Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Moore s Hands Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 83
Moore's hands/existence proof/Stroud: Moore has misunderstood Kant that he doubted the existence of our outside world. - ((s) only our knowledge of it.) - StroudVsMoore: this is only possible in response to a specific question - VsMoore: false evidence: error that the premises are known to be true - ((s) there are hands doubted) - (He is not wrong if he is not VsSkepticism) - MalcolmVsMoore: no answer to skepticism - does not say what is wrong with his doubts - instead of hands, he could not take "that tree there" and prove by clear view on him - (but that is what he seems to do). ---
I 89
AmbrosVsMoore: insufficient as direct empirical position. ---
I 90
Malcolm: Moore argues linguistically. ---
I 92
AmbroseVsMoore: he thinks, the special case of the hands can be distinguished from other things of the outside world - but they cannot. ---
I 93
Wittgenstein: if you succeed in the proof of the hands, we will give you the rest. ---
I 94
Moore himself: considered his evidence not linguistical but empirical. ---
I 99
Moores hands/skepticism/Stroud: the skepticism does not state anything that Moore proves to be false - that is the importance of Moore's proof - there must be a general sentence that there would be no external things, which Moore refutes - then the skepticism would be much more complex and difficult. ---
I 114
Moores hands/skepticism/Stroud: "I know that here is a hand": one cannot deny that there are questions to which this is a response. - VsMalcolm: Moore also knows what he is doing - he just does not answer skepticism. - A deficiency in Moores proof is only there if there is a general question about knowledge, which makes it impossible for Moore to answer. - Outside world/Stroud: unlike skepticism: here Moore has revealed the existence of external things - (as we know). - Skepticism /(s): concerns then also our external world: this could be dreamed?
---
I 115
Stroud: in the questions of the existence of the external world no particular philosophical problem is answered - E.g. direct question: were there apples in Sicily BC? - Then we have an idea how we (ask historians) can find out. - Scepticism: but that does not work, if you do not know anything about the world - Knowledge/(s): if knowledge questions are answered, existence is already implied. ---
I 117/18
Skepticism/Stroud: can only be refuted from the "distanced position" (external knowledge, philosophical, not scientific) - then I cannot rely on certain things like hands. - External knowledge/Stroud: is not a more general form of knowledge - (believing that was Moore's mistake) - the philosophical question cannot be expressed by a common form of words - Pro Moore: especially his refusal to take the external position shows the importance of his remarks. Skepticism/Stroud: does not only ask what is known, but how it is known. StroudVsMoore: his evidence is not empirical.
---
I 124
General/Special/Moore's hands/skepticism/Stroud: there is nothing wrong with Moore's approach (that he provides the general questions of philosophy with certain answers - how else should you answer general questions? ---
I 133
Premises/proof/Moore's hands/Stroud: Moore was aware that he has not proven his premises - but premises must not be proven anyway - many things can be known directly without proof.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Pain Cavell
 
Books on Amazon
I 44
Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: different objects require very different identity criteria. E.g. in the case of sensations, style, colors, diseases, for example, it may be a description, in the case of material objects it may be a place. ---
I 45
Pain/Identity/Cavell: it seems as if we could say of pain and of cars, but not of colors: in a certain way there are two, but in a certain way only one. Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sence perceptions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would be the same!
E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two.
Why not with pain then? Because here "equals" means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not!
---
I 46
Why should not the skeptics have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors, the question is also answered: it is one! But with pain?
Pain/Malcolm: there is a danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas.
It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places.
Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors of headaches are different.
But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, not!
However, we have the same insidious pain which Dr. Eternity describes as part of the eternity syndrome!
---
I 47
Malcom only shows, by adjusting the pain to the colors, how both are counted or identified by means of descriptions. Only in this respect they then behave like cars!
Colors cannot be counted differently, but this does not show that pain cannot be counted differently! If I were put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than colors.
---
I 48
Pain/Cavell: Thesis: in pain it is important that the other needs our attention! This makes it so important to know how strong the pain is. This seems to make a standard description necessary.
Physical identity (i.e., empirical indistinguishability) is not sufficient: for example, two peas in a pod can be indistinguishable, but we do not say it is one pea!
---
I 49
However, it is not necessary either, because if there is a standard description that secures the application of "(descriptive) equal", then we can tolerate an unlimited discrepancy.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Pain Malcolm
 
Books on Amazon
Cavell I 37
Norman Malcolm: Thesis: Attempt to reject the idea of a private pain, according to which it is impossible for two people to have the same pain. Malcolm: Let us first agree that "equal" here means equality of description, and not "equality of place", so we see that it is very possible to share the same pain.
CavellVsMalcolm: the argument is questionable, the skeptic can rightly assume here that our knowledge of the other is not enough.
Knowledge is more than the presence of criteria.
---
Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same!
E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two.
Why not in pain then? Because "equals" here means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not!
---
I 46
Why should the skeptics not have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors the question is also answered: it is one! But in pain?

