Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Common Sense Mill
 
Books on Amazon
Rawls I 304
Common Sense/Mill/Rawls: die Maximen der Gerechtigkeit können nicht allein auf den Common Sense gegründet werden: Bsp Löhne sollen jedem
I 305
nach seinem Einsatz und seinem Beitrag gezahlt werden. Das sind für sich genommen widersprüchliche Verfügungen! Man kann sie auch nicht gegeneinander gewichten. (J. St. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. V, par. 30.) RawlsVsMill: daraus folgt aber nicht, dass man den Utilitarismus als Lösung braucht, wie Mill anscheinend glaubte.
Bsp eine Firma, die Mitarbeiter braucht, muss auch in die Ausbildung der Minderqualifizierten investieren, um ihren eigenen Interessen zu nützen. Dabei entstehen ihr später noch höhere Kosten, weil sie den Mitarbeitern dann höhere Löhne zahlen müssen.
I 307
Common Sense/RawlsVsMill: Keine der Maximen des Common sense kann in den Rang eines Prinzips der Gerechtigkeit erhoben werden. Jede würde zu einer Verzerrung führen.
I 308
Das hat mit den Ineffizienzen des Markts zu tun. (Siehe Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, (Cambridge, 1962) pp. 434f.)

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Descriptions Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 348
Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names - MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental - VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself" - solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. ---
I 378
Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions - shortened description. ---
I 396
Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object - "original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on - problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so - Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location - E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest - (s) and "this mountain" is not a property.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ethics Mackie
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 169
Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error.
The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties).
Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically).
---
Stegm IV 173
Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong?
---
IV 179
Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. ---
Stegm IV 280
Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . - Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense.
Stegmüller IV 263
Moral/Ethik/Mill: glaubte an allmähliche Veränderung der menschlichen Natur in Richtung auf eine "allgemeine Menschenliebe" - StephenVsMill: "unparteiische Nächstenliebe" könnte auch zum Stalinismus führen - Mackie dito - MackieVsMill.
IV 269
Freiheit/Mill/Stegmüller: These: Die einzige Berechtigung für einen Eingriff in die Freiheit anderer besteht in der Verhinderung der Beschädigung anderer - MackieVsMIll: zu schwach - Gedankenfreiheit kann damit nicht begründet werden -. Statt dessen: "Prinzip des legitimen Eingreifens".

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Experience James
 
Books on Amazon
Suhr I 93
Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled word": like "life" and "history". ---
Diaz-Bone I 55
Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories.
---
I 59
Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere.


Dew I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 2016

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Forces Cartwright
 
Books on Amazon
I 59
Composition / causes / forces / Physics / Cartwright: E.g. mix of electromagnetics and gravity. - Vector addition: is a calculation! - It is not nature, what "adds" the forces - because the "component forces" are not there! - MillVs: the partial forces exist. - CartwrightVsMill: Partial forces do not exist - not even - "partial movement towards the north and the east" where the body moves to the northeast. - I 61 solution / Cartwright: we have to give up the "facts-view": In the vector addition causal forces are added - no physical forces - then not "behavior" of the body, but "ability" to behave" - problem: so easily the "facts" cannot be abandoned.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Functionalism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
---
I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. ---
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. ---
I 233f
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance). ---
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action. ---
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer. ---
I 269
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) ---
III 24
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Functions Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer. - E.g. heart has no function, which would be added to its causal relations - brain: by elimination of the level of the deep unconscious, 1. the "physical causation" dissolves into nothing. ---
I 267
The normative component is in the eye of the beholder - the connection of mental content does not need to have a mental content itself - (e.g. delusions). ---
III 24
Function/Searle: always precedes the object: we do not perceive a table simply as an object -> objet ambigu - but nature does not know of functions. ---
III 25
It is nature immanent, that the heart pumps blood, but immanent is the flow, merely attributed to the function - function only in a system of previous value allocations - there, no other facts are detected than causal facts. ---
III 26
Larry Wright: if Z is the function of X, then 1. there is X, because there is Z, 2. Z is a consequence of that there is X - SearleVs: that would eliminate the observer relativity of the function. ---
III 27
Function/SearleVsMillikan: functions are always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: functions arose evolutionary - SearleVs: so we can introduce everything and call it relevant - does not explain the normative component of functions - old dilemma: either only raw causal relations - or real "functional" function. ---
III 50
Animals can assign functions to objects.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Grice Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 52
Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. their literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function.
Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below).
Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding.
Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements.
Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener.
Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions!
Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction.
Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction.
Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction.
Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general.
---
I 53
Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. ---
I 63
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". ---
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things.
In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
---
I 65
VsMillikan: you could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking.
E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!"
A similar example is given by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Imagination Mill
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf II 11
VsMill: ideas (and imagination) cannot explain names, as they are not intersubjectively accessible. Always new ideas, but not always new names.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Life Mill
 
Books on Amazon
Singer I 92
Life/Intelligence/Value/Mill: no intelligent human being would want to swap with an animal, not even if it could swap satisfaction for it: no intelligent and sentient person would swap with a non-sensory and empty-headed human being. It is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a happy pig. The reason is that further developed people are able to see both sides.
VsMill/Peter Singer: many critics have questioned this: does Socrates really know what it is like to be an idiot? ((s) See bat example).
Can a wise human being experience the simple pleasures of an uneducated human?
UtilitarianismVsMill/P. Singer: Mill's point of view is difficult to reconcile with hedonistic utilitarianism: the idiot is satisfied, Socrates is not.
---
I 93
Preference Utilitarianism: whether it can be reconciled with Mill's view depends on how different preferences are weighed against each other.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998

Numbers Mill
 
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Thiel I 15
Numbers/John Stuart Mill: mathematical objects, especially the numbers, are abstractions taken from concrete experience, that is, the most general properties or characteristics of reality. By generalizing the observation, we arrive at definitions for mathematical objects. They express facts about the totality of physical objects. (Mill: "aggregates"). Each proposition based on this asserts that a definite totality could have been formed by combining certain other totals, or by withdrawing them.
Each numeral sign "2", "3", etc. denotes for Mill a physical phenomenon, a property which belongs to the totality of things that we describe with the numeral signs.
---
I 16
FregeVsMill: drastic counterexamples: Doubtfulness in the case of 0 and 1, but also for very large numbers. Who should have ever observed the fact for the definition of 777 865? Mill could have defended himself. That his position seems to be more suited to the justification of our number and form than for the justification of arithmetic.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Political Representation Mill
 
Books on Amazon
Rawls I 232
Politische Repräsentation/Gerechtigkeit/Mill/Rawls: Mill vertrat die Ansicht, intelligente und gebildetere Personen mehr Stimmrecht (extra votes) erhalten sollten, damit ihre Meinung einen größeren Einfluss bekämen. (Siehe J. St. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in Representative Government, ed. R. B: McCallum, Oxford, 1946, pp. 216-222.) Rawls: Mill glaubte, dass dies mit der natürlichen Ordnung des menschlichen Lebens übereinstimmte. Dies sei im Interesse aller und entspräche dem menschlichen Sinn für Gerechtigkeit. Das sollte allerdings nicht bis zu einer Klassengesetzgebung zu ihren Gunsten gehen. Idealerweise sollten die Klügeren auf der Seite des Rechs stehen und in kritischen Fragen den Ausschlag geben. Mill war überzeugt, dass jedermann davon profitieren würde, einschließlich derjenigen, die dadurch weniger stark vertreten wären.
RawlsVsMill: ich will ihn hier nicht kritisieren. Seine Einstellung ist aber ein Beispiel dafür, warum, politische Gleichheit manchmal als geringerwertig gegenüber den anderen Freiheiten angesehen wird.


Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Predicates Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 109
Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... ---
I 110
...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap").
2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s)> disjunction, disjunctive).
Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself.
---
I 111
3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. ---
I 227
Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.
E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back".
Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject.
Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal.
Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities.
---
I 228
External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. ---
I 272
Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: Particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain.
Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others.
Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain.
No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time).
MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Preference Utilitarianism Singer
 
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Peter Singer
I 13
Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics.
Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community.
---
I 14
Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here.
---
I 80
Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future.
---
I 81
This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future). ---
I 81
Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others.

Sing I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

Sing II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Principles Rawls
 
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I 4
Principles/Society/Rawls:
1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice.
2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so.
---
I 7
Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. ---
I 10/11
Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice.
I 41
Prinzipien/MillVsIntuitionismus/Mill/Rawls: Mill argumentierte, dass das Nützlichkeitsprinzip das einige oberste Prinzip sein könne, da es sonst keinen Schiedsrichter zwischen konkurrierenden Kriterien geben könne. (Mill, A System of Logic, bk VI, ch. XII, sec 7, und Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers.26-31). Prinzipien/Sidgwick: das Nützlichkeitsprinzip sei das einzige, das diese Rolle einnehmen kann. (Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV chs. II und III).
Rawls: das ist, es, was die klassische Doktrin so attraktiv machte: dass sie das Problem der Prioritäten zu lösen versucht und den Intuitionismus vermeidet.
RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarismus: wir müssen erkennen, dass es möglicherweise keinen Weg gibt, um die Pluralität der verschiedenen Prinzipien aufzulösen.
I 43
Prinzipien/Rawls: ich schlage vor, selbst bei der „lexikalischen Ordnung (dem stückweise Abarbeiten von Prinzipien nach einer äußerlichen Ordnung) das Prinzip der gleichen Verteilung von Rechten vorrangig vor dem Regeln von wirtschaftlichen oder sozialen Ungleichheiten zu behandeln.
I 61
Prinzipien/Gerechtigkeit/Rawls: vorläufige Formulierung: 1. Jede Person muss das gleiche Recht auf weitest gehende grundlegende Freiheit haben, soweit sie mit gleicher Freiheit für andere kompatibel ist.
2. Soziale und ökonomische Ungleichheiten sind so zu arrangieren, dass sie
a) vernünftig erwartbar zu jedermanns Vorteil sind und
b) mit Positionen und Verwaltungsvorgängen verknüpft sind, die von jedermann inne gehabt werden können.
Zeitlich werden die beiden Prinzipien nacheinander angewendet. Das bedeutet, dass ein Aufgeben des ersten Prinzips nicht durch größere soziale oder wirtschaftliche Vorteile aufgewogen werden kann.
I 62
Abweichungen von einer Gleichverteilung von sozialen Rechten oder wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen kann nur dadurch gerechtfertigt werden, dass dies für jedermann von Vorteil ist. ((s) Das ist eine Anlehnung an den Utilitarismus).
I 63
Die zeitliche Reihenfolge der Befolgung schließt auch aus, dass grundlegende Freiheiten gegen wirtschaftliche Vorteile eingetauscht werden können.
I 64
Ebenso bedeutet die zeitliche Reihenfolge der Prinzipien, dass von Personen immer nur in Form von Inhabern sozialer Rollen die Rede sein kann.
I 83
Prinzipien/Rawls: Neuformulierung des Zweiten Prinzips: Soziale und ökonomische Ungleichheit sind so zu arrangieren, dass sie a) den größten Nutzen für die am schlechtesten Gestellten und b) mit Verwaltungseinrichtungen und Positionen darin verknüpft sind, die allen unter Bedingungen einer fairen Chancengleichheit offen sind.
I 89
Ich gehe davon aus, dass die beiden Teile des Prinzips lexikalisch geordnet sind.
I 116
Prinzipien/Rawls: es ist nichts Inkonsistentes daran, dass Gerechtigkeit als Fairness unbedingte Prinzipien ermöglicht. Es genügt zu zeigen, dass die Parteien in der Ausgangssituation (einer zu errichtenden Gesellschaft) Prinzipien zustimmen, die die natürlichen Pflichten definieren, die dann unbedingt gelten. ((s)VsRawls: Widerspruch: Rawls sagt selbst, dass die natürlichen Pflichten Bsp nicht grausam zu sein, nicht Gegenstand von Vereinbarungen sind. (Siehe Rawls I 114).
I 250
Prinzipien/Gerechtigkeit/Rawls: Neuformulierung im Lichte der Berücksichtigung kontingenter individueller und historischer Ungleichheiten: Erstes Prinzip: Jede Person muss ein gleiches Recht auf das umfassendste System gleicher Grundrechte haben, dass mit einem gleichen System von Freiheit für alle kompatibel ist.
Prioritätsregel: die Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit sind in lexikalischer Ordnung aufgebaut und daher kann Freiheit nur zum Wohl der Freiheit eingeschränkt werden. Hier gibt es zwei Fälle: a) eine weniger umfassende Freiheit muss die Freiheit des Gesamtsystem der Freiheit, das von allen geteilt wird, vergrößern, b) eine eingeschränkte Freiheit, muss für diejenigen akzeptierbar sein, die davon betroffen sind.
I 253
Prinzipien/Kategorischer Imperativ/Kant/Rawls: diese Prinzipien sind im Sinn von Kant ebenfalls Kategorische Imperative. Sie setzen keine bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse und keine individuellen Ziele voraus. Es wird nur ein Interesse an primären öffentlichen Gütern (z.B. Freiheit) vorausgesetzt. Die Präferenz für diese wiederum ist von allgemeinsten Annahmen über Rationalität und den Bedingungen des menschlichen Lebens hergeleitet.
I 302
Prinzipien/Rawls: endgültige Fassung für Institutionen/Rawls: die beiden Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit (s.o.) plus Prioritätsregeln: 1. Prioritätsregel: die Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit müssen in lexikalischer Reihenfolge abgearbeitet werden, sodass Freiheit nur zugunsten größerer Freiheit eingeschränkt werden darf. Zwei Fälle sind möglich: a) Eine eingeschränkte Freiheit muss das Gesamtsystem der Freiheiten stärken, die allen zugutekommen. b) Eine nicht gleiche Freiheit muss von denen akzeptiert werden können, die weniger Freiheiten genießen.
2. Prioritätsregel: (Gerechtigkeit geht vor Effizienz und Wohlstand): Das zweite Gerechtigkeitsprinzip ist lexikalisch vorrangig vor dem Prinzip der Effizienz und dem der Maximierung von Vorteilen,
I 303
Faire Chancengleichheit ist vorrangig gegenüber dem Differenzprinzip. Zwei Fälle sind möglich: a) Chancenungleichheit muss die Chancen der Benachteiligten vergrößern. b) Eine extreme Sparrate muss die Lasten der Betroffenen mindern. Allgemeine Konzeption: alle primären sozialen Güter (Freiheiten, Rechte, Einkommen, Wohlstand, die Voraussetzungen für Selbstachtung usw.) sind gleich zu verteilen, außer wenn eine ungleiche Verteilung einiger oder aller dieser Güter zum Vorteil der am wenigsten Begünstigen ist.#
I 446
Prinzipien/Rawls: während die Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit die sind, die in der Ausgangsposition gewählt werden, werden die Prinzipien der Rationalen Entscheidung oder der Rationalität gar nicht gewählt. Das führt zu der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Richtigen und dem Guten.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Proper Names Kripke
 
