Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 30 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Systems | Luhmann | Habermas IV 231 Action systems/Luhmann/Habermas: LuhmannVsParsons, Talcott: In Luhmann, Parson's "general action systems" are replaced by an evolutionary hierarchy of interlaced action systems formed by simple interactions, organizations that have become autonomous and linked via the media, and society. This is Luhmann's reaction to the phenomenon of the decoupling of the system and lifeworld. >Lifeworld/Habermas, >Action theory. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Systems | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Action system/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: action systems are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. >S. Freud. Habermas IV 323 Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of action systems be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; culturally value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation towards values as an orientation towards objects. >Objects/Parsons. Habermas IV 358 Action System/Society/System/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons defined society as an action system from the mid-sixties of the 20th century, whereby culture and language give way to constitutive provisions instead of value-oriented purposive action. (1) In systems of action, the traditional cultural patterns penetrate through the medium of language with the genetically propagated organic equipment of the individual members of society. Collectives, which are composed of socialized individuals, are the carriers of the systems of action. Moreover, each action system is a zone of interaction and mutual penetration of four subsystems: Culture, society, personality and organism. Each of these subsystems is specialized in a basic function. (2) Habermas IV 359 Subsystems: since they have a relative autonomy, they are in contingent relationships with each other. However, these are determined to a certain extent by their membership of the common system of action. The subsystems form environments for each other. Control: for superior control of these basic functions, Parsons postulates a control hierarchy. (3) Habermas IV 381 At the end of his complex path of thought, Parsons is confronted with the epistemological model of the recognizing subject based on Kant for the action system. HabermasVsParsons: for the purposes of the foundation of social theory, however, the communication-theoretical model of the subject with its ability to speak and act is better suited than the epistemological one. 1. T. Parsons, Societies, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 5. 2. Ibid. p. 7. 3. Ibid. p. 28 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Action Theory | Parsons | Habermas IV 301 Action Theory/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parson's initial question is how society is possible as an ordered relationship of actions. IV 302 Action Theory: starts with the orientations of those acting. The theory assumes a coordination of the actors System theory: examines the integration that goes through action orientations. The theory here assumes a functional networking of action sequences that remain latent, i.e. can extend beyond the orientation horizon of the participants. An orientation towards values and norms that is relevant in action theory is not constitutive for system integration. Habermas IV 303 Problems: 1) the theoretical framework for action is too narrow to develop a concept of society. 2) In system theory, the theory of action cannot be reinterpreted and assimilated without reservation. 3) HabermasVsParsons, Talcott: Parson's theory of modernity is too harmonizing because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. >Modernism. Habermas IV 304 HabermasVsParsons: his theory of action is not complex enough to win a concept of society. >Action Theory/Habermas, >Society/Habermas. Solution/Parsons: at the transition from the level of the action to the level of the context of action, he must change the perspective and the terms. Problem: then it looks as if this transition on its own accord refers to the concept of society as a self-directed system. Solution/Habermas: with the term "lifeworld" as a complement to the term "communicative action", the reproduction of the lifeworld can already be analysed under various functional aspects. This makes a change of perspective superfluous. >Lifeworld, >Communicative Action. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Actions | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. (1) Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation. >Situation/Parsons. Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“(2) HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure".(3) Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources.(4) >Values, >Norms, >Goals. Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. >Systems theory, >Action systems. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. >Cultural Tradition. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, p. 43f. 2. Ibid. p. 719. 3. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, p. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 44 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Bureaucracy | Parsons | Habermas IV 432 Bureaucracy/Weber/Parsons/Habermas: Max Weber bureaucratization thesis: In modern times, bureaucratization is increasing. >Bureaucracy/Weber, >M. Weber. Talcott ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: instead of a trend towards bureaucratization, there is a trend towards associationism. Many, however, feel an increase in bureaucracy. Symptoms of this are a deterioration ((s) of the feeling) of "community". >Community. Habermas IV 433 "Privatization": it is emphasized that the modern community has been "privatized" and many relationships have been moved into the context of large formal organizations. ((s) Parsons characterizes here an attitude that can be attributed to Weber). Parsons: Bureaucratization does not threaten to flood everything. On the contrary, the system of mass communication is a functional equivalent of some characteristics of the "Gemeinschaft" and beyond that, one that allows the individual to participate selectively in the context of his/her individual standards and wishes.(1) HabermasVsParsons: 1) Mass communication: is not designed to counteract the "privatization" of lifestyle, 2) The generalization of formal legal claims cannot easily be understood in the sense of expanding democratic decision-making processes. 1.T.Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, S. 116f. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication Media | Parsons | Habermas IV 385 Communication media/Parsons/Habermas: Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that occupies the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media?(1) Parsons later regarded his attempt to see power as a control medium anchored in the political system with structural analogies to money as a successful test for the generalizability of the media concept.