Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causes Fraassen
 
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I 25
Principle of the Common Cause/P.C.C./Fraassen: eventually leads to postulating unobservable entities. - The principle of the common cause cannot be a general principle of science.
I 28
Common Cause/C.C./Fraassen: to say that C is the common cause for the correlation between A and B is to say that relative to C there is no such correlation. C explains the correlation, because we only notice a correlation for as long as we do not consider C. - FraassenVsReichenbach: the principle of the common cause does not rule the science of the 20th century, because it requires deterministic theories.
I 114
Cause/Explanation/Theory: Def Cause/Mackie: non-sufficient but necessary part of a non-necessary but sufficient condition. - FraassenVsMackie: Restriction: otherwise e.g. growth-plus-death-plus-decay may be the cause of death. - 1) Not every sufficient condition is a cause. - E.g. the existence of the knife is a necessary part. - 2) A cause must also not be necessary. - It may be that there are no previous sufficient conditions at all. - E.g. radium causes Geiger counter to click. - But atomic physics is compatible with that it does not click. - Cause/Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual Conditional: if A had not existed, B would not have exited. - Fraassen: but not literally. - Wrong: that a counterfactual conditional was the same as a necessary condition. - Solution/Fraassen: here, the "if/then" logic does not apply, because applies the law of attenuation there. - Everyday language: there is no attenuation here.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Causes Mackie
 
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Bigelow I 268
Ursache/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: dieser kommt zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen wie Lewis, aber mit strikten Konditionalen. C: ist eine Konjunktion von Bedingungen
c: Ursache
e: Wirkung.
I 268
KoKo/Lewis: c geschieht wäre>wäre e geschieht
c geschieht nicht wäre>wäre e geschieht nicht
Mackie: strikte Konditionale:
N(C gilt und c geschieht > e geschieht)
N(C gilt und c geschieht nicht > e geschieht nicht).
Ursache/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965) These: nicht hinreichender aber notwendiger Teil einer nicht notwendige aber hinreichenden Bedingung.
Ursache/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: beide gehen von einer Kette notwendiger Bedingungen aus. Sie unterscheiden sich darin, wie die Glieder der Kette verbunden sein sollen.
Lewis: durch kontrafaktische Konditionale
Mackie: durch strikte Konditionale. Deren Antezedenten können so komplex sein, dass wir sie in der Praxis nicht angeben können.

Backup-System/Bigelow/Pargetter: (s.o.) würde dazu führen, dass ein kontrafaktisches Konditional fehlschlägt. Dennoch verbucht Lewis die Ursache als Ursache, weil sie zur Kette beiträgt.
Mackie: dito, weil die abweichende Ursache Teil einer hinreichenden Bedingung ist.

BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: beider Theorien haben Nachteile.


Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977


Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Causes Bigelow
 
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I 267
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect. Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect.
---
I 268
If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect. Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature.
Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b, 1986d, 1979).
Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals. (> Cause/Mackie)
Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965) Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.
Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected.
Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning
Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice.
Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain.
Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition.
BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Induction Armstrong
 
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III 50
Induction/Mackie: pro inductive (probability) CoCo ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong pro induction: rational
III 52
Induction/Armstrong: from the observed to the unobserved: invalid, nevertheless necessary (!) rational - from conclusion to best explanation, if not BE, what should be better (analytic truth, that BE = BE?) - the unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified)
III 58
Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same
II 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the U

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Mackie, J. L. Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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Arm III 50
Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G.
Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support KoKo. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified.
III 51
Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above).
Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G.
The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement.
ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong.
b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible.
Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie).

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Mackie, J. L. Nagel Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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III 61
Ethics/Objectivity/Nagel: assumption of objective values ​​and reasons can be challenged if a subjective opinion is more plausible. Not even the assumption of a radical falsity of our ethics is contradictory.
Realism then helps, however, to consider certain alternatives more plausible than others.
Realism/Ethics/Nagel: I believe that, in principle, the possibility of realism cannot be proven by anything. We can only refute arguments for its impossibility.
III 62
ArgumentsVsRealism:
1) VsRealism/Ethics/Mackie: petitio principii: if values ​​are something real, they must be real objects of an ontologically fundamentally different kind. Mackie: Thesis: values ​​are not a part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "beings, qualities or relations of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world". (Position).
NagelVsMackie: he is obviously in possession of a very particular image of the world (e.g. without the "non-natural qualities" of Moore).
But the assumption is not correct! The aspect of being bad in the impersonal sense is not a mysterious additional property of pain.
The recognition of values ​​does not mean that they are something occult, but that they are real values!
That means in consequence that our statements about reasons related to these values ​​can be true or false!
III 63
MackieVsNagel: he had shown him in the wrong light: his doubts did not refer to strange entities, but to the reasons themselves. And precisely those reasons are not needed to explain something that happens. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in their existence.
NagelVsMackie: this raises the problem at another level again: petitio principii: the assumption that utility is a criterion for existence.
NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons, is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation!
Best Explanation/BE/Nagel: if we presume that only that is real which needs to occur in the best explanation of the world, we assume that there are no irreducible normative truths.


