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Philosophy/Heidegger/Figal: also according to the conception of being and time, it is a liberation from the bonds of transmitted concepts, but if this liberation no longer leads to the free attention to the beginning of history, but to the actual structure of existence, the history in its essence is no longer historical. The structure of existence exists as long as existence exists.
Solution: Heidegger succeeds the breakthrough in the winter term 1931/32: interpretation of the cave-parable (Politeia). Liberation from fetters, but metaphor of light (for the time), openness, permeability,"liberate." ---
Freedom/Heidegger: Being and time: existence makes free - later: light makes free. existence designs:
2. Natural science 3. History
Art/Heidegger: neither "expression of experiences" nor pleasure. Instead, "the artist has the essential focus for the possible" to bring the hidden possibilities of beings to work. ---
Figal I 171
HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientificization. ---
Cardorff II 13
Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's philosophy has no subject. It does not want to organize knowledge, make no statements, but create an event with its speech. "Passion for the useless". His philosophy propagates the domination of an admittedly dialogically unlegitimate speaking. ---
Cardorff II 36
Subject/object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. Instead: "Walten sui generis". VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Knowledge - Divine/Human - Vs Totality-constituting categories: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself. (HeideggerVsSchopenhauer).
Cardorff II 46
Development in Heidegger's work: the process of condensation, the difference between existence and being becomes lesser; the human makes up less as something withstanding and holding to something and more and more as an executing and fitting in. The difference between being and exist (ontological difference) tends to be stronger than the inner action of being itself. ---
Cardorff II 60
Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: 1. The thing about which it is can never be guilty of an incomprehension. It reigns as it reigns.
2. Heidegger is never to blame for an incomprehension; he is much too much into the thing.
3. The reader can want to be guilty, but ultimately is never guilty, because it is not he who blocks himself, but the one who is turning away.
4. It can always be assumed that Heidegger has been looking for uncertainty.
Cardorff II 69
Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's texts draw the reader's attention, inter alia, as both meanings and meaning levels pass into one another. Heidegger is concerned with making it impossible to grasp the subject. ---
Cardorff II 102
Heidegger: all the evaluations of his philosophy are meaningless because they come from wrong questions.
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006
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|Ries II 23
Truth/Nietzsche: nothing is true anymore and therefore everything is allowed. Mirror Cabinet of Perspectivism. ---
Ries II 33
Truth/About truth and lie in the extra-moral sense/Nietzsche: "The truths are illusions, of which one has forgotten that they are some". ---
Ries II 34
Truth/Lie/Nietzsche: the contrast is a construction forced by a social need. Truth interest: "Equating the non-equal". ---
Ries II 74/75
Truth/Beyond Good and Evil/NietzscheVsPhilosophy: illegitimate claim to be in possession of truth. Moral evaluations are given as necessary attributes of reality. ---
Ries II 86
Truth/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: it ends with the old truth. ----
Ries II 110
Truth/Nietzsche: there is no truth. ---
Danto III 52
Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche: Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW 1/III, 2, p. 374f): So what is truth? A moving army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations that have been poetically and rhetorically exalted, transmitted, adorned, and that seem to be fixed, canonical and binding to people after a long period of use: the truths are illusions, of which one has forgotten that they are some, metaphors that are worn out and have become sensually powerless, coins that have lost their picture and now as metal do not count as coins anymore. ---
Danto III 53
Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: Please note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche/Danto). ---
Danto III 232
Truth/Nietzsche/Danto:... in so far as he [the scientist] affirms this 'other world' [which the scientist wants to discover] he does not have to deny its counterpart, this world, our world...? ... Then it is still a metaphysical belief on which our belief in science is based (...). Plato's belief that God is the truth, that the truth is divine.... (F. Nietzsche: Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V. 2, p. 259). ---
Danto III 233
God/Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: Zarathustra says that God is dead. If he is right and God is equated with truth, the truth must be dead. Nihilism/Nietzsche: but how, if this becomes more and more unbelievable, if nothing turns out to be more than divine, unless the error, blindness, the lie, - if God Himself proves to be our longest lie (ibid. p. 259).
