Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett
 
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I 143
Actualism/Dennett: only that what is real is possible - Histdict: Mind can only be regarded as an activity, not as a substance.
I 163
Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if determinism is correct, actualism must also be right. Or the other way aroun. If actualism is wrong, indeterminism would have to be right - DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, therefore determinism is wrong - DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism.
I 249
Actualism/DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition - therefore he was a follower of actualism.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Compassion Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 225
Compassion/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche has (at least) two objections against compassion. 1. that the compassionate person actually suffers vicariously with someone, and is brought to the same level as the subject of compassion - which in turn makes him "sick and melancholic" (F. Nietzsche: Morgenröthe, KGW V. 1, p. 124). Danto: This is also how it is to be understood when Zarathustra says that God dies of compassion after suffering, as one should assume, from the suffering of those in whom he has empathized. To demand compassion from the strong means (in this peculiar way) to demand from them to become weak.
Christian ethics/Nietzsche: here Nietzsche observes that compassion is elevated to the "basic principle of society". For Nietzsche, it proves to be what it is: a will to negate life (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 217).
DantoVsNietzsche: this is a central discrepancy in Nietzsche's thinking: by definition, the noble person stands above his companions. In addition, he/she is healthy, powerful and full of vitality. The opposite of noble is common. Unlike the noble personality, the ordinary are sick, exhausted and weak. Consequently, the herd consists of the sick, the weak and the powerless.
---
Danto III 226
It is hardly possible to draw a more misleading conclusion, but it cannot be denied that Nietzsche has drawn it: Nietzsche: There is a surplus of miscarriages, illnesses, degenerates, infirmities, necessary sufferers in humans as in any other animal species; the successful cases are always the exception in humans as well. (above, p. 79).
Danto: correspondingly, the extraordinary human being is not only regarded as statistically deviating, but as a splendid example of his species, which stands out from a mass of miscasts and inferiority. Only if we take the lowest ones as yardsticks, can we believe otherwise. But this belief, as Nietzsche could oppose, would be anything but justified.
Danto: According to Nietzsche, the average applicant is therefore rejected because one expects to fill the position with the best person.
DantoVsNietzsche: that most people are not healthy is simply wrong. In epidemics, on the other hand, strong ones are taken away just like the weak ones.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Copula Nietzsche
 
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Taureck I 84
"Is"/VsNietzsche/Taureck: he confused copula and identity signs: "For a terribly long time, a thing on Earth was considered equal and coincident with a single feature, for example a certain color.
The multiplicity of features was admitted with the greatest slowness.
Even from the history of language we see a resistance to the multiplicity of the predicates ... "

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Tau I
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995
Darwinism Nietzsche
 
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Pfotenhauer I 5
Darwinism/Evolution/Nietzsche/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Pfotenhauer: Darwin's theory of evolution, which makes selection into a principle according to the measure (...) of selection performances to external conditions, is not liked by Nietzsche; he even hates it: "[...]this is the moral.... the middle ones are worth more than the exceptions"..."I am appalled by the formulation [of this] moral." Added Fragments, Spring 1888, KGW VIII, p. 95ff). ---
Danto III 197
Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche falls too often into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. He overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, T. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world.
---
Danto III 268
Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche was convinced VsDarwin that the disabled survive and the abled ones perish. Danto: apart from this tenacious belief, which is as easily attacked by Huxley's famous refutation as its flip side (See Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.), it is difficult to see why Nietzsche wanted people to see him as an anti-Darwinist.
---
Danto III 269
Survival/Nietzsche: According to Nietzsche, whether you preserve yourself or not has nothing to do with the blind exercise of the will to power, which characterizes every thing at every moment. Something survives, insofar as it emerges victoriously from the struggle of the will; but it does not fight to survive - if so, it would be exactly the other way round: above all, something alive wants to omit its power - life itself is the will to power: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it. (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 21).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Darwinism Huxley
 
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Danto III 197
Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: All too often Nietzsche falls into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. He overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world.

