Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Atomism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 218
QuineVsRussell: VsLogical atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex. ---
II 107
Atomic facts/Russell: sensory data - QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed - acquaintance: with sensory data is certain, everything else is fallible (Russell).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Behaviorism Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities (f.o.th.). 2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ( "built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. Just as wrong as the instrument's cunning approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...".
---
Rorty VI 182
Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference ---
Sellars I XXIXf
Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism. Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate.
PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way.
Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior.
---
I 91
Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Empiricism Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
I XXI/XXII
SellarsVsLogical empiricism: the special wit in his criticism is that the experiences of the protocol leading people, that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi-theoretical, postulated entities of an everyday world view. ---
I 54
Elementary word-world connections exist between "red" and red, physical objects and not between "red" and a presumable class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpirism). This does not mean that private feelings are not perhaps an essential part of the development of these associative connections.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Intensions Anscombe
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 96
I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant. 97
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.".
His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they true and then if the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogicAnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes.
Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A" (see Logic/Anscombe).


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Logic Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Kardorff II 56ff
Logic/HeideggerVsLogic/Cardorff: "dissolves in the vortex of an original questioning."

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Logic Anscombe
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 79
I/AnscombeVsLogic: the logicians never have concepts of their objects because they do not need them. So you cannot come close to the "I", or cannot find its meaning. ---
Frank I 88
"I"/Logic/Anscombe: from the point of view of logicians, "I" is certainly a proper name. ---
Fra I 88/89
E.g. Suppose we have a company in which everyone is labeled with two names. 1. The one appears on the back and another on the upper end of the chest (?) (These names, which cannot be seen by the wearers, are different for the wearers, say from "B" to "Z". (?).
"The other name, "A" is imprinted on the inside of their wrists and the same for everyone.
One learns to respond to utterances of the name on one's own chest and back. Self-reports are then made on the basis of conclusions and testimony.
E.g. "B" draws conclusions, expressed by sentences with "A" as the subject, from the statements of other people who use "B" as the subject.
There are reports from B's mouth that say that A did this and that, these are prima facie verified by finding out that B did it.
Thus there is a person for each person, of whom he/she has characteristic limited, but also characteristic, privileged views.
---
Fra I 90
This does not include self-consciousness. Although everyone knows a lot of the object he/she actually is. Vs: the thesis that these people do not have self-consciousness may not seem right for this particular reason. B has consciousness of, i.e. he/she watches some of B's and thus his/her own activities.
So he is conscious of himself. So he has self-consciousness.
AnscombeVs: when we speak of self-consciousness, we do not mean this. We mean something that is expressed by the use of "I" as opposed to "A".


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Logical Constants Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
II 79
Sheffer stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q. ---
VI 95/96
Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. - New: they form part of a broader syntax.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Positivism Popper
 
Books on Amazon
I 116f
Positivism/Popper: understands the problem of demarcation naturalistic, as fixed border - positivist radicalism: the laws of nature are not traceable to elementary experience sets. ---
I 117
Wittgenstein: after his criterion of meaning the laws of nature are meaningless, that means no legitimate sentences. PopperVsCarnap: failure to dismiss metaphysics through reviews. Instead, Popper: it has a heuristic value. (E.g. Speculative atomism).
---
I 127
Log records/Popper: no preferred position. They appear in science only as psychological statements. PopperVsPositivismus: positivism does not wish that there should still be meaningful problems except the problems of "positive" empirical science. He wants to see the so-called philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. That will be always feasible. There is nothing easier to uncover a problem as a pseudo-problem. One only needs to take the concept of "meaning" narrow enough.
---
II 473
PopperVsLogical positivism: Science as a process emphasized more than the characterization of formal traits at theories that are regarded as scientific products.

