Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Concepts Putnam VI 392
Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: could be mental particulars. - I.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. - PutnamVsOckham: Problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW - or another sign, with REFERS.
VI 393
On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head") - (Putnam pro). - But: Problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects". - ((s) "Concept": Here "way of using characters") - If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains. ---
Putnam V 40ff
Concepts/Putnam: cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public - they are (partially) skills, not incidents. ---
I (b) 63
Cluster Concept/Putnam: E.g."human" as a list of properties - PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. - Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means".
I (g) 190
Concept/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts - e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? - Possible Worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke:/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. - Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. - But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. - Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted them to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world - (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). - This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. - We just say water should be nothing else (intention). - That's simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto). - VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference. - (Materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Dualism Chalmers I 125
Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers. ---
I 134
Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. ---
I 135
This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has.
N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative.
2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts.
---
I 136
For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains.
---
I 154
Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded.
---
I 155
Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type.
It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism:
---
I 155
Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. ---
I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
---
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant.
---
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them.
---
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. ---
I 162
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. ---
I 171
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Epicurus Adorno Adorno XIII 209
Epicurus/Adorno: the tradition is quite problematic and incomplete. We only have a fully developed epicurean doctrine in the poem of Lucrez "De rerum natura", which originates from the late republican Roman times. ---
XIII 210
VsEpicurus/VsMaterialism/Adorno: also Epicurus has not escaped the accusation against all materialists, to be puritan, ascetic. The theory of the epicurus was averse to the radical picture of hedonism, for instance, as in Aristippus, who described the immediate and here to obtained pleasure as the only thing worth living for, and yet, despite its moderate consequences, and often with the Stoa itself touching ethics of heresy it is forfeited as hedonistic.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Epiphenomenalism Jackson Boatman I 152
Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982, 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities.
Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena.
Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen.
SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P.
---
I 153
But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all?

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Functionalism Danto I 269
Funktionalismus: die Annahme, man könne gewisse Aspekte des Geistes ohne jede Kenntnis des Gehirns diskutieren. Die gleichen geistigen Operationen können wohl recht gut durch materielle Systeme durchgeführt werden.
I 269f
FunktionalismusVsMaterialismus: hat seltsamerweise gewissen materialistischen Theorien des Geistes ernsthafte Probleme bereitet. Man kann nicht sagen, dass der Geist nichts anders sei als das Gehirn, folglich nichts anders als dieses materielle System, wenn der Geist selber funktional definiert werden kann, und etwas gegeben ist, dass alle seine Funktionen unterstützt, ansonsten aber vom Gehirn verschieden ist. Wie kann der Geist mit dem Gehirn gleichgesetzt werden und genauso gut mit dem Computer, wenn andererseits Computer und Gehirn nicht miteinander gleichgesetzt werden können? Identität ist transitiv. Das wäre hier nicht erfüllt.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Identity Theory Jackson Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Interactionism Chalmers I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
---
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant:
---
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them.
---
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Knowledge Chalmers I 103
Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson 1982(1), Nagel 1974(2)). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors. All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone.
Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none.
---
I 104
Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience. See also Lewis (1990), and Nemirov (1990).
---
I 141
Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H2O. ---
I 142
The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness.


1. F. Jackson, Ephiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982: pp. 127-36
2. Th. Nagel What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435-50

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Knowledge how Loar Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/Intension/primary/secondary Intension/LoarVsJackson/ LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) goes deeper in his criticism than Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical or phenomenal terms to have different primary intentions. For example heat and e.g. medium kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intention) but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intentions)! But that is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge of the phenomenal properties of colors
I 143
was already a knowledge about physical and functional properties, but she could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: Further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscent being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (see example: Rudolf Lingens with >memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from that of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue much more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are like in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how Chalmers Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors...
---
I 143
... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
---
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.



