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Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers Books on Amazon: David Chalmers |
I 185
Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979, Winograd 1972).
N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours.--- I 186
Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this.
---I 313
Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans.
LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961, 1963, Penrose, 1989): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting:VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. --- I 314
Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains.
---I 315
Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations.
Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall.ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. --- I 318
For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like...
---I 319
...Turing machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats.
ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence.--- I 320
This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. |
Cha I D.Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |

Brain/Brain State | Penrose Books on Amazon |
Genz II 333
Brain/Penrose: thesis: unpredictable quantum mechanical processes take place in the brain.
Brain researchVsPenrose: Brain processes take much longer than the quantum mechanical processes analogously assumed by Penrose. The quantum mechanical "coherence" in the brain cannot be maintained that long. |
Penr I R. Penrose The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe 2005 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |

Goedel | Deutsch Books on Amazon |
I 222 DeutschVsPenrose: E.g.
Deutsch cannot consistently prove the truth of this statement.
I can not, although I see that it is true. And I also understand the proposition. So it is at least possible that a statement that is inconceivable for a person, can of course be true, however for any other person. (> Gödel / Penrose). |
Deu I D. Deutsch Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |

Turing-Machine | Dennett Books on Amazon |
I 623
DennettVsPenrose: he says that the brain is no Turing machine, but he does not say that the brain is not well reproduced by a Turing machine. |
Den I D. Dennett Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Den II D. Dennett Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Artificial Intelligence | Penrose Vs Artificial Intelligence Books on Amazon |
Dennett I 617
PenroseVsAI/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence: x can perfectly achieve a checkmate
There is no algorithm for chess. Therefore, the good performance of x can not be explained by the fact that x can run an algorithm. Dennett I 619
Penrose: if you take any single algorithm, it can not be the method by which human mathematicians insure mathematical truths. Therefore they use no algorithms at all. I 621
DennettVsPenrose: thus is not shown that the human brain does not operate algorithmically. On the contrary, it makes clear how the cranes of culture, the community of mathematicians can exploit without recognizable boundaries in distributed algorithmic processes. |
Penr I R. Penrose The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe 2005 Den I D. Dennett Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Den II D. Dennett Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 |

Deutsch, D. | Penrose Vs Deutsch, D. Books on Amazon |
Penrose: even a quantum computer (D. Deutsch) would be a Turing machine that can compute only proven computable functions. But Penrose would also like to push forward with "quantum gravity". Dennett I 625/626
DennettVsPenrose: why does he think that such a theory must not be predictable? Because otherwise the AI would be possible! That s all. (Fallacy). |
Penr I R. Penrose The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe 2005 Den I D. Dennett Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Den II D. Dennett Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 |

Penrose, R. | Dennett Vs Penrose, R. Books on Amazon |
I 614
Gödel/Toshiba Library/Dennett: "there is no single algorithm that can prove all truths of arithmetics." Dennett: But Gödel says nothing about all the other algorithms in the library! I 617/618
In particular, he says nothing about whether or not there are algorithms in the library for very the impressive performance "to call sentences true"! "Mathematical intuition", risky, heuristic algorithms, etc.
DennettVsPenrose: he makes the very mistake of ignoring this group of possible algorithms and of focusing solely on those whose impossibility Gödel had demonstrated. Or about which Gödel says anything at all.Dennett: an algorithm can bring forth "mathematical insight", although it was not an "algorithm for mathematical insight"! I 615
PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence: x can perfectly achieve a checkmate - there is no algorithm for chess.
Therefore, the good performance of x cannot be explained with the fact that x can run an algorithm.I 617
DennettVsPenrose: that’s wrong. The level of the algorithm is obviously the correct explanation level. X wins, because he has the better algorithm! I 619
Fallacy: If the mind is an algorithm, then it certainly cannot be seen or accessed by those whose mind it generates. E.g. There is no specific algorithm for distinguishing italics from bold print, but that does not mean that it cannot be distinguished. E.g. Suppose in the Library of Babel there is a single book which contains the alphabetic order of all New Yorker participants whose net worth is over $ 1 million. ("Megaphone Book"). Now we can prove multiple statements about this book: 1) The first letter on the first page is an A. 2) The first letter on the last page is not A.
E.g. The fact that we cannot find any remains of the "mitochondrial Eve" does not mean that we cannot derive any statements about it.I 619
Penrose: if you take any single algorithm, it cannot be the method by which human mathematicians ensure mathematical truths. Accordingly, they do not use an algorithm at all. I 621
DennettVsPenrose: this does not show that a human brain does not operate algorithmically. On the contrary, it makes clear how the cranes of culture can exploit the community of mathematicians with no apparent limits in decentralized algorithmic processes. I 623
DennettVsPenrose: he says that the brain is not a Turing machine, but he does not say that the brain is not well represented by a Turing machine. Dennett I 625/626
Penrose: even a quantum computer (German) would be a Turing machine which can only calculate functions that are proven to be computable. But Penrose also wishes to advance further than that: with "quantum gravity". I 628
DennettVsPenrose: why he thinks such a theory should not be computable? Because otherwise AI would be possible! That’s all. (Fallacy). DennettVsPenrose: Idea with microtubules is unconvincing: Suppose he was right, then even cockroaches would have a wayward spirit. Because they have microtubules like us. |
Den I D. Dennett Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 |