Pain/Malcolm: Danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas.
It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places.

Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors are different from headaches.
But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, they are not identical!

Malc I
N. Malcom
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971


Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Regress Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 255
Regress / Malcolm: (according to Rorty): models for conformity generate regresses: if you are asked, how do you know e.g. that the seen dog agrees with the idea of a dog, one must ask how do you know that it’s a case of conformity.
I 255
Ryle: Here you have to be satisfied with the sentence, "he sees it." Nothing "Para Mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. > Fodor, > perception.
I 264
Regress / Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a bad question. (VsMalcolm and Ryle "How is motion possible?" "Why does nature follow natural laws?" (How-is-it-possible-questions).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Thoughts Malcolm
 
Books on Amazon
Perler/Wild I 127
Thought/thinking/animal/language//DavidsonVsMalcolm: his concept of "thought" only covers the higher level of thinking - I cover all propositional positions with that - Malcolm: E.g. the dog believes de re of the cat that she climbed the oak but not de dicto - Malcom: These belief de dicto, but not de re requires language - a) thinking (belief): the dog is aware that p - b) have thoughts: the creature is aware that it is aware that p - DavidsonVsMalcolm: even to think one must have a concept of a thought - so language is required.

Malc I
N. Malcom
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Ambrose, A. Stroud Vs Ambrose, A.
 
Books on Amazon
I 89
Skeptizismus/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: beide denken, dass der Skeptizismus - richtig verstanden – nicht empirisch - durch die Sinne - widerlegt werden kann. Skeptizismus/Ambrose: Thesis: der Skeptizismus kann nicht einmal beschreiben, welche Art Ding einen Beweis für "Es gibt Dinge der Außenwelt" darstellen könnte. Es gibt keine beschreibbaren Umstände, in denen man sagen könnte, dass jemand als das wissend beschrieben werden könnte. Also kann der Satz „Niemand weiß, ob Dinge existieren“ nicht falsifiziert werden (A. S. 402) Der Skeptizismus argumentiert für eine logische Unmöglichkeit des Wissen von der Außenwelt und nicht für eine empirische Tatsache.
Jeder Satz wie "Ich weiß nicht, ob da ein Dollar in meiner Tasche ist"
I 90
ist für den Skeptiker "notwendig wahr".
I 91
MalcolmVsMoore/AmbroseVsMoore/Stroud: sie richten sich gegen das, was Moore zu tun glaubt. Er könnte es auch gar nicht! StroudVsAmbrose/StroudVsMalcolm: wir werden sehen, dass diese beiden Kritiken fehlschlagen, aber dafür müssen wir einen weiten Weg mit Moore zusammen gehen, um zu sehen, wie er seinen Beweis meint und dass er damit sogar das tut was er glaubt, auch wenn er etwas anderes erreicht.
I 92
AmbroseVsMoore: für sie ist Moore nicht in der Position das zu tun was er tun möchte, nämlich einen direkten empirischen Beweis geben zu können. Pointe: Moore möchte auf Dinge zeigen, die sich in ihren Eigenschaften von anderen Dingen unterscheiden“ Aber das kann er gar nicht, weil die einzigen Dinge auf die er zeigen kann und auch zu zeigen beabsichtigt, "externe Dinge" sind, und die haben alle dieselbe Eigenschaft, "extern" zu sein. D.h. er hat gar keinen Kontrast zu anderen Dingen, den er aber haben müsste, um überhaupt etwas über externe Dinge im allgemeinen zu sagen. Er kann nur auf einige externe Dinge im Gegensatz zu anderen externen Dingen zeigen, um Unterschiede zwischen diesen zu zeigen, aber damit kann er keinen Existenzbeweis für externe Dinge im allgemeinen leisten. (Zirkulär)
Existenzbeweis/Oberbegriff/allgemeines /Besonderes/Lösung: man kann die Existenz von Münzen beweisen, indem man auf einen Groschen zeigt.
MooreVsAmbrose: (Moore S. 672): besteht darauf, dass sein Beweis empirisch ist, und dass er damit den Satz "Es gibt keine äußeren Dinge" als falsch beweist.
I 93
Bsp so wie wenn man auf einen Groschen zeigt, damit beweisen kann, dass es wenigstens ein äußeres Ding gibt. Moore gibt zu, dass es Unterschiede zwischen den Begriffen "äußeres Ding" und "Münze" gibt, aber nicht in Bezug auf die Möglichkeit, auf Instanzen zu zeigen.
Zeigen/MooreVsMalcolm/MooreVsAmbrose: kann man sicher nur auf äußere Dinge, aber auf innere Objekte kann man die Aufmerksamkeit lenken. Damit hat der Term "äußeres Ding" wohl einen signifikanten Kontrast zu anderen Dingen, die nicht unter diese Klasse fallen: es sind eben Dinge, auf die man zeigen kann.
"äußeres Ding"/Moore: ist wie "Münze" einfach ein allgemeinerer Term. Aber er ist genauso empirisch wie "Münze".
Moore: die einzige Widerlegung könnte in seinen Augen sein, dass man zeigt, dass er nicht bewiesen habe, dass hier eine Hand ist und dort eine andere.
Stroud: dann wäre der einzige Einwand, dass die Prämissen nicht wirklich gewusst werden. Das scheint Wittgenstein in "Über Gewissheit" im Sinn zu haben:
Moores Hände/Wittgenstein: "wenn du weißt, dass hier eine Hand ist, gestehen wir dir den Rest zu". (on certainty, 1969, §1).
MooreVsAmbrose/Stroud: weil Moore seinen Beweis für empirisch hält, geht er über Ambrose’ Einwand hinweg, er mache bloß eine Empfehlung für den Sprachgebrauch.
I 94
Er sieht sich selbst so, dass er mit einer Tatsache - hier ist eine Hand – eine andere beweist: - dass es äußere Dinge gibt. Sprachgebrauch/Existenzbeweis/Sprache/MooreVsAmbrose: ich kann nicht angenommen haben, dass die Tatsache, dass ich eine Hand habe, etwas darüber beweist, wie der Ausdruck "äußere Dinge" gebraucht werden sollte. (Moore, 674)
Genauso wie nichts über der Sprachgebrauch von Bsp "Ich weiß, dass hier drei Druckfehler sind" gezeigt wird, wenn ich zeige, dass es auf dieser Seite drei Druckfehler gibt. Hier geht es um nichts Linguistisches. Nichts darüber, wie Wörter gebraucht werden sollten folgt aus den Prämissen.

