Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capitalism | Weber | Habermas IV 463 Capitalism/Weber/Habermas: in capitalist enterprises, the conspicuous achievement is not the institutionalization of wage labor, but the profit-oriented and rational accounting-based orderliness of economic decisions. Cf. >Labour, >K. Marx, >Marxism. "Spirit of capitalism"/Weber: the Spirit of capitalism is the mentality that characterizes the purpose-rational economic action of early capitalist entrepreneurs. >Purpose rationality, >Economics. WeberVsMarx: While Marx regards the mode of production as the phenomenon in need of explanation, and examines the accumulation of capital as the new mechanism of system integration, Weber learns the investigation into the reversal of the polarity of economy and state administration to purpose-rational orientations for action. This is about social integration. Habermas: Marx assumes problems of the system integration and Weber problems of social integration. Habermas IV 464 The learning capacities acquired by individuals or groups are incorporated into the interpretation system of society through exemplary learning processes. >Learning, >Society, >Progress, >Economic Systems. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Class Conflict | Schumpeter | Brocker I 252 Class conflict/SchumpeterVsMarx/Schumpeter: Schumpeter calls the Marxist theory of the class conflict the "construction of an unbridgeable gap between tool owners and users" (1). Schumpeter sees class theory as "the crippled sister of the economic view of history" (2). "The exaggeration of the finality and meaning of the dividing line between the capitalist class [...] and the proletariat was only outbid by the exaggeration of antagonism between them." SchumpeterVsMarx: this relationship was at normal time primarily one of cooperation.(3). >Marxism, >K. Marx. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946). S. 40 2. Ebenda S. 31 3. Ebenda S. 40. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Classes | Gramsci | Brocker I 711 Classes/Gramsci: Gramsci introduces the concept "Subalterns" in the Quaderni del Carcere (1929-1935). The concept was originally used in the military field for subordinate officers. Gramsci transfers it to those who do not belong to a hegemonic class. GramsciVsMarxism: Gramsci thus deviates from the Orthodox-Marxist approach, which focuses its political attention above all on the Brocker I 712 urban working class. DhawanVsMarx: The rural population is neglected in Marx, as we know, because it is regarded as unorganized and prepolitical and cannot form a systematic antipole to the bourgeoisie. See Governance/Gramsci. Gramsci alternately calls the suppressed classes "classi subalterne", "classi subordinate" and "classi strumentali". This differentiation can only be understood in connection with the dominant social groups. The dominant social groups realize their historical unity in the state, i.e. in the combination of political and civil society. In contrast, the subaltern classes form a fragmented grouping characterized by a lack of autonomy and structural and economic exclusion (1) Subalternity/Dhawan: the term was adopted within postcolonial theory by Guha, among others, who thus defined a space that is cut off from all forms of mobility.(2)(3) Subalternity is thus not an identity designation, but a position that marks the difference. 1. Vgl. Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9. Hefte 22 bis 29, hg.v. Wolfgang Fritz Haug/Klaus Bochmann, Hamburg 1999 (ital. zuerst 1934). 2. Vgl. Spivak. Selected Works of Gayatri Spivak, hg. V. Donna Landry/Gerald Maclean, New York/London 1996, S. 288. 3. Vgl. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgery in Colonial India, Delhi 1983. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolGram I Antonio Gramsci Quaderni del carcere, 1948-1951 - Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Eds. Geoffrey N. Smith/Quintin Hoare, 1971 German Edition: Gefängnishefte Hamburg 1999 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Dialectic | Hegel | Bubner I 75 Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality. Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention. It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it. I 76 Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind. >Irony. Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection. >Reflection. I 77 HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance. This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony. "General irony of the world". >Causality, >Hermeneutics, >Teleology. --- Wright I 21 Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections. Wright I 154 G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. Gadamer I 471 Dialectic/Hegel/Gadamer: The speculative relationship must (...) change into dialectical representation. According to Hegel, this is the demand of philosophy. >Speculation/Hegel, >Predication/Hegel. What means expression and representation here is of course not actually a proving action, but the thing Gadamer I 472 proves itself by expressing and representing itself in this way. Thus dialectic will also really experience that thinking is turned into its opposite as an incomprehensible inversion. Expression: Dialectic is the expression of the speculative, the representation of what actually lies in the speculative, and insofar the "real" >speculative. Proof: But if (...) the representation is not an additional action, but the emergence of the thing itself, then the philosophical proof itself belongs to the thing. Representation: (...) nevertheless, such representation is not at all external in truth. It only considers itself to be so as long as thinking does not know that in the end it proves itself to be a >reflection of the thing within itself. It is true that Hegel emphasizes the difference between speculative and dialectical only in the preface to phenomenology. Because this difference cancels itself out, Hegel later, from the point of view of absolute >knowledge, no longer records it. >Speculation/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Dialectic | Marx | Wright I 21 Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections. I 154 G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist","scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. Cf. >Hermeneutics, >Teleology. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Economy | Weber | Habermas III 300/301 Economy/Weber/Habermas: the two institutional complexes in which Max Weber sees modern structures of consciousness primarily embodied are the capitalist economy and the modern state. >Capitalism, >State. What is "rational" about it? >Rationality. Here Weber seems to envision the organizational model realized in the capitalist enterprise and in the modern state institution when he speaks of social rationalization. Their rationality is that those involved are obliged to act rationally. The decisive economic basis is the 'separation' of the worker from the material means of production: the means of production of the economy, the means of war in the army, the material means of administration in public administration, the means of research in the university institute and laboratory, the means of finance for all of them.(1) Habermas III 301/302 The concentration of material resources is the necessary condition for the institutionalisation of procedural-rational action. >Institutions, >Institutionalization. Weber: "The modern capitalist business rests above all on calculation. For its existence it needs a judiciary and administration whose functioning can be rationally calculated at least in principle on the basis of fixed general norms, just as one calculates the expected performance of a machine".(2) Habermas III 305 WeberVsMarx/Habermas: unlike Marx, who begins with labor value theoretical considerations, Weber explains the institutionalization of procedural-rational action first with the help of Protestant professional culture and then with the help of the modern legal system. >Purpose rationality, >K. Marx. 1. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 1047. 2. Ibid. p. 1048. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Freedom | Marx | Höffe I 365 Freedom/Necessity/Marx/Höffe: Marx adopts a traditional (...) dichotomy: the separation of an empire of necessity subjected to labor from an empire of freedom removed from labor(1). Overwhelmed by the misery of the factory workers of the time, he does not seek the opportunities for freedom inherent in work, which lie in education and training and the possibilities of communication and mutual recognition that are built into the work. Rather, he states, not wrongly, the moment of compulsion that belongs to work. HöffeVsMarx: But when he complains that labor does not satisfy one's own needs, but only the needs of others through goods, he does not take into account that the worker also needs goods, which he/she can obtain through the medium of exchange (money), if he/she has enough of it. >Humans/Marx. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Government | Gramsci | Brocker I 712 Rule/GramsciVsMarx/Gramsci: Gramsci argues for a complex relationship between rule and subordination. ((s) This probably means a multi-layered view of this problem). Gramsci thesis: a subaltern group is not only marginalized by economic conditions, but is affected by heterogeneous exclusions. Gramsci alternately calls the suppressed classes "classi subalterne", "classi subordinate" and "classi strumentali". This differentiation can only be understood in connection with the dominant social groups. The dominant social groups realize their historical unity in the state, i.e. in the combination of political and civil society. In contrast, the subaltern classes form a fragmented grouping characterized by a lack of autonomy and structural and economic exclusion. Solution/Gramsci: the political goal is to overcome the fragmentation of the subaltern groups through organization and through an alliance between workers and rural masses.(1) >Ch. Spivak. 1. Vgl. Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9. Hefte 22 bis 29, hg.v. Wolfgang Fritz Haug/Klaus Bochmann, Hamburg 1999 (ital. zuerst 1934). Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolGram I Antonio Gramsci Quaderni del carcere, 1948-1951 - Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Eds. Geoffrey N. Smith/Quintin Hoare, 1971 German Edition: Gefängnishefte Hamburg 1999 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| History | Fukuyama | Brocker I 805 History/Fukuyama: Fukuyama's thesis of the "end of history" refers to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West conflict or the Cold War. This endpoint is due to the victory of a liberal-market economical Brocker I 806 and democratic system of western character through alternative models of order. The title refers to both Hegel's and Marx' thesis of the same name. History/Hegel: Hegel saw the end of history in the establishment of a liberal state. History/MarxVsHegel/Marx: the end of history is only reached with the worldwide implementation of communism. FukuyamaVsMarx: The enforcement of democracy and capitalism is at the end of history. Democracy/Capitalism/Fukuyama: both have prevailed because they best meet two basic human needs: Capitalism/Fukuyama: is the economic system that best achieves an efficient allocation of goods under conditions of scarcity. Democracy/Fukuyama: is the model of order that relatively satisfies the human need for social recognition better than other systems. Fukuyama does not predict a quick victory for democracy. The struggle for them continues between a so-called post-historical world (in the industrialized countries of the Global North) and a historical world (in the industrializing countries of the Global South). See Democracy/Fukuyama. Brocker I 811 VsFukuyama: His theses were received as not particularly independent. It was pointed out that they already came up under Alexandre Kojève. (1) See also Master-Slave Dialectic/Kojève. Fukuyama's book seemed too pessimistic to many critics. VsFukuyama: 1. The empirical validity of his presentation of history has been called into question. Brocker I 812 FukuyamaVsVs: His thesis is not to be understood descriptive but normative . 