. In revisiting the> A-not-B error, Smith et al. (1999)(1) take a new approach in attempting to explain what infants do in the A-not-B task rather than what they cannot do. Their explanation focuses on performance and ultimately raises profound questions about what it means to know. Knowledge/Piaget: It is [the] idea of mental structures that gradually develop over time that underpins Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. Upton I 56 Achieving the A-not-B task has therefore always been taken to represent a qualitative change in infant thinking; the task can only be completed successfully once the infant has developed a new schema – the object concept. Dynamic Systems/SmithVsPiaget: Smith et al. (1999)(1) challenge this idea. They argue that, although successful completion of the A-not-B task does suggest a qualitative change in infant behaviour, this change in behaviour actually represents a number of quantitative changes in a complex dynamic system. The A-not-B error is explained in terms of general processes of goal-directed reaching; the erroneous reach back to A is seen as the result of a number of processes that enable the infant to look, discriminate locations, control their posture and plan a motor response. All these processes are brought together and self-organised by the task of reaching for a particular object in a particular context. In this perspective, behaviour and cognition are not separate and there are no causal mechanisms, such as an object concept, that generate a thought or behaviour. In this model what we commonly call knowledge and concepts are distributed across and embedded in behavioural processes. 1. Smith, L.B., Thelen, .E, Titzer, R. and McLin, D. (1999) Knowing in the context of acting: the task dynamics of the A-not-B error. Psychological Review, 106(2): 235–60. Available online at www.indiana.edu/~cogdev/labwork/SmithThelen1999.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011). |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Knowledge | Piaget | Upton I 94 Knowledge/Piaget/VsPiaget/Upton: It has also been proposed that younger children’s thinking is hindered by a lack of general knowledge. According to Johnson-Laird (1993)(1), problem solving is not based upon existing mental structures of logical thought, but depends instead on factual knowledge and our understanding of the world around us. We construct mental models – mental images of the problems to be solved – that are based on our factual understanding of the world. The difficulty for children is that they have less knowledge and information about the world – the problem is therefore a quantitative, not a qualitative, one. >Development stages, >Logic/Piaget, >Logic/Philosophy, >Understanding/Psychology. 1. Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1993) How the mind thinks, in Harman, G. (ed.) Conceptions of the Mind: Essays in honor of George A. Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Knowledge | Vygotsky | Upton I 16 Knowledge/thinking/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky thesis: ways of thinking are transmitted to children through social interaction and are then appropriated by children. VygotskyVsPiaget: Our knowledge and understanding of the world is therefore constructed in a social context, not, as Piaget thought, by children acting on the environment alone. Vygotsky also argued that the child follows the adult’s example at first, gradually developing the ability to do tasks without help. He called the difference between what a child can do with help and what he or she can do alone the zone of proximal development (ZPD). >Learning, >Stages of Development, >Cultural tools. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language and Thought | Piaget | Upton I 75 Language and thought/Piaget/Upton: Piaget claimed that, although language and thought are closely related, language depends on thought for its development. Language is not possible until children are capable of symbolic thought; they must understand that one thing can stand for another before they can use words to represent objects, events and relationships. Rationale: fundamental principles of thought (e.g. understanding concepts) are displayed well before language; and the simultaneous emergence of language and other processes (…) are suggesting that language is just one of a number of outcomes of fundamental changes in cognitive ability. >Symbolic play/Piaget. VsPiaget > |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language and Thought | Vygotsky | Upton I 76 Language and thought/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky (1986)(1) saw thought as dependent on language. VygotskyVsPiaget: for Vygotsky language is one of our most important cultural tools and the medium through which most (if not all) learning takes place. Mental operations are believed to be embodied in the structure of language, and cognitive development results from the internalisation of language. >Cultural tools/Vygotsky. Thinking/Vygotsky: Initially thought and language develop as two separate systems. Before the age of about two years, children use words socially – that is, to communicate with others. Up to this point, the child’s internal cognition is without language. At around two years of age, thought and language merge. The language that initially accompanied social interaction is internalised to give a language for thought. This internalised language can then guide the child’s actions and thinking. >Self-talk/Vygotsky. 1. Vygotsky, L.S. (1986) The genetic roots of thought and speech, in Kozulin, A. (ed. and trans.) Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Learning | Piaget | Upton I 97 Learning/Piaget/Upton: Vygotsky (1962/1978)(1) believed that a child can be taught anything as long as the activity falls within the child’s ZPD. >Terminology/Vygotsky. The teacher’s role is therefore to provide direct instruction. In one sense, Piaget and Vygotsky are both arguing for readiness to learn. However, the important difference is that for Piaget development leads to learning, while for Vygotsky learning results in development. If Vygotsky is right, could it be possible to teach a skill such as conservation to children who are not yet at the operational stage of development? Indeed, there is evidence that three- and four-year-old preschoolers who are not yet able to conserve can be taught this skill (Field, 1981)(2). VsPiaget: The short-term nature of the conservation shown by the younger children suggests that they had not actually learned a new thinking skill, but had simply rote learned the ‘correct’ answers. By the time of retesting, they had forgotten what the answers were. This is further evidenced by the finding that the children who retained the ability to conserve were those who had shown that they could generalise their conservation skills to untrained quantities. This suggests that Vygotsky was right – new ways of thinking can be taught, but a child has to be ready to learn those skills. >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Field, D (1981) Can preschool children really learn to conserve? Child Development, 52: 326–34. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Learning | Vygotsky | Upton I 94 Learning/Vygotsky/Upton: [according to Vygotsky] learning takes place within what he calls the zone of proximal development (ZPD). This concept refers to a child’s developmental potential. (…) a child’s actual developmental level is determined by their independent problem solving, while their potential developmental level is determined by the problem solving they can achieve with instruction from an adult or more knowledgeable peer. >Problem solving, >Understanding. The ZPD is the distance between these actual and potential developmental levels. Children develop Upton I 95 new ways of thinking and problem solving through working with more knowledgeable others on tasks that are within this zone. If children are to develop new ways of thinking, it is really important that the tasks that children are given are just out of reach of their independent problem-solving abilities, but not so difficult that they cannot do them even with help. Scaffolding: Adults teach children new skills gradually through a process known as scaffolding. During a learning interaction, the teacher takes the child step by step through the task, varying the level of help given so that it is contingent on the child’s needs (Wood et al., 1976)(1). It is important to remember that, for Vygotsky, teaching is something that happens all the time – parents teach children, and older siblings teach younger ones. Upton I 97 Vygotsky (1962/1978)(1) believed that a child can be taught anything as long as the activity falls within the child’s ZPD( see above). The teacher’s role is therefore to provide direct instruction. In one sense, Piaget and Vygotsky are both arguing for readiness to learn. VygostkyVSPiaget: However, the important difference is that for Piaget development leads to learning, while for Vygotsky learning results in development. >Learning Piaget. If Vygotsky is right, could it be possible to teach a skill such as conservation to children who are not yet at the operational stage of development? Indeed, there is evidence that three- and four-year-old preschoolers who are not yet able to conserve can be taught this skill (Field, 1981)(2). The short-term nature of the conservation shown by the younger children suggests that they had not actually learned a new thinking skill, but had simply rote learned the ‘correct’ answers. By the time of retesting, they had forgotten what the answers were. This is further evidenced by the finding that the children who retained the ability to conserve were those who had shown that they could generalise their conservation skills to untrained quantities. This suggests that Vygotsky was right – new ways of thinking can be taught, but a child has to be ready to learn those skills. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Field, D (1981) Can preschool children really learn to conserve? Child Development, 52: 326–34. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Logic | Piaget | Upton I 93 Logic/Piaget/VsPiaget/Upton: 1. Donaldson (1978)(1) (…) criticised the procedural aspect of [Piaget’s] tasks. In the classic Piagetian conservation tasks. Cf. >Classes/Piaget, >Numbers/Piaget. The same question is usually asked twice in order to test the child’s reasoning – once before any changes are made and then again after the transformation. However, if the children are only asked the question once, after the transformation, more of the younger group get the answer right. According to Donaldson, this is because children learn to make sense of adults’ questions in teaching and testing situations. The child is not only trying to work out Upton I 94 what the meaning of the task is, but also trying to work out the demands of the social relations in which the task is embedded. A key part of this process is trying to guess what answer the adult expects, and what response will please them most (Donaldson, 1978)(1). 2. Wheldall and Poborca (1980)(2) also agreed that the wording of the question prevents the children giving the correct answer to conservation tasks. They therefore used a non-verbal version of the beaker task and found that twice as many children could conserve using this task than in the original approach. 3. Information-processing models provide a different challenge to Piaget’s theory. Donaldson and others criticised Piaget for the tasks he used, suggesting that they did not allow younger children to demonstrate their logical reasoning. However, the assumption was still that human reasoning depends upon having mental structures for logical thinking (…). Information-processing models consider this problem from a different angle. They suggest that children cannot do these tasks because of the demands on processes such as memory and attention, which are still developing at this age. VsVs: In response, supporters of Piaget’s theory (neo-Piagetians) have taken some of these ideas from information processing and integrated them with Piaget’s original theory. For example, it is argued that development through the stages (and changes in logical structures) is made possible by increases in working memory capacity and processing efficiency (Demetriou et al., 2002)(3). >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages, >Logic/Philosophy. 1. Donaldson, M. (1978) Children’s Minds. London: Croom Helm. 2. Wheldhall, K and Poborca, B. (1980) Conservation without conversation? An alternative non-verbal paradigm for assessing conservation of liquid quantity. British Journal of Psychology, 71: 117–34. 3. Demetriou, A, Christou, C, Spanoudis, G and Platsidou, M (2002) The development of mental processing: efficiency, working memory, and thinking. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 67(1): serial no. 268. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Magical Thinking | Piaget | Upton I 78 Animism/magical thinking/Piaget/Upton: Piaget (1923)(1) believed that children’s mental reasoning at this stage was limited by magical thinking and animism. Animism is the belief that objects have lifelike qualities and are therefore capable of having feelings, intentions and emotions. For example, a preoperational child may explain the rain by saying that the clouds are sad and are crying. According to Piaget, this limits children’s understanding of how the world works and so reduces their ability to think logically. It also means that they find it difficult to tell the difference between reality and fantasy. VsPiaget: Woolley (1997)(2) disagrees with the idea that children’s thinking is more magical than that of adults. Adults have been found to be just as likely as Upton I 79 children to engage in magical thinking, especially when they do not have the knowledge to explain phenomena. Adults invent speculation to fill gaps in their knowledge, much as children do. It is therefore the social context that determines whether or not adults or children engage in magical thinking. >Psychological theories on magical thinking, >Psychological and philosophical theories on thinking, >Animism. 1. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. 2. Woolley, J.D. (1997) Thinking about fantasy: are children fundamentally different thinkers and believers than adults? Child Development, 68: 991–1011. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Method | Piaget | Slater I 57 Method/Piaget: Although there is an overarching goal in each of his investigations – for example to discover how children develop the ability to think about mathematics and logic – most of his studies do not use a detailed “script” that the experimenter follows in exactly the same way for every child. Instead, the detailed interactions and specific challenges are adapted to the moment by moment responses of the child. Data/problems: the data from is early studies – in the 1920s – are limited to handwritten notes taken in “real time”. VsPiaget: the data base for any specific study is typically generated by a relatively small and arbitrary sample of children – often Piaget’s own children – so that generalizations made from these studies are not on very solid statistical ground. Indeed, many of Piaget’s pioneering investigations would probably be rejected from most modern journals on methodological grounds of sample size, non-standard measurement, and lack of inter-rater reliability! Nevertheless, many of Piaget’s experiments have been repeated. When procedures are executed in exactly the same way as Piaget described them, the results are almost always the same. VsPiaget: However, in many cases, when small changes are made (…) one often finds results that challenge Piaget’s theoretical interpretation. E.g., >Classes/Piaget. Slater I 58 Researchers found that a slight change in the wording of the problem leads to substantial improvement in children’s performance. General problem/VsPiaget: not the reproducibility, but the theoretical interpretation of the experiments has proven to be problematic. Slater I 59 Today’s theories of cognitive development are stated in the form of computational models of the mental processes that are implemented in the human brain’s neural networks (Elman, 2005(1); Klahr, 2004(2); Rakison & Lupyan, 2008(3)). 1. Elman, J. L. (2005). Connectionist models of cognitive development: where next? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 111–117. 2. Klahr, D. (2004). New kids on the connectionist modeling block. Developmental Science, 7, 165–166. 3. Rakison, D. H., & Lupyan, G. (2008). Developing object concepts in infancy: An associative learning perspective. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 73, 1–110. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Method | Rothbart | Corr I 179 Method/developmental psychology/temperament/Rothbart: researchers have often been sceptical about using parents as informants about their children’s behaviour (e.g., Kagan and Fox 2006)(1). It has been felt that parental biases or lack of knowledge will yield measures that are invalid, with direct observation seen as a preferable method. However, considerable evidence indicates convergence between parent report and observational measures (Rothbart and Bates 2006)(2). >VsPiaget, >Developmental psychology. Because temperament reflects dynamic interactions between affective and cognitive processes and there are limitations to both questionnaire and observational methods, multitrait multimethod approaches to temperament assessment have been advocated whenever feasible (see Rothbart and Sheese 2006(3), for a discussion). >Temperament, >Observation. 1. Kagan, J. and Fox, N. A. 2006. Biology, culture, and temperamental biases, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 167–225. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 3. Rothbart, M. K. and Sheese, B. E. 2006. Temperament and emotion- regulation, in J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of emotion-regulation, pp. 331–50. New York: Guilford Press Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Morality | Piaget | Slater I 57 Morality/children/development/Piaget: five-year-old children believe that wrongness of an act depends on how much damage resulted, rather than the intent of the perpetrator. >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget, VsPiaget > David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Slater I 164 Morality/Piaget: Piaget (1932/1965)(1) was the basis for Kohlberg’s work on the development of children’s orientations toward a moral order (Kohlberg 1963/2008)(2). Moral Realism: is the concept for Piaget’s thesis that young children begin with a heteronomous stage of moral reasoning in which they emphasize obedience to authority and focus more on the outcomes of moral actions than the underlying intent. Heteronomous stage/Piaget: the limitations of children’s moral reasoning at the heteronomous stage are due to a tendency to project one’s own way of reasoning onto others. According to Piaget, this tendency persists until children gain enough experience with peers that they can appreciate the perspectives of others, as they engage in the social coordination that is necessary to reach mutually agreeable outcomes. As a result, children learn to conceive of morality as a fluid process that is based on negotiations among individuals rather than as a set of fixed rules grounded in adult authority. Autonomous stage: Between the ages of about 8 and 11, children typically enter an autonomous stage of moral development, in which they critically evaluate moral rules and take into account the perspectives of others when applying the rules. During the autonomous stage, children come to understand that rules are created by people, and can be modified by social agreement. Piaget: Based on his belief that peer interactions are a particularly important way of learning right and wrong, he set out to observe children in the context of game-playing interactions, and then asked them to reflect on the rules of their games. >Morality/Kohlberg, >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages. 1. Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press. 2. Kohlberg, L. (1963/2008). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I: Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 51, 8—20. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Upton I 123 Morality/Piaget/Upton: According to Piaget (1923)(1), understanding of right and wrong reflects increasing sophistication in a child’s thinking processes: children under four years of age have no understanding of morality. Heteronomous morality: Between the ages of four and seven years, children believe that rules and justice are unchangeable and beyond the control of the individual, and they also judge whether an action is right or wrong by its consequences. Autonomous morality: From seven to ten years of age, children are in transition, showing some features of heteronomous morality and autonomous morality; Finally, at around the ages often to 12 years, children’s understanding shifts to autonomous morality, recognizing that rules are created by people and that intentions are as important as consequences. Piaget believed that, in addition to increasing cognitive abilities, moral development relies on peer relationships. Through the give and take of social interactions and playing games, children experience disagreements that have to be solved, and learn to negotiate the rules of a game, which teaches them to recognize that rules are man-made rather than handed down from a greater authority. >Morality/Kohlberg, >Learning/Piaget, >Psychological theories on learning. 1. Piaget, J (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Numbers | Piaget | Slater I 56 Numbers/children/development/Piaget: Preschoolers believe that if a row of several cookies is spread out, so that they take up more space, that there are now more cookies to eat than before they wore spread out. >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget. VsPiaget > David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Baillargeon | Slater I 86 Object Permanence/Baillargeon: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties. The key was to move away from the Piagetian criteria of active retrieval (e.g., reaching) for a hidden object as a measure of knowledge. Solution/Baillargeon: [she used] the so-called violation of expectation (VoE) paradigm: it is built on the idea that infants will orient more to novel or surprising events than familiar or expected ones (see Charlesworth, 1969(4). Slater I 87 In particular, [Baillargeon] found that between 3.5 and 12 months of age infants became sensitive to the height (Baillargeon, 1987(3); Baillargeon & Graber 1987(5)), location (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988)(6), and solidity of hidden objects (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990)(7). Baillargeon and colleagues also gradually pieced together infants’ understanding of the physical support relations that can exist between objects placed next to or on top of one another (Baillargeon, 2004(8); Needham & Baillargeon, 1993(9), 2000(10)). Experiment/Drawbridge study/HaithVsBaillargeon: (Haith 1998)(11)the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants. Slater I 88 Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. >Object permanence/Haith. Drawbridge study/VsBaillargeon: Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999)(12) Thesis: young infants simply have a general preference to look at the 180-degree rotation for cognitively uninteresting reasons (e.g., longer-lasting movement). Like Haith: Baillargeon’s findings can be explained without any attribution to an ability to think about an unseen object. VsBaillargeon: Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (2000)(13): the relatively high looking times to the 180-degree impossible event in the original drawbridge studies reflected a simple familiarity preference rather than a mental representation of a hidden object. Slater I 89 After nearly two decades of argument in the literature and two highly anticipated debates on this topic at major conferences (Haith vs. Spelke at the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD), 1997; Baillargeon vs. Smith at the International Conference for Infant Studies (ICIS), 1998), it became clear that behavioral methods alone were not going to produce a scientific consensus. Two key questions that emerged from these debates are (1) what actually constitutes evidence of object permanence (i.e., does passive surprise suffice or is active engagement required?) and (2) where and how does this competence originate? >Object permanence/neuroscience, >Object permanence/connectionism. 1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books. 2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208. 3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664. 4. Charlesworth, W. R. (1969). The role of surprise in cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. Flavell (Eds), Studies in cognitive development. Essays in honor of Jean Piaget (pp. 257–314). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where’s the rabbit? 5.5-month-old infants’ representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive Development, 2, 375–392. 6. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1988). Evidence of location memory in 8-month-old infants in a nonsearch AB task. Developmental Psychology, 24, 502–511. 7. Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284. 8. Baillargeon, R., (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects. Evidence for event-general and event-specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7, 391-414. 9. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 47, 121–48. 10. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Infants’ use of featural and experiential information in segregating and individuating objects: A reply to Xu, Carey and Welch (2000). Cognition, 74, 255–284. 11. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179. 12. Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35, 427–435. 13. Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Object permanence in five-and-a-half-month-old infants? Infancy, 1, 403–428. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Piaget | Slater I 86 Object Permanence/Piaget: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties. >Object permanence/Baillargeon, >Object permanence/Connectionsm. >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages. 1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books. 2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208. 3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Operational Thinking | Piaget | Upton I 93 Operational thinking/Piaget/Logic/VsPiaget/Upton: Piaget has been criticized for using tasks that are unfamiliar to the child (e.g. Hughes , 1975)(1). DonaldsonVsPiaget: conservation and class inclusion tasks did not make human sense to the child. Why pour liquid from one beaker to another if it makes no difference? Why ask if there are more cows than animals if we know that cows are animals? Donaldson and others since have shown that, by changing the tasks so that they make sense to the child, even four year olds are able to succeed in conservation and class inclusion tasks. For example, if the class inclusion task is changed so that it only uses cows, some standing, some lying down, and the question asked is ‘Are there more cows or more sleeping cows?’(a more sensible question), then three year olds can answer correctly. The logical challenge is the same, but the task makes more sense (Donaldson, 1978)(2). >Thinking/Piaget, >Psychological theories on thinking. >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages. 1. Hughes, M. (1975) Egocentrism in preschool children. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Edinburgh. 2. Donaldson, M. (1978) Children’s Minds. London: Croom Helm. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Physics | Piaget | Slater I 56 Physics/children/development/Piaget: Infants under eight months old do not expect pobjects to be permanent: if an object is covered or obscured, it simply doesn’t exist in the infant’s mind. >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget. VsPiaget > David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Piaget | Schurz | I 192 Piaget/Developmental Theory/Science Theory/Schurz: Piaget thesis: The development of child intelligence is stage-like. It is based on the gradual formation of general logical structural abilities. Once these are formed, they can be applied anywhere in a short time. Before that, the corresponding cognitive tasks are simply not grasped. Piaget thesis: Sensorimotor stage: reached at 2 years of age. Concrete operational stage:reached at about 6-7 years. . Formal operational stage: reached at 13-14 years. Concrete operational stage/Piaget: (6-7) Ex 1. Ability to change perspective, distinguish own from others. Thus transition from egocentric to sociocentric thinking. 