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I 36
Names have no sense, descriptions have a sense. ---
I 39
Name: different sense, the same meaning. Alexander was teacher and student... - facts are not part of the sense of the name. ---
I 59
Names are rigid designation expressions (descriptions are not). ---
I 81
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. Otherwise we could not understand any sentence in which Socrates appears if we do not know that Socrates means the individual who is called Socrates.
---
I 103
Description does not abbreviate the name - E.g. Even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel still refers to Goedel. ---
I 118
Russell: logical proper names: this: identity without empirical investigation, therefore logical proper names are the only real names. ---
I 136
Name for natural kinds: Gold: could turn out to be blue, but would still be gold (would retain existence). ---
I 145
Concepts for natural kinds: much more closely related to proper names than unusually assumed. ---
I 146
Kripke general names like "cat" do not express any property. ---
EMD II 362
Names/designate/KripkeVsWallace: not everything has to have a name - not every term is denoted - (> Frege every sentence is significant: ((s) all records with unicorn are false or without truth value). ---
Prior I 170
Names/Kripke: structureless - simple sentences are wrong if x does not exist. ---
Stalnaker I 172f
Names/Kripke: Reference is the designated object directly, without the mediation of sense - Frege/Dummett/Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the designated object - otherwise signing out would be inexplicable - learning a language cannot be explained.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Proper Names Searle
 
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John R. Searle
II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content. ---
II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events. ---
II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description. ---
II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular). ---
II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." ---
Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation. ---
Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". ---
V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. ---
V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein. ---
V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. ---
V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Reference Stalnaker
 
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I 177
Proposition/Sentence/Truth/knowledge/Identification/Evans: (1982, 31) E.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is - i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence.
I 180f
Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object: a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (>Kripke) - b) indirectly through our sensing (>Frege) and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things (IT) - Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion? - SearleVsMill: -direct Reference- (without intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties. - Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. - ((s) could have been different).

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Seeing Millikan
 
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I 244
Seeing-as/Seeing/Millikan: seeing-as seems to be a preliminary act of identification. N.B./Millikan/(s): seeing a three-dimensional object means to see an object with a back.
Image/Wittgenstein/Millikan: seeing a painted object is only an alleged seeing-as.
---
I 301
Seeing/Knowledge/Eye/Millikan: the lens of the eye automatically adjusts to sharpness. The function is now that the object, which diffuses rays, is once again bundled (composed) into an object in the eye. For this purpose, however, the organism first has to know when the eyes are focused on an object, i.e. it must know which object the world should look alike, (s)VsMillikan: then only adults could see.
General/Millikan: there must then be characteristics that characterize typical clear images of objects.
Learning/Psychology/Learning Psychology/Millikan: has recently shown that the hard wiring of such knowledge belongs to the conditions of learning.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Semantics Brandom
 
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I 297
Brandom's thesis: understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. ---
II 145
Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions). ---
II 146
Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics. - Epistemology is its suitable working area. ---
Newen I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics. - Justifying the correctness of e.g. "If A is located east of B, B is located west of A". - By the meaning of "west" and "east". ---
Newen I 162
West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski s truth concept too weak) - "correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Utility Mackie
 
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Stegmüller IV 211
Principle of utility /Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for every individual, then the general happiness is a good for the whole of all people. - MackieVsMill: the alleged evidence smuggles illegal assumptions - mankind is wrongly treated as a psychic subject - mankind as a whole is never faced with a choice.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977


The author or concept searched is found in the following 30 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Darwin, Ch. Mill Vs Darwin, Ch.
 
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Dennett I 695
Ethics / Dennett: Question: what are the consequences of the fact that we are acting under time pressure? (> Darwin: acting under time pressure). > MillVsDarwin
I 697
Darwin: it is the best for the people to follow their permanent pulses. Physics / Dennett: this is true, such as mathematics, throughout the universe (> Minsky). BarrowVs.
Darwinists VsMill: the representatives of the theory of utility (Mill) should bear in mind that when we are before a decision we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public.
I 698
MillVsDarwin: E.g. Nobody said, the art of navigation is not was based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings they take the finished work calculated at sea. So rational people lead their lives with ready opinions about right and wrong, and more difficult questions with ready opinions of smart and stupid. (> Internalisation). DennettVsMill: his system was highly impractical. In practice, we see many reasons, including those which we should not overlook.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Fodor, J. Brandom Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 731
BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle.
II 12
Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor.   BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states.
Esfeld I 71
FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below.
NS I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: kehrt die herkömmliche Semantik um. Statt wie die Semantik anzunehmen, dass die Korrektheit des Schlusses Bsp „Wenn Princeton östlich von Pittsburgh liegt, liegt Pittsburgh westlich von Princeton“ durch die Bedeutung von „östlich“ und „westlich“ zu begründen,
NS I 162
Führt er eine kopernikanische Wende durch: Brandom: These: „westlich“ und „östlich“ erhalten ihre Bedeutung gerade, weil sie in solchen Folgebeziehungen vorkommen. Das ganze Netz von Satzäußerungen, in denen die Worte vorkommen, und auch die entsprechenden Handlungen konstituieren den begrifflichen Gehalt der Worte.
Inferentialismus/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: sieht nicht Wahrheit und nicht Referenz als fundamentale bedeutungskonstituierende Einheiten an.
Korrektheit/Brandom: welche Folgerungen aus welchen Äußerungen korrekt sind, wird pragmatisch über die durch implizite Regeln geleitete soziale Praxis festgelegt.
Bedeutung/Holismus/Brandom: die Bedeutung von Begriffen und Äußerungen erwächst aus ihren inferentiellen Rollen zu anderen Begriffen und Äußerungen, daher sind sie nicht atomistisch sondern holistisch. (BrandomVsFodor).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Frege, G. Searle Vs Frege, G.
 
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John R. Searle
II 285
Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions.
II 286
Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege!
Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for.

II 301
The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation.
2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification.
3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress).
Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress..
II 303
Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words.

II 228
Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement.
III 229
Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not.
2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements.
Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation.

V 116
SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too).
V 117
Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself.
E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound!

V 144
SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition!
V 152
Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously
b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions.
Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Logic 2nd stage).