1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108
2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83
3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17
4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28
5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993
6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992
7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33
8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47
9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Materialism Kripke Putnam II 189
KripkeVsMaterialism because of "essential properties": E.g. statue and clay are two objects - different statements are true of them - clay: property "an article which could have been spherical" - that does not apply to the statue.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Materialism McGinn II 30 f
Materialism/Mind: Thesis: There is not more to the mind than there is to the brain. "Brain is all the mind needs". The mind consists of flesh, it is flesh. ---
II 31f
Once the nature (or God) had planted neurons in our brains, no further work was necessary to provide us with consciousness. And that is not because neural processes cause consciousness processes, but because neuronal processes are processes of consciousness.
---
II 32
It is also not true that consciousness processes are only one aspect of neuronal processes, but the state of consciousness is no more or less than its neural correlate. E.g. pain is simply reduced to physical processes, both of which are not only correlated, but identical. Granted, pain looks different in the introspection, but: introspection is merely a source of errors. ---
II 32
The true nature of pain can only be disclosed by observing the third person. The mind is the brain in disguise, the genie is the lamp, although it may look different. ---
II 33
McGinnVsMaterialism: Intuitive Answer: if materialism is right, I am in spite of everything not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia ((s) because the physical processes remain the same). According to materialism we would all be zombies who pretend to have a consciousness. From this follows an argument VsMaterialism: E.g. assuming I knew all there is to know in neurological terms about your brain. Would I know all about your mind then? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. ---
II 33
How can both be declared identical then: MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one thing and knowledge about facts is another. Maybe I know all about your brain, but my knowledge is based on certain ideas (concepts). Materialism insists on that all mental facts are brain facts, that we cannot translate notions of mental facts into notions at the level of brain facts. ((s) A translation would have to perform a level change). E.g. All facts about water are facts about "H2O", although the words "water" and "H2O" do not mean the same thing. They are not synonyms.
McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to distinguish between mental and physical concepts without requiring a distinction at the level of facts.
What distinguishes the idea of ​​pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that in the focus of both concepts there are quite different properties, and thus we cannot say that both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the notion that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations, however, is based in turn on that there are facts relating to manifestations which cannot be explained with brain facts.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Materialism Searle I 47
SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization).
I 18 ff
"Eliminative materialism": the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965).
I 27
Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites.
Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical.
I 40
SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances.
I 53
Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism.
I 62
Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism.
I 72
The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity.
I 112
The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Materialism Chalmers Stalnaker I 242
Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996, 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. ---
Chalmers I XIII
Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. ---
Chalmers I 41
Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. (> Supervenience/Chalmers). ---
I 42
Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism:
Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364).
---
I 123
Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world
2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts.
4. Therefore, materialism is wrong.
---
I 124
The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain.
The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism.
---
139
MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989 (1).) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities.
ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility).
E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color.
---
I 144
Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990)(2) and Nemirov (1990)(3): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible.
---
I 145
Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities.
Loar: (1990)(4) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this."
DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991)(5) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment.
ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge.



1. C. McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98, 1989: pp.349-66
2. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990
3. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990
4. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108
5. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Materialism Churchland Pauen I 100
Materialism, eliminative/VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the abandonment of the terminology of everyday psychology. This assumes, however, that the corresponding entities do not exist in fact. This is an ontological and not just a language-philosophical thesis.
Churchland claims that there are no serious objections to the eliminative materialism. That is not the case, however.
---
I 101
VsMaterialismus, eliminative/Pauen: 1. False claim to know that there are neural, but no mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true. There must therefore be no opinions (i.e., mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implicitly implies that the representative of a claim itself, is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: admits this performative contradiction, but sees in it only a further proof for our entanglement in the everyday psychology.
VsChurchland: that is a mere announcement that the contradiction will be solved somehow.
---
I 102
Performative contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: For example, the vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent asserts that there are no spirits of life. This opponent, however, is himself alive, so he must have spirits of life ...
PauenVsChurchland: that is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not depend on vitalism, but has an alternative concept.
In contrast, the defender of everyday psychology does not have to make such a presupposition: the assertion that knowledge implies an opinion (the controversial mental state), is after all no invention of everyday psychology, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
---
103
VsMaterialism, eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of intertheoretical reduction: everyday psychology is to be eliminated, especially because it cannot be reduced to neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: therefore the two theories must compete on the same level. E.g. Phlogiston/Chemistry.
In contrast to that, everyday psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/third person, micro/macro).
---
I 104
3. For example, split brain patients/Pauen: empirical evidence shows that, in particular, feelings are language-independent and thus can also be identified pre-theorytically. Patients react, but have no more conscious access. The stimuli occur in the right, unconscious, language-incapable hemisphere. Nevertheless, patients can provide correct information. They can neither be based on the generalizations of everyday psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
---
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: The latter then excludes the phenomenal states from the elimination. The everyday experience should no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this, however, diverges from the usual everyday psychology, which also includes pain. He had previously included pain in the states which would be changed by the elimination of the terms.
Moreover, he is inconsistent when he insists on the elimination of cognitive consciousness.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Modal Properties Putnam I (g) 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is the statue missing.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Supposing there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain.
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
I (g) 190
Term/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms - e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay" - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: Is there in the actual world an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? - Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: its ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it - modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world - but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties - essential properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world - (other liquid than H20 water) - which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water - we just say water should not be anything else (intention) - that is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto) - VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference - (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Qualia Lewis I (c) 54
Qualia Theory VsMaterialism, functionalism Vs: E.g. you never tried Vegemite (the famous condiment).Therefore you do not know how it is, to taste Vegemite. Neither information on the nature, nor of the materialists and functionalists helps. But when you taste it, you will know how it is. Therefore, there is a kind of information that has been overlooked by materialists and functionalists, the phenomenal information.
I (c) 55
LewisVsQualia-Theory/MaterialismVsPhenomenalism: There is absolutely no such information. Knowledge, as it is, is not at all possession of information. It is not the exclusion of any previously open opportunities.
I (c) 55
Knowledge as it is, is rather the possession of skills, not information. From skills to recognize something, imagine, predict behavior.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Quantities Vollmer II 82f
Quantity / quality / materialism thesis "quantity turns into quality." VollmerVsMaterialism: these are phase transitions in reality. - quantity can never turn into quality - this is a category mistake.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Theories Chalmers I 165
Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons.
---
I 166
B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience.
A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism.
1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable.
2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time.
3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally.
Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4).
Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10),
B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive.
1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible.
2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically).
3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical.
Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13).
Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21).
C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible.
1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible.
2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts.
3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws.
Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27).
---
I 167
The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest. ---
I 213
Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. ---
I 216
First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. ---
I 218
If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot.



