Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mysticism McGinn I 35
Mysticism/M/McGinn: Takes the concept related facts at face value, but is unable to accept them as something simply inexplicable like the follower of non-traceability. (But raises further claim). ---
I 63
McGinnVsMysticim: the problem is not that a lot on mysticism is undoubtedly wrong but that it is incoherent. It is no position in logical space. What content actually has the concept of the supernatural? - "The supernatural is the reified ignorance of the people." ---
I 138
Free will (According to McGinn): Mysticism: the will is perhaps the natural home of the non-naturalist. He will say that there is surely nothing in the world of experience, which differs so starkly from the routine processes of causality and predictability, like an act of free choice. By free choice we made the otherworldly aspect of our existence proof. Natural expression of the soul, far from human processes.
McGinnVsMysticism: this is not a response to the initial argument (determinism = indeterminism).
Is our supernatural soul determined, or is it not? The question is therefore only postponed. God himself would face the dilemma.
---
I 160
Mystification: we have knowledge a priori by divine revelation. Plato, Goedel: Thesis: there is a special faculty of mathematical intuition that brings us inexplicably with the abstract reality in conjunction. ---
II 104
Human ignorance is no proof that the answer must be supernatural.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Mysticism Poundstone I 58
Extrasensory perception / PoundstoneVsMysticism: to what extent would the world be different if there were no extrasensory perception?
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
McGee, V. Field Vs McGee, V. II 351
Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism.
II 352
in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory.
(ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it.
Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number.
Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated.
McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity.
Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification).
Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation.
Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?.
"Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy.
McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise.
FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy.
"Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!.
Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!.
All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate.
Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything.
II 353
McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of ​​F.
((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown).
Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification.
FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept.
FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range.
Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself).
FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here.
FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!.
II 355
Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence
PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts.
McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it.
FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end).
Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics.
McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly.
Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models".
McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number".
Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models.
FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with
Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language.
Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong).
FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number".
Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help.
Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension.
II 356
Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic.
FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here).
Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition.
FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy.
FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Mysticism Black Vs Mysticism III 69
VsScience/Mysticism/Black: some contemporary critics might say "the so-called science (the "academic" one that arouses their hostility) has proved that real science (mysticism, etc.) is impossible." BlackVsMysticism: the price for giving up objectivity is much higher: it is also the task of the commonsense view of the everyday world. III 70 Naïve realism/Black: the commonsense view is often called naïve realism but it is definitely correct in all essential respects of dealing with the outside world. ((s) The scientist pushes the red button instead of the green one, because he believes that both exist. Def Objective orientation/Terminology/Black: By that I do not mean "everyday ontology", but something that underlies it: we have an objective orientation of perception. Violating it leads to madness and self-destruction.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Mysticism Lewis Vs Mysticism V 169
Causal Dependency/cauD/Lewis: is simply not the same as causation. But causation without causal dependency is rare. >Causal dependenc/Lewis, >causation/Lewis. LewisVsMysticism: if there were inexplicable causal dependencies, we wouldn't (understandably) know anything about it. (If we weren't aware of it).
LewisVsRegularity: a fixed regularity theory would rule out inexplicable causal dependencies, and I want to avoid that.
V 182
The hidden quality must therefore be something else: it does not supervise on those qualities of the possible worlds on which as far as we see everything else supervenes. Accepting something so mystical is a serious matter. We need better reasons than isolated intuitions. (LewisVsMysticism). Some people have important reasons...

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Mysticism Wittgenstein Vs Mysticism III 226
WittgensteinVsEsotericism/Private Language/Flor: it makes no sense to speak of a knowledge of certain phenomena, regardless of the participation in a regulated public practice. WittgensteinVsMysticism.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Mysticism Verschiedene Vs Mysticism John Gribbin Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Kätzchen, München, Zürich 1991
VII 207
Mysticism: some try to equate the net of electromagnetic radiation, through which everything is "simultaneously" connected, with Eastern wisdom. GribbinVsMysticism: they missed the fact that photons can be produced and destroyed naturally! Therefore the net is not complete.
VII 208
Perspective/Gribbin: but the reality is a photon orbit in spacetime, which connects my eye e.g. with the polar star. However, there is no real movement of time in which this orbit develops, this is only my perception from my point of view. From another point of view, this track is an eternal phenomenon.
Reality/Feynman/Diagram: Question: how real are the other tracks now? When we move a slot above the diagram, we change our perception, not reality.
VII 209
We are connected to a constantly moving observation slit. Therefore we see a positron moving forward in time and not an electron moving backward in time. But both interpretations are equally real.
This gave Wheeler the idea that there could only be one electron in the universe. Anyway, they are all connected on a complex zigzag path through space-time.




Mysticism Feynman Vs Mysticism I 250
Mysticism/FeynmanVsMysticism: there is no fortune teller who can tell us about the present times in a remote location - it is unobservable.

Feynman I
Richard Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963
German Edition:
Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001

Feynman II
R. Feynman
The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967
German Edition:
Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993
Mysticism Kanitscheider Vs Mysticism II 70
Vs Unity of Science/Hans Primas: (ETH Zurich) new ideological monism, seeks the domination of a single idea and a single way of life.
II 71
But Primas is also a critic of the rational approach in science. He believes that a "holistic" view must also include the irrational aspects of reality. (Emotionality).
KanitscheiderVsMysticism/KanitscheiderVsPrimas: the existence of the irrational always appears only as a global assertion. The moment an example is given, there is also a science that can approach the phenomenon with rational means.
Primas' assertion that the emotional dimension does not allow rational access is not substantiated by anything, but has no influence whatsoever on the unity of physics.
Irrrationality/Kanitscheider: the irrational does not consist in a further ontological level, but precisely in the belief that this layer of reality exists.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Teilhard de Chardin Kanitscheider Vs Teilhard de Chardin II 176
Teilhard de Chardin/Kanitscheider: precursor of Process Theology. Thesis: Immanence of God in an incomplete and ever evolving world. Omega point. He distinguishes two types of energy, "tangential" (physical), "radial" (mental).
The mental energy becomes denser and more concentrated with evolution, which is expressed in the emergence of intelligent living beings.
In the end, the radial energy dominates the tangential energy.
II 177
Supernatural/Religion/Theory/KanitscheiderVsMysticism/Kanitscheider: For example, if a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. Teilhard de Chardin/Kanitscheider: precursor of Process Theology. Thesis: Immanence of God in an incomplete and ever evolving world.
Omega point - two types of energy, "tangential" (physical), "radial" (mental) - the latter increases and prevails in the end.
KanitscheiderVsTeilhard: Doubling effect - Solution: Self-Organisation.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991