Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
These Das Denken, das auf Urteile gerichtet ist, ist insofern der Art und Weise, wie die Dinge sind (der Welt ) verantwortlich, als es richtig oder falsch ausgeführt sein kann.
Es geht um Rechtfertigung vor dem "Tribunal der Erfahrung".
Rorty17: RortyVsMcDowell: er tut etwas, was Kritiker der Korrespondenztheorie seit je beklagen: er nimmt Wahrnehmungsurteile als Muster für Urteile überhaupt.(VsKorresondenztheorie).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Beliefs Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
McDowell I 85
Conviction /belief/ EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood more demanding, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they are always explicitly created in an active process of opinion formation.   Beliefs are dispositions to the judgments and verdicts - an act of spontaneity.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Beliefs Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 84
Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
III 89
Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one. - III 90 In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
VI 63ff (where?)
Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs.
VI 144
Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological.
VI 187
Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior.
VI 214
Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. - (DavidsonVsMcDowell).
VI 231
Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world.
VI 233
Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. - (Causality) - M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects.
VI 426f
Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Davidson)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Content Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 217
Brandom/Davidson/SellarsVs"Content"/Rorty: incomprehensible concept. You need nothing more than a concept that acts as a node of an inference pattern. Thus all words systematically put into circulation are on the same level, regardless of whether they come from superstitious people or cavemen. (VsMcDowell)
Dav I 19
Pone Example: Thought content must be known - to find it simple or difficult.
Dav I 96/7
Content/Belief/Davidson: the sensory experience does play a major role in the causal process through which beliefs are connected to the world, but it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs! - ((s) content already defined beforehand during learning, otherwise no comparison of beliefs and world possible, because they would always behave in parallel.)

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Deceptions Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 215
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world would do us a favor when it is not fooling us.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Descriptions McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 132
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). ---
I 132/33
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
---
I 210
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Experience Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 294
Rorty: Brandom does not mention "experience" even once! Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson: for all three we are constantly interacting with things and with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all. Causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
---
II 38f
Experience/BrandomVsMcDowell: not part of my words: unneeded mediating entity between facts and reports - no mediation between facts and reports required.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Experience Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 204
Experience / Sellars / Brandom / Davidson / Rorty: causality is sufficient - VsMcDowell: no "rational control", not a "tribunal of experience" necessary.
VI 206
Def experience / Davidson / Sellars: the ability to acquire convictions due to neurologically describable causal transactions with the world, without drawing conclusions ". (> Causal theory of reference).   Rorty: which can be reformulated this way: "the only way to confront the world is the same for people as for computers".

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Explanation McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 211
Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility. It is very easy to get: if we train two people to have the same manner of speaking.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Explanation Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Carnap: the movement of anything and everybody can be predicted based on the movement of elementary particles. Rorty: that way we should be on top of all that living things, but we would not have explained it! > Explain.
Elementary particles are well applicable in any section of the universe, but the talk of politicians or emerald flowers only in particular contexts.
I 230
Knowledge/Rorty: there is no reason to object to statements about the acquisition of knowledge that refer to internal representations. But explanation and justification must be distinguished: one can put forward such explanations without reviving the traditional mind-body problem. Justification: E.g. through sensual data. --- Explanation: causal.
I 234
Explanation: How can you say when a complete causal explanation of X must contain statements about X.
VI 144
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility! Comprehensibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way!.
VI 212
Horwich
I 452
Explanation/f.o.th./Rorty: something that changes, while everything else remains the same cannot be an explanation.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Facts Esfeld
 
Books on Amazon
I 187 ~
Facts / DoddVsMcDowell: McD confuses Freges facts as true propositions with Wittgenstein s facts as the compounds of the world. - (also VsBrandom) - (> Strawson: "set-like things")

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Idealism McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 209
Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects.
We became aware of this possibility in the criticism VsRussell, theory of descriptions.
If one accepts the world as all that is the case, then the world is subordinated to the realm of Fregean sense ("kingdom of the conceivable").
Then there are not episodes and acts of thought but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts; The conceivable, which is the case.
---
I 209
McDowellVs: However, objects do not belong to the sphere of the conceivable (Fregean sense) but to the realm of the object reference (Fregean meaning).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Judgments McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 212
Judgment/RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world would do us a favor if it did not constrict us.        He does not believe that trees and stones are talking, but he believes that they do not just make us make judgments. He conceives of a phenomenon as an invitation for a judgment which proceeds from the world. It is not a judgment itself, but has the conceptual form of a judgment.
       According to McDowell, "impressions" are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferent beliefs themselves, but something between these two: a component of the "Second Nature."