1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968
2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991
3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25
4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949
5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995
6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982
7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996
8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56
9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68
10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43
11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61
12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993.
13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108
14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993
15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992
16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991
17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83
18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995.
19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993
20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995
21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992
22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970
23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303
24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36
25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982
26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988
27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Zombies Stalnaker I 19f
Zombies/Perceptive faculty/Stalnaker: you cannot say that there are possible worlds with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. - General Picture: consciousness: refers to a property that we find in us, and that we probably know, because we have it - but the fact that we are conscious does not provide special access to the nature of this property.
I 239
Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: simple argument Vsmaterialism: that Zombies are conceptually impossible - then there would be two possible worlds that are physically indistinguishable, but can be distinguished in terms of qualitative experiences and consciousness that can be had inside them - then the consciousness does not supervene on the physical.
I 242
MaterialismVsVs: must accept that there could be zombies in the real world, but assert that there are none.
I 251
Materialism must be compatible with the having of consciousness.
I 241
Zombie/Stalnaker: z-World: is a world in which there is nothing, except that which supervenes on the physical - the absence of consciousness is not mentioned - but it is possible that there are zombies - otherwise the z-world is like the w-world. - later: a-world: additionally has consciousness, qualia, and so on - ((s) that is not explicitly denied for the z-world).
I 244
Zombie/Theoretical weight/Theory-laden/Stalnaker: if consciousness is theory-laden, it is built into the meaning of what the theory assumes about it - then the word is no longer innocent - then we might learn something new about it.
I 245 -
Example if water turned out to be a collective term for all manner, then we would say "It is not water" (because it were no element) - on the other hand: innocent use: corresponds to the whatever-. - ((s), the concept of role then denies theory ladenness?).
I 252
Zombie/Conceivability/Stalnaker: conceivability as an argument for possible existence:. Limited sense of conceivability: if it’s conceivable that we live in an a-world, then it is conceivable in this restricted sense that there are zombies there - Materialism: if he’s right and we live in a z-world, then there is no possible worlds that could be described correctly as a zombie world. - Conceivability: in a restricted sense is not an argument Vsmaterialism. - One would have to assume beforehand that materialism is wrong.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


