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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deep Ecology | Pelluchon | Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: The pitfall of separating ecology and existence, as can be blamed on the environmental ethics that emerged in the 1970s (as in the deep ecology of the influential Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess) [is to be avoided]. Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: whose achievement consisted in decentering ethics by attributing to living beings a value beyond their usefulness. PelluchonVsNaess/PelluchonVsDeep Ecology: in its praise of natural wilderness, however, this ecological thinking of the 1970s tended to merely renew in other ways the dualism of man and nature that its opponents claimed. >Body/Pelluchon. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Ecology | Naess | Singer I 251 Ecology/Naess, Arne/Singer, P.: (A. Naess (1973)(1): Def Shallow Ecology/Naess: is limited to the traditional framework of ethics: this is about not polluting water, for example, in order to have enough drinking water and to avoid pollution, so that one can continue to enjoy nature. On the other hand, Def Deep Ecology/Naess: wants to preserve the biosphere for its own sake, regardless of the potential benefit to mankind. Deep Ecology/Naess/Singer, P.: thus takes as its subject matter larger units than the individual: species, ecosystems and even the biosphere as a whole. Deep Ecology(2): (A. Naess and G. Sessions (1984)(2) Principles: 1. The wellbeing and development of human and non-human life on earth have a value in itself (intrinsic, inherent value), regardless of the non-human world's use for human purposes. 2. Wealth and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are values in themselves. 3. People do not have the right to diminish the wealth and diversity of the world, except when it comes to vital interests. Singer I 252 Biosphere/Naess/Sessions/Singer, P.: Sessions and Naess use the term "Biosphere" in a broad sense, so that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems are also included. P. SingerVsNaess: (see also SingerVsSessions): the ethics of deep ecology does not provide satisfactory answers to the value of the life of individuals. Maybe that is the wrong question. Ecology is more about systems than individual organisms. Therefore, ecological ethics should be related to species and ecosystems. Singer I 253 So there is a kind of Holism behind it. This is shown by Lawrence Johnson (L. Johnson, A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, 1993). Johnson's thesis: The interests of species are different from the sum of individual interests and exist simultaneously together with individual interests within our moral considerations. >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research 1. A. Naess (1973). „The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement“, Inquiry 16 , pp. 95-100 2. A. Naess and George Sessions (1984). „Basic Principles of Deep Ecology“, Ecophilosophy, 6 |
Naess I Arne Naess Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Ecology | Pelluchon | Ecology/Pelluchon/PelluchonVsNaess: The pitfall of separating ecology and existence, as can be blamed on the environmental ethics that emerged in the 1970s (as in the deep ecology of the influential Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess) [is to be avoided]. Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: whose achievement consisted in decentering ethics by attributing to living beings a value beyond their utility. PelluchonVsNaess/PelluchonVsDeep Ecology: in its praise of the natural wilderness, however, this ecological thinking of the 1970s tended to only renew in other ways the dualism of man and nature that its opponents claimed. Physicality/Body/Pelluchon: Moreover, the holistic vision defended by the environmental ethics of the 1970s was too abstract: because it only addressed reason and not affects, it could not induce individuals to change their lifestyle. Nor did this thinking succeed in inspiring an ecological policy to put the economy at the service of living things and to reorganize production in such a way that it takes into account the limits of the planet and frees certain sectors, such as agriculture, livestock and care, from the economic dictates of maximum efficiency. >Body/Pelluchon, >Environmental Ethics/Pelluchon, >Ecology/Naess. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Gaia Hypothesis | Braidotti | Braidotti I 84 Gaia Hypothesis/Braidotti: The recognition of multicultural perspectives and the critique of imperialism and ethnocentrism add a crucial aspect to the discussion on the becoming-earth, but nowadays they also fall in their own internal contradictions. Let us take, for instance, the case of ‘deep ecology’. Arne Naess (1977a(1), 1977b(2)) and James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia’ hypothesis (1979)(3) are geo-centred theories that propose a return to holism and to the notion of the whole earth as a single, sacred organism. >Deep ecology, >Ecology/Naess. This holistic approach is rich in perspectives, but also quite problematic for a vitalist, materialist posthuman thinker. What is problematic about it is less the holistic part than the fact that it is based on a social constructivist dualistic method. Braidotti I 85 This means that it opposes the earth to industrialization, nature to culture, the environment to society and comes down firmly on the side of the natural order. This results in a relevant political agenda that is critical of consumerism and possessive individualism, including a strong indictment of technocratic reason and technological culture. But this approach has two drawbacks. Firstly, its technophobic aspect is not particularly helpful in itself, considering the world we are living in. Secondly, it paradoxically reinstates the very categorical divide between the natural and the manufactured which it is attempting to overcome. BraidottiVsNaess/BraidottivsLovelock/BraidottiVsDeep ecology: Why do I not agree with this position? Because of two interrelated ideas: firstly, because of the nature-culture continuum and the subsequent rejection of the dualistic methodology of social constructivism - the post-anthropocentric neo-humanists end up reinstating this distinction, albeit with the best of intentions in relation to the natural order; secondly, because I am suspicious of the negative kind of bonding going on in the age of anthropocene between humans and non-humans. The trans-species embrace is based on the awareness of the impending catastrophe: the environmental crisis and the global warm/ning issue, not to speak of the militarization of space, reduce all species to a comparable degree of vulnerability. The problem with this position is that, inflagrant contradiction with its explicitly stated aims, it promotes full-scale humanization of the environment. This strikes me as a regressive move, reminiscent of the sentimentality of the Romantic phases of European culture. I concur therefore with Val Plumwood’s (1993(4), 2003(5)) assessment that deep ecology misreads the earth–cosmos nexus and merely expands the structures of possessive egoism and self-interests to include non-human agents. Braidotti I 86 In contrast with this position, but also building on some of its premises, I would like to propose an updated brand of Spinozism (Citton and Lordon, 2008(6)). I see Spinozist monism, and the radical immanent forms of critique that rest upon it, as a democratic move that promotes a kind of ontological pacifism. >B. Spinoza. 1. Naess, Arne. 1977a. Spinoza and ecology. In: Siegfried Hessing (ed.) Speculum Spinozanum, 1877–1977. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2.Naess, Arne. 1977b. Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism or through Mahayana Buddhism to Spinoza? In: Jon Wetlesen (ed.) Spinoza’s Philosophy of Man, Proceedings of the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 3. Lovelock, James. 1979. Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London and New York: Routledge. 5. Plumwood, Val. 2003. Environmental Culture. London: Routledge. 6. Citton, Yves and Frédéric Lordon. 2008. Spinoza et les Sciences Sociales. Paris: Editions Amsterdam. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Knowledge | Naess | I 398 Knowledge/Naess: (E.g. About the apple in front of me) when I am drunk, I might grasp at nothing. In our search for knowledge there is no such thing. An increase of evidence can perhaps be estimated or even measured, but not an approach to knowledge. The gripping does not happen but this does not comply with the grasp at nothing. The distance between the truth (sic) and reaching the truth cannot be accurately determined. From the side of proving there can be no zero point determined. ((s) VsNaess: Naess oscillates between approaching knowledge and approaching truth.) >Truth, >Certainty, >Knowledge, >Justification, >Understanding, >Cognition, >Theory of knowledge, >Evidence. |
Naess I Arne Naess Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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