2. Fukuyama's interpretation of the historical process as progress was criticized. 3. The same empiricism can also be interpreted differently than it was done by Fukuyama. 1. Shadia B. Drury, „The End of History and the New World Order“, in: International Journal 48/1, 1992/93, p. 80-99. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| History | Marx | Höffe I 368 History/Marx/Höffe: [Marx](1) begins with the analysis of commodity and money as the factual preconditions and formal elements. He concedes to capital the world-historical task of developing all productive forces of labor. On the other hand, however, it prevents what is indispensable for a truly humane economy: that work or the worker becomes the subject of social processes. Determinism: Freely borrowing from Hegel's philosophy of history, Marx thinks deterministically. For in his view, the allegedly undeniable "impoverishment of the masses" follows a mechanism that inevitably leads to the self-absorption of capital. In his view, there is a growing concentration of capital, in the course of which more and more owners of capital are expropriated, which should have an obvious consequence: As misery grows, so does the indignation of an ever larger organized labor force. >History/Hegel, >World history/Hegel, >Weltgeist/Hegel. 1. K. Marx Das Kapital Vol. I 1867, Vol. II & II 1885 (= MEW 23-25) Gaus I 80 History/Marx/Levine, Andrew: Hegel’s philosophy of history was, of course, the immediate inspiration for Marx’s attempt to make sense of history as such. But Marx broke ranks with Hegel and the entire tradition that his work culminated in by rejecting teleology and, with it, the project of discovering what historical events mean. Marx retained Hegel’s sense of history’s intelligibility; he sought to provide an account of real historical structures and of the direction of historical change. >History/Hegel. MarxVsHegel: But, for Marx, history is as meaningless as nature is. Like nature too, it has properties that are independent of investigators’ interests and that are in principle capable of being known. The philosophers of history, Hegel especially, had grasped aspects of real history, but through the distorting lens of their own teleological convictions. Marx set them right, without succumbing to the atheoreticism of contemporary historians. History/MarxismVsMarx: Western Marxisms, for all their differences, were of one mind in distancing themselves from Marx’s theory of history. The historical materialist orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals was, in the eyes of Western Marxists, too fatalistic to pass muster. It failed to accord human agency its due. Its commitment to historical inevitability even seemed to render the very idea of politics otiose. If the end is already given, one can perhaps hasten its coming, but nothing can fundamentally change the ultimate outcome. This, it seemed to them, was a formula for quiescence, for passively awaiting the revolution. But the historical materialism Western Marxists faulted was not exactly the historical materialism Cohen defended. >History/Cohen. Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Ideology | Marx | Habermas IV 303 Ideology/Marx/HabermasVsMarx/Habermas: critical instruments such as the concept of ideology become blunt because a metatheoretical framework of sufficient complexity cannot be developed within one of the disintegrated paradigms (of action and systems theory). Solution/Parsons/Habermas: in Talcott Parsons these two lines of theoretical history (approach via action and system) converge again. >Talcott Parsons, >Systems theory, >Action theory. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Labour | Arendt | Brocker I 359 Labour/Arendt: Question: How could it come that labour was classified as higher-quality than public speaking, that production took the place of action? While in antiquity labour was despised, in modern times it was declared the basis of life for all and, even more so, the basis of a meaningful life. >Sense, >Life, >Actions. ArendtVsMarx: Labour "does" nothing. Labour has no relation to the world outside the labour cycle. >Creativity. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Marx | Höffe | Höffe I 369 Marx/Höffe: Alienation:HöffeVsMarx: It is (...) not wrong to intertwine two concepts of alienation: the socio-psychological alienation, that "someone or something becomes a stranger to you", and the economic-legal alienation, that "someone sells property". But Marx argues the more far-reaching thesis that both alienations are two sides of one and the same process. Because this thesis is neither substantiated nor plausible, the socio-political goal cannot convince that a change in the economic form, the abolition of private property, the socio-psychological change, will bring about the person who is no longer alienated. >Alienation. Changes/HöffeVsMarx: (...) a change in economic form [comes about] only through a change in people. In Hegel's terms, "objective morality", the world of institutions, is only a counterpart to "subjective morality", human responsibility, not a substitute for it. Höffe I 370 In Hegelian terms, [Marx] generally overestimates the weight of the economy over that of law and state within the framework of objective morality. >Customs/Hegel. Theory/HöffeVsMarx: Even a theory that is compelling in argumentative terms cannot produce the corresponding practice itself. For this it needs an essentially practical moment: the approval of the allegedly compelling theory, its recognition. >Practise. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Marx | Schumpeter | Brocker I 251 Marx/Schumpeter: Schumpeter states that Karl Marx's "practical power of judgement", even his "political method", was based on "diagnostic errors" and "wishful thinking". (1) There are also more friendly comments by Schumpeter about the scientist Marx. Marx had above all asked the right questions and developed a multidisciplinary vision that focused on a "process of incessant change in the economic structure"(2). Brocker I 252 SchumpeterVsMarx: Schumpeter criticizes Marx, which he also criticizes in Ricardo and Keynes: that their scientific statements are calculated for political effect (and thus disguise the scientific content, making it difficult to criticize him constructively). >D. Ricardo, >J.M. Keynes. But to preach in the dress of the analyst and analyze with a view to the needs of the heart, this created a passionate following and gave the Marxist that greatest gift which consists in the conviction that "what one is and what one stands for will never fail, but will ultimately be victorious"(3). Brocker I 253 Economy/Marx/Schumpeter: Schumpeter pro Marx: he was not satisfied with the usual buzzwords of overreaching or cheating, but analyzed exploitation as something that resulted from the own logic of capital, independent of the intentions of the individual.(4) 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946). Insbesondere der Schlussteil des Buches. 2. Ibid. p. 54 3. Ibid. p. 21. 4. Ibid. p. 51 Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Marxism | Ball | Gaus I 20 Marxism/interpretation//Ball: A Marxian approach to textual interpretation encounters a number of difficulties, among them the following. We have seen already that Marxists assume that the ruling ideas of an epoch are those that serve the interests of the ruling class; and since most political thinkers have belonged to an educated and literate elite, their ideas serve the ruling class. 1) BallVsMarxism: But then Marx and Engels (and Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Lukács, and many other prominent Marxists) have not belonged to the class of oppressed labourers but to a learned and literate Gaus I 21 elite. >K. Marx, >F. Engels, >L. Trotsky, >G. Lukács. By Marxian lights their ideas should serve the interests of the ruling capitalist class, not those of the labouring proletariat. How can the ideas of these Marxists serve the interests of a class to which they do not belong? MarxismVsVs: All attempts (by Marx and others) to answer this question - that there are some who through will or intellect transcend their ‘objective’ class basis, that the workers cannot theorize for themselves because they are afflicted with ‘false consciousness’ whilst middle-class intellectuals are not, etc. - are merely ad hoc rationalizations and are clearly unsatisfactory. 2) VsMarxism: Moreover, how Marxists can interpret all political theories, past and present, as ideological masks concealing and justifying the domination of one class by another - and yet exempt their own theorizing as an exception to this rule - is not explained (or even explainable) in any satisfactory way. 3) VsMarxism: (...) not least, Marxian interpretations have a formulaic, cookie-cutter quality: the interpreter has preset ideas about what she will find – namely ideological trickery or obfuscation in the service of the ruling class – and, presto, she finds it lurking in even the most innocent-sounding passages. >Ideology. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Marxism | Feminism | Gaus I 281 Marxism/Feminism/FeminimsVsMarxism/Mottier: For feminist Marxists, the notion of individual rights is an illusion which serves to mask the capitalist Gaus I 282 and patriarchal foundations of the liberal state, as well as its domination by a male elite. They insist particularly on the necessity of recognizing the value of 'reproductive work' accomplished by women. >Capitalism. VsMarxism: However, as Mary Dietz (1992)(1) points out, the theme of citizenship is highly underdeveloped in the Marxist critique of capitalism and representative democracy. Marxist theorists tend to reduce feminist politics to the revolutionary struggle against the state - seen as the principal source of the oppression of women - and to reduce women to their reproductive functions. >M. Dietz. 1. Dietz, Mary (1992) 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship'. In Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 63—85. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Marxism | Habermas | III 216 Marxism/Habermas: Hegel has become effective through an uncritical appropriation of the dialectical conceptual apparatus; the unity of theoretical and practical reason is built into the basic concepts of critique of political economy in such a way that the normative foundations of Marxian theory... III 217 ...have been darkened until today. >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason, >Ethics, >Theory of Knowledge, >G.W.F. Hegel. In Marxism this ambiguity was partly circumvented, partly concealed, but not actually eliminated: circumvented by the division of Marx' social theory into social research and ethical socialism (M. Adler); and concealed both by an orthodox connection to Hegel (Lukács, Korsch) and by an assimilation to the more naturalistic development theories of the 19th century (Engels, Kautsky). These theories form the bridge over which the topic of rationalization, which was initially dealt with in historical philosophy, was transferred to sociology.(1) >Sociology. IV 222 Lifeworld/Marxism/Habermas: the Marxist critique of bourgeois society starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. >Lifeworld/Habermas. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". It must neither identify the environment with society as a whole nor reduce it to systemic contexts. >Society, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 399 Marxism/VsCapitalism/Habermas: The starting point of all criticism of capitalism was the question of whether the conversion of prebourgeois normatively organized labor relations to the medium of money (see Money/Habermas, Money/Parsons), whether thus the monetization of the labor force IV 400 means an intervention in living conditions and areas of interaction which themselves are not integrated in the form of media and cannot be detached painlessly, i.e. without social-pathological effects, from structures of communication-oriented action. IV 504 Marxism/HabermasVsMarxism/Habermas: Marx's approach demands an economically abridged interpretation of the developed capitalist societies. For these, Marx rightly claimed an evolutionary primacy of the economy. However, this primacy must not tempt us to tailor the complementary relationship between the economy and the state apparatus to a trivial superstructure-based concept. Solution/Habermas: in contrast to the monism of value theory, we have to reckon with two control media and four channels through which two complementary subsystems subject the lifeworld to their imperatives. The reification effects can result equally from the bureaucratization and monetization of public and private spheres of life. IV 505 The economicist approach fails in view of the pacification of the class conflict and the long-term success that reformism has achieved in European countries since the Second World War in the broad sense of a social-democratic program. >Interventionism/Habermas. 1. J. Habermas Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt, 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Marxism | Jonas | Brocker I 610 Marxism/JonasVsMarxism/Jonas: Jonas assumes that socialism is more capable of imposing a "policy of renunciation" (1) than the Western liberal democracies. This renunciation is necessary to preserve the biosphere for future generations and to preserve human life. >Ethics/Jonas. - On the other hand: Brocker I 611 JonasVsMarxism: he has helped fuel the technological megalomania of mankind by pursuing - like capitalism - a "fundamentally technological conception of society" (2). JonasVsBloch: Jonas explicitly understands his book The Principle of Responsibility as an alternative concept and as "Critique of Marxist Utopism" (3), as paradigmatically expressed in Ernst Bloch's The Principle of Hope (1954-1959). 1. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, p. 86 2. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 276. 3. Ibid. p. 327 Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Marxism | Olson | Brocker I 483 Marxism/Collective Action/Olson: OlsonVsMarx/OlsonVsMarxism: Problem: Marxist class theory and the pluralistic view of representation of interests overlook the problem of collective action. >Collective action. Brocker I 484 Although the members of the respective classes have common interests, this does not mean that each individual would also be motivated to make their individual contribution. Free rider problem: if the individuals who form a class act rationally, there will be no class-oriented action". (1) This applies to workers who form trade unions to fight for wage increases. But it also applies to the class of workers as a whole, which has an interest in overcoming the division of society into classes. >Free rider, >Moral hazard. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968), p. 104. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Money | Marx | Mause I 299 Money/Marx: Marx's thesis: Money means domination over others and could lead to exploitation and impoverishment: "Since money does not show what it is transformed into, everything, goods or not, turns into money. Everything becomes saleable and purchasable... As all qualitative difference of the goods is erased in money, it in turn as a radical leveller erases all differences". (Marx[1867]/1957.(1) VsMarx: General criticism of Marx's monetary theory: Trend in profit rate: is now widely disproved. Money in practice: contrary to Marx's predictions, even communist states could not do without money.(2) Power/Marx: the idea that possession of money is associated with power is topical for today. >Communism, >Socialism, >Marxism, >Exchange, >Commodity. 1. Marx, Karl. Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Berlin 1867/ 1957. 2. Dirk Wentzel, Geldordnung und Systemtransformation: Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Theorie der Geldverfassung. Schriften zum Vergleich von Wirtschaftsordnungen, Bd. 50. Stuttgart/ Jena/ New York 1995. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Nature | Nietzsche | Ries II 81 Nature/Nietzsche/On the Genealogy of Morality(1)/NietzscheVsMarx: inner nature immortalizes the murderous connection of life in a single tale of suffering. Pessimism. >Life/Nietzsche, >Suffering/Nietzsche, >World/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche, >Humans/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Genealogie der Moral, VI. 2. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Negation | Adorno | Grenz I 50 Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation.(1) >Subjectivity/Adorno, >G.W.F. Hegel. I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. I 50 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics.(2) >Objectivity. Grenz I 51 The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. I Grenz 80 Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. Grenz I 83 Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 91 Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel. I 92 b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational.(3) Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical.(4) c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism. Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice".(5) Grenz I 106 Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. >Art/Adorno, >Works of art/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character.(6) Grenz I 116 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. >Materialism/Adorno. Grenz I 180 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970.p. 159, FN 2. Ebenda. 3. Negative Dialektik, p. 8 4. Th. W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Amsterdam 1947. p 126. 5. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie, In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. p. 205. 