Penrose, R. | Deutsch Vs Penrose, R. Books on Amazon |
Penrose behauptet, dass schon die Existenz einer Art offener mathematischer Intuition, sich nicht mit der bestehenden Struktur der Physik und insbesondere nicht mit dem Turingprinzip verträgt. Wenn das Turingprinzip wahr ist, können wir das Gehirn (wie jedes andre Objekt) als einen Computer auffassen, der ein bestimmtes Programm ausführt. Ein solches Programm verkörpert eine Menge von Hilbertschen Beweisregeln, die nach Gödels Satz nicht vollständig sein kann. I 221 Deshalb kann der Mathematiker, dessen Geist ein Computer ist, diese Aussage ebenfalls niemals als bewiesen anerkennen. Penrose schlägt dann vor, die Aussage diesem Mathematiker vorzulegen. Der Mathematiker versteht den Beweis. Er ist ja schließlich selbstverständlich gültig, und deshalb kann der Mathematiker vermutlich sehen, dass er gültig ist. Aber das würde Gödel Satz widersprechen. Hier muss also irgendwo ein Fehler stecken. Und das ist nach Penrose" Meinung das Turingprinzip. DeutschVsPenrose: Bsp Deutsch kann die Wahrheit diese Aussage nicht widerspruchsfrei beweisen. Das kann ich nicht, obwohl ich sehe dass sie wahr ist, oder nicht? Und ich verstehe den Satz auch. So ist es zumindest möglich, dass eine Aussage für einen Menschen unbegreiflich ist, für jeden anderen jedoch selbstverständlich wahr sein kann! (>Gödel/Penrose). |
Deu I D. Deutsch Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |

Penrose, R. | Pinker Vs Penrose, R. Books on Amazon |
I 126
Penrose: "The Emperor's New Mind": according to Gödel it follows that mathematicians cannot be computer programs.
Since mathematicians often just see if something is true (intuitively).VsPenrose: shown to be a fallacy by many. 1) Flesh should simply not be as reliable as machines. 2) Microtubules: the quantum mechanical effects simply would have to eliminate each other. 3) Microtubules: are ubiquitous in the cells. 4) Not the slightest indication of the effect of quantum mechanics as a creator of consciousness. |
Pi I St. Pinker Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |

Penrose, R. | Quine Vs Penrose, R. Books on Amazon: Willard V. O. Quine |
VI 155
Determinism/free will/Quine: Although determinism was questioned by quantum physics, this is certainly not a back door for the free will (VsPenrose).
I believe with Spinoza and Hume that the determinism has nothing to do with freedom.Our behavior is only free because it is caused by inner motives. That these are in turn caused somehow, is not in the way of freedom. |
Q I W.V.O. Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Q II W.V.O. Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Q III W.V.O. Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Q IX W.V.O. Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Q V W.V.O. Quine Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Q VI W.V.O. Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Q VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Q VIII W.V.O. Quine Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Q X W.V.O. Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Q XII W.V.O. Quine Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 |