Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 143
Actualism/Dennett: only that what is real is possible - Histdict: Mind can only be regarded as an activity, not as a substance.
I 163
Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if determinism is correct, actualism must also be right. Or the other way aroun. If actualism is wrong, indeterminism would have to be right - DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, therefore determinism is wrong - DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism.
I 249
Actualism/DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition - therefore he was a follower of actualism.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Copula Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Taureck I 84
"Is"/VsNietzsche/Taureck: he confused copula and identity signs: "For a terribly long time, a thing on Earth was considered equal and coincident with a single feature, for example a certain color.
The multiplicity of features was admitted with the greatest slowness.
Even from the history of language we see a resistance to the multiplicity of the predicates ... "

Nie I
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Tau I
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett Vs Actualism
 
Books on Amazon
I 162
Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if the determinism is correct, the actualism must also be right. Or the other way around. If the actualism was wrong, indeterminism would have to be right.   DennettVs: that’s wrong. E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, so the determinism is false.
  DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of the determinism.
I 249
DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore, he was a follower of actualism.
I 360
Dennett: we reject actualism, but how may we not go so far in the other direction as to assert that the space of the real possibilities is more densely occupied than is the case.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Hegel, G.W.F. Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
Books on Amazon
I 16
HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual .
II 87
VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit. - - -
Rorty III 196
HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: verstand die Schwierigkeit sehr gut, am Ende einer Erzählung die Leiter wegzuwerfen. Er selbst wollte keine Erzählung, sondern eine Litanei geben.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Habermas Vs Heidegger, M.
 
Books on Amazon
I 165
Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology.
I 178
HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one.
I 179
HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence.
I 180
 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence.  The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation).
I 182
HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason.
I 183
HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Heidegger, M. Rorty Vs Heidegger, M.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 195
Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point.
III 197
Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences. ((s) >Primal Words, Goethe).
History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger).
III 198
Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time. ((s) >Primal Language).
III 199
Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate.
III 204
RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style.
IV 79
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests".
IV 80
Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens.
IV 142
RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words. - - -
VI 140
Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools.
I 390
RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Rorty Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 166
Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas.
I 169
Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here).
I 171
Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between people and propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box.
I 173
Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us.
RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal.
a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are
b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction!
I 174
Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making.
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual).
VI 256
Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria.
VI 257
This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand.
They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer.
VI 263
Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers.
RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment.
VI 264
RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of ​​"purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre:
Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Nietzsche, Fr. Dennett Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
I 249
DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. He was a follower of actualism.

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Nietzsche, Fr. Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
Habermas I 180
HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications.
Habermas II 87
VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon. - - -
Rorty III 68
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: umgekehrter Platonismus: romantischer Versuch, das Fleisch über den Geist, das Herz über den Kopf, mythischen »Willen« über genauso mythische »Vernunft« zu erheben.
Rorty III 179
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "umgekehrter Platoniker". Drang, sich an ein Höheres anzuschließen.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nietzsche, Fr. Putnam Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
V 284
PutnamVsNietzsche: "better" moral: you can only pull out randomly determined values out of context.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Nietzsche, Fr. Rorty Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 59
Truth/RortyVsNietzsche: with the traditional conception of truth he did not abolish the notion that we could discover the reasons for why we are. (>Metaphysics).
III 60
Language/Vocabulary/Rorty: as poets (and thus, according to Nietzsche, as humans) we fail if we accept the description given of our self by another.
III 62
Nietzsche: "Turn all 'it was' into a 'so I wanted it to be'!"

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000