Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Empiricism Barrow I 36
Empiricism / positivism / Barrow: both: there are only individual facts, not universals -EmpirismusVsuniversals / positivismVsuniversals - I 42 both Vsoperationalism / Vsinstrumentalism: theories can only be discovered, they can not be invented -
I 39
Vsempiricism / Barrow: a theory of elementary particles is more than a mere list of their properties - excludes useful terms because they are not observable - so that it forbids any law of nature.

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001

Loewenheim Putnam V 54 ff
Loewenheim/Reference/PutnamVsTradition: tries to fix the intension und extension of single expressions via the determination of the truth values for whole sentences.
V 56f
PutnamVsOperationalism: E.g. (1) "E and a cat is on the mat." - Reinterpretation with cherries and trees so that all truth values remain unchanged. - cat* to mat*: a) some cats on some mats and some cherries on some trees, b) ditto, but no cherry on a tree - c) none of these cases - Definition cat* x is a cat* iff. a) and x = cherry, or b) and x = cat or c) and x = cherry - Definition mat*: x = mat* iff. a) and x = tree or b) and x = mat or c) and x = quark - ad c) here all respective sentences become false. - ((s) "cat* to mat*" is the more comprehensive (disjunctive) statement and therefore true in all worlds a) or b).) - Putnam: by the reinterpretation cat will be enhanced to cat* - then there might be infinitely many reinterpretations of predicates that will always attribute the right truth value - then we might even hold "impression" constant as the only expression. - The reference will be undetermined because of the truth conditions for whole sentences (>Gavagai).
V 58
We even can reinterpret "sees" (as sees*) so that the sentence "Otto sees a cat" and "Otto sees* a cat" have the same truth values in every world.
V 61
Which properties are intrinsic or extrinsic is relative to the decision, which predicates we use as basic concepts, cat or cat*. - Properties are not in themselves extrinsic/intrinsic.
V 286ff
Loewenheim/Putnam: Theorem: be S a language with predicates F1,F2,...Fk. Be I an interpretation in the sense that each predicate if S gets an intension. Then there will be a second interpretation J that is not concordant with I but will make the same sentences true in every possible world that are made true by I. - Proof: Be W1, W2, all possible worlds in a well-ordering, be Ui the set of possible individuals existing in world Wi - be Ri the set, forming the extension of the predicate Fi in the possible world Wj - the structure [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] is the "intended Model" of S in world Wj relative to I (i.e. Uj is the domain of S in world Wj, and Rij is (with i = 1,2,...k) the extension of the predicate Fi in Wj) - Be J the interpretation of S which attributes to predicate Fi (i=1,2,...k) the following intension: the function fi(W), which has the value Pj(Rij) in every possible worlds Wj. - in other words: the extension of Fi in every world Wj under interpretation J is defined such, that it is Pj(Rij). - Because[Uj;Pj(Rij)(i=1,2...k)] is a model for the same set of sentences as [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] (because of the isomorphism), in every possible world the same sentences are true under J as under I. - J is distinguished from I in every world, in which at least one predicate has got a non-trivial extension.
V 66
Loewenheim/Intention/Meaning/Putnam: this is no solution, because to have intentions presupposes the ability to refer to things. - Intention/Mind State: is ambigue: e.g. "pure": pain, E.g. "impure": whether I know that snow is white does not depend on me like pain (> twin earth) - non-bracketed belief presupposes that there really is water. (twin earth) - Intentions are no mental events that evoke the reference.
V 70
Reference/Loewenheim/PutnamVsField: a rule like "x prefers to y iff. x is in relation R to y" does not help: even when we know that it is true, could relation R be any kind of a relation (while Field assumes that it is physical). ---
I (d) 102ff
E.g. the sentence: (1) ~(ER)(R is 1:1. The domain is R < N. The range of R is S). - Problem: when we replace S by the set of real numbers (in our favourite set theory). Then (1) will be a theorem - then our set theory will say that a certain set ("S") is not countable - then S must in all models of our set theory (e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel, ZF) be non-countable. - Loewenheim: his sentence now tells us, that there is no theory with only uncountable models - contradiction. - But this is not the real antinomy - Solution: (1) "tells us" that S is non-countable only, if the quantifier (ER) is interpreted such that is goes over all relations of N x S.
I (d) 103
But if we choose a countable model for the language of our set theory, then "(ER)" will not go over all relations but only over the relations in the model. - Then (1) tells us only, that S is uncountable in a relative sense of uncountable: "finite"/"Infinite" are then relative within an axiomatic set theory. - Problem: "unintended" models, that should be uncountable will be "in reality" countable - ...+ descending ... Skolem shows, that the whole use fo our language (i.e. theoretical and operational conditions) will not determine the "uniquely intended interpretation". - Solution: Platonism: postulates "magical reference". - Realism: has no solution.
I (d) 105
At the end the sentences of set theory have no fixed truth value.
I (d) 116
Solution: Thesis: we have to define interpretation in another way than by models.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Operationalism Barrow I 37
Operationalism: Science is a system of rules for the exploration of the world in the laboratory - linguistically: how are the words used? - InstrumentalismVsEmpiricism: useful concepts are not only those which can be traced back to the sense data. - Theories and laws of nature are only instruments to make the environment understandable. True/false do not exist as properties of theories. - Idealism: since all knowledge is filtered through our minds, we are never sure if there is a connection to reality. I 42 OperationalismVsEmpiricism: theories may also be invented - therefore, the observer receives a more important role.
I 41f
VsOperationalism/Barrow: asks what is measurable. Therefore, he must exclude complex and irrational numbers. - Fragmentation of science: every time we use a different method of measurement, we need to consider a number as a different variable. - Circular: operationalism presumes that we know what an permissible operation is. - Problem: certain concepts may only be used when sensitive devices allow accurate measurements - ((s) thus excluding something in the future.)