Po I
K. Popper
Objektive Erkenntnis Hamburg 1993

Quantifiers Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 237
Quantifiers/Langacker/Gärdenfors: (Langacker 2003) Thesis: Expressions like "any cat" function as special cases of terms for fictional objects. These are points in the conceptual space. Quantifiers/Langacker:
a) proportional quantifiers: e.g. all, most, none
b) representative quantifiers: e.g. each, any. "Some" is used in both ways.
---
I 238
Cognitive treatment of quantifiers/Langacker: Any: random selection
Every single/each: throughgoing single investigation of the elements
All/every: here it is accepted that an individual examination is not possible. Here a picture is conjured that at the same time is to be overlooked.
---
I 236
Quantifiers/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: a cognition-based semantics should be able to say something about the meaning of quantifiers like "all" and "some". ---
I 237
Quantifiers/Langacker: (Langacker 2003) Thesis: Expressions like "any cat" function as special cases of terms for fictional objects. Gärdenfors: These are points in the conceptual space.
GärdenforsVsLogic: the traditional truth-functional semantics sweeps a set of characteristics of quantifiers with respect to the context under the carpet.
E.g. "Everyone has come" does not mean that all mankind has appeared, but only a context-dependent group of individuals.
Grammar: Problem: the quantifiers function grammatically as singular, although the universal quantifiers relate to all elements of a set.
---
I 238
Cognitive treatment of quantifiers/Langacker: Any: random selection
Every single/each: throughgoing single investigation of the elements
All/every: here it is accepted that an individual examination is not possible. Here a picture is conjured that at the same time is to be overlooked.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Science Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
Putnam V 243
Science / Carnap: even if experience is fundamental, observation statements are still not expressed in sensation language - Putnam: nevertheless introspection is not totally excluded - Carnap and Popper exaggerate the extent to which observations are always publicly verifiable - solution: public verifiability in the definition of rationality spares the confrontation - PutnamVsLogical Positivism: implicit majority thinking.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Semantics Black
 
Books on Amazon
II 166
"General Semantics" / nominalism / Alfred Korzybski / Black: educational movement U.S. after World War 1 - VsLogic - distortions call on diseases - "cow" should be replaced by "Bessie" - Vsgeneral terms - VsAbstraction

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Speech Act Theory Austin
 
Books on Amazon
II 240ff
Speech Act Theory: expressive function, accuracy, adequacy VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p").
Speech Act / Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going" - perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence - illocutionary: you frighten the listener - II 245 in addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, account Management - II 247 speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions 1st description of reality, 2nd expression of emotions - speech acts belong to neither of these two categories - II 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - sp. th: shows its strength here.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Verificationism Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
Stroud I 199f
Verificationism/Carnap: we cannot understand anything that cannot be proven true or false. - StroudVs: this failed, even as the attempt to pick out the empirically verifiable sentences. - Problem: verification methods and sentences that somehow involved "theory". - Or "inferred entities". - ((s)> theoretical entities.) - Stroud: but our concepts and our minds are not so strictly tied to "sensory experience". - (VsLogical Positivism). - Solution: verificationism would have had to explain how we confirm our belief by experience. - That did not work. - Then skepticism would have been defeated. - Verification principle (V.P.) and skepticism have the same problem. How our beliefs are empirically confirmed. - Skepticism is not refuted by the verification principle if we do not know if we are dreaming.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Words Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 21
Words/Gärdenfors: express our terms. ---
I 115
Words/Gärdenfors: why are there any at all? If we answer from a linguistic point of view, we are immediately involved in syntactic considerations. For example, we then try to find "arguments" of verbs. Problem: already the distinction transitive/intransitive is unclear. Also the assumption that verbs are used "predicatively" comes from the philosophy and the predicate logic and is an artificial construction. (GärdenforsVsPhilosophy, GärdenforsVsLogic).
Syntax/Gärdenfors: the semantic theory in this book should be free of syntax, i.e. the semantic concepts should not depend on grammatical categories. I do not mean that syntax does not contribute to meaning, only lexical semantics should be operated independently of syntax.
---
I 231
Words/Gärdenfors: are not simply meaning units - they occur in classes. > Word classes.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Behaviorism Searle Vs Behaviorism
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 30
Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism).
I 49
SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition".
Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957).
I 50
LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being.
I 57
Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input,
2. To the various other "mental" states and
3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output.
Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions.
VIII 428
Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma:
a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or
b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting!

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Behaviorism Sellars Vs Behaviorism
 
Books on Amazon
I 89
Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts.
I 90
Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior.
SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances.
I 91
That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior.
So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system.
The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts.

