Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Parmenides | Bubner I 51 Appearance/being/PlatoVsParmenides: new: linguisticality of the term. - Only in the language is the concept of being able to express what it means. Also: the concept of being is only useful in testimonies. >Being/Ancient philosophy >Existence/Gorgias >Existence/Democritus >Existence/Eleatics >Logos/Ancient philosophy >Perception/Aristotle >Perception/Eleatics >Perception/Gorgias |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Appearance | Plato | Bubner I 50 Appearance/Plato: must be understood as the being of nothingness. Thus further problematizations are necessary in order to put the initial question in further dimensions. This makes the conflict with Parmenides inevitable: Bubner I 51 Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to attribute a being to non-being. >Existence/Parmenides, >Appearance/Parmenides, >Existence predicate/Parmenides. Being/Appearance/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being has to be re-established, in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept. Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being is only meaningful in propositions. >Proposition, >Statement. Bubner I 97 Appearance/Plato/Bubner: is due to the peculiar structure of the speech to be able to link intolerable elements in the sentence together. Bubner I 98 Sophistes/Plato: It is not a step into the empiricism. Instead, one can see from the connection of the elements "Theaitetos sits" and "Theaitetos flies" that "man" and "sit", but not "man" and "fly" match. The respective "eidos" is to be examined in the logos analysis to see if they can co-exist. >Logos, >Predication, cf. >Empiricism. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Change | Parmenides | Feyerabend I 193 Change/Movement/Parmenides/Feyerabend: Parmenides claimed there was no change. He had, however, arguments for this. FeyerabendVsParmenides: But we notice change. Cf. >Change/Aristotle >Change/Gorgias >Change/Eleatics |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Common Sense | Nietzsche | Danto III 95 Common Sense/Nietzsche/Danto: for Nietzsche, the common sense itself is an interpretation and nothing that is opposed to interpretations. The common sense is metaphysics that has become everyday for him, (...) a fantasy of error and misbelief, (...) without the slightest concordance with reality. >Metaphysics/Nietzsche. But: Danto III 96 NietzscheVsParmenides/NietzscheVsPlato/Danto: Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live.(1) In the interests of life, we are forced to approve the common sense as set of beliefs and to reject all that is at odds with it. >Truth/Nietzsche, >Reality/Parmenides, >Truth/Plato. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 844 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Designation | Geach | I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. --- I 153f Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). >Existence, >Existence statement, >Existence/Parmenides, >Introduction, >Nonexistence, >Fiction. E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary. Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. >Truth value, >Reference. Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. >de re, >de dicto, >Identification. Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. --- I 252 Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. >Naming. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Existence | Gorgias | Taureck I 85 Existence/Gorgias/Sophist/Taureck: Thesis: "It is nothing". (There are not even fragments of Gorgias handed down). According to Sextus Empiricus, Gorgias wants three things: 1. There is nothing. 2. If there is something, it is not recognizable. 3. But if there is something and if it is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others. (GorgiasVsParmenides). > I 85 Existence/Parmenides: Thesis: only beings can exist and be thought. Gorgias: ad 1. ("There is nothing"): "If the non-existence is non-existence, both the non-being is non-existent, and the being exists, so that nothing more is than the things." Taureck: if one says of non-existence, that it is non-existence, then non-existence belongs to the realm of beings! >Nonexistence. "Nothing is" can also mean that neither non-being nor being is. But why is it to be conceded that non-existence is? ("Is" must be understood here as "means".) I 87 Gorgias: ad 2. ("If there is something, it is not recognizable"): "If non-existence is, then existence is nothing but its opposite. I 88 Therefore nothing should be, if it is not the same to be and not to be. Taureck: if there are only two mutually exclusive ways, the affirmation of non-existence would have to include the denial of existence. Gorgias: ad 3. ("If, however, something is and if it is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others."): equates being and non-being: both, not the non-being and the being, for it is indeed the same as the non-being. Taureck: here he has changed a premise: previously it applied: the non-existence has the property of existence. Now this is not the opposite. I 89 Existence/Gorgias: from the argumentation of the becoming/un-becoming: Either a singular something has become or has not become. Now it can be shown that it is neither one nor the other, so it does not exist. If something has