6. Negative Dialektik, p. 159f |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Politics | Jonas | Brocker I 610 Politics/Jonas: to enforce his ethical imperatives (see Ethics/Jonas, Ecological Imperative/Jonas) Jonas relies entirely on politics and its coercive means. Education alone is not able to achieve the ethical reconsideration of people. According to Jonas, "a maximum of politically imposed social discipline" (1), in the sense of a "policy of renunciation" (2), a "subordination of the present advantage to the long-term imperative of the future" (3), is necessary. Solution/Jonas: Forms of political "autocracy" (4), like socialism, seem more suitable to him than the liberal democracies of the West organized in a market economy. Context: See Ethics/Jonas, However, Jonas has critical reservations VsMarxism: See Marxism/Jonas. 1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 255 2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, p. 86 3. Jonas 1979, p. 255 4. Ibid. p. 262 Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Property | Arendt | Brocker I 358 Property/Possession/ArendtVsMarx/Arendt: Marx wrongly equates property with possession. Arendt, on the other hand, uses a definition of property that largely refers to "house and yard". With John Locke and other liberal thinkers, she insists that posession is qualitatively different from property. Possession is piled up property that goes far beyond the satisfaction of personal necessities. >K. Marx, >J. Locke, >Liberalism. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationalization | Marx | Habermas III 208 Rationalization/Marx/Habermas: according to Marx, social rationalization is immediately asserting itself in the development of productive forces, i. e. in the expansion of empirical knowledge, the improvement of production techniques and the increasingly effective mobilization, qualification and organization of socially useful labour. On the other hand, production relations, i. e. the institutions that express the distribution of social power and regulate differential access to the means of production, are being revolutionized solely under the pressure to rationalize the forces of production. Max WeberVsMarx: See Rationalization/Weber. Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Marx/Habermas: in the version of a dialectic of dead and living work, we can find in Marx already a correspondence to the dialectics of social rationalization. As the historical passages of "Capital" show, Marx examines how the accumulation process undermines the living environment of those producers who are the only real ones who can offer their own labour. He follows the contradictory process of social rationalization in the self-destructive movements of an economic system that organizes the production of goods on the basis of wage labor as the production of exchange values and thus disintegrates the living conditions of the classes involved in these transactions. For Marx, socialism lies in the line of flight from a rationalization of the world of life that has failed with the capitalist dissolution of traditional forms of life.(1) >Life world. 1.Siehe K. Löwith, M.Weber und K. Marx, in: Löwith (1960) 1ff; W. Schluchter (1972); N. Birnbaum, Konkurrierende Interpretationen der Genese des Kapitalismus: Marx und Weber, in: C. Seyfarth, W. Sprondel (1973), 38ff; A. Giddens, Marx, Weber und die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus, ebd. S. 65ff. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationalization | Weber | Habermas IIII 208 Rationalization/WeberVsMarx/Weber/Habermas: Weber assesses the institutional framework of the capitalist economy and the modern state differently: not as production conditions that capture the rationalization potential, but as the subsystems of procedural rational action in which occidental rationalism develops socially. >Capitalism, >K. Marx. Of course, as a result of the bureaucratisation, he fears that social conditions will become reificationary, which suffocates the motivational impetus of rational living. >Reification, >Bureaucracy, >Rationality, >Purpose rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno, later also Marcuse, interpreted Marx from Webers' perspective. In the sign of an independent instrumental reason, the rationality of natural domination merges with the irrationality of class domination, the unleashed productive forces stabilise the alienating production conditions. >Rationalization/Marx, >Instrumental Reason. Habermas III 228 Definition Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 238 Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber wants to explain the institutionalization of procedural-rational action in terms of a process of rationalization. >Institutionalization, >Institutions, >Organisation. Initial situation: the methodological lifestyle of entrepreneurs and civil servants oriented towards professional ethics as well as the organisational means of formal law. The corresponding structures of consciousness are embodied in institutions on the one hand and personality systems (dispositions of action and value orientations) on the other. Ultimately, for Weber, ethical and legal rationalism is the result of a process of disenchantment reflected at the level of worldviews. III 239 There are two major waves of rationalization: 1. rationalization of world views, 2. translation of cultural into social rationalization. >Worldviews. Habermas III 306 Rationalization/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: in the transition from cultural to social rationalization, Weber's theory of action, which is tailored to the type of procedural rational action, narrows the concept of rationality with many consequences. He begins directly with the actual figures of Western rationalism without reflecting them on the counterfactual possibilities of a rationalized world. >Lifeworld. If, however, he needs standards for his further investigations for measuring a shrunken rationality, these problems reappear. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Recognition | Honneth | Brocker I 789 Recognition/Honneth: Honneth thesis: a certain form of relationship Brocker I 790 between individuals has a constitutive meaning for social reality. The intersubjective practice, in which people mutually recognize each other as needy, equal and unique subjects (or refuse to recognize each other), forms the basic building block of social life. It is the basis of the identity of individuals, an essential object of social interactions and disputes and the most important motor of social development. The practical logic of social processes therefore follows a "moral grammar" resulting from individuals' claims to social recognition of their identity and from social struggles for these claims. See Identity/Honneth, Recognition/Hegel, Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Brocker I 796 HonnethVsMead/HonnethVsHegel: as negative equivalents of the positive aspects love, law and solidarity, the phenomena of rape, deprivation of rights and degradation must also be considered in an empirical theory of recognition. It is such experiences of disregard that make "the fact of withheld recognition for social actors socially tangible" in the first place. (1) Three basic forms of recognition/Honneth: Stage 1: elementary intersubjective basic pattern of love and friendship: this is exemplary in Hegel's relationship between parents and children. (2) Here individuals recognize each other in their concrete nature of needs and affects and their interdependence in this respect. Brocker I 797 The elementary form of recognition is formed in the relationship of love (see Love/Honneth). However, this form "cannot be applied arbitrarily to a larger number of interaction partners". (3) Brocker I 798 Stage 2 Socialization, See Law/Honneth, Law/Hegel, Socialization/Honneth. Stage 3: Solidarity: see Self-Respect/Honneth. Brocker I 800 On the problems: here it concerns the demanded integration of the acknowledgment problem into an overall social moral orientation horizon. HonnethVsMead, HonnethVsMarx, HonnethVsSartre, HonnethVsSorel: see (4). See Politics/Honneth. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 150. 2. Ibid. p. 34. 3. Ibid. p. 174 4. Ibid. p. 237, 241, 247f, 253f. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Reification | Marx | Habermas IV 502 Reification/Marx/HabermasVsMarx/Habermas: Marx cannot distinguish the aspect of reification in connection with the proletarianization of craftsmen, peasants and rural plebeians from the aspect of structural differentiation of the lifeworld. His concept of alienation is not sufficiently selective. The value theory (see Value Theory/Marx, Value Theory/Habermas) does not provide a basis for a concept of reification that would allow to identify syndromes of alienation relative to the degree of rationalization of a lifeworld achieved in each case. Habermas: on the level of post-traditional life forms, the pain counts that the separation of Habermas IV 503 culture, society and personality also adds to those who grow into modern societies, as a process of individualization and not as alienation. In a largely rationalized world, reification can only be measured by the conditions of communicative socialization at all, not by a nostalgically conjured, often romanticized past of pre-modern forms of life. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Revolution | Marx | Habermas IV 499 Revolution/Marx/Habermas: Marx not only wants to show how the systemically independent process of self-exploitation of capital is experienced from the lifeworld perspective of wage workers as continuous exploitation, how the subsumption of labour power under the commodity form pulls workers out of their traditional living conditions, first uproots corporative ways of existence plebeianly and then proletarianises them. >Labor/Marx, >Labor Power/Marx, >Alienation/Marx, >Commodity. Rather, Marx drafts a practical-political perspective of action which, in its prerequisites, is exactly contrary to the perspective tacitly adopted by system functionalism. Systems theory presupposes that the process of instrumentalizing the lifeworld has already come to a conclusion. Habermas IV 500 In contrast, Marx envisages a future state in which the objective appearance of the capital has melted away and the world held captive under the dictates of value law has been returned to its spontaneity. He foresees the formation of a movement that seizes political power only to revolutionize society; together with private ownership of means of production, it will destroy the institutional foundations of the medium through which the capitalist economy has been differentiated and bring the systemically independent process of economic growth back into the horizon of the lifeworld. Terminology/Marx: In Marx, the system and lifeworld appear under the metaphors of the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom". >Lifeworld. WeberVsMarx/Habermas: compared to Marx's revolutionary expectations that theoretical criticism only has to solve the magic that rests on the work that has become abstract, Weber is proved right: "that the abolition of private capitalism...would by no means mean a break-up of the steel housing of modern industrial work...".(1) >M. Weber. HabermasVsMarx: his error can be traced back to the dialectical link between system and environment analysis, which (...) does not allow a separation between the (...) Habermas IV 501 level of system differentiation and the class-specific forms of its institutionalization. >Lifeworld, >Systems Theory. Brocker I 203 Permanent Revolution/Marx: Marx already used the term "permanent revolution" for the first time in his paper "On the Jewish Question", 1844(4), where he declared the Jacobin rule in the French Revolution as a violent attempt to establish the political superstructure of bourgeois society. This can only be achieved by declaring the revolution permanent. The political drama therefore ends just as necessarily with the restoration of religion, private property, all elements of bourgeois society, as the war ends with peace.