(2) Habermas IV 386 In the order of money, power, influence and value retention, Parsons has analyzed four media in broad lines, each of which is assigned to one of the social subsystems: Money: the economic, Power: the political system, Influence: the system of social integration Value retention: the system for the preservation of structural patterns. Habermas: in another round of generalization, Parsons introduced four more media: Intelligence, performance, affect and interpretation.(3) >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Values. HabermasVsParsons: the analogies to the medium of money become less clear and even metaphorical during the course of theory formation. This applies all the more to the media that Parsons recently assigned to the subsystems of the all-encompassing system of the human condition: transcendental order, symbolic meaning, health and empirical order. (4) Habermas IV 387 In the end, money is for Parsons only one of 64 socio-theoretically remarkable media. Problem: then one cannot know which of the structural characteristics read off the money medium are characteristic of media at all. Habermas IV 388 Problem: are we dealing here with an overgeneralization, i.e. with the thesis that there is something like a system of control media? Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 393 Media/Parsons/Habermas: serve not only to save information and time, and thus to reduce the effort of interpretation, but also to cope with the risk that the action sequences will break off. Media such as power and money can largely save the costs of dissent because they uncouple the coordination of action from the formation of linguistic consensus and neutralize it against the alternative of agreement and failed understanding. They are not specifications of language, they replace special language functions. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Communicative action/Parsons, >Communication theory/Habermas. 1. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128 2. T. Parsons, On the Concept of Power, in: Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967 3. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory, in: J.C. McKinney, E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology, NY 1970 S. 27ff. 4. T. Parsons, Action, Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 393. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Crises | Habermas | IV 434 Crises/Society/HabermasVsPasons/Habermas: Talcott Parsons Thesis: Social pathological phenomena are due to systemic imbalances. >Systems/T. Parsons, >Systems Theory. HabermasVsParsons: with this reduction, the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. Whether these imbalances assume a "critical dimension" can only be assessed by the systems analyst from an external perspective if, as with organisms, he/she can refer to clearly identifiable limits of superiority. A comparably clear-cut problem of death does not arise for social systems.(1) Crises/Habermas: only when relevant social groups experience structural changes that are systemically reduced as critical to their existence and feel their identity threatened, may the social scientist speak of crises.(2) Solution/Weber/Habermas: By understanding modernization as social rationalization, Weber establishes a connection with identity-vouching worldviews and with structures of the lifeworld that determine the conditions of consistency of social experiences. >Worldviews, >Modernization, >M. Weber. IV 565 Crises/Habermas: system imbalances only have an effect as crises if the achievements of economy and state remain manifestly below an established aspirational level and impair the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld by causing conflicts and reactions of resistance there. IV 566 Before such conflicts endanger core areas of social integration, they are moved to the periphery: before anomic states occur, phenomena of withdrawal of legitimacy or motivation occur. However, if we succeed in intercepting control crises, i.e. perceived disturbances of material reproduction through recourse to resources of the lifeworld, pathologies of the lifeworld will arise. This can be imagined as an overexploitation of the remaining resources: culture and personality are being attacked in favour of a crisis-managing stabilisation of society. Phenomena of alienation and uncertainty of collective identities arise. See Colonization of the Lifeworld (Terminology/Habermas) and Reification/Lukács. 1. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt, 1973 2. J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt 1973, S. 9ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Crises | Parsons | Habermas IV 433 Crises/Society/Parsons/Habermas: Talcott Parson's thesis: Social pathological phenomena are due to systemic imbalances. Habermas IV 434 HabermasVsParsons: Parsons cannot, like Weber, teach standards for the experience of crises by those affected. He uses the term crisis without reference to identity problems. He can grasp crises solely in terms of media dynamics ((s) media are, among other things, money and power.) >Communication Media/Parsons. Economic inflation and deflation problems serve Parsons as a model for this. (1) 1. Parsons, T./Platt, M. The American University, Cambridge Mass. 1973, S. 304ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Tradition | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Cultural Tradition/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: systems of action are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. Habermas IV 323 The part of cultural tradition that is relevant for the constitution of systems of action is the pattern of value. These are processed through internalisation into personal motives or character-forming dispositions for action. Then action systems are complementary channels through which cultural values are translated into motivated actions.(1) >Values, >Action Systems. Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of systems of action be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; cultural value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. >Action theory, >Communicative action. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation to values as an orientation to objects. >Objects/Parsons. 1.Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951, S. 54. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Decisions | Parsons | Habermas IV 333 Decisions/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons thesis: for any situation of action there are five problems which inevitably face each actor in the form of binary schematized general and abstract decision alternatives.(1) 1. Should the actor follow his/her interests directly or allow for normative considerations? 2. Should he/she immediately follow his/her emotions and desires or suppress impulses? 3. Should he/she analyse the situation in a detached way, or should he/she get involved as a participant? Habermas IV 334 4. Should he/she judge other actors according to their performance or contributions? 5. Should he/she consider concrete objects and actors in their complexity or limit himself/herself to analytically described circumstances? Parsons gains from this the following table: 1. The private vs. collective interest dilemma: self vs. collectivity orientation. 2. The gratification-discipline dilemma: affectivity vs. affective neutrality. 3. The dilemma of transcendence vs. immanence: universalism vs. particularism. 4. The choice between object modalities: performance vs. quality (achievement vs. diffuseness). 