The author or concept searched is found in the following 23 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Berkeley, G. Stegmüller Vs Berkeley, G. Stegmüller IV 376
Perception/Berkeley: the elements of ideas (the real things) depend on the will of the perceiver! They run in accordance with certain rules (which we would call natural laws today). Deceptions do not work this way. This proves that the divine spirit is more powerful than ours.
Reality/Berkeley: those ideas that make up what we call reality don't need to be constantly brought out again. If we do not perceive them, they remain existent because God's Spirit constantly perceives them.
VsBerkeley: unclear: if an idea exists only in and through being perceived, then it seems to be an object of consciousness. But then it is impossible that more than one mind could perceive exactly the same idea!
VsVs: For example, the tree I see, which is only my own idea, ceases to exist when I cease to see it.
IV 377
Although the ideas are causally dependent on the perceiving minds, they are not constituted by being perceived! Ideas: would then be more than mental contents or objects of reference: the real things would be ideas directly produced by God. The tree would then be independent of me.
Terminology: "Immaterial realism". Realism because for the perceiver there is a whole world of other spirits and ideas.
Theism/Stegmüller: Even ordinary theism claims that the physical world is "dependent on God", but this relationship remains dark here. In contrast, Berkeley's system is a clear and understandable interpretation: the world simply consists of ideas that exist in the divine spirit.
IV 382
Materialism/Idealism/Berkeley/Stegmüller: the decision for an alternative depends on the statement on Berkeley's seven arguments (IV 379 380).
VsBerkeley:
on (i): what kind of similarity does the materialist demand? on (ii): Locke only assumes that there are acceptable explanations for seeing, hearing, touching, etc., in which only objects with spatial properties are used as a starting point, but whose other properties need have no similarities with our ideas of secondary qualities. The question of whether this is similar for primary qualities can be left open.
IV 383
on (iii): even if movement, size, etc. are relative, they can be of an objective nature! Relativity does not imply mental dependence! on (v): it could be that a theory about a mind-independent reality is confirmed by the fact that it provides a better explanation for our sensory data than any other theory.
Moreover, this argument is worthless for Berkeley: it is not specifically directed against materialism as opposed to its immaterial realism.
The basic problem of any theory of representation: the "veil of perception" also exists here!
on (vi): this is indeed a problem for materialism, but that such a difficulty as the body soul problem occurs does not prove the untenability of all variants of this theory.
on (vii): things or qualities that are similar to our ideas do not need to be passive as well!
Conclusion: StegmüllerVsBerkeley: no argument from BerkeleyVsMaterialism is conclusive!

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Churchland, P. Pauen Vs Churchland, P. Pauen V 99
Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of ​​nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories.
V 100
VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis.
All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though.
V 101
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology.
VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved.
V 102
Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits...
PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design.
In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
V 103
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry.
In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro).
V 104
3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
V 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts.
He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness.

V 188
Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
V 189
forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology.
Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other.
V 191
Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible!
The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
V 192
Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties:
Levine: then there is a two-stage process:
V 193
1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are.
V 194
This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Eccles, J.C. Pauen Vs Eccles, J.C. Pauen V 52
Def Psychons/Eccles: the smallest elements of mental states. Their activity only changes the probability of the release of transmitters. Therefore no conflict with energy conservation. Solution: quantum-mechanical deviations. (>Consciousness/Penrose). Eccles/Pauen: with this he approaches substance dualism again! Psychons are not properties, but independent entities that instantiate consciousness.
Only dualism can ensure the free will (like Popper).
Eccles/Popper: Thesis: the self-conscious mind is busy actively modifying brain events in accordance with its interests.
Def Attachment Problem/Pauen: in view of the diversity of neuronal activity, the consistency of the first-person perspective can be explained only by the intervention of a conscious mind, but not by the neuronal activities.
V 53
Attachment Problem/Pauen: there are now concrete neuro-biological proposals for a solution. Attachment Problem/Eccles: brings empirical evidence: Libet. "Ability of self-conscious mind" to perform "temporal tricks".
Mind/Consciousness/Brain/Experiment/Benjamin Libet/Pauen: e.g. weak skin stimuli are only registered after 0.5 sec, but are dated back to the time when they actually occurred.
Mind/Brain/Experiment/Kornhuber: even in the complete absence of physical stimuli neuronal activity can be caused solely by mental processes.
EcclesVsMaterialism/EcclesVsIdentity Theory: unscientific superstition.
PauenVsEccles: it is unclear whether the undisputed effects of the ideal world 3 on the physical world 1 can only be explained under the assumption of the existence of autonomous mental processes.
E.g. If a glass breaks while a soprano singer is practicing, this explanation is inadmissible in any case!
V 54
E.g. congresses have undisputed physical procedures, but they can all be explained intra-physically. E.g. the energy balance in the congress center. The mere discovery of a new method does not bring the scientists together. Only if acts of will were found that cannot be explained neurobiologically, the position of the monists would be shaken.
V 55
VsEccles: he claims to possess such evidence, but the experiments by Libet and Kornhuber do not yield that: the results could only be evaluated as products of autonomous mental acts if physical causes can be excluded, and the experiments did not show that in the least. Since the brain has the ability to maintain activity for long periods even without external stimuli, also seemingly "spontaneous" reactions can be explained neurobiologically.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Functionalism Qualia-Theorie Vs Functionalism Lewis I 54
Qualia Theory VsMaterialism, VsFunctionalism: E.g. you never tasted "Vegemit" (the famous condiment). Thus, you also do not know what it s like to taste Vegemit. No information of the type, the materialists and functionalists talk about, helps. But when you taste it, you will know how it is. Therefore, there is a kind of information that has been overlooked by materialists and functionalists, the phenomenal information.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Functionalism Stalnaker Vs Functionalism I 219
Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//Stalnaker: if that were possible how could we talk about it? Both persons (of whom one would have a reversed spectra) would call red things red. The only thing that would be different would be the inner experiences, experiences that we cannot compare because we are not in a position to do so. Lately the problem is taken more seriously again.
This raises problems especially VsFunctionalism and VsMaterialism.
It has consequences for the concept of mind or the consciousness and intentionality.
VsInner experiences/Stalnaker: 1. Wittgenstein is skeptical about them.
2. VerificationismVsInternalism.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Gadamer, G. Block Vs Gadamer, G. Avra I 149
Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind).
I 150
Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Idealism Ryle Vs Idealism I 23
RyleVsIdealism/RyleVsMaterialism/Ryle: both idealism and materialism are the answer to a question asked wrongly. Either there is mind or there is body (but not both). E.g. As if someone wanted to say: either I bought a left and a right glove, or a pair. But not both.
Ryle: you can speak in a logical tone of mind and in a different tone of the body (of the existence), but these expressions do not to indicate different types of existence, because
"Existence"/Ryle: is not a generic word like "color" or "sex". Rather, they show two different meanings of the word "exist". E.g. "rising" can have different meanings: "The tide is rising", "The expectation is rising", "The average age at death is rising".
It would be a bad joke to say that now three things have risen.
Likewise, a bad joke would be to say that primes, Wednesdays, public opinion and fleets existed. Or that both mind and body exist.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Identity Theory Jackson Vs Identity Theory Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation).

