Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Language Davidson I (e) 113
Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them. >Rules, >Conventions, >Explanation.
Glüer II 54
Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim.
Rorty II 21
Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works." DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation.
Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (These are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate!
Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance.

Brandom I 922
Language/Davidson: is merely practical, hypothetical necessity, convenient for the community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations. >Content, >Propositional content, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation.
Brandom I 518
Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up.
Glüer II 51
Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - this ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language. >Truth theory.
Brandom I 454
Language/Davidson/Rorty: is not a conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world. >Conceptual scheme.
Rorty III 33
Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?" - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?" >Use.
Rorty VI 133
Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs")(1): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized.
Seel III 28
Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them.
VsMentalese/language of thought: does not exist. - Language is a part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. >Mentalese.
Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow.
Medium/Gadamer: is not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought.

1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Seel I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Seel II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Seel III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Learning Churchland Lanz I 303
Learning/Fodor: acquisition of the mother tongue: presentation and testing of hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the congenital "language of thought" (mentalese). ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one cannot learn new concepts in a certain sense.
If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere.
Does a sentence in the "language of thought" have to be stored for every tacitly held opinion? This would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage was not enough, the sentences would have to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the connections must be transparent to the organism (though not to consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese). Cf. >Mentalese.


Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Mentalese Dennett I 491
Mentalese/language of the brain/Dennett: A unified "brain language" in which the information is stored in different human brains is very unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. - And therefore, brains are something completely different from chromosomes.
II 161
Intentionality/Mentalese/Dennett: E.g. ambiguous description: what about the corresponding action? The actions themselves have a meaning, because they are formulated in Mentalese! Dennett: this is a hopeless answer, not because it could not be found in the interior of the brain; you can find it!
It is hopeless, because it only shifts the problem. Because supposing that there is a language of thought, where would it take the meanings of its concepts from? And how do we know what its sentences mean in our language (Dennett like Searle, like Putnam).
Mentalese/Dennett: Most of what was written about the possibility of a "language of thought" presupposes that we think in a written language of thought. (DennettVsMentalese).
II 69
Mentalese/DennettVsMentalese: shifts the problem (like Searle, like >Putnam).

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Psychology Churchland Lanz I 302
Everyday psychology/Churchland: (pro everyday psychology/Sellars - ChurchlandVsDennett): Link to Sellars: Everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. You have to check if A) the everyday psychological predicates actually designate natural species
B) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, which is closely linked to everyday psychology, is plausible. The Churchlands deny a) and b).
Instead, Patricia S. Churchland: "Neurophilosophy":
Ad a): it is remarkable that due to everyday psychology we have not the faintest idea what underlies the psychological phenomena with which we are familiar.
>Language of thought, >Mentalese, >Folk psychology.
Lanz I 303
Ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution, language is a latecomer. There were intelligent creatures before language came into the world and there are intelligent creatures who are not able to speak. Thus, due to the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes must also be assumed in humans. >Language/Deacon, >Thinking without language.

Peter Lanz, Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in: Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Churchland, P. Dennett Vs Churchland, P. II 64
Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g.    "X is a weight in grams of 144"
   "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second."
DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g.
  "This goat is worth $ 50".
  And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc.

I Lanz 302
Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species
b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b).
Instead, P.S. Churchland: >"Neurophilosophy":
ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of ​​what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology.
I 303
ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Fodor, J. Churchland Vs Fodor, J. Lanz I 303
Learning / Fodor: represent and examine hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the innate "language of thought" (Mentalese): acquisition of the native language. ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one can not learn new concepts in a certain sense.
If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere. Must then for every opinion also a tacit record be saved in the "language of thought"? That would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage would not be sufficient for the sentences to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the links must be transparent for the organism (though not the consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese).

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Fodor, J. Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. I 208
Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values ​​of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L".
PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there.
E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell.
I 209
But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time.
In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from.
Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing.
Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs.
Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about
e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions.
But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands.
Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions:
1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) ​​states.
2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior.

