|Distributive Justice||Libertarianism||Gaus I 228
Distributive Justice/Libertarianism/Lamont: in contrast to [desert theories, resource-based view (RBV) and institutional utilitarianism] libertarian theories deny the relevance, for distributive justice, of both luck and utility. In terms of the political institutions affecting distributive justice, libertarians (also known as classical liberals or right libertarians) typically recommend that in ideally just conditions goods and services be distributed in a free market with minimal state intervention, redistributive measures and protectionism (...). These recommendations are usually
based on what libertarians see as the normative implications of property rights and liberty (Kukathas, 2003(1); Lomasky, 1987(2); Machan, 1989(3); Machan and Rasmussen, 1995(4); Narveson, 1989(5); Nozick, 1974(6)).
Nozick: The starting point for libertarians' strong interpretation of property rights is commonly self-ownership. The most influential libertarian, Robert Nozick (1974)(6), argues that since people own their natural endowments and their labour power, and since they freely exercise these in various ways, they are entitled to the fruits of their labour. Even though outcomes are not justified according to desert (and hence may be the result of luck), Nozick rejects Rawls's description of them as morally arbitrary, since self-ownership gives rise to entitlements (1974(6); ch. 7). Compensation for the influence of luck has no place in the Nozickean conception of justice, nor do any government measures to improve the lives of people or to relieve human suffering. Aid to the less fortunate must result from the indivi-dual voluntary actions of others.
Minimal state: Libertarian theories proposing minimal states on the basis of self-ownership have generally encountered two stumbling blocks internal to the theories themselves (Haworth, 1994). VsMinimal state:
1) Self-ownership: one is in defending the argument that self-ownership implies unequal
and nearly absolute property rights. Critics of libertarianism are more disturbed with the unequal ownership of material goods and natural resources than with self-ownership per se. The problem of how ownership of oneself extends out to ownership of natural resources has plagued all ownership-based libertarian theories. >Natural resources/Libertarianism.
Gaus I 229
2) Injustice: The second problem internal to ownership-based libertarianism is what to do about past injustices. Libertarianism is widely interpreted as advocating a change to a laissez-faire system with government functions limited to minimal taxes for police, defence, and a court system. This interpretation, however, is a mistake for the majority of libertarian theories. Although right libertarians do believe such minimal government is ideal when there has been no injustice, current holdings of goods and land are not morally legitimate under libertarianism if they have come about as a result of past injustices. Given that such past injustices are systemic to any current society, libertarians have difficulty justifying any move towards a more minimal state, unless they can specify some way of recognizing and rectifying past injustices first. >Inequlities/Nozick.
1. Kukathas, Chandran (2003) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press.
3. Machan, Tibor R. (1989) Individuals and their Rights. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
4. Machan, Tibor R. and Douglas B. Rasmussen eds (1995) Liberty for the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
5. Narveson, Jan (1989) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic
Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications
Gerald F. Gaus
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
|Society||Market Anarchism||Gaus I 119
Society/Market Anarchism/Gaus/Mack: Members of the liberty tradition attracted to anarchistic solutions thus endorse competitive providers of legal and police services. As in the market generally, competition between providers of judgements and enforcement will tend to produce high-quality goods; in this case, a high-quality good of impartial, efficient umpiring of conflicting rights claims. People will gravitate to impartial judging services for a variety of reasons. Verdicts from partial or unreliable judges will be apt to be resisted by others, and private enforcement agents will not seek to execute them, knowing that they are likely to be biased and, so, opposed by those who are found guilty or liable by them (Barnett, 1998). Market rivalry in the production and sale of protective services will motivate not merely price competition but also the discovery and production of new and better modes of law and rights protection. Law: Desirable positive law will emerge as the articulated rights and rules that protective agencies will provide in order to satisfy consumer demand. As with other dimensions of desirable social order, claims the market anarchist, desirable positive law is more likely to be the product of market (or market-like) processes than of political processes.
Political power: In the world of the market anarchist, politics as we know it - including law that arises through legislation– completely withers away. The complete elimination of the political is a better yet alternative to eternal vigilance towards political power (...).
Market AnarchismVsMinimal State theory: an aspiring competitor who proposes to sell services very much like those offered by the minimal state is proposing to deploy his resources in ways which the champions of the minimal state cannot honestly claim are impermissible and subject to coercive suppression. The champions of the monopolistic provider called ‘government’ must themselves recognize that its suppression of these competitive endeavours would be criminal.
1. Barnett, Randy E. (1998) The Structure of Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon.
Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.
Gerald F. Gaus
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004