N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Mackie, J. L. Putnam Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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V 276
Ethics/Mackie thesis: the good is ontologically "strange": one cannot know that something is good, without having a "Pro" attitude with regard to this something. This boils down to that one presupposes the emotivism to prove it. It also presupposes that there is ONE TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is not correct, there are also cases of conscious infringement.
Philippa Foot: you may even intend to be a bad person.
---
V 277
The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad feature of the vocabulary. From the fact that "good" is used for recommendations, it does not follow that it is not a property.
---
V 278
Properties/Mackie: thesis: there is no property like "to be justified", but only "justification settings". PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. For the "dedicated physicalists" there is even the problem that the reference (reference) is "ontologically strange". There are simply too many "candidates" (relations) for this post. Namely endlessly many.
Nature/Putnam: a priority would really be strange because we have built a certain neutrality, a certain blankness into our concept of nature. Nature should neither have interests nor intentions, nor a position.
Would a physicalist property be identical with moral correctness, that would be really weird. As if nature itself had intentions of reference.
---
V 279
Insofar, Moore was right. But that does not schow that the good, the right, etc. do not exist. It only shows that the monistic naturalism (or "physicalism") represents an inadequate theory. ---
I 201
Causality/Mackie: is something epistemic and nothing at all in the world. However, there can be "mechanical causality" next to it in the world. (Energy transfer,> Vollmer).
---
I 202
PutnamVsMackie: but this is difficult to see without counterfactual sentences. E.g. Putnam: then my practical frictionless operation of a switch does not represent a "mechanical cause".
PutnamVsMackie/PutnamVsVollmer: such a narrow term may be physically useful, but it is not useful for explaining reference.
On the other hand, when the circuit is mechanical causality, how do we characterizes it then without the counterfactual sentence: "The current would not have flown through the wire if the switch had not been moved"?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Mackie, J. L. Wright Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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Rorty VI 44
Kognitivismus/WrightVsMackie: Vs "Irrtumstheoretiker"/Vs Irrtumstheorie: (Mackie: hält die Anwendung von "wahr" auf moralische Urteile für einen Fehler).

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mackie, J. L. Verschiedene Vs Mackie, J. L. Stegmüller IV 435
Gott/Newman: nun gibt es keine irdische Person, die dieser Rolle voll gerecht würde! Glauben/MackieVsNewman: Argumente erzeugen selten den Glauben, wenn sie ihn auch bestärken.

NewmanVsMackie: tatsächlich ist es vielmehr die tatsächliche Erfahrung des Gewissens!
1. Es gebietet legitim (oder autoritativ)
2. Es weist über den Handelnden hinaus
3. Die Sanktionen müssen von einer Person, einem intelligenten Wesen herrühren.
MackieVsNewman: 1. das führt nicht zu Unendlichkeitsattributen Gottes.
2. Man kann nur entweder der ersten oder den beiden anderen Prämissen zustimmen.
Dilemma:
a) Wenn das Gewissen als gültig genommen wird, schreibt es bestimmte Handlungen als vernünftig vor. In der Handlung selbst ist das ein "Getanwerdensollen".
In diesem Fall braucht man nicht jenseits der Handlung nach einem höheren Wesen zu suchen.
IV 436
Dass hier Bedauern, Schuldgefühle usw. auftreten, ist natürlich: denn das Gewissen selbst sagt uns, dass wir so empfinden sollen. Außerdem treten die Schuldgefühle einer (menschlichen) Person gegenüber auf, die wir schlecht behandelt haben, und nicht gegenüber Gott. b) Wenn wir das Gewissen nicht einfach so hinnehmen, sondern versuchen es kritisch zu deuten, dann stoßen wir tatsächlich auf Personen, aber auf menschliche und nicht auf göttliche. Eltern, Lehrer, Institutionen usw.
IV 437
So gibt es hier entweder den ethischen Objektivismus und den Intuitionismus oder eine naturalistisch psychologische Deutung des Gewissens als bessere Hypothesen. MackieVs moralische Gottesbeweise: bessere Erklärungen für Handeln als für die Existenz einer göttlichen Person.
Praktische Entschlüsse müssen sich auf Tatsachenüberzeugungen gründen und nicht umgekehrt!
Wir können nicht das, was wir als vernünftiges Handeln anzusehen geneigt sind, als Beweis für das heranziehen, was der Fall ist.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: Schwierigkeit seines moralischen Arguments: wenn ein bestimmtes praktischen Prinzip ganz bestimmte Tatsachenbehauptungen voraussetzt, dann kann die Vernunft, so rein sie sein mag, nicht beanspruchen, die Gültigkeit dieses praktischen Prinzips aufgezeigt zu haben, wenn sie nicht unabhängig davon die Gültigkeit der fraglichen Tatsachenbehauptungen nachgewiesen hat.