2. ability to recognize that certain operations which change the appearance of objects can be undone. (Reversibility). Thus, at the same time: invariant recognition. Two areas: a) invariance of the number of objects. b) Invariance of the quantity of a substance. Verification/Piaget: by test that provide laws of association: Ex change of perspective: mountain landscape that children could walk around. Invariance of number: ex. coins. Invariance of quantity of substance: ex clay ball deformed into a sausage. I 193 Ex core: intelligence development is primarily based on stages development of logical structural abilities. Ex Periphery: at 6-7 years almost all children reach the concrete operational stage. Ex Empirical prediction: almost all children fail it at 6, all can do it at 7. I 194 Test/adequacy/selectivity/Schurz: a test must be adequate for the characteristic being studied. i.e. it must be selective. I.e., they must measure the traits (abilities) and not others at the same time. At the same time, the indicators must be interchangeable. Ex It must not matter for the change of perspective whether it is examined on a mountain landscape or on another form. Indicator/(s): Object within an experiment. VsPiaget/Schurz: It was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: Bsp children presented with a simpler shape than a mountain landscape (a box with four different colored sides) could solve the task at age 4 (instead of age 6-7). Schurz: But that did not mean that one gave away the core of the theory. (according to the Lakatos motto). ((s) i.e. the stages proceeded differently, the assumption of the importance of the logical-structural was maintained. I 195 VsPiaget: it was concluded that his test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, Brainerd 1978(1)) 2. VsPiaget: example number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New: E.g. The children had to choose pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this number test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Kern/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: Example propositional logic. According to Piaget, children with 13-14 years would have to master propositional logic correct conclusions. Problem: modus ponens is actually mastered already with 3 years, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: This cannot be fixed by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: Ex. conservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive principle: (here): Objects that are occluded do not therefore cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the sensorimotor stage at 2 years. Variant: E.g. dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at 6 years: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/development/alternative theoryVsPiaget: The development of intelligence is not about the formation of general abstract structures, but is based on the development of content-specific and content-bound abilities. (Ausubel, 1978(2), Novak 1980(3), Schurz 1985(4)). >J. Piaget, >VsPiaget. 1. Brainerd, C. (1978). Piaget's Theory of Intelligence. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 2. Ausubel D. et al. (1978). Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View. New York: Holt. 3. Novak, J. (1980) "Eine Alternative zu Piagets Psychologie". In: Jung W. (Hg., 1980) Piaget und die Physikdidaktik. Physica Didactica 7, 17-24. 4. Schurz, G. (1985). "Denken, Sprache und Erziehung: Die aktuelle Piaget-Kontroverse", Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 7, Heft 4 1985, 335-366. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Problem Solving | Klahr | Slater I 65 Problem solving/developmental psychology/Klahr: in order to test the abilities in making inferences, Klahr (Klahr & Robinson, 1981)(1) modified the Tower of Hanoi to find out what problem-solving strategies a child can develop. Choosing cups instead of discs makes it impossible to put a smaller one on a larger one without giving explanations. The child was asked to tell the experimenter what she (the experimenter) should do in order to get her (the experimenter’s) cans to look just like the child’s in order to find out what mental representations the child could create. Slater I 66 Participants: 51 children, 19 each in a 4-year and 5-year groups and 13 in a 6-year group. Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls at each age level. The children were told a cover story about three monkeys on a riverbank (father, mother, child), which were represented by the cups (red, yellow, blue). Slater I 67 The main question of interest is how far into the future a child could “see” in describing move sequences. To avoid overestimating this capacity on the basis of a few fortuitous solutions, we used a very strict criterion: a child was scored as able to solve n-move problems only after proposing the minimum path solution for all four of the problems of length n. Slater I 68 KlahrVsPiaget: (Cf. >Abilities/Klahr, >Method/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget) the absolute level of performance was striking, given Piaget’s earlier claims. Over two-thirds of the five-year-olds and nearly all of the six-year-olds consistently gave perfect four-move solutions, and over half of the six-year-olds gave perfect six-move solutions. Almost half of the four-year-olds could do the three-move problems. Recall that these solutions required that the child manipulate mental representations of future states, because the cans were not moved during or after the child’s description of the solution sequence. 1. Klahr, D., & Robinson, M. (1981). Formal assessment of problem solving and planning processes in preschool children. Cognitive Psychology, 13, 113–148. David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Psychology | Piaget | Slater I 57 Psychology/children/development/Piaget: young children don’t realize that what they know isn’t also known by everyone else, or that someone viewing a scene from a different perspective that their own will see a different relative location of object in the scene.>Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget. VsPiaget > David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Quantities | Piaget | Slater I 56 Quantities/liquid quantity/children/development/Piaget: Four- and five-year-old children believe that when water is poured from a short wide glass into a tall thin glass that there is more water in the latter. >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget. VsPiaget > David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Self-Talk | Piaget | Upton I 76 Self-Talk/Piaget/Upton: Piaget (1923)(1) called self-tak egocentric speech and suggested that it reflects some of the limitations of young children’s cognitive skills, which we discuss in the next section. >Cognitive development/Piaget. VygotskyVsPiaget: In contrast, Vygotsky argued that all speech, including self-talk, is ‘social’ and therefore self-talk did not disappear – it simply becomes internalised. >Self-Talk/Vygotsky. Vygotsky argued that to believe that self-talk disappears would be like believing that children stop counting when they stop using their fingers to do so. Vygotsky alleged that, even when internalised, self-talk continues to guide a child’s actions. This idea is given some support by the way in which the conscious use of self-talk intensifies when children are presented with tasks of increasing difficulty. >Vygotsky, >Self-Talk. 1. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Self-Talk | Vygotsky | Upton I 76 Self-talk/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky (1930/1978)(1) identified self-talk as a critical part of the child internalising previously external social speech. In early childhood, especially between the ages of three and four, children often talk out loud to themselves. Over time this self-talk seems to disappear. >Self-talk/Piaget. Piaget (1923)(2) called self-tak egocentric speech and suggested that it reflects some of the limitations of young children’s cognitive skills, which we discuss in the next section. VygotskyVsPiaget: In contrast, Vygotsky argued that all speech, including self-talk, is ‘social’ and therefore self-talk did not disappear – it simply becomes internalised. He argued that to believe that self-talk disappears would be like believing that children stop counting when they stop using their fingers to do so. Vygotsky alleged that, even when internalised, self-talk continues to guide a child’s actions. This idea is given some support by the way in which the conscious use of self-talk intensifies when children are presented with tasks of increasing difficulty. >J. Piaget. 1. Vygotsky, L.S. (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Stages of Development | Piaget | Upton I 16 Stages of development/Piaget/Upton: 1. Sensorimotor (0 to 2 years): Begins to make use of imitation, memory and thought. Begins to recognise that objects do not cease to exist when they are not in view. Moves from reflex actions to goal-directed activity. 2. Preoperational (2 to 7 years): Gradually develops use of symbols, including language. Able to think operations through logically in one direction. Has difficulties seeing another person’s point of view. 3. Concrete operational (7 to 11 years): Able to solve concrete problems. Understands some mathematical operations such as classification and seriation. 4. Formal operational (11 to adult): Able to solve abstract problems in a logical fashion. Becomes more scientific in thinking. Develops concerns about social issues and identity. VsPiaget: Some of the details of these stage theories have been criticised and the evidence now suggests that he underestimated children’s abilities. >Psychologial theories on development stages, >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Learning/Piaget, >Knowledge/Piaget. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Thinking | Piaget | Slater I 60 Thinking/future/children/cognitive development/Piaget: Piaget was interested in whether young children, around five years old, could “think ahead” in their everyday lives. He used a simple version of the Tower of Hanoi (TOH). Rules: 1. Only move one disk at a time 2. Never put a larger disk above a smaller disk. Slater I 63 Piaget: conclusion: most five- and six-year-old children “cannot move the three-disk tower even after trial and error ( …) (Piaget 1976(1) p. 288). VsPiaget: because, even an infant can remove a single obstacle to achieve a desired goal (McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 1999(2)) or use a tool to retrieve a desired object (Chen & Siegler, 2000)(3). >Consiousness, >Play, >Intelligence, >Thinking. 1. Piaget, J. (1976) The grasp of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. McCarty, M. E., Clifton, R. K., & Collard, R. R. (1999) Problem solving in infancy: the emergence of an action plan. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1091-1101 3. Chen, Z., & Siegler, R. S. (2000). Across the great divide: bridging the gap between understanding of toddlers’ and older children’s thinking. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 65, 2, (Whole No. 261). David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Understanding | Educational Psychology | Upton I 106 Understanding/science/educational psychology/Upton: Piaget (Piaget, 1923)(1) argued that children cannot understand scientific reasoning until they have reached the formal operational stage of development, which usually happens in adolescence. VsPiaget: However, many educators and psychologists now agree that children begin to understand about the natural world and how it works from an early age (Duschl et al.. 2007)(2). The evidence suggests that they construct their own theories of how the world around them works based on their everyday experiences. While a rudimentary understanding of scientific phenomena such as density has even been demonstrated in preschoolers (Kohn, 1993)(3), it must be remembered that these naive theories are often imperfect and may include misconceptions. Piaget (1923)(1) argues that this is because young children do not have the cognitive structures to enable them to understand the scientific theory. According to Piaget, early misconceptions must be replaced by more accurate understanding as the child’s cognitive abilities mature. However, contemporary evidence suggests that, rather than dismissing children’s early theories, this knowledge should be used as a building block for scientific thinking. See Pine et al. 2001(4) - For a different point of view (VsPine) see Hardy et al. 2006(5). >J. Piaget, >Stages of development, >Developmental psychology. 1. Piaget. 1(1923) Languci.ge and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. 