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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitution | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Constitution/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza(1) starts with the foundations of law and state, shows that it is neither possible nor necessary to transfer everything to the highest authorities, and draws some political doctrines from the state constitution and history of the Hebrews. He declares that the law in spiritual matters, including the decision on external religious worship, is the exclusive prerogative of the highest authorities, and ends with the argumentation goal of the entire treatise: that in a free state not everyone is allowed to act as one wants, but that one is allowed to think what one wants and say what one thinks. >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza. Chapter 16(1), which is fundamental for the philosophy of law and state, breaks with the traditional Aristotelian Stoic-Thomist theory of natural law, which extends into the Spanish late scholasticism. >Natural justice, >Aristotle, >Stoa, >Thomas Aquinas. Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Validity claims. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N. Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this, a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with one’s ability to enforce one’s right. >Law, >Rights, >Freedom, >Society. SpinozaVsRationalism: Spinoza, a rationalist who is methodologically uncompromising in ethics, surprisingly rejects any recourse to ratio here. Thus, Höffe I 236 within his metaphysics he gives priority to content-related naturalism over methodical rationalism. >Rationalism. The state treaty necessary for overcoming the state of nature is only valid under considerations of usefulness. >Contract Theory/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 2. Ibid., Chap. 16 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Hegel | Honneth | Brocker I 791 Hegel/Honneth: Hegel's Jena program (1) must be understood as a break with the social-philosophical mainstream of his time; this had been dominated in its understanding of social relations by the paradigm of the "struggle for self-preservation. (HegelVsMachiavelli, HegelVsHobbes). Honneth: In Hegel's work, on the other hand, a more complex logic of practice comes to the fore, namely that which unfolds out of the "struggle of subjects for mutual recognition of their identity". (2) The subjects are no longer concerned exclusively with scarce resources for their own survival, but with their own identity or the creation of a positive self-relationship. See Identity/Honneth. Brocker I 792 HonnethVsHegel: with his turn of consciousness philosophy (already raised in the Jena writings), he ultimately left the decisive suggestions of his concept of recognition theory unused. See Recognition/Honneth. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Humans | Hobbes | I 218 Human/Hobbes/Höffe: Even if Hobbes speaks the word of absolutism, with him the human being as a person already becomes the subject and measure of the political order. But it is not the essence of equal dignity, neither in its secular determination as a gift of language and reason nor in its religious determination as an image of God. Human rights: In any case, there can be no talk of human rights or fundamental rights in the natural state. What matters is the same weakness and vulnerability. After all, through cunning or through association with others, the weaker ones can kill even the strongest. As a result, the natural desire for happiness runs the risk of people throwing each other into misery. >Civil war, >Natural state. Hobbes/VsMachiavelli: Unlike Machiavelli, this danger does not arise from a pessimistic view of humanity (fed by political realism). According to Hobbes, people are not, as Machiavelli says in the Prince, "ungrateful, fickle, mendacious, hypocritical and greedy" (1). War of all against all/Hobbes: The misery is rather the result of living together without a community: without statehood people live in a state of war of all against all. Aggression/Civil War/Hobbes/Höffe: (...) with the latent, not necessarily actual violence in the natural state, Hobbes does not claim that the human being is inherently aggressive and destructive. >War/Hobbes. For him, human passions are non-judgmental driving forces that are realistically accepted as they are. The human is not antisocial in a moral sense, that is to say evil; he is not even innocently evil. His basic passion, the striving for free self-preservation and for happiness (...) leads to the (...) inevitable antisocial tendency, the tendency to violence. 1. Machiavelli, Il Principe Chap. XVII |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 |
| Natural Justice | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Natural justice/Aristotle. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N.Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with his ability to enforce his right.(1) >Freedom, >State, >Society, >Individuals, >Community, >Law, >Rights. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
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