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Justification Esfeld
 
Books on Amazon
I 146 ~
Justification/McDowell/Esfeld: thesis space of reasons (justifications) further than that of the conceptual - ---
I 161 ~
I/you-relations/Brandom/Esfeld: show in contrast to relativistic I-We-relationships that the community as a whole can be wrong - I-We: myth of the given - I-Thou: replaces representationalism by inferentialism - no enforcement of consensus, community has no privileged status ---
I 191 ~
Justification/belief/Esfeld: justification only by other beliefs because these have statement form - but circumstances are not sufficient, but inferential practices are - ultimately coherence theory - social holism: beliefs are isolated from the world, only them, nothing in the world is conceptually (VsMcDowell) but beliefs are bound to the world by not being epistemic self-sufficient - (epistemically self-contained: Content v.belief state n. ontological dependent on physical texture)

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Language Games Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 221
Rules / language game / Derrida / Rorty: he does not want to make a move in the language game. - He does not want to play. - He does not wants to refute anyone.
VI 210f
RortyVsMcDowell: one should not speak of forms of comprehensibility. McDowell: logical space of reasons and logical space of the laws are sui generis respectively.
RortyVsMcDowell: They are not so strictly separate areas (the reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They can not be reduced to one another. e.g. Football and biology. But that is philosophically sterile question.
With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Nature Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. - VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge.
VI 214
World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner. I 215 it does not merely call on us to judge.
VI 434
Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Science McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 219
Research/Standards/McDowell: it is just the wit of the standards of research, that their compliance increases the probability to get closer to the the world as it is, the "suchness"! RortyVsMcDowell: again leading to a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's critique of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this.
James would ask: what difference in behavior would it make?

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sensory Impressions McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 14
Sensory impressions do not belong in the area of the reasons. Sensory impressions/Empiricism: not in the same space as knowledge.
Sensory impressions are not in such a space in which the one is justified by the other. (Otherwise the naturalistic fallacy threatens).
---
I 33
Sensory impressions/McDowell: Thesis: from the outset there is no distance between the conceptual content and the effects of reality on the sensuality. The sensory impressions already have the most basic conceptual content.
---
I 173f
Definition sensory impression/McDowell: The impact of the world on our senses. (s) So the world's achievement, not the subject's achievement. Not the impression we have, but the impression made by the world. According to Sellars/Davidson: non-conceptual.
A sensory impression: the belief that an object has certain properties is due to the fact that the corresponding fact itself exerts an impression on the subject. This is the same as the impression which the object exerts.
Sensory impressions/DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. There are no facts at all.
2. Causality: only conclusions from knowledge about causal connections - causality itself does not reveal the world.
Sensory Impressions/McDowell: are transparent according to me, Sellars and Davidson do not see it like this.
Sensory Impressions/McDowell: Thesis: a harmless concept of this could be: we can assume that spontaneity is rationally controlled by the receptivity without the receptivity blocking our access. For this we must reject only the dualism of reason and nature.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Understanding Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 38
Microstructure/macrostructure: Putnam: we cannot understand from the knowledge of elementary particles why square pegs do not fit into round holes. But that’s not a disturbing ontological gap!
II 126
Def understanding/Rorty: ability to link old descriptions with new descriptions.
IV 109 ff
Comprehensibility: it is hard to explain what it is supposed to mean that tables and chairs are incomprehensible and God is not (or vice versa!). Logical positivism is already something of a solution with its formal type of speech.
IV 117
Comprehensibility: problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly tempted to say "the intelligibility conditions of a statement are..." Although the statement itself does not fulfil the specified conditions.
VI 208 ff
McDowell: Problem: "whether our experience is excluded from in the area of the kind of intelligibility appropriate to the concept of meaning". RortyVsMcDowell: one should not even speak of "forms of intelligibility"! -
McDowell: logical space of reasons - and logical space of the laws are each sui generis.
VI 211
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no strictly separated areas (of reason and law). All language games are sui generis.
VI 212
Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about comprehensibility - comprehensibility is quite cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. Esfeld Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 181
pragmatischer Realismus/Esfeld: jenseits des traditionellen Gegensatzes von metaphysischem Realismus und Relativismus. EsfeldVsBrandom: nicht begriffliche Züge machen einige unserer Überzeugungen wahr. (Das entspricht der Tradition)
Welt/Hegel: hat selbst begriffliche Züge! (>McDowell pro).
Esfeld I 187
Tatsache/DoddVsMcDowell: (1995): McDowell verwechselt eine Fregesche Sicht von Tatsachen als wahrer Propositionen mit einer Sicht von Tatsachen, aus denen die Welt besteht!
I 188
Tatsache/EsfeldVsBrandom: dieser Vorwurf kann auch Brandom gemacht werden, wenn er Tatsachen mit dem Inhalt wahrer Behauptungen identifiziert und fortfährt: "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist, eine Konstellation von Tatsachen". (I 476 477). Esfeld: ich vermeide den Begriff, um Konfusion zu vermeiden.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Davidson, D. McDowell Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 42
McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.)
I 41
McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)).
I 168
Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so.
I 172
Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control.
I 86
Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs).
I 124
The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such.
McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable.
I 216
McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons.
- - -
Rorty VI 205
McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible.
Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson).
VI 206
McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good.
VI 207
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world.
- - -
Rorty VI 213
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world.
- - -
Rorty VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education").
To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world.
McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom.
Rorty VI 217
McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Evans, G. Grice Vs Evans, G.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II XXI
Evans/McDowell: normal linguistic behavior is just as unconscious. (Only deviations are noticed). Then only two factors remain:
1) X’s belief about what S means from the lips of Y about t,
2) X’s beliefs about the relevant facts in the context.
GriceVsEvans/VsMcDowell: a Gricean could say that we set too much store by the unreflected behavior and postulate smoothly functioning super beings that mimic our unconscious behavior. (>Platonism).
We behave in an unreflected way as if we behaved very reflected.
EMD II XXII
And a proper understanding of this behavior depends on us recognizing this fact. Evans/McDowellVs: this seems very attractive, but we reject it: we find the question extremely difficult and our following considerations are insufficient.
The appeal lies in the special phenomenological duplicity of language that makes Wittgenstein say:
Signs/"Bestowing"/Wittgenstein: every sign in itself is dead, what bestows life upon them?