HuxA I
A. Huxley
Science, Liberty and Peace London 1946


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Grammar Nietzsche
 
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Ries II 35
Grammar/On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: pre-drawn relation of "accidental" predicate and "underlying" subject: fiction. This has made the rule of madness irrevocable. ---
Ries II 75
Grammar/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: Subject formation suggests real entities. Value judgements and statements of reality appear identical in their linguistic form. Terms are linked to attributes. Thus philosophy believes that it has made the real properties of things visible. ---
Danto III 209
Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: something similar had set up thrasymachos in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake.
DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, however Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. But pulsation cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can pulsate.
---
Danto III 210
Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Happiness Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 271
Happiness/bliss/Nietzsche/Danto: From Nietzsche's theory of the will to power follows that bliss is not the goal we are actually fighting for. It is not different from the rest of the world; people are concerned about power. Humans are undeniably suited to more power ((s) than other living beings) and this has nothing to do with happiness. Joy is simply the conscious reflection of our superiority in strength. The 'last human' who thinks in terms of 'peace' and bliss, is involved in contradictions. There's no happiness without a fight. (Cf. F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin 1999, p. 750.) ---
Danto III 272
Nietzsche/Danto: obstacles experienced as displeasure are stimuli for the will to power and foreplay to pleasure. Pleasure/Nietzsche/Danto: there are two corresponding types of pleasure - the pleasure of victory and the pleasure of sleep. The latter is the happiness of nihilistic religions and philosophy. The rich and living want victories, overcome adversaries, overflowing the feeling of power over other areas than hitherto. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin 1999, p. 713.)
DantoVsNietzsche: Nietzsche uses the term "pleasure" here (as is often the case) in both a narrower and a broader sense. It is absurd to respond to the intention to avoid unwillingness by saying that life is struggle and unwillingness, so that the questionable intention is opposed to life. (Cf. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 217.).
Danto: Last but not least, Nietzsche's inability to look through this fallacy contributed to his lack of foresight in social reform.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Language Nietzsche
 
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Ries II 35
Language/On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: Seduction by Language: makes the deception of intellectual judgement performance appear as a natural context. ---
Ries II 86
Language/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche:"coarse fetish being": produces reason prejudices: subject, causality and substance. ---
Danto III 51
Language/thinking/order/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche draws his pessimistic conclusions from his epistemological analysis (like B. Russell later): according to them, our perceptions cannot be similar to their causes, so that the language we use (...) does not really describe the world. Order/Nietzsche/Danto: At this point Nietzsche assumes that there could be an order or structure in the world which we are not able to comprehend.
---
Danto III 107
Language/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a philosophical mythology hidden in language, which breaks out every moment, however cautious one may be otherwise (F. Nietzsche: Der Wanderer und seine Schatten, KGW IV, 3. p. 215). ---
Danto III 209
Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak, but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake.
DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that.
---
Danto III 210
Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not nouns and adjectives.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Literal Truth Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 57
Literal Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: if you define the metaphor like Nietzsche (see Metaphor/Nietzsche) and therefore each sentence is considered metaphorical, then - absurdly - each sentence must also be unconventional. Then it's hard to see what we mean by metaphor. Danto: Nietzsche would probably reply: "Metaphors are sentences that are never perceived, or at least never literally true; no sentence is ever to be taken literally in relation to what he is dealing with; therefore, each sentence is metaphorical to a certain degree. In practice (or even rhetoric) it makes little difference whether we say that no sentence is literally true or, as Nietzsche should formulate it even more radically later, that every sentence is literally wrong.
The only question is whether our language can help us in life.
---
Danto III 58
DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is also just metaphorical, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.).
---
Danto III 62
Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Metaphors Nietzsche
 