V 155
Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b).
Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms.
V 156
Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property!
V 172
Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression.
V 173
2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals.
4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals.
5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions.

V 256
Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions.
To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star.
They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Grice, P.H. Millikan Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 3
Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc.
Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed).
Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized.
Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given.
Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin.
Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use).
I 4
Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use.
Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity".
Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects.
I 5
Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use.
belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language.

I 51
quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped".
I 52
Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between
1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. its literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function.
literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below).
Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding.

I 61
Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions.
I 62
Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs.
I 63
2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth.
Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it!
Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things.
Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
I 65
VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking.
Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!"
There is a similar Ex by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop.
I 66
Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative.
((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones).
generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes
"Usually: if A then B" and also:
"Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)"
rational: then would follow that John had to believe.
a) "usual: if A then C" and
b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases.
1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B.
2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C.
I 67
Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C.
Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C?
Millikan: we assume that he has to.
Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing:
"Usually, if D, then C" etc.
Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying?

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Hume, D. James Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 55
JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas.   James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories.
I 57
VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Kant, I. Frege Vs Kant, I.
 
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III 30
HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature!
III 30
Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious.
III 41
Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds
III 42
Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!.
III 43
A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity.
III 120
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
III 121
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts!.
IV 61
Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic.
I 119
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 120
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection.
I 121
The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.
Stepanians I 34
Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics.
Stepanians I 34
pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view.
I 36
Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic.
Newen I21
Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical.
Quine X 93
Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory.
Tugendhat II 12
"Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kripke, S. A. Searle Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wolf II 30
Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality.
Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions.

Searle II 292
SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception.
II 293
By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular.
II 294
Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose".
According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for?
Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all.
II 295
Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island?
II 296
Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory.
II 346
A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception.
Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content.
II 297
But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection.
II 298
E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory.
II 346
The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition.
II 300
E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses.
Searle IV 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks.
IV 179/180
Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker.
The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention.
IV 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary.
There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent.

Stalnaker I 173
SearleVsKripke: (1969, 93) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation
I 174
SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (1969,80) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense".
I 175
And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that.
Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object.
Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Verschiedene Vs Kripke, S. A. Wolf II 232
Identity/Schmidentity/VsKripke: einige haben behauptet, dass Identität nicht die Relation sein kann, die zwischen jedem Ding und ihm selbst und nur da besteht, weil das nicht die nontriviality von Identitätsaussagen erklären könnte. Kripke: "Test": wenn eine hypothetische Sprache diese Relation enthält und dieselben Probleme erzeugt werden, ist das keine Widerlegung dessen, dass "identisch mit" im Englischen für dieselbe Relation steht.

Stalnaker I 175
VsCausal Theory/Namen/VsKripke/Stalnaker: wurde für ihre Vagheit kritisiert. Man müsste noch die Art der kausalen Verbindung spezifizieren, Kripke: Thesis: er habe keine reduktionistische Analyse der Referenz geliefert, sondern nur ein alternatives Bild.
I 176
Kripke/Stalnaker: artikuliert eigentlich nur die naive Antwort, ohne die Details. VsMillsche Semantik/: ich werde ein Argument für die Unmöglichkeit einer Semantik, die den Referenten ohne zwischengeschalteten Sinn herausgreift untersuchen, das die beiden Fragen trennt und untersuchen, wo es Schwächen hat.
VsMill/VsKripke/Stalnaker: ein Argument VsMill behauptet, dass nicht jede wohldefinierte Sprache die Sprache einer Gemeinschaft sein kann. Z.B. so:
Sprache/VsMill/VsKripke: wenn die Semantik korrekt ist, müssen die Sprecher wissen, was sie sagen. Es mag sein, dass sie in Einzelfällen Wörter gebrauchen, die sie selbst nicht verstehen, aber
1.
a) wenn man gar nicht weiß, was man sagt, kann man auch nicht meinen was man sagt und b) wenn man das was Leute in einer Gemeinschaft sagen korrekt darstellt, muss man sagen, dass die Leute im allgemeinen meinen was sie sagen.
I 177
2. es könnte sein, dass wir einen semantischen Wert feststellen können ohne zu wissen was der Wert ist, sogar, dass niemand weiß, was der Wert ist.





K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Metalanguage Prior Vs Metalanguage
 
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I 100
Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences
b) a translation of every sentence of the given language.
Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (?), then its sentences are their own translation!
Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form:
x is true iff. p
"x": represents the name in the metalanguage.
"p": represents the translation.
Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage.
That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski.
In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language.
Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc.
This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc.
((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.)
Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory.
Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense.
We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences.
I 144
Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance.
Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill.
Names/Mill: a) singular ones
b) general ones
each . "connotative ones", . not connotative ones. (Special character).
General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative.
PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote".
Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red").
But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things!
I 145
Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it.
Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing.
Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily.
Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it.
Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory.
Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. >Peirce, verbs!
Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs.
Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects.
The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes.
Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs!
E.g. "every man runs':
I 146
here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person".
Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative".
Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate.
E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate.
Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verb).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Mill, J. St. Dennett Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Dennett I 697
Ethics/Dennett: Question: What consequences result from the fact that we are acting under time pressure? (> Darwin: acting under time pressure). > MillVsDarwin Dennett I 695 Darwin: it is best for the human to follow their permanent impulses. Physics/Dennett: true, like mathematics, in the entire universe (> Minsky). BarrowVs.
Darwin’s followers VsMill: the representatives of utility theory (Mill) should keep in mind that we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public when facing a decision.
Dennett I 698
MillVsDarwin: No one asserts that the art of navigation is not based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings, they take the finished calculated work to sea. This way, rational people lead their lives with ready-made opinions about right and wrong and the more difficult questions of wise and foolish. (Internalization). DennettVsMill: this covered the fact that his system was highly impractical. In practice, we overlook many reasons, even those that we should not overlook.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Mill, J. St. Dummett Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Stalnaker I 179
Mere Knowledge/Mere knowledge/Reference/DummettVsKripke/DummettVsMill/Stalnaker: Dummett states the impossibility of a "bare knowledge of reference". Def Mere Reference/Mere Knowledge/Dummett (1991, 127) mere reference of the name a would be the knowledge of an object, the fact that a refers to it, which would, however, be a complete characterization of the determined knowledge. Stalnaker: this could be identified with knowing a certain proposition. - A proposition which is true iff a particular individual is the reference of the name a.
Dummett/Stalnaker: his argument for the impossibility of the bare reference corresponds to Searles principle of identification.
Principle of Identification/Searle/Stalnaker: We have no knowledge of a thing, that it has a certain property F, if we do not have the ability to describe the object or identify it.
Propositional Knowledge/Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: stronger: for every true knowing-what attribution: there must be a true propositional knowledge, the contents of which are a non-singular proposition which makes the method of identifying explicit and contains the knowing-what attribution: an attribution of propositional knowledge on which the knowing-what attribution rests. ((s), the object must be described by a second indication apart from only the attribution by the name in question. A second property except the name in question. Therefore, you need non-singular propositions).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Mill, J. St. Frege Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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III 33
Numbers/Mill: initially, like Leibniz, wants to base everything on definitions. Numbers/FregeVsMill: he spoils everything, because he considers every science as empirical. This is not possible in the case of numbers.
 What in the world is to be thought of the physical fact that corresponds to the number 777 864?
 Too bad that Mill cannot show the physical facts which would correspond to 0 and 1.
III 34
Calculate/Mill: does not follow from the definitions, but from the observed fact. FregeVsMill: where could Leibniz have relied upon a fact in the above definition?
Mill overlooks, like Leibniz, the gap caused by the elimination of the brackets.
Laws: in them, E.g. the peculiarity of the number 1000 000 = 999 999 + 1 is lost.
Equation/Addition/Calculating/Numbers/Mill: asserts: the equation 1 = 1 could be wrong, because one pound piece does not always have exactly the weight of the other.
III 37
Calculating/Numbers/Addition/FregeVsMill: the sentence 1 = 1 does not want to say that at all! Mill understands the sign "+" in a way that is should express the relationship of the parts of a physical object or a heap to the whole, but that is not the sense of the plus sign.  Mill always confuses applications with the purely arithmetical proposition itself. Addition does not correspond to a physical relationship.
III 52
Number/Mill: "the name of a number designates a property which belongs to the aggregate of things that we call by that name." This property is the characteristic manner in which the assembly is composed and divisible. " FregeVsMill: there is more than one "characteristic way". (>Intension).
III 55
FregeVsMill: there is no physical difference between "a pair of boots" and "two boots".
Kripke I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: in reality, a proper name, which is used properly, is only an abbreviated or disguised description.
Read III 158
Names: if there was no criterion for recognition, names could not stand for an object. (FregeVsMill): this is wrong about Mill’s connotation-less explanation of names. (Russell openly admitted that there was a difficulty in identifying real names).
Stepanians I 34
Pure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is no sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses.