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Kant, I. McDowell Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon
I 69
Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito.
McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality.
I 69
Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other.
I 109/110
Second Nature/(S): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education.
I 111
Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
I 122
Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world.
I 123
McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background.
I 126
Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm.
I 127
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Loar, B. Avramides Vs Loar, B.
 
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Avramidis I 29
Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages ​​within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is ​​parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111
Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
McDowell, J. Davidson Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon
McDowell I 173
Sensation / McDowell: the belief that an object has certain characteristics is due to the fact that the relevant fact exerts an impression on the subject itself. This is tantamount to the impression exerted by the object. Sensations / DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. there are no facts (elsewhere). 2. causality: we only draw conclusions from the knowledge of causal links, the causality itself not revealing the world.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
McDowell, J. Esfeld Vs McDowell, J.
 
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I 185
soziale Praxis/Esfeld: schließt bisher keine rationale Einschränkung von seiten der Welt auf unsere Überzeugungen ein. (>McDowell). EsfeldVsMcDowell: um das zurückzuweisen, müssen wir erst noch zeigen, wie die sozialen Praktiken, die den begrifflichen Inhalt bestimmten, auf die Welt antworten.
I 188
Regelfolgen/EsfeldVsMcDowell: selbst wenn der Bereich des Begrifflichen unbegrenzt ist, sind wir mit dem Problem des Regelfolgens konfrontiert. Wie können Überzeugungen Inhalt haben?
I 189
Wir brauchen also in jedem Fall soziale Praktiken, auch wenn der begriffliche Bereich unbegrenzt ist. Wir sollten versuchen, die rationale Einschränkung ((s) Korrektur, Kontrolle, "Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber der Welt") innerhalb der sozialen Praktiken zu konzipieren, statt der physikalischen Welt selbst einen begrifflichen Status zuzubilligen. Der soziale Holismus ist dafür hinreichend.
Die Welt übt eine Einschränkung auf unsere Praktiken aus, die nicht nur kausal, sondern auch rational ist. Das ist notwendig um sicherzustellen, daß dasjenige, dessen Inhalt in inferentiellen Beziehungen besteht, Überzeugungen sind, deren Wahrheitswert von der Welt abhängt.
Damit wäre dann auch dem Einwand vorgebeugt, daß nicht nur die Sprache sondern auch der Inhalt unserer Überzeugungen konverntionell sei.
Esfeld: These: die physikalische Welt ist nicht Teil des begrifflichen Inhalts unserer Glaubenszustände. Aber sie ist Teil der sozialen Praktiken, in denen dieser Inhalt bestimmt wird. Lager: BrandomVsMcDowell: (1998a, auch 1994 473 476,875 876, (mit Sellars und Davidson)