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Pfotenhauer IV 41
Metaphor/Concepts/Nietzsche: (F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW, III, 2, p. 380ff): the concepts that built up a rigid and regular world covered a fundamental "drive to metaphor formation" - the anthropomorphic activity, which is also the basis of ... ---
Pfotenhauer IV 42
...science, but hidden, it then would become productive on the basis of this drive. New "transfers, metaphors, metonymies" (p. 381) would be added. Continually, the desire to redesign the existing world of the awake human being so colorfully and irregularly, incoherently, and eternally new as the world of dreams is. Pfotenhauer: He no longer finds consolation in an art exercise that is above all of them, the aesthetic game has become the moment of a life's fulfilment.... In this conception, the change of emotions and the causality of the mental processes has replaced the exuberant view of aesthetic possibilities.
---
Danto III 53
Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto:: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense, KGW1/III, 2, p. 374f)). We are talking about metaphors. Note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche/Danto).
---
Danto III 58
DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is just metaphorical as well, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.).
---
Danto III 62
Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Metaphysics Nietzsche
 
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Adorno XII 136
Metaphysics/Nietzsche/Adorno: Nietzsche has shown or believed to show that (...) the surface of the categories assigned to a sensual life of any sense, according to the measure of his own metaphysics, i. e. a metaphysics of the very living, are deeper than what this surface denies and only insists on the hidden, but this is due that if one wanted to insist on it, it would transform into in ideology. For example Carmen/Nietzsche: be deeper than Wagner's "Ring".
Adorno: in its essential surface being, in its essential sensual being, certain mythical behaviours are met. Nietzsche understands this as more appropriate than oppposed to the Wagnerian, where the myths become a kind of back world or latent meaning.
---
XII 137
Content/Nietzsche/Adorno: the point of Nietzsche's philosophy is to a certain extent that the surface, i. e. the immediate, passionate, sensual and manifesting life itself is precisely the content. ---
Ries II 46
Transcendental/"ideal things"/Nietzsche: philosophy, religion, art, morality are all "higher lies", because they are traced back to their origin in the lower, all too human. ---
Ries II 46
NietzscheVsMetaphysics: Insignificance is given illusory meaning. ---
Ries II 77
Metaphysics/Morality/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: The problem of legitimacy: in the previous "Science of Morality" the problem of morality itself was still missing! The suspicion that there is something problematic here. ---
Ries II 78
The occidental metaphysical contrast between God and devil is lost. Thus also the basis for a metaphysically founded morality of the "good in itself". ---
Ries II 87
Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: the entire decay history of Western metaphysics is recounted by Nietzsche on a single sheet of paper: how the true world finally became a fable. History of an error. ---
Ries II 88
Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Development: Plato: Spatial model of the truth relations: "here" and "there" are replaced by the temporal determination "now" and "then". Temporalization of metaphysics through Christianity, decaying platonism. ---
Ries II 89
Kant/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Kant makes God and the "true world" unattainable, because it cannot be proven. ---
Danto III 210
Metaphysics/Morality Theory/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a complex connection between Nietzsche's moral theory and metaphysics: For example, if a falcon behaves like a lamb, it is - according to this theory - a lamb, because a lamb is what a lamb does. This is how the strong ones behave under all circumstances. Language/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives.
---
Danto III 209
Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Nietzsche, F. Löwith
 
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Pfotenhauer IV 22
Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith, Heidegger, Denker in dürftifer Zeit, Frankfurt 1953, pp. 76ff.): Karl Löwith deals with Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. He doubts the context (sic) that arises from the connection to the western metaphysics Nietzsche with Aristotle, Leibniz or Hegel. (p. 90).
Löwith believes Heidegger overestimates Nietzsche because he demonstrates on him his own motives for thinking. Löwith believes that Nietzsche is more important in the expressions of his subjective concern, which, from a philosophical point of view, would be closer to Pascal or Kierkegaard. (p. 96).
Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Eternal Return of the Same, Stuttgart 1956, p. 120ff): Nietzsche would consider the experience of natural rhythms to be important as an impulse for philosophical reflection on transsubjective orders. The preservation and return of the forces would thus determine our physical existence and commit our thinking.
---
Pfotenhauer IV 23
Christianity/Nietzsche/Löwith: Nietzsche's critique of Christian spiritualism would basically meet the philosophical-historical view (cf."Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. The revolutionary break in 19th century thinking ", Stuttgart 1964, p. 356ff) of a control and overcoming, given up by us, of given living conditions. This would only nourish self-tormenting resentment towards one's own, unassailable prerequisites for existence. It seduces to nihilism, it tempts projections of a fulfillment of existence in an unattainable future. Despite all the positivist naturalism (K. Löwith, 1956, p. 208ff), Löwith's concept of an antique conception of nature, which he believes he can recognize and affirm in Nietzsche, is strongly humanistic.
Pfotenhauer: It is based on the model of classic moderation and sublimation of modern subject claims (see: K. Löwith). Consequently, he must protect Nietzsche's return to pre-socratic thinking against his own, often shrill emphasis on will. For it is not the sovereignty claims of the individual that basically determines life. (LöwithVsNietzsche).