2. Duschl. R. Schweingruber, H and Shouse, A (eds) (2007) Taking Science to School: Learning and teaching science in grades K - 8. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 3. Kohn, A (1993) Preschoolers’ reasoning about density: will it float? Child Development, 64: 163 7-50. 4. Pine, KJ, Messer, DJ and St John, K (2001) Children’s misconceptions in primary science: a survey of teachers’ views. Research in Science and Technology Education, 19(1): 79-96. Available online at https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2 299/613/1/103 202.pdf. 5. Hardy, I, Jonen, A, Möller, K and Stem, E (2006) Effects of instructional support within constructivist learning environments for elementary school students’ understanding of ‘floating and sinking’. Journal of Educational Psychology, 98: 307-26. Further reading: Nunes, T, Schliemann, AD and Carraher, DW (1993) Street Mathematics and School Mathematics. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Understanding | Piaget | Upton I 106 Understanding/science/Piaget/Upton: Piaget (1923)(1) argued that children cannot understand scientific reasoning until they have reached the formal operational stage of development, which usually happens in adolescence. >Thinking/Piaget, >Development stages/Piaget, >Psychological theories on development stages. VsPiaget: However, many educators and psychologists now agree that children begin to understand about the natural world and how it works from an early age (Duschl et al.. 2007)(2). It must be remembered that these naive theories are often imperfect and may include misconceptions. Piaget (1923)(1) argues that this is because young children do not have the cognitive structures to enable them to understand the scientific theory. According to Piaget, early misconceptions must be replaced by more accurate understanding as the child’s cognitive abilities mature. However, contemporary evidence suggests that, rather than dismissing children’s early theories, this knowledge should be used as a building block for scientific thinking. >Knowledge/Psychology. 1. Piaget. J. (1923) Languci.ge and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. 2. Duschl. R. Schweingruber, H and Shouse, A (eds) (2007) Taking Science to School: Learning and teaching science in grades K - 8. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Piaget, J. | Pinker Vs Piaget, J. | I 375 Piaget: compared children with young scientists - Pinker pro: we all think scientifically from childhood on - but for primitive humans it was more difficult to survive than for the people of today I 391 PinkerVsPiaget: considering knowledge strategies as innate is something else than presuming science I 392 Piaget: children are sensorimotoric beings and unaware that objects are related and persist, and that the world obeys external laws and not the actions of a child. I 414 Logic/Human/Child/Development/Evolution/Pinker: children use "and", "or", "if" properly before they turn three. I 418 Maths/Child: three-week-old babies notice when they first see a scene with three and then one with two objects, and vice versa. Ten months: they remember how many (up to four objects) are presented to them, and it does not matter whether the objects are homogeneous, grouped or spread, also sounds. Arithmetic: Five months: surprised when suddenly on object is missing. I 419 18 months: Babies know that there are different numbers and that they belong in a particular order. Question: can these children and animals count without having words? Pinker: counting does not depend on language. Adults: use several representations for quantities. Preschoolers: even before they fully see through counting and measuring, they understand a lot of the logic and try to split a sausage fairly by cutting it. I 421 E.g. even a blind toddler knows that the straight line from A to B is the shortest and a turn to C is longer. I 422 School/TIMMSS: American students' performance is extremely poor. PinkerVsPiaget: mathematical education follows constructivism: a mixture of constructing while the social institutions are at odds about these concepts. "Holistic" method. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Piaget, J. | Schurz Vs Piaget, J. | I 194 VsPiaget/Schurz: it was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: For example, children who were presented with a simpler form than a mountain landscape (a box with four differently coloured sides) could solve the problem at the age of 4 (instead of 6-7). Schurz: this did not mean, however, that the core of the theory was revealed. (according to the Lakatos motto). I 195 1. VsPiaget: it was concluded that its test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, 1978). 2. VsPiaget: e.g. number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New. E.g.: the children should select pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this payment test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Core/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: e.g. statement logic. According to Piaget, children of 13-14 years of age should be able to make propositional logic correct statements. Problem: modus ponens is actually controlled at the age of 3, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: this cannot be solved by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: e.g. preservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive Principle: (here): objects that are hidden therefore do not cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the senso-motoric stage at the age of 2. Variant. For example, dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at the age of 6: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/Development/Alternative TheoryVsPiaget: the development of intelligence is not based on the formation of general abstract structures, but on the development of content-specific and content-related abilities. (Ausubel, 1978, Novak 1980, Schurz 1985). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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