Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Observation Language | Fraassen | I 56 Phenomenon/Fraassen: phenomena are preserved by being shown to be fragments of a larger unit. VsObservation language: you cannot describe phenomena apart from the rest of the world. >Language, >Method, >Experiments, >Obervation. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Phenomena | Fraassen | I 2 Phenomenon/Fraassen: does not decide about the truth of hypotheses about atoms. Def phenomenon/Fraassen: observable processes and structures. I 44 Phenomenon/Newton: should be preserved. Reality/Newton: is postulated. I 56 Phenomena/Fraassen: preserved by being shown to be fragments of a larger unit. VsObservation Language: one cannot describe phenomena different from the rest of the world. >Observation language, >Observation, >Structures, >Hypotheses, >Theories. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Observation Language | Fraassen Vs Observation Language | I 56 Empirical Content/Theory/Fraassen: we have seen that we cannot isolate the empirical content of a theory in the interpretation by saying that language consists of two parts (observation language, theoretical terms). That should not surprise us. Phenomenon/Fraassen: the phenomena are preserved if they are proven to be fragments of a larger unit. FraassenVsObservation Language: it would be very strange if the theories described the phenomena, the observable, in other terms than the rest of the world they describe. A conceptual distinction between the observable and the unobservable is always too easy. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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