Löw I
Karl Löwith
Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit Göttingen 1960

Psychology Nietzsche
 
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Ries II 79
Psychology/Resentment/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: Basic concept of the Psychology of Christianity. Explains how the hierarchy of power given by nature could turn into the rule of the powerless. ---
Danto III 130
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche considered himself a born psychologist. DantoVsNietzsche: in his thinking was a whole lot of circular arguments. Our psychological theories are part of our perspective, but our perspective must be explained by psychic phenomena that are part of it. Our moral attitudes are jointly responsible for our (...) perspectives. Psychology, however, is invoked to explain why we take our moral perspectives, and especially why exactly them.
---
Danto III 132
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: If there is nothing material, then there is nothing immaterial. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 537).
Danto: one could say that there is no substance that would be the task of psychology to explore.
Moral/Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche fought on two fronts at the same time: On the one hand, he hoped to attack morality by exposing the psychology that was attached to it as illogical, on the other hand, he wanted to attack this psychology by attacking the morality assumed by it.
Philosophy/Nietzsche: The attack on the soul or the self - in which he claimed to find the essence of modern philosophy - was at the same time an assassination attempt on the basic premise of Christian doctrine. (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 33).
---
Danto III 134
I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the "I" as being, in the "I" as substance and projects the belief in the ego-substance on all things - it only creates the term 'thing' through this ... Being is thought into everything as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'... (F. Nietzsche: Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 71.) ---
Danto III 200
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: two terms play a prominent role in Nietzsche's psychology: resentment and bad conscience. Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness.
---
Danto III 201
He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Finally, the master will be evil in his own eyes. (See also revaluation of all values). ---
Danto III 208
Gentlemen/Slaves/Nietzsche: it would be a mistake to ask the beast to suppress its animal instincts. Similarly, people have no choice but to be different from what they are. Nietzsche: Demanding from strength that it does not express itself as strength (...) is just as absurd as demanding from weakness that it expresses itself as strength. (F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 293.).
---
Strengths/Nietzsche: the strong are simply actions of strength, not individuals who act in a strong way at their discretion. Just as lightning is not an entity that does something, but the light itself. The strong being is not free to show his strength or not to show it. (ibid. p. 294.)
---
Danto III 209
Humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in politics: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake.
DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Repetition Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 46
Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's nihilism culminates in the doctrine of the Eternal Return, according to which the world repeats itself endlessly and precisely. Nietzsche considered it to be a serious scientific insight and the only alternative to the view that the world has or can have a goal, a purpose or an end state. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 684). If every state of the world (if one can even say so since Nietzsche describes the world as formless) comes back an unlimited number of times, no state can be definitive, and as far as the nature of things is concerned, there can be neither progress nor regression...
---
Danto III 47
...rather, the same is always repeated. ---
Danto III 244
Return/Repetition/Eternity/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's thought of eternal return is that everything that exists will return, and that everything that exists is a return of itself, that everything has already happened and will happen again, every time in exactly the same way, forever and ever. There is no beginning and no end, and no middle in the story of the world: there is only the monotonous emergence of the same episode. Gateway/Danto: in the gateway episode, the dwarf is the personification of gravity.
---
Danto III 245
Nietzsche: From this gateway a long eternal lane runs backwards: behind us lies an eternity... Does this doorway not also have to be there already?... And does it not have to be so tightly knotted with all things that this moment draws all the coming things after itself? So - also itself? (F. Nietzsche: Zarathustra, KGW VI. 1. p. 196). Zarathustra: I myself belong to the causes of the eternal return (ibid., p. 272.)
---
Danto III 247
Apart from the Zarathustra and one or two mentions in Beyond Good and Evil and in Ecce homo (as well as some early references in Gay Science), the doctrine of eternal return hardly ever appears in the published works. Danto: there can be no proofs or evidence for the doctrine of the return. If the repetitions are exactly the same, they cannot bear traces or imprints of previous episodes.
((s)VsNietzsche: Problem: It is not clear where the seams of the episodes should run or where a new episode should start. For example, it cannot happen while an object is falling because the case is not interrupted; in any case, the doctrine does not involve the interruption of processes. As processes are now constantly under way and observable, there are no points at this level where a repetition could occur.
---
Danto III 252/253
Repetition/Poincaré/Danto: In 1890 Poincaré proved a theory of the phases, according to which a certain mechanical system within the Statistical Mechanics to be specified conditions must, in a sufficiently long period of time and this infinitely often come close to each of its states. Danto: But "infinitely close" does not correspond enough to Nietzsche's doctrine to affect the problem.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett Vs Actualism
 