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
McDowell, J. Evans Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
McDowell I 85
Judgment / Evans: thinks that intuition and concept must be divided among experience and judgment. (McDowellVs). Information System / Evans: its states are independent of beliefs. Beliefs cannot explain the contents of a perceptual experience, because it could be that you have no beliefs with an appropriate content!
Belief / EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood in a more demanding way, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they always explicitly arise in an active opinion-forming process.
  Beliefs are dispositions to judgments and judging is an act of spontaneity.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
McDowell, J. Rorty Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 111
McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
- - -
VI 201
McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly.
RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory).
VI 203
Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor.
VI 204
"Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all.
RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
VI 208
RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts:
1. "Crass naturalism"
2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom"
Vi 210
Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning."
VI 211
RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"!
Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of ​​law each are sui generis.
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it.
With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes.
VI 212
Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms.
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech!
McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of ​​"memorizing facts".

RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric.
VI 214
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us.
VI 215
      Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one.
VI 217
      "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature".
VI 216
VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons."
VI 219
Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this.
     James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior?

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
McDowell, J. Sellars Vs McDowell, J.
 
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Rorty VI 207
SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: man has no responsibility to the world.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
McDowell, J. Wright Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 260
Def "platonistische Skylla" 1. Irgendeine Begründung muss gefunden werden für etwas, das völlig unabhängig von menschlichen Fähigkeiten die reale Richtung festlegt, der eine Regel folgt,
2. Es muss erklärt werden, wie wir überhaupt in irgendeiner kognitiven Verbindung mit dieser "wirklichen Richtung" sein sollen.
Das ist die die entsprechende
Def "regelskeptische Charybdis": Die Auffassung, nach der es überhaupt keine objektiven Erfordernisse gibt, die durch Regeln erzeugt werden, sondern ausschließlich natürliche uneingeschränkte menschliche Fähigkeiten. Also keine "allgemeine wirkliche Objektivität".
Lösung/McDowell/Wright: die "vollkommen zufriedenstellende Zwischenposition": Einsicht, dass das einzige, was mit der Skylla nicht in Ordnung ist, dass die Objektivität aus einer externen Perspektive beurteilt werden müsste.
Regeln existieren eben nur innerhalb einer Praxis, die dadurch aufrechterhalten wird, dass die Beteiligten sich einig sind.
I 261
Moral/Ethik/McDowellVsNon-Cognitivism: geht von einer unsauberen Konstruktion der ethischen Tatsachen und der Objektivität aus (Skylla). Als ob die moralischen Tatsachen unabhängig vom bewertenden Standpunkt "da" seien. Tatsache/Wright: doch auch die Würdigung irgendeiner Tatsache verlangt einen Standpunkt!
Realism/Anti-Realism/Wright: in dieser Debatte vertritt der Realist die Seite der Skylla, der Anti Realist die der Charybdis.
I 262
Diese Debatte wird nun unterminiert von der "vollkommen zufriedenstellenden Zwischenposition". Es hat nie eine Debatte gegeben, nur ein Missverständnis dessen, was das Zusammenwirken unseres Geistes mit einem objektiven Gehalt erfordert. (Bei McDowell nur implizit). WrightVsMcDowell: das ist überhaupt nicht überzeugend: wenn die Debatte unterlaufen werden soll, müssen die Gegner klar an die Hörner gebunden bleiben.
Der Realismus muss also immer Überobjektivierung umfassen und der
Anti-Realismus muss immer als Flucht davor dargestellt werden. Auf diesem Weg findet man aber keine Lösung.
Bsp die Frage ob die Kognitive Nötigung apriorisch gilt, hat keine wesentliche Verbindung zu einem hyperobjektiverten Tatsachenbegriff, und daher auch keine Verpflichtung auf eine externen Standpunkt.
I 263
McDowellVsWright: man könnte entgegnen, dass jede Unterscheidung unter der Ägide der Kognitiven Nötigung unsere Entscheidung wäre. Daher wäre es ein Fehler anzunehmen, dass Gegensätze bezüglich der Objektivität in soliderer Weise "da" sein könnten als etwa die Erfordernisse der Addition.
I 264
McDowells Wittgenstein: möchte Fluchtweg aus der Debatte erschließen.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
McDowell, J. Verschiedene Vs McDowell, J. VsMcDowell. manche werfen mir Anthropozentrismus vor: ein grundloses Vertrauen darauf, daß sich die Welt vollständig innerhalb der Reichweite unseres Denkens befinde. I 64
McDowell: dafür gibt es keine Garantie und die Fähigkeit der Spontaneität bringt die Verpflichtung mit sich, ständig über die Belege nachzudenken, die jederzeit die aktive Tätigkeit leiten. I 65
VsMcDowell: Gefahr des Idealismus: idealistische Grundstimmung der Elimination der äußeren Grenze. Das entzieht uns eine Möglichkeit, auf die wir nicht verzichten sollten: die Möglichkeit der unmittelbaren Berührung zwischen dem Geistigen und den Gegenständen! I 209
Wenn man die Welt als alles, was der Fall ist annimmt, dann ordnet man die Welt dem Reich des Fregeschen Sinns ("Reich des Denkbaren") unter. Dann gibt es nicht Episoden und Akte des Denkens, sondern Identität. Tatsachen in diesem Sinn sind Gedanken, Das Denkbare, das der Fall ist.
McDowellVs: Gegenstände gehören aber nicht zum Bereich des Denkbaren (Fregescher Sinn) sondern zum Reich des Gegenstandsbezugs. (Fregesche Bedeutung.).
VsMcDowell: der Einwand lautet nun, daß Wittgensteins "Gemeinplatz" (s.o.) den Geist auf das Reich des Sinns ausrichtet, aber nicht auf das Reich des Gegenstandsbezugs (Bedeutung).I 210
VsMcDowell: dann brauchen wir doch irgendeine Theorie der Kennzeichnungen.
Theorie der Kennzeichnungen/Russell/McDowell: indirekter Bezug zur Welt.