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Materialism Berkeley Vs Materialism Ber I 231
Imagination/BerkeleyVsMaterialism: there can be no similarity between something that is an imagination and something that is not an imagination. So a perception cannot depict anything alien to perception.
What the perception is supposed to depict must itself be of the kind of perception, "an imagination can only be similar to an imagination".
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Materialism Functionalism Vs Materialism Danto2 I 272
FunctionalismVsMaterialism: functionalism has created serious problems for materialist theories of the mind. One cannot say that the mind is nothing other than the brain, and consequently nothing more than this material system, when the mind itself can be defined functionally, when something is given that supports all its features, but otherwise is different from the brain.   How can the mind be equated with the brain and with the computer, if on the other hand the computer and the brain cannot be equated with each other? Identity is transitive. That would not be fulfilled here.
Avra I 148
Holism/Avramides: therefore one sometimes says that behaviorism does not manage to find an access to the holism of the mental. Solution: Functionalism: was specially designed to take this holism into account.
FunctionalismVsMaterialism: has in relation to holism an advantage over the old materialism, which is sometimes called "central state materialism". (e.g. Smart 1969, Place 1969).
Def Central State Materialism/Avramides: (is a type of physicalism). Mental states and mental events can be reduced to physical states and events.
Problem: then certain beings cannot have a mind because of the certain form of their inner structure.
Solution: Functionalism: now allows "variable realization" of states of mind. Thus it identifies mentality not with a property of the 1st level, but with a property of the 2nd level (property of property). Property 2nd level of systems.
Functional property: is a property of a property. I.e. even beings without grey matter in their skulls can still be characterized as sensitive, cognitive beings. (Variable Realization).
Variable Realization/Functionalism: can assume variable realization, because it does not refer to certain structure or matter, but to inputs and outputs.
Thus he can avoid the problems of reductionism and Cartesianism. He still refers to behavior.
AvramidesVsFunctionalism: but it is still independent of "normal evidence" (normal behavior).
At first the attribution must not refer to the irreducible mental (otherwise circular). But this is not yet certain with the reference to input/output.
I 149
Solution/Lewis: his version of functionalism (1972,83a,83d)).
Materialism McGinn Vs Materialism II 33
McGinnVsMaterialism: intuitive answer: if materialism is right, I am despite all not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia! ((S) Because the physical processes remain the same.) - According to materialism we would all be zombies who imagine to have a consciousness.
II 34
That leads to an argument VsMaterialism: Ex assuming I know all about your brain what there is to know in neurological terms. Then, do I know all about your mind? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How then both can be declared identical? MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one matter and knowledge of facts is another matter.
McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to discriminate between mental and physical concepts without demanding a distinction at the level of facts.
What differentiates the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that the focus of both concepts are quite different properties, and thus we can not say, both properties are identical.
The materialist is forced to introduce the idea that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations in turn is beased on the fact that in relation to manifestations there are facts that they can not be explained by facts about the brain.
II 42
McGinnVsMaterialism: he tries to construct the mind from properties that are not suitable for it. He assumes that enough drops of neuronal water will light the fire of the mind.
He's right that some property of the brain is responsible for consciousness, but he is mistaken about the nature of this property.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Materialism Nagel Vs Materialism III 30
Objectivity/Reality/Nagel: with the accepted restriction that we can only detect the specific quality of every experience perspective from the inside, we do not give up the idea of a world as it is created in reality regardless of the appearance for any of us. Nagel: the world as it is also contains appearances and there is no privileged perspective to grasp them.
This is the negation of idealism with respect to consciousness.
The world is neither my world nor is it ours (this does not even apply to the mental world)!
NagelVsMaterialism: ultimately based on a kind of idealism: the idealism of objectivity
Objectivity/Nagel: is not reality, it's just a way of understanding reality. ((s) >Searle: realism as method and condition for forming hypotheses).
III 31
But it is still useful, because the search for an objective understanding is the only way to expand our knowledge. Otherwise we would have to dispense with mathematics, because it cannot be complete.