Books on Amazon
I 162
Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if the determinism is correct, the actualism must also be right. Or the other way around. If the actualism was wrong, indeterminism would have to be right.   DennettVs: that’s wrong. E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, so the determinism is false.
  DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of the determinism.
I 249
DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore, he was a follower of actualism.
I 360
Dennett: we reject actualism, but how may we not go so far in the other direction as to assert that the space of the real possibilities is more densely occupied than is the case.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Hegel, G.W.F. Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 16
HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual .
II 87
VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit.
Rorty III 196
HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: verstand die Schwierigkeit sehr gut, am Ende einer Erzählung die Leiter wegzuwerfen. Er selbst wollte keine Erzählung, sondern eine Litanei geben.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Habermas Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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I 165
Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology.
I 178
HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one.
I 179
HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence.
I 180
 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence.  The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation).
I 182
HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason.
I 183
HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Heidegger, M. Rorty Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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Richard Rorty
III 195
Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point.
III 197
Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences. ((s) >Primal Words, Goethe).
History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger).
III 198
Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time. ((s) >Primal Language).
III 199
Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate.
III 204
RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style.
IV 79
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests".
IV 80
Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens.
IV 142
RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words.
VI 140
Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools.
I 390
RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Rorty Vs Kant, I.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 166
Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas.
I 169
Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here).
I 171
Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between people and propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box.
I 173
Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us.
RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal.
a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are
b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction!
I 174
Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making.
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual).
VI 256
Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria.
VI 257
This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand.
They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer.
VI 263
Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers.
RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment.
VI 264
RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of ​​"purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre:
Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Nietzsche, Fr. Dennett Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
I 249
DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. He was a follower of actualism.

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Nietzsche, Fr. Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
Habermas I 180
HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications.
Habermas II 87
VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon.
Rorty III 68
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: umgekehrter Platonismus: romantischer Versuch, das Fleisch über den Geist, das Herz über den Kopf, mythischen »Willen« über genauso mythische »Vernunft« zu erheben.
Rorty III 179
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "umgekehrter Platoniker". Drang, sich an ein Höheres anzuschließen.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nietzsche, Fr. Putnam Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
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V 284
PutnamVsNietzsche: "better" moral: you can only pull out randomly determined values out of context.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Nietzsche, Fr. Rorty Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 59
Truth/RortyVsNietzsche: with the traditional conception of truth he did not abolish the notion that we could discover the reasons for why we are. (>Metaphysics).
III 60
Language/Vocabulary/Rorty: as poets (and thus, according to Nietzsche, as humans) we fail if we accept the description given of our self by another.
III 62
Nietzsche: "Turn all 'it was' into a 'so I wanted it to be'!"

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000