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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Environmental Organisations | Economic Theories | Mause I 413f Environmental Organizations/Economic Theory: According to a 1965 (1) thesis by Mancur Olson on collective action, there is an asymmetry in the organizational and conflict capacity of economic and environmental associations. VsOlson: the situation of environmental associations is not quite as it should be according to Olson's logic. Protest as a central form of action has lost importance in the last 20 years. (Roose, 2009, p. 111) (2) The asymmetries mentioned above have also eased (von Winter, 2001, p. 218) (3) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press 1965. 2. Jochen Roose, Unterstützungslogik und Informationslogik. Zu zwei Formen der Interessenvertretung im Umweltbereich. In Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Hrsg. Britta Rehder, Thomas Winter und Ulrich Willems, 109– 131. Wiesbaden 2009. 3. Thomas von Winter, Verbändemacht im kooperativen Staat. In Zukunft der Demokratie in Deutschland, Hrsg. Andrea Gourd und Thomas Noetzel, 211– 234. Opladen 2001. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Politics | Olson | Mause I 413f Politics/Collective Action/Olson: According to a 1965 (1) thesis by Mancur Olson on collective action, there is an asymmetry in the organisational and conflict capacity of business and environmental associations. VsOlson: the situation of environmental associations is not quite as it should be according to Olson's logic. Protest as a central form of action has lost importance in the last 20 years. (Roose, 2009, p. 111) (2) The asymmetries mentioned above have also eased (von Winter, 2001, p. 218) (3) Brocker I 486 Politics/Olson: Thesis: The interests of small groups are overrepresented in political competition. "The high degree of organisation of entrepreneurial interests and the power of these entrepreneurial interests must be largely due to the fact that entrepreneurs are spread across a large number of (generally oligopolistic) 'industries', each comprising only a fairly small number of companies" (4). See Collectives/Olson, Communicative Action/Olson, Power/Olson: smaller groups behave much differently according to Olson. In particular, smaller groups can be better controlled by selective incentives. Problem: large groups are always in danger of being exploited by smaller groups: For example, agricultural migrant workers, employees, taxpayers, consumers: these groups usually have no organization "that could oppose the power of organized or monopolistic producers". (5) Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press 1965. 2. Jochen Roose, Unterstützungslogik und Informationslogik. Zu zwei Formen der Interessenvertretung im Umweltbereich. In Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Hrsg. Britta Rehder, Thomas Winter und Ulrich Willems, 109– 131. Wiesbaden 2009. 3. Thomas von Winter, Verbändemacht im kooperativen Staat. In Zukunft der Demokratie in Deutschland, Hrsg. Andrea Gourd und Thomas Noetzel, 211– 234. Opladen 2001. 4. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 141. 5. Ibid. p. 163. |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Goods | Olson | Brocker I 477 Social goods/collective goods/Olson: generally, goods are differentiated in the economic literature as follows: Private Goods/Musgrave: are characterised by exclusivity (not everyone has access) and rivalry (consumption reduces the amount of goods) Club goods: Excludability - Rivalry Common goods: non-excludability - Rivalry (e.g. fishing) Public goods: Non-excludability - Non-Rivalry. (1) On the other hand Olson: distinguishes between exclusive and including goods. Def Exclusive Collective Goods: are primarily found in market-oriented groups. They are characterised by rivalry. (2) Here the total benefit of the collective good does not increase with the number of users. Thus it corresponds to the common good. The benefit for the individual decreases with the number of users. Def including collective goods/Olson: are characterized by non-rivalry. The benefits for all increase with an increasing number of users (non-excludability). These goods are also called pure collective goods. ((s) Example Networks). Brocker I 487 VsOlson: some authors note that collective goods may have far more properties than those used by Olson and that these properties may also be relevant to the question of the realisation of these goods in groups (3). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) (4), for example, analyse collective goods that are only made possible with a large number of collective users. In addition, there are goods that are not continuously variable, but require a minimum level of participation in order to be made available at all (Chong 1991)(5). 1. Musgrave, Richard A., »Public Finance and Finanzwissenschaft Traditions Compared«, in: FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 53/2, 1996, 145-193. Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert (suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft) (German Edition) (Kindle Locations 9884-9886). Suhrkamp Verlag. Kindle Edition. 2. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 36f. 3. Carolin Stange, Die Übertragbarkeit lokaler Lösungsansätze auf Bereitstellungsprobleme Globaler Öffentlicher Güter, Dissertation, Bamberg 2017, Kap. 2. 4. Frohlich, Norman/Oppenheimer Joe A., »I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends«, in: World Politics 23/1, 1970, 104-120. 5. Chong, Dennis, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago/London 1991. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Goods | Ostrom | Brocker I 727 Social Goods/Ostrom: Ostrom thesis: Common goods (jointly used goods, social goods) can often be managed successfully and sustainably by their users themselves without the mandatory need for state supervision or individually shared private property. Brocker I 728 OstromVsTradition/OstromVsHardin: the conditions under which the actors in Garrett Hardin's contribution decide (see Social Goods/Hardin) are very restrictive and are by no means directly transferred to the reality of many common situations. OstromVsHardin/OstromVsOlson: (see Social Goods/Olson): The pessimistic findings of Hardin and Olson lead either to direct attention away from individual decisions and towards state solutions or to question the millennia-old institution of community property in principle or to ignore it in political decisions. (1) Solution/Ostrom: more attention must be paid to the problem-solving potential of local individuals. In traditional approaches, individuals are regarded as "prisoners" (2) Nor do they produce "relentless tragedies"(3) (OstromVsHardin). Brocker I 729 Questions: 1. How and by whom does it come to the provision of the common good management system, i.e. the organisational performance and the rules of the game? 2. how do users ("owners") and providers manage mutual credible commitments of participation and self-restraint? 3. How and by whom is the monitoring and sanctioning of compliance with such restrictions and rules of use? Brocker I 730 Ostrom thesis: Unlike in business theory or state theory, in a theory of the self-organisation of common goods we must assume that expenditure is the result of collective action and complex distributional tasks. See Collective Action/Ostrom, Self-Organization/Ostrom. Brocker I 737 Problems: Ostrom shows through examples of failed common management (coastal fishing cooperatives, forest management) that at least one of her 8 building principles of self-organization does not apply. (4) (See Self-Organization/Ostrom). Core elements of an analysis of collective actions are for Ostrom: institutional analysis, multi-level consideration and rational election actions. OstromVsTradition: the common problem can also be self-organized and solved sustainably. It does not necessarily require the division and entrepreneurial use of the common good through the individual allocation of private property rights or state paternalism or regulation. VsOstrom: she was criticised for her broad use of the term and for the fact that its methodological individualistic approach largely ignores the effect of structural elements such as social power relations. OstromVsVs: Ostrom showed that its research results could be made fruitful across disciplines, e.g. in resource economics, experimental economics and behavioral research. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 18 2. Ibid. p. 8 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. chap 5. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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