Rorty IV 64
NagelVsMaterialism/Rorty: ignores the "consciousness", i.e. the way things look viewed from inside the person. RortyVsNagel: the "view from the inside" allows to see some, but do not all the internal causes of behavior. These causes can be identified under "mental" descriptions. The ego of people are not organs and particles, but mostly their beliefs and desires.
IV 65
Introspection/Rorty: the ability to report does not depend on something being "present to the consciousness", but on that the use of words can be taught! (e.g. you need to know what fever is to find out whether you have it). "Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I"
Def "I"/Rorty: consists of the mental states of a person.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Materialism Putnam Vs Materialism I (b) 61
Principle of ignorance/PutnamVsMaterialism: the principle recommends not to insist on the fact (as materialists), that the mechanism of reference must be known to the speakers. Sensation/perception/Materialism: another group of materialists has suggested, to equate "I see a yellow spot" with "I am in the physical state."
PutnamVs: this is only a hypothesis.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Materialism Qualia-Theorie Vs Materialism Lewis I 54
Qualia Theory Vsmaterialism,Vsfunctionalism: E.g. you have never tasted "Vegemit" (the famous condiment). Thus, you do not know what it s like to taste Vegemit .Not as much information of the type, the materialists and functionalists talk about, helps. But when they taste it, they will know how it. Therefore, there is a kind of information that have been overlooked by materialists and functionalists: the phenomenal information.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Materialism Rorty Vs Materialism Rorty I 98
VsMaterialism/Rorty finds no place for imperfect perception (apprehension) (that something seems to be the case).
I 100
Appearance/Rorty: "Appearance" is a richer concept in our context, however! We must base it on the following premise: (P) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state of our own, there must be a property that we have present, and that led us to this announcement.
Vs (P): the premise embodies the Cartesian dualism.
I 101
What is the difference between the false description of a star and a false description of pain? We expect the appearance of the star to remain unchanged, if it turns out that it is just a hole in the sky vault. Pain, on the other hand, would have to feel different! Materialism/Rorty: every appearance of something turns out to be a brain state. According to this, the materialist would then have to argue that the "rough doubling" of a brain state presents itself as another brain state.
Opponent: "Well, let us talk about the brain state which is the "act of imperfect perception" of the previous brain state. >Materialism.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Materialism Searle Vs Materialism I 40
SearleVsMonism/SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally misguided. The real mistake was ever to start counting! Dualism: two flavors: substance dualism and property dualism. Searle: you can add a third: "conceptual dualism": that is, taking the dualistic terms so serious that "physically" implies "not mentally" and vice versa.
I 41
SearleVsMaterialism: Materialism is in fact a form of Dualism: it takes at least at the beginning the Cartesian categories seriously.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Materialism Verschiedene Vs Materialism Lanz I 285
VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory: three objections: 1. In contrast to the usual theoretical entities (genes, electrons), we have direct, introspective access to our own mental states. The assumption of their existence does not seem to depend on their explanatory role.
Lanz I 283
2. Sensations have qualitative characteristics that cannot be captured by causal analysis. For example, sweet/sour taste: clear qualitative difference, regardless of what their causal roles may be. (> Qualia problem). 3. (VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory): a purely causal analysis cannot explain the characteristic of intentionality. (Propositional Attitutede).
Materialism uses representation theory (VsSpeech Act Theory).
Stalnaker I 19
Zombie/Awareness/Stalnaker: one cannot say that there are possible worlds (poss.w.) with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. Problem: all materialists agree that there are possible worlds that the dualist calls "zombie worlds", they are even metaphysically possible!
Stalnaker: but the conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility only works if one assumes that materialism is wrong. And therefore the thinkability of zombies does not provide an argument VsMaterialism. The general picture goes like this:
"Consciousness": refers to a quality that we find within ourselves and that we may know because we have it. But the fact that we are conscious does not provide any particular access to the nature of that property.
Stalnaker I 239
VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: simple argument against him: that it is imaginable or conceptually possible that zombies exist. Some conclude that zombies are metaphysically possible.
Problem: if there are possible worlds that are physically exactly like the actual world,
I 240
only that there is no consciousness, then it follows that consciousness does not supervene on the physical! VsMaterialism: if consciousness does not supervene on the physical world, materialism is wrong.
I 242
Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: any materialist who believes that we are conscious beings must believe that the real world is the z-world, but deny that the z-world is a zombie world. This is the reason for A and B materialists to claim that the zombie world is metaphysically impossible: that some of the possible worlds that come into consideration as a candidate for a zombie world (the z-world) are not a zombie world.
Metaphysics/Imaginability/Lücke/VsMaterialism: if this is correct, materialism can no longer defend itself against the zombie argument that tries to drive a gap between imaginability and possibility. Namely that there are possible worlds that are imaginable, but not metaphysically possible.
I 243
MaterialismVsVs: each materialist will agree with all three philosophers that the z-world is not only imaginable, but also metaphysically possible. Metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: the question is not whether a situation is metaphysically possible, but whether, if it is, it is correctly described.
VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: the argument against it depends decisively on whether the z-world is a zombie-world. This cannot depend on innocent talk (semantics). It is about what world we live in.
Solution: we need more details about the z-world.
z-World/Stalnaker: we have defined it in terms of the actual world. And since we are not omniscient, we may argue about how the actual world should exactly and physically be (and so is the z-world). But these remain empirical questions.





Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Materialism Jackson Vs Materialism Schiffer I 152
Frank JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the criticism of materialism is based on an overly optimistic view of the animal man is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: argues only that qualia are epiphenomena. (camp). Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain type if one has no coherent account of how and why that is supposed to happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P causes having B, then it should be possible to subsume this under a psychophysically sophisticated causal law. At least some mechanism should explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does most likely not exist (especially considering that it should be possible that different physical states have B!) And what ever should a non-statutory mechanism be?

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Materialism Papineau Vs Materialism David Papineau
Literature
II 309
Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b)
a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences
b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences.
However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them.
(Mention = Reference)
II 310
Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.).
II 312
PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.)

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004
Materialism Stegmüller Vs Materialism Stegmüller IV 384
StegmüllerVsMaterialism: (i) It is surprising how well our two-dimensional perceptions are coordinated with each other. Largely Euclidean.
(ii) There is a constant interplay of data that Berkeley has to explain with a constant intervention of God (>occasionalism).
...(v) we can trace and explain the sensory physiology of the eye.
Such explanations are a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it deal with it?
Stegmüller IV 422
Consciousness/Mind Body Problem/SwinburneVsMaterialism: 1. There must be a clear or ambiguous correspondence between any kind of conscious process and one or more kinds of brain processes.
2. This relationship must be interpreted causally. The materialist must show that all consciousness processes are predictable due to brain states.
3. He must show that causation is based on natural laws simple enough to serve explanatory purposes.
Mackie: agrees that we must adopt a dualism of physical and experiential (phenomenal) properties.
IV 423
MackieVsSwinburne: this dramatises and distorts materialism: it does not claim that physical explanations are given for everything. Only in principle should this be possible. Supervenience/Stegmüller: Thesis: that there can be no world different from our world without at least one physical difference.