Mackie, J. L. Kanitscheider Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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I 465
Gott/Erschaffung/John Leslie Mackie : scharfsinnige Kritik der herkömmlichen Gotteslehre: These: die Feinabstimmung aller notwendigen Voraussetzungen für die Existenz von Leben anstatt wie üblich durch eine Viele-Welten-Hypothese durch eine neuplatonische Annahme des ethischen Gefordertseins zu erklären.
Theologie/KanitscheiderVsMackie: hat zwei Schöpfungsbegriffe nicht auseinander gehalten:
1. creatio originans
2. creatio continuans, Stützung der Gesetzesstruktur, Permanenz.
I 467
Naturgesetze/Kanitscheider: es hat keinen Sinn, sich vorzustellen, wie man die Gesetze wie Fischbeinstäbe aus dem Korsett der Welt herauszieht, um anschließend zu beobachten, wie sie in sich zusammenstürzt. ((s) Nach welchen Gesetzen würde der Zusammenbruch denn erfolgen?)
Die begriffliche Trennung zwischen der Welt und ihren Gesetzen führt ins Leere.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Rawls, J. Mackie Vs Rawls, J.
 
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Stegmüller IV 206
Altruism/Rawls: ( "justice as fairness"): Rawls feins that creatures are not guided by sympathy, but only by self-love, "rational egoist".
IV 207
Rawls/Stegmüller: the "veil of ignorance" goes back to J. Harsanyi. VsUtilitarianism: initially, subjective preferences are unknown.
MackieVsRawls: nevertheless, the result is something similar to utilitarianism: each rational egoist presumes, probably rightly so, that he is more likely to belong to the broader group of luckies than to the smaller group of unfortunates and accordingly schemes disadvantages for "the others."
Instead: search for a compromise that is acceptable to everyone involved.
Society/MackieVsRawls: but now this compromise is identical to U3, the third stage of universalization.
IV 208
RawlsVsMackie/Stegmüller: Rawls would not accept that, since his model is not an immediate guide to action. Def morality in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: restriction of the self-interests of the agents.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Skyrms, B. Armstrong Vs Skyrms, B.
 
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Arm III 36
Regularity theory/Armstrong: If we vary the accompanying circumstances now, then the limit value of the relative frequency in each class of circumstances is maintained. (Truth conditions/tr.cond./law statements/Resilience: But the resilience throws no light on the truth conditions for law statements, as the text might suggest).
Description dependence/Resilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms/ArmstrongVsMackie: this introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness or convention. The law statement ascribes a precise probability to Fs for being Gs.
It conceals that it depends on the decision how the facts are described. Mackie and Skyrms are honest enough not to conceal that:
Coincidence/physical coincidence/Skyrms: is not absolute! (Facts are description dependent).
Standards for resilience evolve along with physical theories.
Resilience/Armstrong: the term is useful when we want to develop objective tests.
Laws of Nature/LoN//ArmstrongVsSkyrms: one should never ask more of laws than this: they should be potentially resilient. Fs have the probability of being a G always under all nomically possible circumstances.
III 37
But the fact that these circumstances exist is contingent! We expect that some never occur. Skyrms: Follows the reg. th.
Arm III 65
Resiliency/Laws of nature/Regularity/Armstrong: E.g. it is assumed to be a Humean Regularity that Fs are Gs. Which additional condition would turn this into a law? We want the Fs to resilientyl be Gs, i.e. under every nomically possible circumstance. Of course, this cannot absolutely be fulfilled. But relative resilience: E.g. there may be Fs that are Hs that are Js that are Ks ... where the class of factors {H, K, J ...} covers a wide range of appropriate circumstances. Then and only then the reg. is a law.
How broad must the range be to ensure that the factors are suitable? Intuitively, so that if there are many factors, it is nomically possible in the test to produce an F which is a ~G.
E.g. Smith’s Garden (see above). The generalization is highly resilient here, because there is a broad range of circumstances that could falsify it if it is falsifiable.
VsResiliency/VsSkyrms: why should there not be laws that are non-resilient?.
Law: if it is a law that the Fs are Gs, then s is potentially resilient by definition. It is physically not possible for an F, which is a K, not to be a G. But why should nature be so accommodating as to provide us with reasons to assume that there is no such K? Why should there be Fs which are accompanied by factors that are plausible candidates for Ks, but happen to be not?.
E.g. why should Smith’s Garden not exist somewhere, but without fruits, and yet be it a law that it contains nothing but apples? Only a vulgar positivism could prohibit that.
ArmstrongVsResilience/ArmstrongVsSkyrms: that is the reason why the refinement of reg.th. must be rejected by resilience. This requires an urgent systematic solution.
How can the resilience theorists specify the real factors for a test?.
III 66
Only by filtering out the nomically significant factors. He needs a coherent system. Therefore, problems of the systematic approach are also problems of the resilience approach.