Thiel I 16
FregeVsMill: drastic counter-examples: doubtfulness in the case of 0 and 1, but also for very large numbers. Who should ever have observed the fact for the definition of the number 777 865? Mill could have defended himself. That his position seems to be more suitable for the justification of our number and perception of form than for the justification of arithmetic.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Mill, J. St. Husserl Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 21
Mill: Logic as an art science of thought is an empirical regularity of thinking, the development of a thought process. This is identical to the laws of psychology.
I 22
HusserlVsMill: the contemplation of thought processes leads at best to observations of how the thinking functions under specific conditions. Also the scheme true / false is not to be found by the mere observation of events.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Mill, J. St. James Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 55
JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in intellectual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions that generate ideas by acting on the organism.   James: This "determinism" explains well the feelings of the details, but not the experience of wills, emotional states, rationality, memories.
Mill, J. St. Kripke Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Kripke I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill:Fallacy: in reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only an abbreviated or disguised description.
I 81
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. We could otherwise understand any sentence in which "Socrates" is used if we do not know that "Socrates" means "the individual who is called ’Socrates’".
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: Description. Non-connotative: proper name.
I 145
But Mill: All names for general types are connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties which specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a human being: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Mill, J. St. Putnam Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 215
Knowledge/Metaphysics/realism/Putnam: would I dare to be a metaphysician, I would probably create a system in which there is nothing but obligations. Metaphysical fundamentally would be what we should do, say, think. Then all the "facts" would be "values". (> extreme pragmatism).
I would be obliged to think that there is a chair when the epistemic conditions are good enough.
VsMill: the chair would not be a "permanent possibility of sensations" but a "permanent possibility of obligations". (This would also be the "sense data").
But I am not so daring.
Description/Putnam: the reverse tendency would be to reduce everything to description or eliminate it, which is absurd.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Mill, J. St. Russell Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Bertrand Russell
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: error: in reality, a proper name that is used correctly, is only an abbreviated or disguised designation.
---
Kripke I 36
Mill: "singular names": connotative: characteristic. Non-connotative: proper names.
---
I 145
But Mill: all names for general types connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties, which specify necessary and sufficient conditions for the being-a-human: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: wrong with general names, correct with singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: correct with singular names, wrong in general names. Maybe some general names express ("foolish", "fat", "yellow") properties. General names like "cow" and "tiger" do not, unless being a cow, counts in a trivial way as a property . (> properties).
---
I 145
Strand: Kripke general names such as "cat" express no property.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Mill, J. St. Searle Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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John R. Searle
V 144
SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names were "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative".
V 247
Names/SearleVsMill: (Mill: proper names have no sense). E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma can be used to make geographical, not only lexicographical assertions.
Had proper names however no sense, no information could be transmitted by that! Then there were no more information than in the sentence Everest = Everest. (This is Frege's argument against Mill).

Stalnaker I 181
SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference" without intermediary sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his view of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and it's properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt, real or alleged characteristics to transmit a language to the world. ((s)> also Kant like Searle).
Searle: you cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him.
Stalnaker: there can be no good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Mill, J. St. Strawson Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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IV 170
Definition Cause/Mill: "epitome of all conditions, positive and negative, taken together, unity of all contingencies of any kind, in whose realization the consequens follows inevitably". StrawsonVsMill: we have no prospect and also no interest to explore all that.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Mill, J. St. Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 349
Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative".
Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute.
Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself."
TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself.
His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object.
I 350
Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves.
It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation.
I 352
Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially.
I 353
Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense.
I 354
TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense.
2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart.
I 355
However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Substitutes).
I 356
3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty Dumpty Theory).

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Mill, J. St. Mackie Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Stegmüller IV 209
VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (even U.) concedes that utilitarian theories often fail due to the vagueness and diversity of conceptions of justice. Mill: still, the utility principle has the same sanctions available as all other moral norms.
MackieVsMIll: that is empirically false: violationy of the common good upset us far more than violations of special rules of justice.
Rule-Utilitarianism: more indirect than U.: two stages: (Austin):
IV 210
1. The benchmark of our rules should be usefulness 2. The benchmark of our actions should be the rules.
Puts the rules far more to the fore and draws on utility only to justify the rules.
These rules do not need to be explicit.
VsRule-Utilitarianism: all problems of utilitarianism return on a higher level of abstraction.
IV 211
Utilitarianism/Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for each individual, then general happiness is a good for the totality of all people. Utilitarianism/MackieVsMill: the alleged proof sneaks in ineligible premises.
The entirety of human kind is falsely treated as a psychological subject. Humanity never has a choice. (IV 225)
IV 212
Fallacy: from "everyone" to "all". In addition, in the transition from the individual to society, instead of subjectivism an objectivism of values (Wertobjektivismus) is introduced.

IV 263
Morality/ethics/Mill: Thesis: believed in a gradual change of human nature toward "universal human kindness". J. F. StephenVsMill: that's "transcendental Utilitarianism": a person animated by "impartial charity" might behave in a Stalinist way. Anything can be used to justify violence.
Mackie dito.
IV 264
Morality/ethics/Mackie: must refer to anthropological conditions: different ideals require general (common) principles.
IV 265
The rejection of objective values includes rejection of objective rights. Consequence: special rights cannot be deduced a priori from general reasons.
IV 269
MackieVsMill: his utilitarian concept of justification is shaky: the "principle of non-intervention" would be better justified differently:
IV 270
via the conception of the good for human kind. Good/MackieVsMill: 1. not everyone is able to always correctly assess their own good.
2. Mill's principle is too weak. Ex. freedom of thought, freedom of speech. Both cannot be justified by Mills principle alone!
Mackie: instead, we need a "principle of legitimate intervention."