MooreVsMalcolm/Stroud: dann muss auch Malcolms Interpretation falsch sein. Dass hier eine Hand ist, beweist überhaupt nichts darüber, wie irgendwelche Ausdrücke gebraucht werden sollten.
MalcolmVsMoore: Malcolm glaubt, dass Moore ihn nicht zurückgewiesen hat und ihm sogar eigentlich zustimmt.
StroudVsMalcolm: das kann aber nicht sein, wenn Moore das tut, was er sagt.
MalcolmVsMoore: weiteres Argument: er kann gar nicht das getan haben, was er tun wollte
Skeptizismus/Sprache/MooreVsAmbrose: der Skeptiker mag denken, er habe a priori Gründe für die Leugnung von äußeren Dingen oder von Wissen darüber.
I 96
Aber selbst dann bedeutet das nicht, dass er nicht empirisch zurückgewiesen werden könnte. Angenommen, jemand behauptet, er habe a priori Gründe dafür, dass es keine Dinge der Außenwelt gibt. Gerade dann kann er durch einfaches empirisches Zeigen solcher Gegenstände widerlegt werden.
Moore/StroudVsMalcolm/StroudVsAmbrose: die Reaktion von Ambrose und Malcolm ist immer noch , dass Moore genau das tut, was er zu tun glaubt.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Dodwell, P.C. Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 258
Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer.
I 259
VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware.
The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine.
I 259
Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value.
I 260
The idea of ​​a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them.
DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements!
Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (see Brandom).
Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual.
Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs).
I 261
Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway)
Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls.
Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside.
Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology:
As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character.
I 262
No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology!
Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain.
(Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.)
RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea:
I 263
if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement:
Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain.
The latter is doubtful.
RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself.
Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs.
Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle.
I 263/264
It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?").
I 265
Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid.
I 266
For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills:
RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations.
At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs).
Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature.
Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes.
Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Malcolm, N. Putnam Vs Malcolm, N.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 171
Theory Change/PutnamVsMalcolm, Norman: the new meaning is not given to the words. The sentence simply had no use previously. Meaning change/term change: some authors: you should not confuse the meaning change with a change of distribution (distribution) of a word. E.g. "go around the earth" can be a normal sentence, but no circumstances can be imagined in which the assertion of the identity of physical and mental states would not have got different.
PutnamVs: this idea is not a good argument: for primitive people, it was inconceivable that the Earth would have been around. 40 years ago, the advances in modern science may have been unimaginable.
The point is another:
---
IV 172
Theoretical Identification: "is": (2) light is electromagnetic radiation (of this and this wavelength).
(3) water is H2O.
