Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constructivism | Kanitscheider | II 20 KanitscheiderVsConstructivism: Constructivism moves close to Fichte's absolute idealism, in which the I sets the world. 1. nature becomes fiction. However, at least the constructing cognitive faculty and its biological carrier must be presupposed as a starting point. 2nd problem: The epistemic status of illusions. In everyday life as well as in science we are able to weed out illusions. Someone who relies on illusions does not live long. (Evolutionist argumentVsMaturana). >Humberto Maturana. II 21 Something seems to prevent us from creating arbitrary worlds. >Ontology, cf. >Possible worlds. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Constructivism | Schurz | I 56 Constructive RealismVsRadical Constructivism/Schurz: Constructive Realism denies the ontological constructivism that reality itself is not given "in itself". However, the perceived result is the result of an active cognitive construction. Radical constructivism/Maturana: That, about which we can say something, is only the reality constructed by us. SchurzVsMaturana/VsConstructivism: Kier the concept of "stating" is taken in a naive realist sense of reflection. >Humberto Maturana, >Reality/Maturana. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Constructivism | Searle | III 168 Constructivism/Maturana: the nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality. >Autopoiesis. SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image of reality is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. >Constructivism/Maturana. Maturana: rejects the idea of an "objective reality" in favour of the idea that nervous systems like autopoietic systems create their own reality. Since we have no idea and no access to reality except through social construction, there is no independent reality. >Objectivity/Maturana, >Reality/Maturana. SearleVsMaturana: from the fact that our knowledge/imagination/image of reality is constructed by human brains in social interactions, it does not follow that reality has been created by human brains. III 169 Genetic misconception: a problem beyond that: would the interactions themselves also be constructed by interaction? >Regress. Winograd: example: "there is water in the fridge". Relative to different backgrounds you can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that reality does not exist independently of our representations. SearleVsWinograd: the genetic fallacy as in Maturana confuses our image (background) with reality. Cf. >Background/Searle, >Terminology/Searle. --- Derrida: "Il n'y a pas de "hors texte"". SearleVsDerrida: this is simply claimed without argument. In a later polemical answer he seems to take everything back anyway. He claims that the whole thing only means banality, that everything exists in one context or another. >Derrida. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reality | Searle | III 168 Reality/Maturana: the nervous system (autopoietic) creates reality. SearleVsMaturana: there is a genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. III 179 E.g. someone says: "In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same. III 185 Truth/reality/Searle: truth cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. -> Aspects/Searle; >Conceptual scheme. Ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. PutnamVsSearle: there is no "ready made world". >"...if everything was different." >Berkeley. III 194 Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. >Background/Searle, >Moore's hands. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constructivism | Schurz Vs Constructivism | I 56 Constructive RealismVsRadical Constructivism/Schurz: bestreitet den ontologischen constructivism, dass die Wirklichkeit selbst nicht "an sich" gegeben sei. Wohl aber ist das wahrgenommene Ergebnis das Ergebnis einer aktiven kognitiven Konstruktion. Radical Constructivism/Maturana: das, worüber wir etwas aussagen können, ist nur die von uns konstruierte Wirklichkeit SchurzVsMaturana/VsConstructivismc: hier wird der Begriff des "Aussagens" in naiv realistischem Widerspiegelungssinn aufgefasst. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Luhmann, N. | Maturana Vs Luhmann, N. | MaturanaVsLuhmann: refuses to describe communication systems as social systems. LuhmannVsMaturana: that is a strong emotional element on his side: he does not want to lose sight of the people. (Cass.5) |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Maturana, H. | Luhmann Vs Maturana, H. | Kass. 5 Component/"component"/Maturana/LuhmannVsMaturana: strange English: covers too much and leaves open whether the operations or the structures are meant. This may be sufficient for biology, because it does not start out so strongly from events and attributes elemental character to the chemical states and state character to the elements. Even if with a short period of time. Kass. 5 Event/System Theory/Luhmann: in the investigation of consciousness and communication the concept of event imposes itself! (Non-resolvable events). A sentence is said on a certain occasion and not again. Perception is only there in a certain moment. No "components" are necessary. Kass. 6 Structural Coupling/Maturana/Luhmann: I will vary his term a little. Maturana's concept is not precise enough with regard to the causal relationship S/U. System/Maturana: assumes that one can make two statements about a system: 1. it has an autopoietic organization. LuhmannVsMaturana: the concept of organization is unusable for us! It should be enough to say: autopoietic reproduction with great scope. 2. specific structures, depending on the type of creature (mammals, fish, etc.). Kass. 7 Observation/Maturana: life must function biologically. LuhmannVsMaturana: but in biological terms it is more difficult to see which limitations constitute the selection. There are obvious possibilities for expanding complexity. Parallel to sociology: self-fullfilling prophecies: are given into society qua communication and the society that knows how to forecast itself reacts to it. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Maturana, H. | Searle Vs Maturana, H. | III 168 Maturana: rejects the idea of an "objective reality" in favor of the idea that the nervous systems as autopoietic systems creates its own reality. Since we have no idea and no access to the reality except through the social construction, there is no independent reality. SearleVsMaturana: from the fact that our knowledge/idea/image of the reality is constructed by human brains in social interactions, does not follow that the reality has been created by human brains. III 169 Genetic fallacy: Problem beyond: would the interactions then themselves also be constructed by interaction? (Regress). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Maturana, H. | Verschiedene Vs Maturana, H. | Kanitscheider II 21 KanitscheiderVsConstructivism/VsMaturana: moves closer to Fichte's absolute idealism, in which the ego sets the world. 1 Nature becomes fiction. As a starting point, however, at least the constructing cognitive faculty and its biological carrier must be assumed. 2. Problem: the epistemic status of illusions. Both in everyday life and in science we are able to eliminate deceptions. Someone who invokes illusions does not live long. (Evolutionist ArgumentVsMaturana). Something seems to prevent us from creating arbitrary worlds. Reality/Kanitscheider: as explanation for success and failure we accept the resistance of an autonomous reality. (PutnamVs). BiologistsVsMaturana: what do we gain if we still call the known chemical processes autopoiesis? (Luhmann Kass.5). |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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