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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constructivism | Meixner | I 12 Constructivism/Meixner: constructivism is an approach of IntersubjectivityVsObjectivity. Constructivist ontology: cannot claim objectivity, but only intersubjectivity. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity. VsObjectivity. > |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Unintended Models | Field | II 264 Unintended/Non-standard model/NSM/Field: Problem: we cannot simply say that the non-standard model is unintended. >Models, >Model theory. II 265 Non-disquotational view: here it is only meaningful to speak of "unintended", if we can state by what facts about our practice these models are unintend - and precisely because these models make each of our sentences just as true, the specification of such facts appears to be impossible. >Disquotationalism. II 267 Applying/Explanation/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - That explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Satisfaction. II 319 Unintended Model/Interpretation/Putnam/Field: there is nothing in our use of the set theoretical predicates. That could make an interpretation "unintended". (VsObjectivity of mathematics). FieldVsPutnam: but this cannot be extended to the number theory. >Number theory. II 320 Not every objective statement is formalizable. - E.g. Consequences with the quantifier "only finitely many". >Formalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Values | Putnam | V 232f Value/values/Max Weber: there is a distinction between facts and values (VsObjectivity of value judgments) "Non-judgmental understanding": ideal type: is the understanding of rational "instrumental" actions. Karl-Otto Apel: these can be reconstructed as transpositions of if-then rules. Sociology: does not have to prove that maximum demands are fulfilled, but only that it was rational for the actor, how he/she has fulfilled his/her objectives. PutnamVsWeber, VsApel: this is only operationalist and too instrumentalist, to understand rationality only from purposes. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Rationalism, >Teleology, >Purposes. --- I (d) 217 Facts/values/Putnam: facts are not separated. Parisi I 311/312 Facts/values/economic theories/Putnam: In an economic analysis of law, disputes and conflicts between parties are often framed as disagreements as to facts. When facts are in dispute the parties can undertake further investigation and they can recalculate their choices and reassess their optimal course of action. The focus on factual disagreement lends itself to the objective and rational point of viewlessness that grounds the claim that economics is a science. In law, however, disputes are frequently about something more than a disagreement as to facts; they involve disagreements as to values (Putnam, 2002)(1). These value-based disagreements shape the facts as people understand them, and influence the relative importance attributed to any given fact by any particular party. Value disputes are not easily resolved by appeal to economic analysis. At best, economics can only offer some indirect input on factors to consider in a given situation, but in the end law must operate to make a judgment—a value choice between and among competing claims that are often based on emotion, culture, and other human characteristics that are not easily subject to an economic calculus. Consequently, when economic analysis is applied to law, it often functions to redirect attention away from a conflict involving deeply held values and translates the disagreement into one of competing facts. The problem with this move is that it may function to “mask” what the law is really doing and can undermine the traditional role of law in working to mediate tensions among competing and deeply held values in our system of democratic governance (Noonan, 1976)(2). 1. Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Noonan, Jr., John T. (1976). Persons and Masks of the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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