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001

Operationalism Putnam V 50-53
PutnamVsOperationalism: the link between theory and experience is probabilistic - not simple semantic correlations - "permitted interpretation": different effects always have different causes - PutnamVsTradition: wrong: to conclude from an experience E, whether the theory works because the sentence is operationally linked with the experience E - ((s) > Löwenheim). - Operationalism: is trying to fix reference operationally. - PutnamVs. ---
I (c) 81
Operationalism/Putnam: instead of "true": "is simple and leads to true predictions" - Putnam: then the causal-explanatory role of truth and reference is not maintained - ((s) about the existence of the things that cause the phenomena). >PutnamVsOperationalism, cf. >instrumentalism.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Field, H. Putnam Vs Field, H. Field IV 405
Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism.
Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam.
1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects.
2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world.
Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all.
Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language.
Field IV 406
Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.).
One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms.
Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory.
3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things.
VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects).
Field IV 429
Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects.
Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world.
Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory.
PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses?
However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3.
I: is a definite set of individuals.

Williams II 430
P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P.
This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism).
Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique.
Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory.
PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then?
Field/Putnam: could cover two positions:
1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or.
2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective.
Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc.
Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general?
Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible.
Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth.
If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification.
---
Putnam III 208
Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description".
---
Putnam V 70
Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume:
(1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y.
Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions.
Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world.
V 71
Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation.
PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say.
Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true.
PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth).
----
Putnam I (c) 93
PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Kant Vollmer Vs Kant I 25
VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity!
I 84
Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms.
Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences.
I 103
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge.
He cannot answer the following questions:
How are our categories created?
Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories?
Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others?
Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems:
Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution?
Why can we understand each other?
How is intersubjective knowledge possible?
Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!)
Can they be scientifically justified?
I 193
Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible.
I 196
Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false).
For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws.
I 197
Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to
a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes.
2. Anticipations of Perception
a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes
3. Analogies of Experience
a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances.
4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions).
I 199
VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs).
Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause!
Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs).
Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation.
Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine.
Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them.
VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact.
Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE.
EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct.
2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success.
Kant does not make this distinction.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm.
I 304
Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer).
I 305
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena.
I 306
Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized!
II 48
Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Operationalism Armstrong Vs Operationalism Armstrong
Martin II 74
MartinVsOperationalism: dispositions are not options for reducing qualities to possible operations or possible measurements. II 75 dispositions may never be manifested. They can also appear and disappear without there ever having been a manifestation