I 215
Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ.
Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C.
Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent.
That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations!
The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ".
The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures.
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".
I 215/216
Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism
b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that
c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and
c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes.
d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties.
VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either:
1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or:
2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Mentalesese Churchland Vs Mentalesese I Lanz 303
ChurchlandVsMentalese: ad b): VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not good at languages. So because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors one must assume a large number of non-voice-analog cognitive processes even in people.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Mentalesese Dennett Vs Mentalesese II 177
Mentalese/Dennett: most of what has been written about the possibility of a "thought language" presupposes that we think in a written thought language (thought language, Mentalese). (DennettVsMentalese).
Münch III 375
DennettVsAdaptionism: is, like mentalism, at risk of building the entire building from the ground up. Theory/Dennett: Adaptionismus and mentalism are no theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and to ask nature questions.


Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Mentalesese Peacocke Vs Mentalesese I 212
PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. Disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra).
There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone!
Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs!
It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present.
"Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them.
Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious.
I 213
Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa.
In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required!
There is only the modus tollendo ponens.
PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations?
If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese.
Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse).
It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately.
Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax).
I 213/214
Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module.
Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states.
This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.")
The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself.
I 215
Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessarily apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Mentalesese Stalnaker Vs Mentalesese II 234
Semantic structure/belief/Stalnaker: beliefs can also be about semantic structure or about internal or external representations with a semantic structure. You can believe that a belief has a certain semantic structure
II 235
without assuming a certain truth value of this belief! Semantics/belief/belief ascription/Stalnaker: why is semantic knowledge or lack of knowledge relevant to the problem of belief objects?
Informational content: e.g. M and N have the same informational content. Suppose x believes M but not N.
Solution/Stalnaker: then it must be the way that x either does not know what content M has or does not know what content N has. And that is purely semantic information.
Information/content/belief/Stalnaker: thesis: so there must always be a difference in the information not only in the way the content is saved. (> StalnakerVsMentalese, ((s) > hyperintensionality: this concept is here not used by Stalnaker.).
Since the believer precisely distinguishes between M and N a (semantic) information about the difference between necessary equivalent statements must be available to him!
Semantic knowledge: is in simple cases obvious. E.g. if O’Leary does not know that 12 = a dozen (Stalnaker: a fortnight = 14 days) then he is missing information on the semantic value of certain words.
((s) Semantic value/Stalnaker/(s): e.g. the semantic value of "a dozen" is twelve pieces. (or a fortnight = two weeks).

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Stalnaker, R. Field Vs Stalnaker, R. II 35
Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed.
Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say.
FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT).
Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions.
By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth.
Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following:
(i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth.
Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following:
(ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth.
wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language.
Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself!
And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world).
FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing.
Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences.
E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms.
The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons.
II 45
Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that.
Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations.
This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations.
Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations.
II 46
It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages:
1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents).
2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states.
II 82
Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions.
II 83
FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of ​​E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent.
II 84
2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way.
3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR.
Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear.
Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either.
Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content.
Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following:
1) the belief objects are coarse.
Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent.
2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought.
Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image.
FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading.
Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions.
II 85
StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Language Davidson, D. II 54
Language/Davidson: Thesis: The concept of language is superfluous! "There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists think."(1986, 446)
Fra I 625
Language/Mind/mental/thinking/Davidson: Thesis: The mental area is not superior to the linguistic, the connection between subjective mind and interpretable language is theoretically unsolvable.
Seel III 28
Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium. But mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world. Seeing: we do not see through our eyes but with them. VsMentalese: There is no language like mentalese. Language is part of us. It is an organ of us. It is the way we have the world.
Medium/Davidson/Seel: used very closely here. Medium/Gadamer: not instrument, but indispensable element of thinking.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Seel I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Seel II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Seel III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001