5. The definition of the scope of interest in the object: specitiy vs. diffuseness. HabermasVsParsons: he has not fulfilled the claim that this table constitutes a system. >Systems. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 76 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Environment | Parsons | Habermas IV 342 Environment/System/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Problem: Parsons uses the term ambiguously: a) for the status of an environment superior to the action systems and at the same time b) for the action systems internal environment, which is nevertheless deprived of empirical properties of a system environment. >Action system. Habermas IV 371 Parsons establishes a hierarchy between behavioral system, personality, social system, and culture in such a way that the lower one corresponds to the respective Habermas IV 372 higher system in used energy, which is superior to the lower system in terms of information and control performance. This gives the cultural system the position of a sovereign of control. >Behavioral system, >Personality, >Social system, >Culture. Habermas: Parsons not only sets the course for a cultural determinism, but differentiates between two categories of environments: a) at the lower pole the natural or empirical environment, b) at the opposite pole an environment of a non-empirical, supernatural nature.(1) 1.T. Parsons, “Social Systems”, in: Parsons, Social Systems, 1977, S. 181. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Existential Generalization | Hintikka | II 42 Existential Generalization/EG/HintikkaVsParsons, Terence: Parsons' criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Cf. >Non-existence. E.g. (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll. From this one cannot infer, even though Caroll existed, and this was known by the Queen that (2) (Ex) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is x. And therefore: (3) Someone is so that Queen Victoria knew that he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) says the same as: (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll is. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2) - (3) with (4) is, however, quite independent of whether the quantifiers go only about existent or non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of the unambiguousness. Unambiguity, however, fails because in various situations, which are compatible with the knowledge of the queen, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different people. Therefore, not only a single specific object can function as the value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply in (1) and yet it can be understood that it obliges the one who utters it to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parsons' criterion fails. II 54 Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the existential generalization entitles us to move from one sentence S (b) to a singular term "b" to the existence statement (Ex) S (x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". (Existential Generalization) E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentatively concluding) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails because (11) has the strength of (12). (12) George IV knew who w is. >Predication, >Identification/Hintikka, >Identity/Frege, >Identity/Hintikka. Existential Generalization/failures/solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that we are dealing with ideas of speakers in intensional (opaque) contexts. >Opacity. HintikkaVsFrege: problem: then (11) would in any case follow from (10) ((s) and that is just not desired). For one would have to assume that there is in any case any meaning under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" picks out different individuals in different worlds. II 56 Semantics of Possible Worlds/solution/Hintikka: e.g. suppose (13) George knows that S (w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S (x) Whereby S (w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition (15) (Ex) in all relevant worlds (w = x) But this is not a well-formed expression in our notation. We must say what the relevant worlds are. Def relevant world/Hintikka: all worlds which are compatible with the knowledge of George are relevant. Thus, (15) is the same with (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. That is, George knows who is w (knowing-that, knwing-who, knowing-what). >Knowledge, >Knowledge how. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Functions | Parsons | Habermas IV 363 Functions/Society/Systems/Parsons/Habermas: Because each institution (business, state administration, law, church, family) belongs to all social subsystems (economy, law, preservation of cultural patterns) in different aspects, none is suitable as a defining characteristic for each of these subsystems. Functions/Parsons: he now defines them on a relatively abstract level as adaptation, goal achievement, integration and maintenance of structural patterns (see AGIL schema/Terminology). These are production services of the economy, organisational services of state administrations, integration services of law and the normalisation services of tradition. Habermas IV 364 Problem: Parsons must explain why these four functional aspects are necessary and sufficient for the analysis of action systems. Habermas IV 367 Since the scheme of the four basic functions in Parsons is no longer based on action theory and applies to living systems in general, the analytical components of the action themselves must now be seen as solutions to system problems. IV 370 VsParsons: the division and assignment of functions in his system theory is arbitrary. J. Alexander asks, for example, why integration problems cannot be solved just as well by universalistic as by particularistic action orientations or why problems of the preservation of cultural patterns should not be solved just as well by orientation on the achievements instead of on the intrinsic qualities of a counterpart. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Idealism | Parsons | Habermas IV 374 Idealism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: there is a hidden idealism in Parson's system functionalism: this can already be seen in the structure of the cultural system. Instead of Max Weber's tripartite division into cognitive patterns of interpretation, moral-practical patterns of value and aesthetic-expressive patterns of expression, a fourth division is now required: constitutive symbolism, in other words religion. In Parson's late philosophy, the general system of action is reified as the "telic system". >Idealism, >Religion, Culture, >Culture/Parsons, >Society/Weber. Habermas IV 377 Parsons emphasizes the talk of a telic system presupposes the belief in a sphere of ultimate reality. Habermas IV 378 Method/HabermasVsParsons: Parsons takes the general action system as the starting point for a reflexively turned view of the system of the basic human constitution. >Action system/Parsons. However, the theorist thus loses a position independent of this subsystem. He cannot break out from the perspective of the action system. The theory becomes self-referential on the anthropological level. For this, Parsons has the model of Kant's critique of recognition in mind.(1) >Self-reference, >I. Kant. 1.T. Parsons, Action Theory and Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 367f. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Method | Parsons | Habermas IV 311 Method/explanation/sociology/theory of action/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: if purposes and values in orders are already related to existing interests, institutionalized action can be understood as a process of realizing values under factual conditions. In this way, action and order could be correlated. However, Parsons isolates these two levels of analysis from each other. This exacerbates the construction problem. >Theory of Action/Parsons. Habermas IV 330 HabermasVsParsons: in connection with a theory of communicative action, the attempt to separate "material" from "immaterial" patterns of value increases the confusion. HabermasVsSubject Philosophy/HabermasVsEpistemology: the subject of epistemology directed at objects is a wrong model in its approach. Solution/Habermas: a model of communication-oriented action that can be used for studying how culture, society and Habermas IV 331 personality cooperate in the determination of action orientations. >Background/Habermas. Habermas IV 337 Method/HabermasVsParsons: when the pattern-variables (see Terminology/Parsons) describe a structural core common to several components (e.g. society, culture, personality), they cannot serve simultaneously to clarify the specific developments of these components on action orientations. Problem: there is no counterpart to the communication mechanism. Habermas IV 351 HabermasVsParsons: Parsons must make action connections suddenly understandable as systems without becoming aware of the change of attitude with which the concept of the action system is methodically first created through the objectification of the lifeworld. Therefore, he focuses on the theoretical introduction of the system concept. Solution/Parsons: Parsons simply gives basic conceptual priority to system theory. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Habermas | III 297 Modernism/Habermas: Modernism has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Worldviews, >Worldviews/Weber, >Method, >Discourses, >Rationale, >Ultimate Rationale. Based on Weber's analysis, two problems are encountered on the threshold of modernity: 1. Religious asceticism must first penetrate the non-religious areas of life in order to subject profane actions to the maxims of ethics of conviction. >Religion, >Society, >Morality. Weber identifies this process with the emergence of Protestant professional ethics. >Ethics/Weber. 2. In the emergence of modern science, the decoupling of the theory from practical experience must be overcome. This happened in the form of experimental natural sciences.(1) >Practise. III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the demystification process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.(2) >Protestant ethics. IV 433 Modernism/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Parsons describes the same phenomena that Weber can interpret as signs of social pathologies as further evidence of the formation of a form of solidarity appropriate to the complexity of modern societies. >T. Parsons. Parsons/Habermas: through his division of the basic concepts, he creates a synchronization of the rationalization of the lifeworld with increases in the complexity of the social system. In this way, he prevents exactly the distinctions that we have to make if we want to grasp the pathologies occurring in modernism. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. 1.W. Krohn, Die neue Wissenschaft der Renaissance, in: G. Böhme, W. v.d. Daele, W. Krohn, Experimentelle Philosophie, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 13ff. 2.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th.Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981 |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Luhmann | Habermas IV 420 Modernism/LuhmannVsParsons/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann only emphasizes the traits of complexity in modern societies. These owe their high complexity to the strong differentiation of subsystems, which are relatively independent of each other and at the same time form environments for each other and interact with each other via media in such a regulated exchange that zones of mutual penetration (interpenetration) arise. Neo-Kantianism/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann clears up with Neo-Kantianism, i.e. he abandons the idea of realizing values Habermas IV 421 and sweeps the skies clean of cultural values. He gives the theory of modernity greater flexibility back by undoing the corset of the scheme of four functions (see AGIL scheme). LuhmannVsParsons: Luhmann wants to explain historically what Parsons still predicts theoretically, e.g. that the development of modern societies is characterized by exactly three revolutions. ParsonsVsLuhmann/Habermas: in contrast to Luhmann, Parsons can translate the increase in system complexity recorded from outside, from the observation into the self-image of the system members bound to the inner perspective of the lifeworld.(1) 1.T.Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, S. 114ff. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Parsons | Habermas IV 303 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parson's theory of modernism is too harmonistic because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. Habermas IV 420 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons' theory of modernity has a Janus face: A) it differs from a system functionalism that exclusively emphasizes the traits of complexity in modern societies. That's Luhmann's line. >Modernism/Luhmann. Habermas IV 421 Method/ParsonsVsLuhmann/Habermas: Parsons understands social modernization not only as systemic rationalization, but as action-related rationalization. Habermas IV 422 HabermasVsParsons: Problem: Parsons lacks a social concept designed from an action perspective. Therefore, he cannot describe the rationalization of the lifeworld and the increase in the complexity of action systems as separate, interacting, but often also contradictory processes. Therefore, he cannot grasp the corresponding dialectic and must reduce these phenomena to the degree of crisis symptoms that can be explained according to the pattern of inflation and deflation. >Revolutions/Parsons. Habermas IV 432 Modernism/Parsons/ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: Parsons does not arrive at a different view than Weber through a divergent description of global trends, about which one could argue; rather, this view is deductively derived from his analysis of the modernization process: "When developed modern societies are characterized by a high degree of inherent complexity, and when they have this complexity only in all four dimensions of adaptation capacity. If we can simultaneously increase the differentiation of media-controlled subsystems, inclusion and value generation, then there is an analytical relationship between a) the high complexity of the system and b) universalistic forms of social integration and informal institutionalized individualism. Habermas: Parsons therefore draws a harmonized picture of modernity. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. Habermas IV 433 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons must reduce sociopathological phenomena to systemic imbalances; then the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, Habermas IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Non-Existence | Hintikka | II 37 Non-existent objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. >Possibilia. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka/thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Model theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid? >Fictions. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Relevance. II 38 Ontology/language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on the ontological status? >Ontology. Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional! Model Theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. Acceptance/acceptability/inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. Singular Terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms requires us to use an existential generalization. And thus also requires a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. > II 39 Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.) >Existence statements. II 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because Montague assumes the domain of individuals to be constant). Individual Domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. Problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for". ((s) That is, that both are looking for the same unicorn). >Objects of thought, >Cob/Hob/Nob exmaple/Geach. Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual? |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Non-Existence | Parsons | Hintikka I 37 Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. >Possibilia, >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. >Syntax. Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Semantics, >Model Theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply? >Fictions, >G. Ryle. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Criteria, >Relevance. I 38 Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones! Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. >Conclusions. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. >Acceptability, >Inferences. Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. >Singular terms, >Ontological commitment. HintikkaVsParsons. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Object | Parsons | Habermas IV 328 Object/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons distinguishes physical objects from cultural objects by their conditions of identification. Physical objects are entities in space and time, while symbolic objects represent cultural patterns that can be handed down, i.e. transferred and appropriated without changing their meaning. Spatiotemporal individualization does not touch the semantic content, but only the material substrate, in that the pattern of meaning symbolically takes shape. HabermasVsParsons: by marking objects ontologically from the perspective of the subject, he misses the important difference between spatiotemporal individualized objects and symbolically embodied meanings. For Parsons, the actor therefore refers to cultural patterns as well as to objects. This reification obscures the view of the role played by cultural tradition as context and background for communicative action. >Communicative action. Habermas IV 329 Problem: the individually specified objects cannot form a common basis for a common interpretation framework of the action situation. Habermas IV 330 HabermasVsParsons: Parsons does indeed juxtapose the cultural patterns of meaning that supposedly appear as "objects" with those components of culture that have been internalized. With this distinction, however, he does not reverse the reification of the culture, he even makes it all the more firm. >Reification, >Culture. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Paradoxes | Putnam | I (i) 232f Paradoxes/truth/PutnamVsTarski: the paradox of his theory is that you have to stand outside the whole hierarchy to say that the hierarchy exists. Charles Parsons: thesis: statements about truth values are made in a higher language - a speech act 'sui generis'. Cf. >Liar Paradox. I (i) 234 PutnamVsParsons, Charles: a speech act is not more 'sui generis' than a sentence in red ink. This is a merely formalistic trick to say, they could then not contain paradoxes. The problem is only shifted: the language in which we express that sentences in red ink ... Solution/Putnam: some forms of discourse can be understood without a prerequisite concept of truth. Rorty: proposes this for all discourses. Some: these things could not be "said, but shown". PutnamVs: the notion that there was a discursive thought that could not be said is incomprehensible. Gödel: takes set-theoretic paradoxes to be solved; semantic paradoxes for not solved. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Preferences | Parsons | Habermas IV 336 Preferences/Parsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Example: The "social action" of the entrepreneur represents only one of several types of purposive and value-rational action: The modern doctor typically acts as universally and functionally specified as the businessman of the capitalist economy, but at the same time he/she is subject to the rules of professional ethics that prevent him/her from pursuing his/her economic interests by all legally permitted means.(1) S ee Terminology/Parsons: pattern variables. Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. >Decisions/Parsons. Habermas IV 337 Preferences/Professions/Parsons: the instrumental activism from which Parsons reads the action orientation of American businessmen and doctors in the 1940s and 1950s and which he sees as being determined by basic decisions for an emotionally neutral attitude, universalism, performance orientation and a field-independent, cognitive style directed towards the specific, is simultaneously depicted on three levels, namely in structurally analog motives for action, professional roles and cultural values. (2) HabermasVsParsons: Problem: the scope of decision regulated by preference patterns is not filled by interpretation performances of the actor. The model does not permit any initiatives that could then be investigated in terms of how the various resources of the lifeworld, acquired competences, recognised norms and traditional cultural knowledge converge and form a reservoir for action orientations. >Preferences. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Professions and the Social Structure; The Motivation of Economic Activities, in: T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev. ed. NY 1949. 2. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 78 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Religion | Parsons | Habermas IV 379 Kant/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons makes cursory reference to the three Kantian critiques and understands them as attempts to reconstruct the transcendental conditions for the objectivation of external nature (under cognitive-instrumental aspects), for the constitution of the contexts of action (under moral-practical aspects) and for the non-objectivating handling of one's own inner nature (under aesthetic aspects).(1) >I. Kant, >Action/Parsons, >Action Theory, >Communicative Action. Religion/ParsonsVsKant: Religion can also be interpreted within the limits of reason if it is the hybrid result of an objectification of transcendental performances of order. That is not enough for Parsons.