McDowell, J. Schiffer Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 204
SchifferVsDavidson/SchifferVsMcDowell/SchifferVsEvans: thesis: a translation theory is possible for the Radical Interpretation (RI). compositionality/Schiffer: problem: If Davidson is right, and we first need a theory of meaning for our own language for the RI, then our language must have a compositional semantics. (…+…)

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
McDowell, J. Dodd Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 187
Natur/McDowell: ist nicht mit dem identifiziert, was in der modernen Wissenschaft anerkannt wird. These McDowell tritt für eine partielle "Wiederverzauberung" (reenchantment) der Natur ein, um den Aspekt der physikalischen Welt zu erfassen, aufgrund dessen die physikalische Welt nicht außerhalb des begrifflichen Bereichs liegt. DF.
Die Wissenschaft selbst kann diesen Aspekt nicht erfassen. Sie ist vielmehr ein Hindernis dafür, daß wir sehen, daß die Welt aus Tatsachen besteht, die der Inhalt unserer wahren Überzeugungen sind.
Tatsache/DoddVsMcDowell: (1995): McDowell verwechselt eine Fregesche Sicht von Tatsachen als wahrer Propositionen mit einer Sicht von Tatsachen, aus denen die Welt besteht!
I 188
Tatsache/EsfeldVsBrandom: dieser Vorwurf kann auch Brandom gemacht werden, wenn er Tatsachen mit dem Inhalt wahrer Behauptungen identifiziert und fortfährt: "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist, eine Konstellation von Tatsachen". (I 476 477). Esfeld: ich vermeide den Begriff, um Konfusion zu vermeiden.

Dodd I
J. Dodd
An Identity Theory of Truth Basingstoke 2008

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Loar Versus Avramides I 29
Loar / meaning theory: near Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, thesis: do not separate semantics and pragmatics - (Grice ditto) - Wiggins/McDowell: Separation th. of sense /th. of force - Loar: ultimately psychologically and thus reductionist.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
McDowell Pro Esfeld I 189
BrandomVsMcDowell: (1998a, auch 1994 473- 476,875-876, (with Sellars and Davidson)

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Social Holism Esfeld, M.
 
Books on Amazon
I 189~
Esfeld: These die physikalische Welt ist nicht Teil des begrifflichen Inhalts unserer Glaubenszustände. Aber sie ist Teil der sozialen Praktiken, in denen dieser Inhalt bestimmt wird.
I 195
...: wir müssen einen Aspekt der physikalischen Welt annehmen, der jenseits des wissenschaftlich Erfassbaren liegt (>McGinn). These Das berücksichtigt der soziale H. Überzeugungen sind von der Welt getrennt, in dem Sinne das nur sie und "nichts in der Welt" begrifflich sind. (EsfeldVsMcDowell).
Radical Interpretat. Schiffer, St.
 
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I 204
SchifferVsDavidson / SchifferVsMcDowell / SchifferVsEvans / SchifferVs EMD: for RI a theory of translation is possible.