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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer | I 12 Meaning theory/Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P. - Then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory. - No one has ever done this. >Compositionality, >Meaning theory/Davidson. I 182 Truth Theory/Schiffer: a truth theory cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. >Truth theory, >Understanding. I 220 Meaning theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. >Relation theory. I 222 The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. I 261 Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites. Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. Then every sentence must have a feature, and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning. Because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic properties. E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. >Semantic properties. I 264 SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. >Intentions/Grice. I 265 Meaning theory/meaning/SchifferVsMeaning theory: all theories have failed. Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation). Schiffer:Meaning is not an entity - therefore there is also no theory of this object. I 269 Schiffer: Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. I 269 No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. The scheme "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical. >Language use, >Language behavior. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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