Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Everyday Language Cavell
 
Books on Amazon
I 39
Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself.
We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories.
---
I 40
Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language.
How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning).
So we need to understand his position from within.
---
I 41
Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway.
---
Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 170
Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them:
Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...."
Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations.
Type III statement: Generalizations.

Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do.
---
II 172
Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements.
MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech.

CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken.
---
II 173
CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: ---
II 174
(> e.g. Austin: voluntary gift).

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Mates, B. Cavell Vs Mates, B.
 
Books on Amazon
II 172
Cavell These: Native Speaker (Muttersprachler) benötigen im allgemeinen keine Feststellungen darüber, was man in ihrer Sprache sagen kann. Sie selbst sind die Quelle solcher Feststellungen. MatesVs Intuition und Erinnerung in Bezug auf richtiges Sprechen.
CavellVsMates: Intuition ist auch gar nicht notwendig. Ich brauche keine Erinnerung an die Stunde, in der ich etwas lernte, und kein perfektes Gedächtnis für mein Sprechen. Man erinnert sich nicht an die Sprache, man spricht sie.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002