Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Church-Turing Thesis | Lorenzen | Berka I 266 Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equation of "constructive" with "recursive". >Constructivism, >Recursion, >Recursivity. LorenzenVsChurch: this is a too narrow view: thus it no longer permits the free use of the quantification over the natural numbers. >Quantification, >Numbers, >Infinity. I 267 Decision-making problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limiting to recursive statements, there can never be a dispute as to whether one of the admitted statements is true or false. The definition of recursiveness guarantees precisely the decision-definition, that is, the existence of a decision-making process. >Decidability, >decision problem.(1) 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Intersubjectivity | Schurz | I 28 Intersubjectivity/Objectivity/SchurzVsLorenzen/SchurzVsKamlah: Intersubjectivity cannot be used as a definition of objectivity because competence is an uncertain and gradual criterion. All competent speakers can be wrong. Solution/Peirce: idealized end result. >Ideal assertibility, >Objectivity, >Definitions, >Definability, >Competence, >Criteria, >Capabilities. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Knowledge | Lorenzen | Wessel I 346 Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: it is assumed a certain group of people has accepted a certain system of statements W as true. From these people, all statements which follow logical from these statements are then recognized as true. >Dialogical logic, cf. >Logical omniscience, cf. >Scorekeeping model. Lorenzen regards this as meaningful only for future statements. Knowledge/Lorenzen/Wessel: for Lorenzen, it follows that everything we know is necessary with regard to this knowledge. >Necessity. Tradition: For example, if we know that in a pea pod are five peas and that it contains protein. This is only the second necessary knowledge. According to Lorenzen, both statements are necessary knowledge. (WesselVsLorenzen). >Facts, >Contingency. Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: too broad a view. That all knowledge is supposed to be necessary is a "fatalistic consequence". >Fatalism. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Modalities | Lorenzen | Wessel I 347 Modality/Wessel: modality is not a kind of truth value, as often is falsely assumed! Truth/Carnap: identifies truth and logical necessity, Truth value/Lukasiewicz: has a third truth value "possible" >Truth values. Lorenzen: uses "possible" and "possibly true" synonymously. WesselVsLorenzen. Truth value/Wessel: a truth value is a special logical predicate to which statements are pronounced or denied. The difference between modalities and truth values is obvious: since alethic modalities are only linked to subjects of the form sA (the fact that A) and truth values are linked only to such with those of the form tA (the statement A) to connect statements. Truth value: is a statement. Modality: is a fact. >Statements, >Facts, >States of affairs, >Levels/order. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Church, A. | Lorenzen Vs Church, A. | Berka I 266 Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equating of "constructive" with "recursive". (S) so all structures are recursively possible? Or: there is only one recursive structure. (Slightly different meaning). LorenzenVsChurch: view to narrow: it allows no longer the free use of the quantification of the natural numbers. I 267 Decision Problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limited to recursive statement forms there can never arise dispute whether one of the approved statements is true or false. The definition of recursivity guarantees precisely the decision definiteness, that means the existence of a decision process.(1) 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Kamlah, A. | Schurz Vs Kamlah, A. | I 28 Intersubjectivity/Objectivity/SchurzVsLorenzen/SchurzVsKamlah: intersubjectivity kann nicht als Definition von objectivity verwendet werden, da Kompetenz ein unsicheres und graduelles Kriterium ist. Alle kompetenten Sprecher können sich irren. Lösung/Peirce: idealisiertes Endresultat. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Lorenzen, P. | Wessel Vs Lorenzen, P. | I 345/346 Laws/Wessel: always have the logical form of a formal implication (although not all true formal implications are laws) ((x)(P(x) > Q(x)). As conclusions from this alone we never get formulas of the form Q(a), where a is an individual constant. Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: it is assumed that a certain group of people has accepted a certain system of statements W as true. From these people all statements are then also recognized as true, which logically follow from these statements. Lorenzen regards this as meaningful only for future statements. Knowledge/Lorenzen/Wessel: for Lorenzen it results that everything we know is necessary regarding this knowledge. Tradition: For example if we know that there are five peas in a pea pod and that it contains protein. So only the second is necessary knowledge. According to Lorenzen, both statements are necessary knowledge. (WesselVs). Modality/WesselVsCarnap: too narrow a view. Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: too broad a view. That all knowledge should be necessary is a "fatalistic consequence". I 347 Modality/Wessel: is not a kind of truth value, as is often mistakenly assumed! Carnap: identifies truth and logical necessity, Lukasiewicz: has a third truth value "possible" Lorenzen: uses "possible" and "possibly true" synonymously. WesselVsLorenzen. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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