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Operationalism Field Vs Operationalism III 3
Nominalism/Field: I use some means which the nominalist rejects: E.g. finitism and operationalism reject the way in which I formulate physical theories: FieldVsFinitism/FieldVsOperationalism: I will say that between two points (E.g. of a light beam) there is always a third point (FinitismVsField). The objections (VsField) stem from considerations that have nothing to do with the nature of the physical entities. Physics/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also about subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it).
III 36
Region/Field: do we need it together with the sp.z. points? Not necessarily, we can quantify on any small open region instead of on points. That’s still nominalistic. But we must not do without points. III 37 Finitism/Field: the purist desire to make do without points is a quasi-finitistic one, not nominalistic. FieldVsFinitism. Region/Field: reverse question: can nominalism have something against regions? Is there a problem with them? III 114 Solution: Individuals Calculus/Goodman/Field: if we accept Goodman’s individuals calculus, there is no problem with regions: we simply regard them as sums of points. Then, namely with the introduction of points, the concept of region is simultaneously introduced (as the sum of points). Empty Region/Individuals Calculus/Sum/Goodman/Field: it then also follows that there can be no empty region. III 37 Region/Goodman/Field: (as sum) does not need not be connected or measurable. There are very "unnatural" collections of points that can count as regions.
Point/Field: even without individuals calculus entities can be assumed that can be regarded as a "sum" of points. Then points can be seen as a special case of the regions (very small ones). That’s nominalistically acceptable.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Operationalism Putnam Vs Operationalism V 50
Operationalism: clumsy agreement: when the needle of the voltmeter is deflected, current flows. PutnamVsOperationalism:
1. The connections between theory and experience (read) are probabilistic and cannot be properly formalized as perfect correlations. (Background noise, etc.).
2. Even these probabilistic connections are not simple semantic correlations but depend on the empirical theory, which is exposed to the revision. According to the naive operationalism the terms undergo each time a change of meaning when a new test procedure is developed.
There is an operational notion after which theories are tested sentence after sentence.
---
V 51
Solution: one can formulate the class of permissible to be accepted interpretations so that the sentence S is mostly true. (Attenuation). The ideal set of operational preconditions is what we gradually approach in the course of empirical research, and not something that we just agree on. E.g. a "permissible interpretation" is such that different effects always have different causes.
---
V 70
Re-interpretation/language/PutnamVsOperationalism: the whole problem only arises when the permissible interpretations are only picked out by operational or theoretical preconditions. The embarrassing thereto is that operational plus theoretical preconditions represent the natural process. What remains is the looseness of the relationship between truth conditions and reference.
---
V 71
Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not useful. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be a relation in each permissable model and it will nothing contribute to reduce the number of permissable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation.
PutnamVsField: but this cannot necessarily be expressed in that you simply pronounce (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wants to say.
Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true.
PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view, whereby is it then made true? How is a particular correspondence R discarded? It appears, the fact that R is really the reference, should be a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if reference to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke 'metaphysically necessary' truth).

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Operationalism Kanitscheider Vs Operationalism I 218f
Theory/Kanitscheider: the preparation of empirical data requires a considerable theoretical background. Operationalism/Definition/Measuring/KanitscheiderVsOperationalism: the so-called operational definitions do not actually exist, because a measuring rule can only be described by a series of sentences, but never by a single term!
I 220
Def Measuring/Def Definition/Kanitscheider: Measuring is a theory-supported, empirical process while defining is a conceptual activity performed within a theory. The meaning of a theoretical term can only be elucidated by a semantic investigation.
The measurement already assigns numerical values to metric quantities with factual reference, which are represented by a certain function.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Operationalism Barrow Vs Operationalism John D. Barrow Die Natur der Natur, Hamburg 1996
I 42
VsOperationalism: erweist sich als Bumerang, denn er setzt voraus, dass wir wissen, was eine erlaubte Operation ist. ((s)>. Blinder Fleck) .Um sie zu definieren, müssen alle möglichen physikalischen und mathematischen Begriffe eingeführt werden. Ein Operationalist muss hellsehen können, denn was heute unmöglich ist, kann morgen möglich sein. Und gewisse Begriffe dürfen nur dann verwendet werden, wenn etwas empfindlichere Geräte genauere Messungen zulassen.
Weder Operationalismus noch Instrumentalismus behaupten, dass unsere Gesetze und Theorien lediglich entdeckt werden; sie können auch erfunden werden. Der Beobachter bekommt eine wichtigere Rolle als beim Empirismus, der seinerseits mit dem tatsächlichen Tun der Wissenschaftler besser übereinstimmt.

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001