Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causes | Bigelow | I 267 Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect. Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect. I 268 If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect. Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature. >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Anomalous monism. Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b(1), 1986d(2), 1979(3)). >Necessity, >Conditions, >Sufficiency. Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals. >Cause/Mackie. Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(4) Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. >Counterfactual conditional. 1.Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67. 2. Lewis, D.K. (1986d). Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. 4. Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, pp.245-255. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causes | Fraassen | I 25 Principle of the Common Cause/P.C.C./Fraassen: eventually leads to postulating unobservable entities. - The principle of the common cause cannot be a general principle of science. >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities. I 28 Common Cause/C.C./Fraassen: to say that C is the common cause for the correlation between A and B is to say that relative to C there is no such correlation. C explains the correlation, because we only notice a correlation for as long as we do not consider C. FraassenVsReichenbach: the principle of the common cause does not rule the science of the 20th century, because it requires deterministic theories. I 114 Cause/Explanation/Theory: Def Cause/Mackie: non-sufficient but necessary part of a non-necessary but sufficient condition. >INUS/Mackie). FraassenVsMackie: restriction: otherwise e.g. growth-plus-death-plus-decay may be the cause of death. 1) Not every sufficient condition is a cause. - E.g. the existence of the knife is a necessary part. - 2) A cause must also not be necessary. >Causation, >Causality. It may be that there are no previous sufficient conditions at all. - E.g. radium causes Geiger counter to click. But atomic physics is compatible with that it does not click. Cause/Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual Conditional: if A had not existed, B would not have exited. >Counterfactual conditional. Fraassen: but not literally. - Wrong: that a counterfactual conditional was the same as a necessary condition. Solution/Fraassen: here, the "if/then" logic does not apply, because applies the law of attenuation there. Everyday language: there is no attenuation here. >Everyday language. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Causes | Mackie | Bigelow I 268 Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he comes to similar results as Lewis, but with strict conditionals. C: is a conjunction of conditions c: cause e: effect. I 268 Counterfactual Conditional/Lewis: c would happen > e would happen c would not happen > e would not happen Mackie: strict conditionals: N(C applies and c happens > e happens) N(C applies and c does not happen > e does not happen). Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(1) Thesis: not sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both assume a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditionals Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup System/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis will treat the cause as the cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: ditto, because the deviating cause is part of a sufficient condition. >Cause/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. 1. J. L. Mackie (1965). Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly2, pp. 245-55, 261-64. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Induction | Armstrong | III 50 Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational. III 52 Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation. III 58 Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same. II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Induction | Place | Armstrong III 50 Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational. Armstrong III 52 Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation. Armstrong III 58 Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same. Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mackie, J. L. | Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. | Arm III 50 Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G. Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified. III 51 Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above). Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G. The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement. ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong. b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible. Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Nagel Vs Mackie, J. L. | III 61 Ethics/Objectivity/Nagel: assumption of objective values and reasons can be challenged if a subjective opinion is more plausible. Not even the assumption of a radical falsity of our ethics is contradictory. Realism then helps, however, to consider certain alternatives more plausible than others. Realism/Ethics/Nagel: I believe that, in principle, the possibility of realism cannot be proven by anything. We can only refute arguments for its impossibility. III 62 ArgumentsVsRealism: 1) VsRealism/Ethics/Mackie: petitio principii: if values are something real, they must be real objects of an ontologically fundamentally different kind. Mackie: Thesis: values are not a part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "beings, qualities or relations of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world". (Position). NagelVsMackie: he is obviously in possession of a very particular image of the world (e.g. without the "non-natural qualities" of Moore). But the assumption is not correct! The aspect of being bad in the impersonal sense is not a mysterious additional property of pain. The recognition of values does not mean that they are something occult, but that they are real values! That means in consequence that our statements about reasons related to these values can be true or false! III 63 MackieVsNagel: he had shown him in the wrong light: his doubts did not refer to strange entities, but to the reasons themselves. And precisely those reasons are not needed to explain something that happens. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in their existence. NagelVsMackie: this raises the problem at another level again: petitio principii: the assumption that utility is a criterion for existence. NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons, is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation! Best Explanation/BE/Nagel: if we presume that only that is real which needs to occur in the best explanation of the world, we assume that there are no irreducible normative truths. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Putnam Vs Mackie, J. L. | V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: the good is ontologically "strange": one cannot know that something is good, without having a "Pro" attitude with regard to this something. This boils down to that one presupposes the emotivism to prove it. It also presupposes that there is ONE TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is not correct, there are also cases of conscious infringement. Philippa Foot: you may even intend to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad feature of the vocabulary. From the fact that "good" is used for recommendations, it does not follow that it is not a property. V 278 Properties/Mackie: thesis: there is no property like "to be justified", but only "justification settings". PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. For the "dedicated physicalists" there is even the problem that the reference (reference) is "ontologically strange". There are simply too many "candidates" (relations) for this post. Namely endlessly many. Nature/Putnam: a priority would really be strange because we have built a certain neutrality, a certain blankness into our concept of nature. Nature should neither have interests nor intentions, nor a position. Would a physicalist property be identical with moral correctness, that would be really weird. As if nature itself had intentions of reference. V 279 Insofar, Moore was right. But that does not schow that the good, the right, etc. do not exist. It only shows that the monistic naturalism (or "physicalism") represents an inadequate theory. --- I (g) 201 Causality/Mackie: is something epistemic and nothing at all in the world. However, there can be "mechanical causality" next to it in the world. (> G. Vollmer: nowadays causality is traced back to energy transfer,). I (g) 202 PutnamVsMackie: but this is difficult to see without counterfactual sentences. E.g. Putnam: then my practical frictionless operation of a switch does not represent a "mechanical cause". PutnamVsMackie/PutnamVsVollmer: such a narrow term may be physically useful, but it is not useful for explaining reference. On the other hand, when the circuit is mechanical causality, how do we characterizes it then without the counterfactual sentence: "The current would not have flown through the wire if the switch had not been moved"? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Wright Vs Mackie, J. L. | Rorty VI 44 Cognitivism/WrightVsMackie: Vs "Error Theorist"/Vs Error Theory: (Mackie: considers the application of "true" to moral judgements a mistake). |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Verschiedene Vs Mackie, J. L. | Stegmüller IV 435 God/Newman: now there is no earthly person who would fully live up to this role! Belief/MackieVsNewman: arguments seldom create belief, even if they reinforce it. NewmanVsMackie: in fact, it is rather the actual experience of conscience! 1. it commands legitimately (or authoritatively) 2. it points beyond the actor 3. the sanctions must come from a person, an intelligent being. MackieVsNewman: 1. This does not lead to infinity attributes of God. 2. One can only agree to either the first or the other two premises. Dilemma: a) If conscience is taken as valid, it prescribes certain actions as reasonable. In the action itself this is a "should be done". In this case one does not need to look beyond the action for a higher being. IV 436 The fact that regrets, feelings of guilt, etc. occur here is natural: because conscience itself tells us that we should feel this way. In addition, the feelings of guilt appear against a (human) person whom we have treated badly, and not against God. b) If we do not simply accept conscience in this way, but try to interpret it critically, then we actually encounter people, but human and not divine ones. Parents, teachers, institutions, etc. IV 437 There is either ethical objectivism and intuitionism or a naturalistic psychological interpretation of conscience as better hypotheses. MackieVs moral proofs of God: better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on factual beliefs and not vice versa! We cannot use what we are inclined to regard as reasonable action as evidence of what is the case. IV 438 MackieVsKant: difficulty of his moral argument: if a certain practical principle presupposes quite certain factual assertions, then reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have shown the validity of this practical principle if it has not independently proved the validity of the factual assertions in question. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Kanitscheider Vs Mackie, J. L. | I 465 God/Creation/John Leslie Mackie: sharp criticism of the conventional doctrine of God: Thesis: to explain the fine tuning of all necessary preconditions for the existence of life by a neo-Platonic assumption of ethical being-demanded instead of the usual many-worlds hypothesis. Theology/KanitscheiderVsMackie: did not distinguish between two concepts of creation: 1. creatio originans 2. creatio continuans, support of the legal structure, permanence. I 467 Laws of Nature/Kanitscheider: there is no point in imagining how to pull the laws out of the corset of the world like fish bone sticks, and then watch them collapse. ((s) According to which laws would the collapse take place?) The conceptual separation between the world and its laws leads to emptiness. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Rawls, J. | Mackie Vs Rawls, J. | Stegmüller IV 206 Altruism/Rawls: ( "justice as fairness"): Rawls feins that creatures are not guided by sympathy, but only by self-love, "rational egoist". IV 207 Rawls/Stegmüller: the "veil of ignorance" goes back to J. Harsanyi. VsUtilitarianism: initially, subjective preferences are unknown. MackieVsRawls: nevertheless, the result is something similar to utilitarianism: each rational egoist presumes, probably rightly so, that he is more likely to belong to the broader group of luckies than to the smaller group of unfortunates and accordingly schemes disadvantages for "the others." Instead: search for a compromise that is acceptable to everyone involved. Society/MackieVsRawls: but now this compromise is identical to U3, the third stage of universalization. IV 208 RawlsVsMackie/Stegmüller: Rawls would not accept that, since his model is not an immediate guide to action. Def morality in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: restriction of the self-interests of the agents. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Skyrms, B. | Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B. | Arm III 36 Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest). Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs. It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that: Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent). Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories. Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests. Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances. III 37 But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th. Arm III 65 Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law. How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G. E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable. VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?. Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?. E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that. ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution. How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?. III 66 Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach. |
Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics | Mackie, J.L. | Put V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: The good is ontologically "strange": you cannot know that something is good without having a "pro attitude" towards that something. This amounts to assuming emotivism in order to prove it. It also presupposes that there is A TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is incorrect, there are also cases of deliberate contravention. Philippa Foot: You can even aim to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad function of vocabulary! The fact that "good" is used to recommend does not mean that it is not a property! Stegm IV 266 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: Primacy of rights over duties and goals. IV 286 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Problem: Exceptions for animals, sick, disabled, old. IV 287 Thesis: Here we have to develop a humane attitude that makes us wish that people and animals are well. (Disposition). IV 287 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: neither teleological nor deontological: rather methodological! Without reference to mythical entities such as "objective values", obligations and "transcendental necessities". IV 288 Self-love is a positive value for Mackie. IV 288/289 He hopes that "utilitarianism", "law" and "egoism" will result in one and the same thing. ">Convergence optimism. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 |
| Justification | Mackie, J.L. | Put V 278 Properties / Mackie: there is no such property as to be "justified," but only "justification stances." PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. |
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| Values | Mackie, J.L. | Nagel III 62 Mackie: Thesis: values are not part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "entities, qualities, or relationships of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world. (Position). III 63 NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation! Bridge IV 169 Ethics/Mackie: thesis: there are no objective values. IV 170 Stegmüller: this is ontological, not linguistically analytical. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Justification | Quine, W.V.O. | V 278 Properties / Mackie: there is no such property to be "justified," but only "justification settings." PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theism | Swinburne, R. | Stegm IV 425 Theismus/Swinburne: personale Erklärung durch Schöpfer einfach plausibler als der Dualismus mit problematischer Wechselwirkung zwischen Physischem und Psychischem. Evolution/Swinburne: bestreitet nicht die Evolutionstheorie! (>Position). IV 425/426 Erklärung/MackieVsSwinburne: wir haben als Philosophen nicht das Recht, in einem ersten Schritt aus einem in Wahrheit sehr komplizierten Vorgang diejenige einfache Beziehung, die uns interessiert und die uns bekannt ist, gedanklich zu isolieren und oder Idealisierungen anzustellen und in einem zweiten Schritt als vertrautes Modell zu verwenden. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: könnte erwidern, daß es zu Gottes Fähigkeiten gehören könnte, die entsprechenden Absichten in uns hervorzurufen. Stegmüller: das ist aber höchst mysteriös. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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