(2) Habermas IV 380 The system of order performance must be reinterpreted into a system of supreme control values or final structures such that it can interact as a world of supra-empirical entities with other worlds. HabermasVsParsons: As with Comte and the St. Simonists, Parsons, too, results in a powerless attempt to create a social theory substitute for the social integration functions of a religion whose substance has been attacked.(3) 1. T. Parsons, Action Theory and Human Condition, NY 1978, p. 370f. 2. Ibid. p. 371. 3. A. W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Sociology, NY, 1974; (German) Hamburg 1974, p. 300ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sanctions | Habermas | IV 417 Sanctions/Communication/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Problem: under conditions of sanctioning, the actor cannot take his/her own yes to a validity claim (consent to an assertion, recommendation, etc.) seriously. >Validity claims. The sanction scheme can only include modes of interaction that are about empirical efforts to continue an interaction. Solution/Habermas: one can attribute a general receptiveness of alter to individual sources of ego's reputation or influence in such a way that the empirically, by incentive and deterrence motivated bonds can be distinguished from the rationally, namely by justified agreement motivated trust. Either one is guided by penalties and rewards, or one has sufficient knowledge and is sufficiently autonomous to guarantee the fulfilment of the communicatively raised validity claims. >Knowledge/Habermas, Autonomy/Parsons. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sanctions | Parsons | Habermas IV 415 Sanctions/action theory/validity claims/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons does not take into account, and he cannot take into account in his action theory, that the concept of sanctions cannot be applied to yes/no statements on criticisable validity claims. The strategy pairs incentive/deterrence and belief/admonition differ: in one case ego is solely oriented towards the consequences of his actions, in the other case he has to talk to alter and inform or convince him about the existence of facts. Habermas IV 416 In the first case it is about success-oriented action, in the second case about communication-oriented action. Cf. >Illocutionary Acts, >Perlocutionary Acts. Habermas: under conditions of sanctioning, the actor cannot take his/her own yes to a validity claim (consent to an assertion, recommendation, etc.) seriously. The sanction scheme can only include modes of interaction that require empirical efforts to continue an interaction. Fpr a solution see Sanctions/Habermas. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Systems | Parsons | Habermas IV 229 System/Talcott Parsons/Habermas: the mature Parsons reinterprets the structural components of the lifeworld, i.e. culture, society and personality, into systems of action that form environments for each other. Parsons easily subsumes the concept of the lifeworld under system-theoretical terms, although it has a completely different origin. >Systems theory, >Culture, >Society, >Personality. Lifeworld/Parsons: He defines the physical substrate of the lifeworld under the term "behavioral system". HabermasVsParsons, Talcott: I would like to take into account the methodological difference between internal and external considerations. Habermas IV 338 Systems/Parsons/Habermas: after Parson understood early systems simply as ordered sets of elements, he later sees them from the point of view of conservation and demarcation against an over-complex environment.(1) Cf. >Systems/Luhmann. Habermas IV 339 (Cultural anthropological) structural functionalism is now being replaced by (biocybernetic) system functionalism. Then the terms "function" and "structure" are no longer on the same level. Structures and processes form functional equivalents for each other.(2) Habermas IV 340 ParsonsVsLuhmann: the special position culture occupies in relation to empirical systems of action gives Parsons the possibility of introducing the Newkantian dualism between values and facts into system functionalism. This value-theoretical barrier separates his approach from that of Luhmann's. Habermas IV 341 Parsons distinguishes between the two tasks of preserving the integrity of the action system inwards and outwards: he treats the corresponding basic functions under the keywords "allocation" and "integration".(3) >Terminology/Parsons, Environment/Parsons. Habermas IV 352 Action/Luhmann: "The plot is a system due to its internal analytical structure".(4) 1. Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951. S. 108. 2. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 27ff. 3. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S 114ff. 4. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, S. 8 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Parsons | Habermas IV 333 Pattern variables/Terminology/Parsons: since Parsons neglects the mechanism of communication in building his theory of action, he must, under different premises, try to find an equivalent to the lifeworld with the three components culture, society and personality. >Life world, >Culture, >Society, >Personality He introduces the "pattern variables of value orientation"(1): Cultural values serve as a pattern for a choice between alternative courses of action: they determine the orientations of an actor by defining preferences without affecting the contingency of the decision. Habermas IV 334/335 The pattern variables lie on the dimensions in which older sociology had described the transition from traditional to modern societies, i.e. the processes of social rationalization. Habermas VI 336 Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. It should be possible to test how any cultural values structure the decision-making scope of actors through one of the a priori possible combinations of basic decisions. Habermas IV 341 Def Allocation/Parsons: covers adaptation and target achievement functions, procurement, mobilisation, distribution and the effective use of scarce resources. Def social integration/Parsons: extends to functions of preservation and integration of cultural values incorporated into the system of action. It is not measured by functional imperatives, but by consistency requirements. Habermas IV 361 AGIL Schema/Parsons/Terminology/Habermas: (Since 1953): Adaptation (behavioral system) Goal attainment (personality) Latency (Cultural System) Integration (Social System). HabermasVsParsons: in doing so, he disguised the interface that had been created by the merging of the two paradigms "action" and "system". Habermas IV 366 Problem: Parsons has to analyze the coping with the problems simultaneously in the dimensions space and time. A system must secure its existence in relation to the environment and to itself (internal/external) as well as in relation to the start/end state. >Space, >Time, >Systems, >Inside/Outside. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System NY 1951, S. 78ff |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Understanding | Habermas | III 152 Understanding/action/sociology/Habermas: there is a problem of rationality when understanding actions, because the different types of action (teleological, dramaturgical and communicative action) presuppose different relations of the actor to the world. >Actions/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. III 159 Sociology must seek an understanding approach to its field of objects, because it contains processes of understanding through which the field of objects has in a way already constituted itself. The social scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured objects; they embody the structures of pre-theoretical knowledge with the help of which subjects capable of speech and action have produced these objects. The waywardness of this pre-structured reality (...) is contained in the generation rules according to which the subjects produce the social context of life directly or indirectly. Examples are acts of speech, purposeful activities, cooperations and sediments of these utterances such as texts, traditions, documents, works of art, theories, goods, techniques, etc. Speaking and acting are the unexplained basic concepts. >Basic terms, >Method. III 160 In order to understand the lifeworld, the social scientist, who has no access to it other than the layman, must be able to participate in its production in general. >Lifeworld. III 170 Communicative actions cannot be interpreted in two steps, i. e. first of all to be understood in their factual course of events and then compared with an ideal-typical course of events. III 171 Instead, the interpreter must assume a divided basis all the time, which he/she has in common with the one to be judged. III 173 If we assume that there is a possibility of mutual criticism between the observer and the actor,... III 174 ...the distinction between descriptive and rational interpretation becomes meaningless. The rational interpretation is here the only way to open up the factual process of communicative action. >Hermeneutics/Habermas. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. III 403 We need to broaden our perspective to the context of interaction so that we can identify fulfillment conditions under which the listener can connect his actions to the actions of a speaker. However, knowledge of the "fulfillment conditions" is not sufficient to know when an expression is acceptable (see Acceptability/Habermas). For this we still need knowledge of the conditions for an agreement. III 404 Imperative: in the case of imperatives involving a claim to power of the speaker, i.e. a possible sanctioning, we must know the sanction conditions. IV 400 Understanding/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Thesis: Understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action can be expanded, organizationally mediated and rationalized, but not replaced and thus mechanized by media in the areas of life that primarily fulfil functions of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization. >Agreement/Habermas. Gaus I 157 Understanding/Habermas/Bohman: 'Formal pragmatics' is Habermas's term for a general account of the capacity of a speaker to use and understand speech acts correctly: 'the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and action, who are attributed the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing (at least intuitively) between valid and invalid expressions' (1990(1): 31). Bohman: the intuitive knowledge of a competent speaker permits them to engage in second-order evaluation in asking for justification or reasons for various sorts of validity claims that are implicit in utterances; to understand an utterance is to know its 'acceptability conditions'. While validity claims may remain implicit so long as communication is unproblematic and ongoing, competent speakers may also demand that the implied warrant be redeemed and demand explicit justification in second-order communication (communication about communication, or 'discourse' proper) in order to reach an understanding. Critical function/Bohman: such a reconstruction of implicit know-how may have a critical function in so far as it can specify when speakers violate the conditions of rationality implicit in communicatively successful utterances. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Validity Claims | Parsons | Habermas IV 415 Validity Claims/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons does not take into account, and he cannot take into account in his theory of action, that the concept of sanctions cannot be applied to yes/no statements on criticizable validity claims. The strategy pairs incentive/deterrence and belief/admonition differ: in one case ego is solely oriented towards the consequences of his actions, in the other case he has to talk to alter and inform or convince him about the existence of facts. Habermas IV 416 In the first case it is about success-oriented action, in the second case about communication-oriented action. >Illocutionary Acts, >Perlocutionary Acts. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Parsons, Ch. | Putnam Vs Parsons, Ch. | I (i) 233 Language/Paradox/antinomies/Tarski/Putnam: that brings us to the philosophically important opportunity to deny that our informal discourse is a "language". (That says Russell!). Charles Parsons: (1987) the statement about the truth value in each higher-levelled language is a "speech act sui generis". PutnamVsParsons, Charles: that such "systematically ambiguous statements" as (V) Each language S has a meta-language MS look quite the same way as ordinary inferences, but are none. (This works by inserting to infinity: language Sn has the metalanguage MSn). For Parsons this is supposed to be a very different kind of discourse that cannot be understood in the normal kind of language use. I (i) 234 Putnam: that is simply incomprehensible for me: E.g. as if language, which is written in red ink, would be a "language sui generis". Since generalizations, written in red ink, about "all languages", would not include the red ink language in which they are written (the Red ink language is sui generis), we could not get any paradoxes. But this is only a formalistic trick: The problem is only shifted: in what language do we express the fact that "generalizations about the Non-Red ink languages do not go beyond the red ink language"?. Putnam: Solution: Perhaps the idea is, in fact, that some forms of discourse can be understood without presupposing the concept of truth at all. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Parsons, Ta. | Luhmann Vs Parsons, Ta. | Au Kass 11 Interpenetration/Parsons: different subsystems are coupled: E.g. Culture penetrates the social system (interpenetrates with it). E.g. A social system affects the individuals through socialization. E.g. Individuals domesticate their own organisms through learning processes. Parsons thus marks overlaps. But after the whole theoretical construction this did not happen on an operative level! Rather, Parsons thinks that the various subsystems contribute to the emergence of action. They are not themselves already operative! If they are differentiated out as action systems, then again only on the level of action. These systems must then in turn fulfil all the requirements of systems. ((s) So the levels remain separate). LuhmannVsParsons: but the term that would have to say what actually affects the other system or how culture is actually a part of the social system could never be explained by the division into four of Parson's box (see above). I.e. several system relations would have to be internalised and identified as internal subsystems and then the whole system would be defined by the interpenetrative relations. This was not possible and therefore remained unclear. AU Kass 1 LuhmannVsParsons: terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed to be given. No criteria for the inventory of the item. Instead, the theory must be able to include all deviance and dysfunction. (Not possible with Parsons). Question: in which period of time and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (Example Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory Criteria Biology: definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. AU Kass 2 LuhmannVsParsons: assignments are not always mandatory. LuhmannVsParsons: certain hermeticism of the conceptual scheme, the compulsion to always fill out the 4 boxes, leads the theoretical decisions. Is thereby more and more occupied by self-posed problems. One cannot recognize any direct mistakes, but nevertheless a dead end. LuhmannVsParsons: he has already integrated a lot: Cybernetics, Input/Output Language, Linguistics. But self-reference (important in modern systems theory) is not possible within the framework of Parson's model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Parsons, Ta. | Verschiedene Vs Parsons, Ta. | Luhmann AU Kass 14 Conflict/Luhmann: here there is an ideological theory controversy in the 50s: DahrendorffVsParsons: Overestimation of consensus, underestimation of conflict. Luhmann: that was read into Parsons. Luhmann: Question: can the distinction consensus/conflict be made like this? Cooperation/Competition? Can one imagine models that only opt for one side, for example that our society is only a competitive society or that without cooperation no action would be possible? Solution/Luhmann: the concept of communication with bifurcation yes/no shows that in the operation itself cooperation and competition are always real! I.e. one-sidedness burdens a theory. Consensus and conflict always both occur, a theory must take this into account. AU Kass 1 Action TheoryVsParsons: Action is incompatible with any system. |
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| Parsons, Ter. | Stalnaker Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 73 Bare particulars/modal logic/ML/semantics/Stalnaker: the problem is now to connect the bare particulars-theory with these three restrictions with the quantified modal logic (ML). I 74 Terence ParsonsVs/Stalnaker: T. Parsons attacked this proof theoretically (1969). Anti-essentialism/T. Parsons: question: what axioms do we need for a full and reasoned anti-essentialist theory? That means a theory that prevents any questionable ascription of essential properties? StalnakerVsParsons: problem: some of his propositions are not theorems: e.g. Theorem: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). ((s) if F is a necessary property for an object then this applies to all such objects x) E.g. if a square is necessary angular, then all squares). Stalnaker: but the following substitution instance is not a theorem: (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). ((s) If something is necessary the father of y, all is necessary the father of y.) Stalnaker: that means the atomic predicate "F" does not represent any property as it should normally be but just a random property of a certain kind. This is not bad per se but imposes the semantics additional burdens. Because the rules have to pick out suitable properties as values for atomic predicates. ((s) QuineVs - Quine: predicates do not represent properties). properties/anti-essentialism/predicates/Stalnaker: in distinguishing it is naturally about between intrinsic, qualitative characteristics and referential or possible world-indexed properties. Only the former come into question. StalnakerVsParsons: this one requires this but does not explain it. Atomic predicate/Stalnaker: this concept cannot help because it is purely syntactic and cannot make a semantic job by itself. Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Shapiro, St. | Field Vs Shapiro, St. | II 357 Intermediate Claim/IC/Parsons/Shapiro/Field: both acknowledge that. They formulate an intermediate position between the strong and the weak assertion saying that according to that skepticism about the determinacy becomes uninteresting. (IC) any two persons who accept the schematic arithmetic must consider the theory of another equivalent to their own. II 358 FieldVsShapiro/FieldVsParsons: 1) I doubt that you have to accept the intermediate claim (VsIC). 2) Even if we accept it, skepticism about determinacy is not uninteresting. FieldVsIC: E.g. X (male) considers his own schematic arithmetic as indeterminate, but acknowledges the weak conclusion that each "copy" of it in his own language is equivalent to his own arithmetic. Question: Does X have to regard a Y (female), who accepts schematic arithmetic, as someone who accepts something equivalent to that which X accepts?. Assuming both X and Y use the same vocabulary: "number", "successor", etc. Question: Does X have to a) translate Y’s number theoretical vocabulary homophonically, or rather. b) assume that if he introduces a new special term as a translation of Y’s term "number" (E.g. "number*"), etc., he then has an argument for an equivalence between his own vocabulary and the translation of Y’s vocabulary. ((s) equivalence rather than homophony). Question: can we not simply apply the conclusion from the monolingual case for it? No, because even if X assumes that Y accepts the full scheme (correctly), it only means that he X is tied to the acceptance of any new instances in Y’s own language! (And that X should be committed to their translations). If X cannot argue that Y can enhance her language for every predicate P in hir own language (i.e. "number", etc.), so that it contains an expression that X can translate as P, then there is no reason to assume that X should consider Y’s schemes complete in relation to X’s language. Problem: there is no way to argue for it without leaving the question open. E.g. X cannot argue that, because Y accepts full arithmetic, she must accept induction over a predicate, which means "the same" as X’s predicate "natural number". (s) he does not know whether the predicate means the same thing >Translation indeterminacy). Field: this is just a variant of McGee’s cheating that Y must accept induction on a predicate whose extension are the natural numbers. ((s) he does not know whether this is the extension >indeterminacy of the reference). II 360 FieldVsShapiro/VsIntermediate Claim/Vs(IC): the reason why we cannot accept the (two-language) intermediate claim is that we are forced (in the single-language case) to consider two copies (of theories) in our own language as equivalent. FieldVs(IC): even if the intermediate claim applied, it would be indeterminate! It would guarantee that in every acceptable semantic interpretation of X’s language the extension of "natural number" would be identical with the extension of the term "the extension of Y’s term "natural number"". But even that would not show that there are no non-standard elements in every acceptable interpretation of this joint extension! (Superior view of asymmetry). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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