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Swinburne, R. Mackie Vs Swinburne, R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 405
Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed?
The data have to be taken from background knowledge.
IV 406
Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses:
a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe
b) That there is a God.
Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe.
Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not.
proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne:
2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely".
A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely!
If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God.
IV 407
proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity.
MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities.
2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world?
3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities).
IV 408
4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence".
Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more.
IV 425/426
Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious.
Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation!
1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation.
2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism
3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones).

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Ethics Mackie, J.L.
 
Books on Amazon
Put V 276
Ethik/Mackie These das Gute ist ontologisch »seltsam«: man kann nicht wissen, daß etwas gut ist, ohne eine "Pro -"Einstellung im Hinblick auf dieses Etwas zu haben. Das läuft darauf hinaus, daß man den Emotivismus voraussetzt, um ihn zu beweisen. Außerdem setzt es voraus, daß es EINE WAHRE THEORIE gibt. PutnamVsMackie: das heißt aber nicht, daß die sprachliche Verwendung unrichtig ist, es gibt auch Fälle von bewußter Zuwiderhandlung.
Philippa Foot: man kann es sogar darauf abgesehen haben, ein schlechter Mensch zu sein.
V 277
Der Unterschied zwischen präskriptivem und deskriptivem Gebrauch ist keine schlechte Funktion des Vokabulars! Aus der Tatsache, daß »gut« zum Empfehlen gebraucht wird, folgt nicht, daß es keine Eigenschaft ist!
Stegm IV 266
Moral/Ethik/Mackie: These Primat von Rechten gegenüber Pflichten und Zielen.
IV 286
Moral/Ethik/Mackie: Problem: Ausnahmen für Tiere, Kranke, Behinderte, Alte.
IV 287
These Hier müssen wir eine humane Einstellung entwickeln, die uns wünschen läßt, daß es Menschen und Tieren wohl ergeht. (Disposition).
IV 287
Moral/Ethik/Mackie: weder teleologisch noch deontologisch: vielmehr methodologisch! Ohne Beziehung auf mythische Entitäten wie "objektive Werte", Verpflichtungen und "transzendentale Notwendigkeiten".
IV 288
Eigenliebe stellt für Mackie einen positiven Wert dar.
IV 288/289
Er hofft, daß "Utilitarismus", "Recht" und "Egoismus" auf ein und dasselbe hinauslaufen werden. >"Konvergenzoptimismus".
Justification Mackie, J.L.
 
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Put V 278
Properties / Mackie: there is no such property as to be "justified," but only "justification stances."   PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism.
Values Mackie, J.L.
 
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Nagel III 62
Mackie: These Werte sind kein Teil des Gewebes der Welt. Wären sie es, so wären sie "Wesenheiten, Qualitäten oder Beziehungen von sehr seltsamer Art, die von allen anderen Dingen in der Welt ganz verschieden wären". (Position).
III 63
NagelVsMackie: die These, daß es besondere Gründe gibt, ist eine normative These und keine Aussage über die beste Erklärung!
Stegm IV 169
Ethik/Mackie: These es gibt keine objektiven Werte. IV 170 Stegmüller: das ist ontologisch, nicht sprachanalytisch.
Justification Quine, W.V.O.
 
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V 278
Properties / Mackie: there is no such property to be "justified," but only "justification settings."   PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Theism Swinburne, R.
 
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Stegm IV 425
Theismus/Swinburne: personale Erklärung durch Schöpfer einfach plausibler als der Dualismus mit problematischer Wechselwirkung zwischen Physischem und Psychischem. Evolution/Swinburne: bestreitet nicht die Evolutionstheorie! (>Position).
IV 425/426
Erklärung/MackieVsSwinburne: wir haben als Philosophen nicht das Recht, in einem ersten Schritt aus einem in Wahrheit sehr komplizierten Vorgang diejenige einfache Beziehung, die uns interessiert und die uns bekannt ist, gedanklich zu isolieren und oder Idealisierungen anzustellen und in einem zweiten Schritt als vertrautes Modell zu verwenden. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: könnte erwidern, daß es zu Gottes Fähigkeiten gehören könnte, die entsprechenden Absichten in uns hervorzurufen. Stegmüller: das ist aber höchst mysteriös.