(2) >Judaism, >French Revolution, >Bourgeoisie. This had nothing to do with the idea of a permanent revolution to bring the proletariat to power. Permanent Revolution/Marx/Engels: later it is about making the revolution permanent and carrying it to all countries until the competition of the proletarians in these countries has stopped.(3) 1.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Köln 1964 2. Marx, Karl, »Zur Judenfrage« [1844], in: ders./Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin [DDR] 1956, Bd. 1, 347-377. 3. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, »Ansprache der Zentralbehörde an den Bund vom März 1850«, in: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin [DDR] 1960, Bd. 7, 244-254. 4. Karl Marx: Zur Judenfrage. In: Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Paris 1844, S. 182 ff. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Value Theory | Habermas | IV 494 Value Theory/Method/Habermas: Marx' value theory specifies rules according to which systematic statements (about anonymous value relationships) can be translated into historical statements (about interaction relations IV 495 between social classes). In this way, problems of system integration can be mapped at the level of social integration and be linked to the dynamics of class conflicts. IV 498 Method/HabermasVsMarx: it is a weakness of value theory that statements about the system or about the lifeworld are only possible as statements about a totality that holds both moments together. >System, >Lifeworld. It is assumed that there is a logical connection between system development and structural change in everyday life. Marx understands the unity of the system and the lifeworld (...) according to the model of the unity of a torn moral totality. >Totality. IV 499 This leads him to misunderstand the evolutionary intrinsic value of media-controlled subsystems (see Media/Habermas). Problem: this makes it impossible for Marx to present his perspective of action within the framework of his theory of revolution. IV 501 HabermasVsMarx: Marx lacks the criteria with which he could distinguish the destruction of traditional living environments. IV 503 HabermasVsMarx: another decisive weakness of value theory is the generalization of a special case of the subsumption of the lifeworld under system imperatives. The processes of reification does not need to necessarily occur only in the sphere in which they are created - in the world of work. They can also occur in private life. Value theory (however) calculates only with one channel, that of the monetization of labour. >Values/Economics, >Labour. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Value Theory | Marx | Habermas IV 302 Value Theory/Marx/Habermas: Question: How do the two forms of integration of contexts of action relate to each other, one that takes place in the consciousness of the actors as it were (>action theory) and the other that silently reaches through the actors' orientations (>system theory)? Solution/Hegel: in legal philosophy, Hegel solves this problem in the sense of an idealistic transition from the subjective to the objective mind. Solution/Marx: Marx introduces value theory in order to connect political-economic statements about the anonymous connections of a system with sociological-historical statements about the action connections, structured in the lifeworld, of actors, individuals or Habermas IV 303 collectives. HabermasVsMarx/HabermasVsHegel: these solution strategies have now lost their plausibility. Action and system theory can be understood as remaining parts of these approaches. Mause I 69 Labor theory of value/Marx: Karl Marx (1818-1883) can in some respects be described as a classical economist: Like the representatives of the classical school, he concentrated on production and supply conditions and economic growth and its determinants; Marx' labor theory of values is essentially the same as that of Ricardo. >D. Ricardo. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Value Theory | Schumpeter | Brocker I 253 Value Theory/SchumpeterVsMarx/Schumpeter: Schumpeter criticizes Marx' value-added theory of capitalist exploitation and its underlying theory of labour values in land and soil. In his view "it is easy to prove that under Marx's own conditions the theory of added value is untenable" (1). >Value theory/Marx, >Capitalism/Schumpeter, >Socialism/Schumpeter. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946). S. 53. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Authors | Derrida Vs Various Authors | Derrida I 50 DerridaVsLogocentrism: conflict between the "will to say" and the unintentional by the nature of the description given. Derrida tries to find a point outside: the "exorbitant". "Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical. DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this critique around. By wearing out the metaphor, it withdraws. Return in a changed form. Derrida I 88 (?) Vs Derrida: he overlooks that "wearing out" is again a metaphor. The thinking in its relation to the metaphor cannot be determined or identified! I 139 DerridaVsMarx: is too dependent on enlightenment. Derrida deconstructs Marx and introduces the term "messianic" in contrast to messianism. I 150 DerridaVsMauss: does not notice the contradiction between gift and exchange, because there is a delay between gift and exchange. Therefore Mauss does not speak of the gift but in reality of the circular exchange. Habermas I 194 Derrida: criticizes the rule of the Logos, which is always inherent in the spoken word. DerridaVsPhonocentrism: is a disguised figure of the logo centrism of the Occident. The metaphor of the Book of Nature is a manuscript hard to decipher. Habermas I 203 Jaspers: "The world is the handwriting of another, never completely readable world; existence alone deciphers it. DerridaVsPlatonization of meaning. Habermas I 234 DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalism), Vs Structuralist Aesthetics. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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