Stegmüller IV 209
VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (selbst U.) gesteht zu, dass utilitarian theories oft an der Vagheit und Verschiedenheit der Auffassungen von Gerechtigkeit scheitern. Mill: dennoch stehen dem Nützlichkeitsprinzip dieselben Sanktionen zur Verfügung wie allen anderen moralischen Normen.
MackieVsMIll: das ist empirisch falsch: Verletzungen des Allgemeinwohls erregen unser Empfinden weit stärker als Verletzungen spezieller Regeln der Gerechtigkeit.

Rule-Utilitarianism: indirekter als der U.: zwei Stufen: (Austin):
IV 210
1. Maßstab unserer Regeln soll die Nützlichkeit sein 2. Maßstab unserer Handlungen seien die Regeln.
Stellt die Regeln weit stärker in den Vordergrund und greift auf Nützlichkeit nur zur Rechtfertigung der Regeln zurück.
Diese Regeln brauchen nicht explizit zu sein.
VsRule-Utilitarianism: alle Probleme des utilitarianism kehren auf einer höheren Abstraktionsstufe wieder.
IV 211
Nützlichkeitsprinzip/Mill: Übergang vom individualistischen zum universalistischen Hedonismus. Wenn Glück für jeden Einzelnen ein Gut ist, dann ist das allgemeine Glück ein Gut für die Gesamtheit aller Menschen. Nützlichkeitsprinzip/MackieVsMill: der angebliche Beweis schmuggelt unzulässige Prämissen ein.
Die Gesamtheit der Menschen wird fälschlich als psychisches Subjekt behandelt Die Menschheit steht niemals vor einer Wahl. (IV 225)
IV 212
Fehlschluss: von "jeder" auf "alle". Außerdem wird hier beim Übergang vom Individuum zur Gesellschaft anstelle des Subjektivismus ein "Wertobjektivismus" eingeschmuggelt.

IV 263
Moral/Ethik/Mill: Thesis: glaubte an allmähliche Veränderung der menschlichen Natur in Richtung auf eine "allgemeine Menschenliebe". J. F. StephenVsMill: das ist "transzendentaler Utilitarianism": ein von "unparteiischer Nächstenliebe" beseelte Person könnte sich stalinistisch verhalten. Alles kann zur Rechtfertigung jeglicher Gewaltanwendung herangezogen werden.
Mackie dito.
IV 264
Moral/Ethik/Mackie: muss sich an anthropologischen Rahmenbedingungen ausrichten: unterschiedliche Ideale bedürfen allgemeiner (gemeinsamer) Prinzipien.
IV 265
Die Zurückweisung objektiver Werte schließt die Ablehnung in sich bestehender Rechte ein. Folge: spezielle Rechte lassen sich nicht a priori aus allgemeinen Gründen herleiten.
IV 269
MackieVsMill: sein utilitaristisches Begründungskonzept steht auf wackligen Füßen: das "Prinzip des Nichteingreifens" ließe sich besser anders begründen:
IV 270
durch die Auffassung vom Guten für den Menschen. Gut/MackieVsMill: 1. nicht alle können ihr eigenes Wohl immer richtig einschätzen.
2. Mills Prinzip ist zu schwach. Bsp Gedankenfreiheit, Redefreiheit. Beide lassen sich durch Mills Prinzip allein nicht begründen!
Mackie: statt dessen brauche wir ein "Prinzip des legitimen Eingreifens".

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Mill, J. St. Cartwright Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 38
Objective probability/VsCartwright: It might be objected that the partitioning on irrelevant factors would do no damage, once all factors are fixed. "True prob"/Cartwright: = objective prob? Relative frequency/RelFreq/Cartwright: is not the same as objective prob. Simpson’s Paradox/Solution/VsCartwright: We can certainly always find a third factor, but normally we do are not dealing with finite frequencies, but with objective prob. Objective prob/VsCarwright: if you do not extract it from finite data, no apparent correlations will come about.
I 60
Vector addition/Cartwright: according to this view, two forces (gravitational force, or electromagnetic force) are produced, but none of them exists. Composition of forces/Causes/MillVsCartwright: he would deny that both do not exist: According to him, both exist as part of the resulting effect. E.g. two forces in different directions. "Partial forces". CartwrightVsMill: there are no "partial forces". Events may have temporal parts, but there are no parts of the kind that Mill describes, e.g. one northwards and one eastwards, with the object not moving neither north nor east, but to the northeast. I 59 CartwrightVsMill: Problem: then it is vital for the laws to have the same form, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the composition. And that’s not possible! It is not possible if the laws are intended to describe the actual behavior of concrete object.
I 70
Def Super-Law/Explanation/Law/Circumstances/Terminology/Mill/Cartwright: in the case of E.g. Coulomb’s law and the law of gravity, we can simply put an increasingly complex antecedent in front of it to grasp the situation and thus explain what is happening. Mill: that is possible in mechanics, but not in chemistry. This explains why chemistry is not a deductive or demonstrative discipline. This presupposes the covering-law approach. CartwrightVsSuper law/CartwrightVsMill: 1) Super laws are not always available; if we do not describe everything exactly, we lose our understanding of what is happening. And we explain without knowing super laws. We need a philosophical explanation for why these explanations are good. 2) Super laws may often not even be a good explanation. This is an old objection Vscovering laws. E.g. why does the quail in my garden shake its head? Because all quails do this.
I 71
Equally E.g. "All carbon atoms have five energy levels" explains nothing. 3) Certainly, covering laws are explanatory for complex cases. In particular, if the antecedent of the law does not precisely grasp the components of the individual situation, but provides a more abstract description.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Mill, J. St. Wolf Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Wolf II 11
WolfVsMill: 1. unbefriedigend: der Name bezeichnet den Gegenstand zu jedem Zeitpunkt, die Vorstellung ist aber zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt und in einer bestimmten Perspektive gegeben. Andere Autoren haben deswegen von einer "nicht-anschaulichen Vorstellung" gesprochen. Das ist unklar.
VsMill: Vorstellungen können Namen nicht erklären, da sie nicht intersubjektiv zugänglich sind. Immer neue Vorstellungen, aber nicht immer neue Namen.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Mill, J. St. Burks Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Wolf II 139
Kennzeichnung/Bedeutung/Burks: die meisten Menschen haben kein vollständiges Wissen und wenden die Zeichen dennoch richtig an. Namen/Bedeutung/Burks: da Namen im Allgemeinen mehrere Bedeutungen (Gegenstände) haben, gibt es kein wesentliches Prädikat.
Einige Prädikate mögen kausal wichtiger sein als andere.
Jedenfalls besteht eine eventuell wesentliche Eigenschaft nicht in einer Konjunktion von Eigenschaften!
Jedes Gegebene Bezeichnete besitzt mehr Eigenschaften als diejenigen, auf die mit seinem Eigennamen (bzw. Kennzeichnung) Bezug genommen wird.
II 140
Kennzeichnung/Bedeutung/Burks: Bsp "Dieser braune Tisch war gestern rot" ist kein Widerspruch: die Beschreibung ist sowieso nicht vollständig. Namen/Bedeutung/Mill: die Eigenschaft, auf deren Grundlage ein Name zugeordnet wird, ist nicht Bestandteil der Bedeutung. sonst würden wir den Namen abschaffen, wenn das Ding die Eigenschaft verliert.
Namen/token/BurksVsMill: verschiedene Vorkommnisse desselben Namenstyps haben häufig verschiedene Bedeutung, aber bezeichnen stets dasselbe.
II 141
Name/Existenz/Bedeutung/Burks: eine Beschreibung könnte eine Bedeutung haben und dennoch nichts bezeichnen.
II 142
Natürlich könnte man festsetzen, dass ein Ausdruck nur dann ein Name ist, wenn er wirklich ein Bezeichnetes hat, aber dann hängt die Frage von empirischen Tatsachen ab und nicht von rein sprachlichen Überlegungen. Burks: "Name" sollte eine rein grammatische Kategorie sein.
Abkürzung/Burks: eigenartig: für "dieser Zeitpunkt" gibt es eine Abkürzung: "jetzt",
nicht aber für "dieser Hut".

Burks I
A. W. Burks
Chance, Cause, Reason 1977

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Millikan, R. Brandom Vs Millikan, R.
 
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Millikan I 109
Subjekt/Prädikat/Abbildung/Millikan: These: es gibt keinen Unterschied zwischen der Weise, in der logische Subjekte von Sätzen
I 110
die Welt abbilden und der Weise, wie dies logische Prädikate tun. 1. weil man Prädikate ersetzen kann durch andere Prädikate Bsp „...schwimmt“ durch „...fliegt“ sind sie noch lange nicht als Gegenstände anzusehen.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): Unterscheidung von Rahmen und Einsetzungs-“Lücke“).
2. Frage: müssen Prädikate Universalien entsprechen, wenn wir sie behandeln wie Substanzen? Jedenfalls müssen wir sie nicht als Einzeldinge ansehen, sondern wie die Tradition als Gedankenobjekte oder als Möglichkeiten.
Universale/Millikan: Universalien als Gedankenobjekte; sind sie in der Natur?
Prädikate/Millikan: jedes einfache Prädikat muss eine historisch in der Natur verwurzelte Variabilität widerspiegeln ((s) >disjunkt, disjunktiv).
komplexe Prädikate/Millikan: auch sie sollen Variablen der Natur widerspiegeln, aber das müssen keine Etwasse (Dinge) sein.
Eigenschaft/Art/Millikan: haben nur einen Siedlungsraum: das ist die Natur selbst.
I 111
3. Relation/Eigenschaft/Millikan: als Varianten innerhalb von Tatsachen erhalten sie aus kausalen und erklärungsmäßigen Verbindungen Intentionalität! Dann müssen sie in der gleichen Weise in der Natur sein, wie es ihre Identität oder Selbigkeit auch ist! (s.u. Teil IV).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Millikan, R. Searle Vs Millikan, R.
 
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John R. Searle
III 27
Function/Ruth Millikan (SearleVs): new concept of "actual function" based on "reproduction" and causation. Recursive definition: So that an object A has a function F as its "proper function", it is necessary (and also adequately) that meets either one of the following conditions:
1. A emerged as a "reproduction" (copy or copy of a copy) of an earlier object that has actually performed partly due to the possession of reproduced characteristics, F in the past, and A exists (causal historical) due to this direction.
2. A has emerged as the product of any previous means that under the circumstances of this direction of F had a real function and that under these circumstances is usually the reason that F is performed by means of the production of objects such as A. (derived "actual functions").
Function/SearleVsMillikan: so one can introduce any new technical expression. However, such definitions do not take any certain essential characteristics of the ordinary concept of function into consideration.
1. For Millikan the definition of the function depends on a specific causal historical theory.
II 28
Even if all previous, also Darwinian turn out to be wrong, my heart would continue to pump blood. 2. Furthermore, there are also stark counter-examples: E.g. according to Wright and Millikan we would have to say that it is the function of colds to spread cold germs.
SearleVs: but colds do not have any function at all!
3. The normative component of functions remains unexplained. (Although Millikan's theory takes into account that some features in reality may not be exercised.) Normative: Millikan does not explain why we are talking about better and worse functioning hearts, heart failure, etc..
Old dilemma: either we talk about crude, blind, causal relations, or we believe that there really is something functional to functions, although Millikan omits the observer relative properties.
III 29
Observer relative/Searle: functions, the fact that there are police officers and professors. (Intensional). Immanent: the fact that there are people at all. Blind, causal relations.
Function: a) Use Function: screwdriver, drive shaft.
b) Non-use functions: independent of practical intentions of the people: the function of the heart to pump blood.
III 33
Use functions: within: special class: representative function, represent something, stand for something else: e.g. baseball icons.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Millikan, R. Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 90
Satz/Überzeugung/Sprache/Denken/Millikan: es scheint klar, dass wenn wir keine Überzeugungen hätten, wir aufhören würden, zu sprechen bzw. Sätze mit Bedeutung zu äußern. Aber warum ist das klar? Wir brauchen eine andere Erklärung (s.u.).
Satz/Intentionalität/Millikan: These: ein Satz (und jedes andere typisch intentionale Muster) ist intentional wegen Eigenfunktionen und Normalen Relationen, die dieses Muster zu einem Produzenten und einem Interpreten hat. Diese beiden sind kooperierende Einheiten in diesem Prozess.
Pointe: dann sind Sätze doch grundlegend intentional und haben keine abgeleitete Intentionalität. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle).
((s) Intentionalität/Millikan/(s): muss sich dann nicht mehr auf das Mentale berufen. )
VsMIllikan: man könnte einwenden, dass Intentionalität doch mit dem Mentalen verbunden sein muss, weil die Analyse der Intentionalität von Gedanken oder innerer Repräsentationen wenigstens im Einklang mit Prinzipien geschehen müsste, nach denen Bewusstsein und das Mentale selbst analysiert werden muss.
Relation/VsMillikan: die von Millikan angebotenen Relationen seien bloß externe. Bestenfalls korrelieren sie Veränderungen des Bewusstseins mit Veränderungen in der externen Welt. Sie liegen selbst außerhalb des Geistes und außerhalb des Bewusstseins.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: sei aber ein Bewusstsein der Welt, nicht bloß Bewusstsein der Veränderungen seiner selbst.
I 91
Tradition: wir erfahren unser Bewusstsein direkt. MillikanVsTradition: was soll das für eine Erfahrung der Intentionalität sein? Was für eine Kraft soll dieses Argument haben?
Die Kraft müsste epistemisch und rational sein.
Unkorrigierbarkeit/MillikanVsTradition: die Erfahrung des Bewusstseins (Erfahrung der Intentionalität) müsste etwas Unfehlbares haben. Wir müssten dann auch ein unmittelbares Verstehen haben. Es müsste auch die Existenz von Intentionalität und Bewusstsein annehmen, denn sonst könnte die Erfahrung ja nicht „in“ ihr sein.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: nimmt an, dass das Bewusstsein durchsichtig (transparent) sei. Und daher könne sie nicht allein aus externen Relationen zur äußeren Welt bestehen, und seien diese naturnotwendig.
MillikanVsVs: Angenommen, wir lehnen dieses epistemisch rationalistische Bild ab, d.h. wir leugnen, dass es „epistemisch Gegebenes“ gibt. Dann könnten wir zugeben, dass sich Leute manchmal ihrer Gedanken bewusst sind. Aber wir könnten aufrechterhalten, dass dieses Bewusstsein (awareness) teilweise eine externe Relation ist. Die „Innenseite“ dieses Gefühls (Bewusstsein, awareness)
I 92
gibt keine Garantie dafür, dass es die Innenseite einer echten Bewusstseinsrelation (awareness Relation) ist. Bewusstsein/Millikan: selbst Bewusstsein von Bewusstsein ist kein unmittelbares Objekt. Es gibt nichts durchsichtiges am Bewusstsein.
Pointe/Millikan: das ist beunruhigend, weil daraus folgt (negative These), dass es möglich ist, dass wir nicht wissen, was wir denken! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). D.h. aus dem Akte des Bewusstseins selbst heraus ist nichts garantiert.
Rationalismus/rationalistisch/Intentionalität/Bewusstsein/MillikanVsRationalismus/Millikan: die traditionelle rationalistische Sicht des Bewusstseins und der Intentionalität führt ein eine Sackgasse nach der anderen.




Russell, B. Kripke Vs Russell, B.
 
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I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: In reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only a shortened or disguised description.
I 87
Description: Kneale and partly Russell as well say that it is not an insignificant message that Socrates was the greatest philosopher in Ancient Greece. It is, however, an insignificant message that we called Socrates "Socrates". KripkeVs: it is not an insignificant message: If it is some sort of fact, it can be wrong! sie ist keineswegs eine unbedeutende: wenn das irgendeine Art von Tatsache ist, kann es falsch sein! A wrong message is indeed that Jesajah was called "Jesaja". The prophet would never have recognized this name! And naturally the Greeks have not given their country the name "Greece" nor a similar one. It is, however, insignificant that we call Socrates that way. I do not believe that it is analytic or necessary.
Sentences as "Socrates is called ’Socrates’" are very interesting indeed, and their analysis can be discussed for hours.
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: description. non-connotative: proper names.
I 145
But Mill: all names are connotative for general types, e.g. "human being". It is defined as a conjunction of specific characteristics which are sufficient and necessary to be human: rationality, animality and specific physical characteristics. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.

Wolf II 209
KripkeVsRussell: Artificial descriptions are not always elliptic.
II 216
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: It does not work: No two-tier distinction can take on this task because it requires a tripartite. Ex: (2) The number of planets could necessarily have been a straight number.
(The number could have been eight, for example, and that would have been a straight number.)
II 217
Kripke: If(2) is interpreted as true, it is neither de re nor de dicto, i.e. the description has neither the smallest nor the biggest domain (according to Russell). (M= möglich= possible, N= notwendig= necessary)
(2a) MN(Ex)(There are exactly x planets and x is a straight number). (Smallest domain, de dicto)
(2b) (Ex)(There are exactly x planets and MN(x is a straight number)).(Biggest domain, de re)
(2c) M(Ex)(there are exactly x planets and N (x is a straight number)). (Middle domain,).
Middle domains are possible if operators are repeated.
(2c) renders (2) true.
(2a) states, probably erroneously, that it might have been necessary that there is a straight number of planets.
(2b) erroneously states that the real number could necessarily have been a straight one.
e.g. The newspapers wrote: "FBI Chef Hoover leveled an accusation that the Barrigan were planning to kidnap an American senior civil servant". (It was Kissinger)
a) there is a senior civil servant, so that Hoover believes...(biggest domain, de re)
b) Hoover believes that the Barrigan were planning...(smallest domain, de dicto)
c) Hoover believes that there was a senior civil servant. (middle domain)
The more intentional constructions (or others)are repeated, the more possible domains exist.
II 218
Kartunnen showed that no n-partite differentiation suffices for each specific n.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Searle, J.R. Stalnaker Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 178
Identification/reference/Searle: (1969,87): ultimately by description. (description). Stalnaker: and this must then be explained by the ability of the speaker to a certain behavior. Otherwise you need a magic intentionality.
StalnakerVsSearle: even if he was right, it would not provide additional premise that he needs to show the impossibility of Mill's semantics.
For he does not say that we cannot have intentions on certain individuals. He only says that we need a necessary condition for it.
Solution: he needs a restriction on the content of the attitudes that we can have
StalnakerVsSearle: he offers instead only a restriction of the conditions under which we may have attitudes with a specific content.
Mill/Stalnaker: as long as it is possible to have such intentions ((s) "direct reference") it is possible to speak and understand a corresponding language.

I 181
SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference", without interposed sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his understanding of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and its properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt to transmit real or alleged characteristics of a language to the world. ((s) > also Kant like Searle).
Searle: one cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that now himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him.
Stalnaker: it cannot be a good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from it. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it).

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Wittgenstein, L. Millikan Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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I 221
not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (S)VsWittgenstein/(S)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining".
Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs.
b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence.
Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist.
Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities.
negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value.
Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation.
negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way.
Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations.
projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts).
Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((S)> Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs).
I 222
And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can.
When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations.
Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference
.Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"?
Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator!
Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p".
1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd.
2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements!
3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference.
Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact.
negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles.
non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation.
negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist".
negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how such a thing is done:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does.
I 223
This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known:
1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist."
Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions.
Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem:
Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square.
Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense!
Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real.
Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function.
2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value.
real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm?
I 224
Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences).
Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function.
Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves.
I 229
"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense.
Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense.
sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense.
Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation.
Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense.

I 303
Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Logic, empirical Pro Quine2 XI 64
Quine: Per empirical logic - but QuineVsMill: arithmetic truth is not due to spatial arrangement.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Selbstidentität Kripke, S.A.
 
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Newen / Schrenk I 87
Self-identity / identity / Kripke / Newen / Schrenk: Kripke: self-identity is necessary - E.g. Cicero is identical with Tully -((s) not that Cicero s first name was Tullius).
Newen / Schrenk I 101
Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object.   VsMill: Problem: blank name and informative identity sentences.
  Eg "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is necessary.
Ethics Mill, J. St.
 
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Stegmüller IV 263
Morality / ethics / Mill: believed in gradual change of human nature towards a "universal human love."   JF StephenVsMill: that s "transcendental utilitarianism": a person souled of "non-partisan charity" might behave stalinist. Everything can be used to justify any use of force. - Mackie ditto.
Names Mill, J. St.
 
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Newen / Schrenk I 101
Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object.   VsMill: Problem: empty names and informative identity sentences.
  E.g. "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is also necessary.