Danto III 234
Danto: a new problem arises: the question of the value of truth. And since the scientist is committed to the truth, the question cannot be answered scientifically. Nietzsche: All science, (...) the natural as well as the unnatural (...) is now looking to talk the human being out of his former respect for himself. (F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 422.)
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009
Beyond Good and Evil 2014
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
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Words/Gärdenfors: express our terms. ---
Words/Gärdenfors: why are there any at all? If we answer from a linguistic point of view, we are immediately involved in syntactic considerations. For example, we then try to find "arguments" of verbs. Problem: already the distinction transitive/intransitive is unclear. Also the assumption that verbs are used "predicatively" comes from the philosophy and the predicate logic and is an artificial construction. (GärdenforsVsPhilosophy, GärdenforsVsLogic).
Syntax/Gärdenfors: the semantic theory in this book should be free of syntax, i.e. the semantic concepts should not depend on grammatical categories. I do not mean that syntax does not contribute to meaning, only lexical semantics should be operated independently of syntax.
Words/Gärdenfors: are not simply meaning units - they occur in classes. > Word classes.
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Consciousness-Phil.||Heidegger Vs Consciousness-Phil.
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|Habermas I 164
HeideggerVsPhilosophy of Consciousness: Vs monological approach: Vs inventory securing the object as calculating dealing with perceptible and manipulable objects. Understanding of the subjects among themselves: "To count on the other." - In contrast, Heidegger: non-strategic sense of agreement intersubjectively achieved. Heidegger ignored completely what other philosophers had had as insights on this path (pragmatism, Wittgenstein, Austin, Gadamer).
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
|Phenomenalism||Evans Vs Phenomenalism
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EvansVsPhilosophy of Mind: (this option): like Wittgenstein: E.g. why is it that someone is in love with one of two identical twins? Maybe he met one but not the other. I 315 However, the theorists cannot explain why no other descriptions can be the deciding factor, based on errors, or accidentally refer to the other twin. If God had seen in the mind of the person concerned, wouldn’t he have seen there with whom he was in love, or about whom he has thought.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
|Philosophy||Feynman Vs Philosophy
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Relativity Theory/RT/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: Philosophers have often misunderstood the theory of relativity. But it is true that the phenomena depend on the reference system. Scientific camps: there is a school of philosophers who are uneasy with the fact that we cannot determine the absolute velocity without looking outside. They would say that it is useless to speak of velocity without looking outside. I 233 FeynmanVs: these philosophers will always be there, they struggle at the periphery, they never really understand the subtleties and depths of the problem. Our inability to demonstrate absolute movement is a result of the experiment and not just of pure thought. If Newton was the first to formulate the principle of relativity, why did people in his time not make so much noise about "everything is relative"? Answer: because only with Maxwell’s equations and theory of electrodynamics laws of physics existed that suggest that one could measure one’s speed without observing the outside world. Soon it was however found experimentally that it it is impossible!. Movement/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: there is a camp of philosophers who assert that movement cannot be proven at all except by observing the outside world. FeymanVs: that’s just not true! Only uniform rectilinear movement cannot be proven (if one is affected by it oneself). E.g. if we rotate in space, we experience a "centrifugal force" ((s) pseudo-force, but noticeable). E.g. the Earth’s rotation can be detected with the Foucault pendulum, without looking "outside". (Internal evidence).
Philosophy/Feynman: if the philosopher is a good one, he comes back and says, "we really do rotate relative to the stars, therefore they must cause the centrifugal force" Feynman: According to all we know that is true. But currently we cannot say whether the centrifugal force would exist, if there were no stars, we just do not know. Then the philosopher might assume he proved that there is only relative movement to the stars. FeynmanVs:... it is just equally obvious that linear movement relative to the stars is not precisely detectable.
Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993
Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001