not become, it is unlimited, but it cannot be anywhere. So it is not. (Here Gorgias refers to Zenon and Melissos). >Change/Gorgias, >Change/Aristotle, >Change/Parmenides, >Change/Eleatics. I 91/92 Gorgias: ad 2. ("If there is something after all, it is not recognizable"): If the merely thought already refers to existent, then only the imagined would rotten on existence. From the point of view of the imagined, however, we know that it is not true. (There are no criteria for the really existent). I 93 Gorgias: ad 3. ("If, however, something is and is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others."): How should one utter what has been seen, through speech? How could this be clear to the listener, where he/she does not see it? Just as seeing does not recognize sounds, in the same way the hearing does not hear colors. I 94 Taureck: perceptions cannot represent each other. Logos is here only speech and no longer the described thing itself. Gorgias, however, already knows the concept of the sign (semeio). >Logos. >Logos/>Aristotle >Logos/Ancient Philosophy >Logos/Bubner >Logos/Gorgias >Logos/Heraclitus >Logos/Plato >Logos/Protagoras |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Existence | Parmenides | Taureck I 16 Existence/Being/Parmenides (Eleat)/Taureck: Thesis: There cannot be a "nothing" because it is not conceivable for us. GorgiasVsParmenides. > Taureck I 85 Existence/Parmenides: Thesis: only beings can exist and be thought. Gorgias: ad 1. ("It is nothing"): "If, namely, the non-being is non-being, both the non-being is non-being and the being is being, so that nothing more is there than the things." Taureck: If one says of non-being, that it is non-being, then non-being belongs to the realm of beings! "Nothing is" can also mean that neither is non-being, nor being. But why is it to be conceded that non-being is? ("Is" must be understood here as "means"). I 87 Existence/existence predicate/VsParmenides/Taureck: even today we still perceive this error in him: he confuses the concept of existence with a predicate (existence as a property). Gorgias could have recognized this, but the tradition does not allow that. In addition, Gorgias would repeat the mistake inversely. >Existence predicate. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Existence Predicate | Parmenides | Taureck I 87 Existence/existence predicate/VsParmenides/Taureck: even today we still perceive this error in him: he confuses the concept of existence with a predicate (existence as a property). Gorgias could have recognized this, but the tradition does not allow that. In addition, Gorgias would repeat the mistake inversely. >Existence predicate. >Existence/Parmenides. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Ideas | Plato | Gadamer I 434 Ideas/Plato/Gadamer: The idea, the true being of the thing, is not recognisable in any other way than in going through (...) mediations. But is there a realization of the idea itself as this particular and individual? >Mediation. Is not the essence of things a whole in the same way that language is a whole? Recognition: Just as in the unity of speech the individual words only gain their meaning and relative unambiguity, so too, true cognition of the essence can only be achieved in the whole of the relational structure of ideas. Knowledge/Whole/Parmenides: This is the thesis of the Platonic "Parmenides". From this, however, the question arises: in order to define even a single idea, i.e. to be able to distinguish in what it is from everything else that is, does one not have to know the whole? Gadamer: One can hardly escape this consequence if, like Plato, one conceives the cosmos of ideas as the true structure of being. Speusippos: In fact, it is reported by the Platonist Speusipp, Plato's successor in the leadership of the Academy, that he drew this conclusion. We know from him that he particularly cultivated the search for the common (homoia), going far beyond what was generalization in the sense of the logic of the genus, by using analogy, i.e. the proportional equivalent, as a research method. >Analogies/Speusippus. Bubner I 27 Ideas/The Republic/Plato/Bubner: it is no accident that the theory of ideas is developed in The Republic (>philosopher king). Problematic: that also the practical good should belong to the ideas. Bubner I 28 Definition Ideas/Plato: The reasons of being of everything real. Bubner I 51 Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to attribute a being to non-being. >Existence/Parmenides, >Appearance/Parmenides, >Existence predicate/Parmenides. Being/Appearance/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being has to be re-established, in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept. Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being is only meaningful in propositions. Ideas/Plato: now only one step is needed to introduce the community of ideas among themselves: the presocratic ontology provides, as a matter of course, the concepts of being, rest, and movement. Each determination is now itself and not another. Thus, determinateness implies negation. Here the dialectics finds its highest field of activity as the doctrine of the relations between one and many. Cf. >Ontology/Plato, >Unity and multiplicity. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Reality | Parmenides | Taureck I 110 Reality/Parmenides/Taureck: his provocation lies in the revaluation of the judgment according to which the human does not represent reality as it is, but deforms and distorts it. ProtagorasVsParmenides/Taureck: what is shown, exists as it appears. The human does not deform the world, but unlocks it knowingly. Cf. >Appearance/Plato >Perception/>Aristotle >Perception/Eleatics >Perception/Gorgias >Protagoras |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Thinking | Heidegger | Tugendhat II 47 Thinking/thought/Parmenides: thinking is perspective - such as hearing a sound or seeing a color. Tugendhat II 57 HeideggerVsParmenides: thinking is not perspective. >Parmenides, >Thinking. --- Cardorff II 51 Thinking/Heidegger: Thinking is pointing: not uncovering, not wanting to make present. >Pointing, >Ostension, >Revelation. Cardorff II 55 Thoughts/Heidegger/Cardorff: "We never come to a thought. They come to us." II 56 Thought: Thinking is no means for knowing, thinking draws furrows into the field of being (Acker des Seins"). "Thinking is not an understanding." Thinking is actually: leaving available, taking into consideration. In thinking there is neither method nor theme, but: "The area ..." >Method, cf. >Method/Gadamer. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Locke, J. | Hume Vs Locke, J. | I 97 Mind/Hume: the mind is delirious! It is demented! Closed systems, synthesis and cosmologies are only imaginarily possible. I 98 Here, principles are not exceeded subsequently, but in principle! Ancient philosophy: would have made use of the 'substance' to secure long-term survival, HumeVsSubstance. Modern philosophy: has its own phantoms: it distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, which is no less crazy (HumeVsLocke). I 105 HumeVsLocke: perception allows us no distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. ((s) because perceptions are individual.) --- Quine I 235 'Nothing' and 'nobody' is an indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has caused a lot of confusion. HumeVsLocke: supposedly, Locke succumbed to the same confusion ('nobody overtook me'). Locke: if a process had no cause, then it would have nothing as its cause, and nothing could not be a cause. Quine: this is 'quite humorless' (also Heidegger, PlatonVsParmenides) of the indeterminate singular term. 'Nothing' has the unfortunate tendency to pose as a determinate singular term. Cause: parallelism to 'everyone', which already reminds us of the indeterminacy by sheer manifold, this reminder is absent in 'no'. --- Stegmüller IV 347 Religion/belief/theology/HumeVsLocke: (Hume, Treatise, 10th Sect.): the Christian religion cannot be believed by any rational person without seeing in this belief itself a miracle (Mackie pro). --- Vollmer I 20 Hume: (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) (Vollmer: much more astute than Locke). HumeVsLocke: these are innate ideas. In particular, the reasoning from experience, the inferring from the past to the future, is based on a habit that cannot be equated with rational deduction. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Parmenides | Heidegger Vs Parmenides | Tugendhat II 57 Thinking/HeideggerVsParmenides: thinking is not opinion! |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Parmenides | Plato Vs Parmenides | Bubner I 51 Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to concede being to the the nonexistence. Being/Appearing/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being must be newly approached, namely in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept. Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being only occurs usefully in statements. I 52 Being/Not-Being/Paradox/PlatoVsParmenides: Solution: the other is the form in which that which is not directly about itself has a mediated being. So it is the being of that which is not. So every logos speaks of something that it is not. The wrong speech can only deceive because speech and thing are not one. Tugendhat II 43 Being/PlatoVsParmenides: (Theaithet): apart from the possibility of not thinking something, there is the possibility to think that something is not. "Not believing" does not mean "not saying" but "saying that not", "denying". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Parmenides | Zeno Vs Parmenides | Bubner I 66 Eleatism/Hegel: concentrates on Zenon (student of the Parmenides). Pre-Socratics: they were primarily concerned with a determination of the Absolute. Absolute/Ionians: was understood naturally, (Thales: water is the principle of all things). Eleatism: the Absolute is the form of pure thought. Parmenides: universal unity of being. ZenonVsParmenides: dissolved by the paradoxes. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Parmenides | Kanitscheider Vs Parmenides | Kanitscheider II 35 World/HeraclitusVsParmenides: Question: is the totality of all things or all events the world? Time/Kanitscheider: that amounts to the question whether temporality is an inner quality of the world. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parmenides | Versus | Frank I 221 Nonexistence / Castaneda: the idea that what one thinks exists and that what does not exist has no properties, goes back to Parmenides. Sophist / PlatonVsParmenides: Non-existent is feasible and can have properties. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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