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Materialism Vollmer Vs Materialism II 82
Materialism/Mind/Consciousness/Body-Soul-Problem/Vollmer: Thesis: the "change from quantity to quality" represents a consistent monism.
II 83
VollmerVsMaterialism: 1. "Turning" is hopelessly imprecise. The preferred examples are phase transitions (e.g. evaporation) which have been described much more precisely in the meantime. (e.g. by molecular distance or molecular orientation). 2. Above all, quantity can never turn into quality. This is a confusion of categories.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Materialism Wessel Vs Materialism I 21
"Panlogism"/Wessel: panlogism refers to a philosophical doctrine, according to which the world develops according to logical laws. (World Laws, logos, Idealism). According to this, the world is dominated by something spiritual. Hegel: Everything real is reasonable.
There are similar approaches in materialism.
WesselVsMaterialism: projects only the general linguistic structure (logic) into reality and then identifies it with the structure of the world.
The universality of logical rules that we represent has nothing to do with panlogism.
Logical laws do not give us any information about the nature of non-linguistic reality. However, it is precisely the knowledge of this self-legality that allows us to distinguish real knowledge about non-linguistic reality from purely logical true statements.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Various Authors Identity Theory Vs Various Authors Lanz I 281
IdentitätstheorieVsKritiker: drei Repliken: 1. kein Kategorienfehler, sondern das Ungewohnte der wissenschaftlichen Neuigkeit. Viele wissenschaftliche Neuerungen begannen ihre Karriere als angebliche Kategorienfehler. Bsp manche fanden die Behauptung, Röntgenstrahlen gingen durch den Körper, sinnlos. Strahlen werden doch von Körpern reflektiert und nicht durchgelassen! Also quasi Widerspruch zur Definition. (Fälschlich).
2. Replik schlägt verbesserte Formulierung der Identitätsthese vor: sie identifizieren nicht mentale Objekte (Empfindungen, Gedanken, Vorstellungsbilder) mit neuralen Objekten, sondern Sachverhalte!
These der Sachverhalt, dass einer das denkt oder dies empfindet, ist identisch mit dem Sachverhalt, dass sich sein Körper in dem oder dem Zustand befindet! So beziehen sich die psychologischen Ausdrücke nicht auf mentale Objekte, sondern adverbiale Modifikationen von psychischen Personenzuständen, die nichts anderes sind als physische Zustände ihres Körpers.
3. Replik: es handelt sich um den Def eliminativen Materialismus: worüber wir mit psychologischen Ausdrücke reden, darüber werden wir mit Hilfe verbesserter Theorien mit nichtpsychologischen Ausdrücke sprechen lernen. Der Glaube an die Existenz mentaler Phänomene wird genauso verschwinden wieder Glaube an Hexen.
PutnamVsIdentitätstheorie. (Funktionalismus).
FodorVsIdentitätstheorie. (Fodor ist auch Psychologe). (Funktionalismus). >Lager.
Lanz I 287
Identitätstheorie: die Identitätstheorie identifiziert Typen mentaler Zustände mit physikalistisch charakterisierten Typen von Zuständen des Gehirns. Danach muss ein bestimmter Typ von Geisteszustand (z. B. »Schmerzen haben«) immer in derselben neuralen Struktur realisiert sein!
FunktionalismusVsIdentitätstheorie: das ist empirisch unplausibel:
1. Das Gehirn hat die Fähigkeit, Schädigungen seiner Teile zu kompensieren, indem andere Teile die ausgefallenen Funktionen übernehmen. (Split-Brain).
2. Zwei Wesen könnten physiologisch sehr unterschiedlich realisiert sein (Roboter, Marsmenschen) und dennoch die selben Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Erwartungen haben.
Split-Brain VsMaterialismus (Funktion kompensiert).
Funktionalismus (Marsmenschen, Roboter) VsMaterialismus.
FodorVsIdentitätstheorie: die Koextensivität der Prädikate ist bestenfalls ein Zufall, aber niemals ein Gesetz!
Pauen V 108
IdentitätstheorieVs semantischen Physikalismus/Pauen: bestreitet die Übersetzbarkeit der Aussagen und Vokabulare. IdentitätstheorieVsMaterialismus/Pauen: hält an der Realität des Bewusstseins fest. Sonst würde angesichts der postulierten Identität ja letztlich die Existenz des Gehirns bestritten.
V 109
IdentitätstheorieVsEpiphänomenalismus/Pauen: macht ohne Aufwand die kausale Wirksamkeit mentaler Prozesse deutlich, weil sie eben immer auch physische Prozesse sind. IdentitätstheorieVsInteraktionismus/Pauen: kann auf eine Erweiterung der Physik verzichten, schließlich können immer die neuronalen Prozesse der Forschungsgegenstand sein.

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001