To (2): before the identification, there were two separate theoretical disciplines: optics and the theory of electromagnetic fields. It was a decision to define light as "electromagnetic radiation", justified by the following considerations: (> Definition).
1. it allowed to derive laws of optics from "more fundamental" laws of physics.
2. it allowed the derivation of new predictions in the reduced discipline (Optics). E.g. that the laws of geometrical optics would not apply in certain cases. (See Duhem: reduction of Kepler's laws to Newton's).
For the identification of mental states with physiological states we needed not mere "correlates" of subjective states, but we needed something more far-reaching:
---
IV 172/173
We must know physical states, with which we could not only predict, but also causally explain human behavior.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Malcolm, N. Rorty Vs Malcolm, N.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Frank I 610
Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility.
- - -
Rorty I 238
MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here.
I 239
RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior.
I.e. applies
2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Malcolm, N. Cavell Vs Malcolm, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
Norman Malcolm: These Versuch, die Idee eines privaten Schmerzes zurückzuweisen, die Idee, wonach es unmöglich sei, daß zwei Menschen den gleichen Schmerz haben. Malcolm: sehen wir erst einmal ein, daß "gleich" hier Gleichheit der Beschreibung bedeutet, und nicht "Gleichheit des Ortes" so sehen wir, daß es sehr wohl möglich ist, den gleichen Schmerz zu teilen.
CavellVsMalcolm: das Argumenten ist fragwürdig, der Skeptiker kann hier zurecht annehmen, daß unser Wissen vom anderen nicht ausreiche.
Zum Wissen gehört dann mehr als die Anwesenheit von Kriterien.
Kriterien/Cavell: der Skeptiker hat recht mit der Annahme, zum wissen darüber, dass jemand Schmerzen habe, gehöre mehr als nur die Anwesenheit von Kriterien.
Kriterien können bestimmen, ob ein Verhalten mehr Schmerz als Freude ausdrückt, aber nicht, ob es sich um echten Schmerz anstellen von vorgetäuschtem handelt.
I 46
Schmerz/CavellVsMalcolm: das scheint zu zeigen, daß Farben von Kopfschmerzen verschieden sind. Ich kann aber die Frage beantworten, ob die Schmerzen numerisch identisch sind mit seinen: nämlich nicht!
Allerdings haben wir den gleichen heimtückischen Schmerz, den Dr Ewig als Teil des Ewigkeitssyndroms beschreibt!
I 47
Malcom zeigt mit seiner Angleichung der Schmerzen an die Farben nur, wie beide anhand von Beschreibungen gezählt oder identifiziert werden. Bloß in dieser Hinsicht verhalten sie sich dann auch wie Autos!
Farben können nicht anders gezählt werden, aber das zeigt nicht das Schmerzen es nicht können! Wenn man mich hier unter Druck setzte, würde ich sogar sagen, daß Schmerzen in dieser Hinsicht eher wie Gegenstände sind als wie Farben.
I 55
CavellVsMalcolm: wir brauchen nicht dieses Bsp, um in den Konflikt zu geraten: wenn wir annehmen, daß jeder von uns einen Schmerz in der linken Hand hat, wenn er mit dem Hammer darauf schlägt, werden wir in die gleiche Richtungen gedrängt wie im Fall der Zwillinge. Bsp Alexandre Dumas: die Korsischen Brüder (modifiziert): wenn der eine ausgepeitscht wird, krümmt sich der andere vor Schmerzen.
I 56
Cavell: Lösung: der Schmerz im Körper von Zweiter ist gar nicht sein Schmerz.
I 60
Schmerz/Wissen/Malcolm: der Ausdruck "Ich weiß" im Zusammenhang mit Schmerzen kann keine seiner normalen Aufgaben erfüllen. 1. Berufung auf Gewißheit,
2. auf Autorität
3. auf privilegierten Zugang.
CavellVsMalcolm: hier sind aber noch drei weitere relevante Aufqaben:
1. "Ich kenne New York, (Sanskrit, die Garbo, mich selbst)"
2. "Ich weiß, ich bin kindisch".
3. "Ich weiß" um zuzustimmen.
I 61
Pointe: nicht weil es ein Ausdruck der Verärgerung ist, kann es kein Ausdruck der Gewißheit sein!

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002