| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| History of Problems | Neo-Kantianism | Gadamer I 381 Problem History/Neo-Kantianism/Gadamer: The logic of question and answer that Collingwood develops puts an end to the talk of the permanent problem that underlies the relationship of the "Oxford Realists" to the classics of philosophy, and also to the concept of problem history that New Kantianism developed. >Question/Answer/Collingwood. GadamerVsNeo-Kantianism: The history of problems would only be truly history if it recognized the identity of the problem as an empty abstraction and admitted the change in the questions. A location outside history from which the identity of a problem in the course of its historical attempts to solve it does not really exist. It is true that all understanding of texts of philosophy requires >recognition of what is recognized in them. Without it, we would understand nothing at all. But by no means do we step out of the historical condition in which we stand and from which we understand. The problem that we recognize is in truth not simply the same, if it is to be understood in a genuine questioning execution. It is only because of our historical short-sightedness that we can consider it the same. The "more-than-a-standpoint" from which its true identity would be thought is a pure illusion. Cf. >Abstraction, >Problem/Gadamer. Problem Concept/Gadamer: It is significant that in the 19th century, with the collapse of the immediate tradition of philosophical questioning and the emergence of historism, the problem concept rose to universal validity - a sign that the direct relationship to the factual questions of philosophy no longer exists. Thus, the embarrassment of the philosophical consciousness in relation to historism is characterized by the fact that it took refuge in the abstraction of the problem concept and saw no problem in the way in which problems actually "are". The history of problems of Neo-Kantianism is a bastard of historism. The criticism of the concept of problem, which is carried out with the means of a logic of question and answer, must destroy the illusion that the problems exist like the stars in the sky. >Question/Gadamer, >Question/Answer/Collingwood. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neo-Kantianism | Luhmann Vs Neo-Kantianism | Reese-Schäfer II 37 Subject / Object/Luhmann: this juxtaposition is no longer necessary, sense is a kind of potential for unrest with built-in force to self change. Sense relates to a process oriented at differences. Not subjective. (VsWeber, Max, VsNeo-Kantianism). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |