Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Metalanguage | Prior | I 103 Metalanguage/Prior: Problem: "I say something wrong" cannot be the only thing I say. Then a meta language is necessary, otherwise follows an absurdity: I could choose a short time interval in which I could say nothing else. Also: the language in which the theorems are expressed, can not be the same as the language used in some other opportunities to do so. >Levels/order, >Description levels. A hierarchy is possible without metalanguage : e.g. "N": "something that Prior says between t and t is not the case": then: N is a true sentence if and only if ... something is not the case. ((s) Without quotation marks). E.g. VsMetalanguage. "I’ll be damned if grass is pink." ((s) quasi-operator). >Operators. Prior: "isolation" through "I’ll be". Solution: a meta-part of the language (isolated), no complete metalanguage. Cf. >Object language. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Truth | Tugendhat | I 263 Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation. >Timeless sentence. I 267 Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. >Deception. I 285 Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use. >Reference. VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. --- III 190 Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - >Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Tugendhat VsMetalanguage >Metalanguage. Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. III 196 Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. >Judgments. III 208 The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio. >Given, >Correspondence theory. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Metalanguage | Prior Vs Metalanguage | I 100 Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences b) a translation of every sentence of the given language. Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (!), then its sentences are their own translation. Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form: x is true iff. p "x": represents the name in the metalanguage. "p": represents the translation. Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage. That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski. In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language. Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc. This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc. ((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.) Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory. Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense. We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences. I 144 Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance. Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill. Names/Mill: a) singular ones b) general ones each α. "connotative ones", β. not connotative ones. General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative. PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote". Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red"). But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things. I 145 Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it. Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing. Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily. Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it. Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory. Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs. Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects. The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes. Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs! E.g. "every man runs': I 146 here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person". Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative". Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate. E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate. Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verbs). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Metalanguage | Tugendhat Vs Metalanguage | I 326 Metalanguage/Tugendhat: in the usual meta language semantics, the definition of truth for a predicative assertion is roughly the same: I 327 It is true if the singular term is an element of the class for which the predicate stands. The name of the object is then given in the meta language. (List with combinations). TugendhatVsMetalanguage: unsatisfactory. 1. Relapse into object-theoretical position. (That a sentence must correspond to a state of affairs). I 328 2. Also assumes that you already understand what a class is. 3. The metalanguage also presupposes that you already understand the corresponding expression of another language. 4. Predicate and singular term are not explained as complementary expressions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Metalanguage | Wittgenstein Vs Metalanguage | VI 78 Figure/sentence/Wittgenstein/Schulte: In the sentence must be distinguished just as much as to the situation that it represents. (4:04). (Mathematical, logic manifold). --- VI 79 This mathematical multiplicity cannot be reproduced again. One cannot escape it during reproduction. (4041). (WittgensteinVsRussell, WittgensteinVsType theory, WittgensteinVsMetalanguage). The logical element - which gives the image the multiplicity - cannot be the subject itself of an image. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Metaphysics | Field Vs Metaphysics | II 216 Gavagai/FieldVsMetalanguage: Although it is psychologically easier to understand sentences like (10) as formulated in an unambiguous (determinate) ML, but they are just as understandable and have the same truth conditions if the metalanguage is indeterminate: (10) "rabbit" partially signifies the set of rabbits and partially the set of unseparated parts of rabbits. II 385 Metaphysics/FieldVsMetaphysics: I have nothing against "metaphysical restrictions", only that they should rather be called semantic restrictions. They are only demands relating to the meaning of "epistemic goal" or "belief". And here you can demand what you want. If someone has goals that my demand does not meet, why should he bother about whether I call his goals "epistemic" or his mental states "belief"? I doubt that the goals and beliefs of the people differ so radically, but otherwise they could also be called "shmepistemic" and "shmelief". But if these do not exist, it has nothing to do with "metaphysical limitations". Richard Jeffrey: "the fact that it is allowed to wear knight’s armor in buses does not mean that they are full of it." (1983, 145). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| |||