Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Putnam | VI 393 Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact. Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. >Verification. N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent. >Bivalence, >Incorrigibility. Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. >Observation sentence, >Reference. Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. >Metaphyiscal realism. Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies. >Meta language, >Private language. --- I (d) 124 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again. I (d) 125 It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. I (e) 150 Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Appearance | Brandom | I 424 Form/appearance/BrandomVsPhenomenalism: "it looks as if" just holds back approval. I 426 Error: Understanding appearance as a cognitive act, about which one cannot be wrong - otherwise the mind would consist of infallible representations - Solution: errors and failure are not applicable here - approval that cannot be given cannot be held back - also error: attempt as an act that (as such) cannot fail. I 428 Appearance/Phenomenalism: goes beyond supervenience: > Reductionism: perceptual conditions can only be formulated in terms of the way things are - E.g. Something cannot just appear to seem to be red without really seeming to be red. E.g. you can try to lift a weight, without actually lifting it, but you cannot just attempt to try it without really trying. I 425 Form/appearance/Sellars: two uses: 1. E.g. the chicken seems to have a certain number of spots, but there is no specific number, which it seems to have - 2. Distinction between a) it looks as if there is a tree b) there is something that looks like a tree c) over there is a tree Understanding/Brandom: here, it "seems to be red" requires it "to be red" - Appearance: is not iterable (trying to do smomething: ditto). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Phenomenalism | Brandom | I 422 Phenomenalism/Brandom: Slogan: "Being means to be perceived" - The represented is explained in concepts of the representing and not vice versa - Object and proposition are structures or constructions of perceptions - existence, independence and propositions are characteristics of assignment. >Existence, >Propositions, >Attribution, >Appearance, cf. >Berkeley. I 423 Facts about having propositional supervene facts about the appearance - i.e. first the observation must be explained. Without reference on what it means to be a thing, it needs to be explained what it means to be regarded as a thing - then you can say that there is no fact about which things are red - VsPhenomenalism: has notoriously failed - Cartesian dualism appearance as a basis certainty "that it seems to me". >Supervenience, >Facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Phenomenalism | Lewis | I (c) 55 LewisVsQualia Theory/MaterialismVsPhenomenalism: there is no such information at all. Knowledge, as it is, is not at all possession of information. It is not the exclusion of any previously open possibilities. >Qualia/Lewis, >Materialism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Phenomenalism | Putnam | V 240f Phenomenalism/Mill/Putnam: we only talk about our feelings. Modern Form: the modern form connects to the instrumentalism: thesis: all facts are ultimately instrumental. Bohr: science cannot find out how nature is, but what we can say about the nature. Ethics/phenomenalism: thesis: statements about values are emotive, not cognitive. (>Non-Cognitivism). CarnapVsPhenomenalism/CarnapVsHusserl: translations of statements about objects in statements about feelings are actually wrong; it is a wrong kind of reductionism. Feelings are private, objects are public, reading of measurements is not an experience. Phenomenalism/Putnam: motivation: phenomenalism will clear out the apparent conflict between instrumental science and direct interest in nature. --- I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: ("The Logical Structure of the World", final chapter): in this final chapter, there is a sketch of the ratio of "thing-language" ("thing language", i.e. physical language) to feeling-language which is not a translation. PutnamVsPhenomenalism: that is the old assertion that we could choose the simplest theory. >Theories/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Phenomenalism | Ryle | I 322 ff PhenomenalismVsSubstance, Vs "higher unity" in the object -> sense-data theory. I 321ff We do not have a "pure" vocabulary of sensations. We can indicate our sensations only by mentioning ordinary objects, including people. I 322 A goalpost is permanent, while sensations are fleeting. It is a unity, while sensations are a multiplicity, so there is a tendency to say that "behind" the sensations there is a higher unity of the goalpost; important features, namely, that it is a continuing substance, a thing in itself a source of causality, an objective unity... Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of theory but does not recognize the disease. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less laudable motive: he assumed that having a sensation is itself a determining of something, or that something is "revealed" in the sensation. >Sense data theory. It seemed to follow that we can't really observe things and therefore can't find out by observation those things that we know very well about goalposts. I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: The truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is also meaningless. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mentalism. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it is false to see sensation as something to explore (Vs "sense objects"). "Indirect monitoring": sensation is not describable without reference to objects. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Phenomenalism | Stalnaker | I 221 Phenomenalism/Stalnaker: thesis: the qualitative experiences are fundamental - "as it is". Modern form: a modern form is internalism. VsPhenomenalism/Representationalism: our ability to represent the world is basic. Basic concept: a basic concept is the appearance - not "as it is". Representatives: representatives of phenomenalism are Dretske, Harman, Lycan, Michael Tye. >Fred Dretske, >Gilbert Harman, >William Lycan. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Phenomenology | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 108 HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists. Cf. >Phenomenalism. I 156 ff Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects. ((s) for independency of sentences see >Atomism.) I 199ff Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings. >Colour. WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology. >Grammar. Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names. I 201 Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth. I 202 The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore. >Understanding. I 204 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one. I 215 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.) I 222 WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects. >Quantification. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Qualia | Lewis | I (c) 54 Qualia Theory VsMaterialism, functionalism Vs: E.g. you never tried Vegemite (the famous condiment).Therefore you do not know how it is, to taste Vegemite. Neither information on the nature, nor of the materialists and functionalists helps. But when you taste it, you will know how it is. Therefore, there is a kind of information that has been overlooked by materialists and functionalists, the phenomenal information. >Knowing how, >Phenomenalism, >Materialism, >Functionalism/Lewis. I (c) 55 LewisVsQualia-Theory/MaterialismVsPhenomenalism: There is absolutely no such information. Knowledge, as it is, is not at all possession of information. It is not the exclusion of any previously open opportunities. I (c) 55 Knowledge as it is, is rather the possession of skills, not information. From skills to recognize something, imagine, predict behavior. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Internalism | Nozick Vs Internalism | II 280 Knowledge/Nozick: we conceive knowledge as based on an independent reality (externalism). But how does it feel from the inside? How does a person form their knowledge? (FN 105). II 281 We may be mistaken about every single fact, there is a distance, perhaps a gap. Knowledge should, however, bring us in touch with the facts. Skepticism: if he's right, nothing shows us that the connection exists. "Internal"/"External": are unclear concepts. Internalism/Knowledge/Nozick: believes that if q is implied by the knowledge of p, and S knows that p, then S knows that q. NozickVsInternalism: if that is true, then we know all implications and consequences of our knowledge (absurd). ((s) >logical omniscience/Nozick). Externalism/Nozick: but must not be exaggerated. Even if the external fact that p is connected to us, then the connection is still external. It is beyond our horizon. II 282 Reductionism/Nozick: E.g. phenomenalism or Berkeley. NozickVsPhenomenalism: we say that they do not take us where we want to be, to external reality. Any theory that wants to connect us with external facts has to make the connection partly externally. If our belief would co-vary with the facts over a broader span than over conditionals, would the connection seem closer to us? If we had a complete connection, would it still be external? Is there not still a gap between it and us? Or is the absence of a complete connection a sign of externality? Is something external by its lack of complete covariance? (FN 105). II 283 Perhaps it would be better if our beliefs co-varied less closely than with conditionals. But that would not satisfy NozickVsInternalism that wants to eat the external reality and keep it. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism | VI 390 Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true". Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective"). PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g. T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc. Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong. E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard. T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models. Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality. M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD. SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates). Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski). VI 391 TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"? Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model). "Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1, VI 392 then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T. Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it. T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT). On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT). Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions". theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference. N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism). unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended? Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible. Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer. VI 393 Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification. Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth: Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". VI 394 N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used. Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism. Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc. Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be. Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least). Solution: Internal realism is all we need. Problem: that is not the whole story: Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory). PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere: E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line. Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD: Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it VI 396 and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments. VI 397 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g. Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model. We take advantage of that. Now, if our view is correct, VI 399 then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3. VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference. Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use). Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore. Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these? VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?" Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction. Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. VI 401 Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true? VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention. --- Field IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. --- VII 440 Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Phenomenalism | Brandom Vs Phenomenalism | I 423 VsPhenomenalism: with respect to physical objects subjective phenomenalism has failed notoriously in both fields of explanation. The Cartesian acts of consciousness appeared as ideal candidates for the targeted confusing-with-something. (Privileged access of the subject, transparency and incorrigibility). The fact that something may not seem red to a subject, without the subject by virtue of it knowing that it seemed red, and that something cannot merely apparently seem to be red without really seeming to be red. Special epistemic status: you know everything about these states simply by having them or being in them. There is nothing else in the game than the knowing subject and the state of consciousness. (Descartes). Appearance: eliminated. Basic Concept: "privileged access". (BrandomVs). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Phenomenalism | Danto Vs Phenomenalism | DantoVsphenomenalism: Problem: There is an immense number of possible sense-data, even with the simplest objects. Every experience is thus incomplete. I 218 Problem of translation: The question is, if I need physical concepts to explain perceptions at the end. I.e. physical terms in order to eliminate physical terms. That would make phenomenalism as a feasible way impossible. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Phenomenalism | Dummett Vs Phenomenalism | Brandom I 429 Dummett: problem of "recognition transcendence": distinguishing three things: 1. What should be considered phenomenalistically (objects, mental activity, semantic properties, the past, etc.) 2. To which considering-to-be or attribution the talk about such things should supervene, 3. how this supervenience relation is to be fully understood. For each phenomenalistic assertion there is now a class of assertions that are realistic, in the sense that they deny the phenomenalistic "there is nothing but« analysis. (DummettVsPhenomenalism). Horwich I 393 Reference/Anti-Realism/Verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/Anti-Realism/Dummett: Thesis: the Theory of Understanding should be pursued in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (E.g. sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses the truth conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence means knowing what its verification would be. Analogy: for intuitionism: knowing the constructive evidence means to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility Condition/Assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam: Important Argument: we say the that sentence is verified by being pronounced! > Firth: Def Self-Affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirming. It is verified by being pronounced. ((s) In such and such circumstances). That does not mean that it is incorrigible! Neither does it have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: Thesis: in this sense (of the "self-affirmation of observation statements" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". I 394 Important Argument: The realistic terms of truth and falsity are not needed for this! Important Argument: the problem of how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise! Because the term "reference" is not needed. Reference: we can introduce it à la Tarski, but then "cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and the understanding of this sentence does not need a metaphysical realism. Facts/Verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: you should not use verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither of sense data). Otherwise all objections VsMetaphysicAL Realism could be repeated at the level that the MS becomes incomprehensible (this would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s private language argument). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply verificationism also in the metalanguage and the meta-metalanguage, etc. (1) 1. Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1976, pp. 483-98, in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Phenomenalism | Lewis Vs Phenomenalism | I (c) 55 LewisVsQualia-Theory / MaterialismVsphenomenalism: There is no such information! Knowing-how is not a possession of information! It is not the exclusion of any previously open possibilities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Phenomenalism | Nagel Vs Phenomenalism | I 109 Def Phenomenalism/Nagel: the analysis of all statements about the physical world with the help of concepts for real and hypothetical sensory experiences. NagelVsPhenomenalism: assumptions about an unperceived content of the refrigerator are incomprehensible as long as no non-conditional facts concerning the outside world are used for their explanation due to which these statements are true. I 110 Any attempt to explain a section of our worldview by others has to leave us with a world view that is compatible with the fact that we have this precise worldview! It cannot contain any description of ourselves that contradicts what we know, e.g. that there are infinitely many natural numbers. I 112 The question "How is it possible that people add?" does not equal the question "How is it possible that computers add?". In the first case, I ask about my own ability to follow a rule, in the second one I ask about a law of nature. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Phenomenalism | Quine Vs Phenomenalism | II 57 QuineVsPhenomenalism: Our propositions typically deal with bodies and fabrics in the outside world (sic) and not with sense data. Some of these sentences, however, are triggered by stimulation of the surface. At the time of word and object any aftertaste of "sense qualities" was extinguished at the surface stimulation. People do not think or talk about the stimulation of their nerve endings. The physiological formulation was in accordance with my naturalism and the rejection of a first philosophy. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Phenomenalism | Ryle Vs Phenomenalism | I 322 Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of the theory, but he does not recognize the disease. (Ryle). RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less praiseworthy motive: He assumed that having a sensation is to be a determination of something, or that something is "revealed" in sensation. (> Sense data theory). It seemed to follow that we cannot really observe things and therefore cannot find out through observation things that we already know about gate posts. --- I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: the truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is meaningless. Such facts: that gate posts persist for a long time, especially when they are painted with protective paint, that they are hard and solid other than smoke clouds, that they can be found by anyone at day or night other than shadows, that they carry the weight of gates and doors, but possibly burn down, are found by observation and experimentation. In the same way, it is also found that gateposts can sometimes look very similar to trees and people, and that it is, under certain circumstances, very easy to be mistaken about their size and distance. Certainly such facts are not directly given to the senses, or are revealed in sensation. RyleVsPhenomenalism: this also shows why the language does not make it possible to formulate the statements to which, according to phenomenalism, all statements about gate posts should be translatable: the reason is not that the vocabulary is inadequate but that there are no such objects, for which such additional expressions would be desired. "Sense objects" are absurd. Rather, we cannot describe our sensations without referring to ordinary objects. Observation: some say we should reserve the honour-title "observation" for those operations which are absolutely safe. Ryle: But why? If it makes sense to call a person a careful observer and another person a negligent observer, why should we deprive ourselves of this possibility? --- I 325 Because it was assumed that from the fact that every observation could be erroneous, there would have to be a special kind of fail-safe observation so that "empirical" can be defined with their help. For this purpose the sensory perception was invented to play this role. Erroneous immunity/immunity/Ryle: but the reason why a sensation cannot be faulty is not that it is a failing-safe observation, but that it is not an observation at all. (In addition, the above postulate is strongly circular). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Phenomenalism | Searle Vs Phenomenalism | II 86 SearleVsPhenomenalism: leads to solipsism. The sense data are always private. My sense data are not available to anyone else. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Phenomenalism | Smart Vs Phenomenalism | Fraassen I 209 Regularity/Fraassen: we can then perceive them a) as accidental, then we cannot know them at all as regularities! Because then they would not have to happen at all. b) as of underlying reasons. But we know about certain regularities, so there must be underlying reasons. Scientific Realism/Peirce/Smart/Fraassen: Peirce: ~ confidently predict that the stone will fall to the ground if I let it go. Theoretical Entities/SmartVsPhenomenalism: if he were right (disbelieving in theoretical entities), everything would be a cosmic coincidence. Then statements about electrons are only instrumentalistically useful. FraassenVsLeibniz: We have learned to recognize the question "Why is there something and not nothing?" as illegitimate. But we still consider it legitimate to ask: I 210 "Why is the world like this and not rather different? But both questions must not be answered with "by chance" or "because it is so". ("as a matter of fact"). |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Phenomenalism | Verschiedene Vs Phenomenalism | Kanitscheider II 110 Phenomenalism / Kanitscheider: the view that the appearances are not unquestionable elements of our knowledge. KanitscheiderVsphenomenalism: the recourse to a solid foundation of science is impossible because there simply is no such infallible basic knowledge. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Phenomenalism | Stalnaker Vs Phenomenalism | I 221 Phenomenalism/Stalnaker: thesis: the qualitative experiences are more essential - modern form: internalism. VsPhenomenalism: thesis: essential be our ability to represent the world. We project our image of the world back to us. Appearance/VsPhenomenalism: we understand the world in concepts of how the things appear to us not to have "as it is"-experiences. Representatives: Harman, Lycan, Dretske, Michael Tye. Intentionality/advantage: with the anti-phenomenalist view materialism and functionalism can be better understood in terms of intentionality. Functionalism: in terms of intentionality ((s) what can we say about something) is better understandable as in terms of phenomenal consciousness ("as it is"). Qualia: are then more comprehensible to analyze if you represent the world in concepts like experience ((s) "about"). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Phenomenalism | Kanitscheider Vs Phenomenalism | II 110 Phenomenalism/Kanitscheider: the view that the phenomena are the unquestionable elements of our knowledge. KanitscheiderVsPhenomenalism: the recourse to a secure foundation of the sciences is impracticable, because such an infallibles basic knowledge simply does not exist. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Qualia | Lewis Vs Qualia | I (c) 53 Qualia: The theory of Qualia is the most impressive challenge to materialism and functionalism: according to Qualia, we omit the phenomenal aspect of intellectual life. We forget that pain is a sensation. I (c) 54 Lewis: so far we don't deny anything! LewisVsQualia theory: despite his tendentious jargon, he simply talks about pain and various aspects of its functional role. Part of this causal role is to evoke judgements of the content that one has pain and to recognize it. I (c) 55 LewisVsQualia-Theory/MaterialismVsPhenomenalism: There is no such information at all! Knowing what it's like is not information at all. It is not the exclusion of any previously open possibilities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phenomenalism | Danto2 I 218 Phenomenalism / Danto: the reference to objects is always eventually reference to the sensory experience. The whole theory is a kind of translation program. E.g. beeswax: the whole process of melting can be expressed in terms of actual and possible sense-experience. The phenomenalism made the assumption of divine omniscience superfluous. VsPhenomenalism: Problem: there is an immense number of possible sense-data, even with the simplest objects. Every experience is thus incomplete. Problem of translation: the question is whether or not I end up needing physical concepts to explain perceptions. So physical concepts to eliminate physical concepts. That would make the phenomenalism useless as a feasible way. |
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| Representationalism | Pro | Stalnaker I 221 Phenomenalism / Stalnaker: Thesis: the qualitative experiences are fundamental "how it is" - modern form: internalism VsPhenomenalism / representationalism: basic is our ability to represent the world - basic concept: appearance - not "how it is" - representative: Dretske, Harman , Lycan, Michael Tye. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Phenomenalism | Harman, G. | Staln I 221 Phenomenalism/Stalnaker: Thesis: the qualitative experiences are fundamental - modern form: Internalism. VsPhenomenalism: Thesis: that our ability to represent the world is fundamental. We project our idea of the world back onto ourselves. Appearance/VsPhenomenalism: we understand the world in terms of how things appear to us, not "how it is" to have experiences. Representative: Harman, Lycan, Dretske, Michael Tye. |
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| Vs Phenomalism | Lycan, W. | Staln I 221 Phenomenalism / Stalnaker: the qualitative experiences are fundamental - modern form: internalism. VsPhenomenalism: what is basic is our ability to represent the world. We project our vision of the world back to us. appearance / VsPhenomenalism: we understand the world in terms of how things appear to us, not "how it is" to have experiences. Representative: Harman, Lycan, Dretske, Michael Tye. |
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| Phenomenalism. | Stalnaker, R. | I 221 Phenomenalism / Stalnaker: the qualitative experiences are fundamental - modern form: internalism. VsPhenomenalism: basic is our ability to represent the world. We project our vision of the world back to us. Appearance / Vs phenomenalism: we understand the world in terms of how things appear to us, not "as it is" to have experiences. Representative: Harman, Lycan, Dretske, Michael Tye. |
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