I XXIX
Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism.
I XXX
Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form.
I XXXI
Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Empiricism Quine Vs Empiricism
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
IV 397
British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social.
IV 398
The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism).
IV 402
QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages ​​and theories.

VI 11
"Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism).
Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not!
We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence.
VI 11/12
Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut.
Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical.
QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack.

V 189
Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism.
V 190
Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise.
Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses.
Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning.
Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies.
V 191
Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low.
QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data.
Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same.
Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values ​​of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates.

Stalnaker I 3
QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Empiricism Rorty Vs Empiricism
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Horwich I 465
Logical Empiricism/RortyVsLogical Empiricism: was a reactionary development, uses the dualism scheme/content.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Empiricism Sellars Vs Empiricism
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 205
SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason.
Rorty I 194
QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths.
I 195
Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas.
I 196
Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter.
I 196/197
Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach.
VI 219
RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue.
Sellars I XVII
To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification.
Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification.
Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge.
Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons".
I XXI
SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view.
I XXII
Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language.
Sellars I 54
Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Intuitionism Poincaré Vs Intuitionism
 
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Wessel I 236
PoincaréVsIntuitionism/VsConstruktivism/Wessel: (Poincaré calls the intuitionists pragmatists): "The pragmatist should take the position of the extension, the Cantorian that of comprehension (compréhension). The objects, however, are there before the inscriptions, and the set itself would exist if there was no one who would undertake to organize it."
I 237
Intuitionism/Logic/Wessel: the intuitionists reject not only the concept of the actual infinite, but they also believe that they have to limit logic: Brouwer: the law of excluded third only applies within a certain finite main system, since it is possible to come to an empirical confirmation here.
BrouwerVsLogic: as foundation of mathematics. Instead: vice versa!
I 238
 (s) It is about the practice of the mathematician, therefore the limits of the constructive possibilities are not random or can be overcome easily by logical considerations.) Constructivism/Brouwer/Heyting: examines the construction as such, without inquiring after the nature of the objects, e.g. whether they exist!
Law of Excluded Third/Intuitionism/Heyting/Wessel:
(a) k is the biggest prime number such that k-1 is also one; if there is no such number, k = 1
(s) "the only prime that is adjacent to another".
(b) l is the biggest prime such that l-2 is also one; if there is no such number, l = 1.
Wessel: k can really be determined (k = 3), while we do not have any methods to determine l.
This leads to the rejection of the law of excluded third: for if the sequence of prime twins was either finite or infinite, then (b) would define an integer.
Intuitionism/Logic/Logical Operators/Wessel: because certain laws of logic do not apply here, the different logics are various complexes of operators.
But the intuitionists have the same claim, to comprehend the meaning of "and", "not", "or" in the everyday language.
Def Conjunction/Intuitionism/Wessel: p u q can be claimed exactly then when both p and q can be claimed.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Kripke, S. A. Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Frank I 84
I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance."
Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism.
AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body.
I 85
According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this.
Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke).
I 85/86
AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that."
So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself.
Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual.
Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?.
Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that.
I 96
I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant.
Fra I 97
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes.
Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
Fra I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A".

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Positivism Field Vs Positivism
 
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III 15
Logical Positivism/Mathematics/Field: our view has some resemblance to the logical positivism that says mathematics is analytically true:
III 16
I.e. it has "no factual content." But the reason was another one: they wanted to emphasize the non-empirical character (also of logic). FieldVsLogical Positivism: the "lack of content" was not further characterized.
Def Lack of Content/Logical Positivism/Field: stemmed from the fact that the conclusions were already included in the premises.
FieldVsLogical Positivism: but it is not explained how they are supposed to be included in it and I think that’s not possible.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Structuralism Field Vs Structuralism
 
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II 328
Numbers/Structuralism/Field: it is sometimes expressed in a way that 2 is simply a point in a structure. (Resnik 1981, Shapiro 1989). Vagueness/Field: This view corresponds to the view that vagueness is in the world instead of in our language! ((s)> epistemic view).
FieldVs: it seems to work well not only for numbers like "2", but also for the expressions that we use to describe structures in which there are no symmetries.
Symmetry/Field: brings a problem into play here.
E.g. Brandom: √-1/Root -1/Complex Numbers/Field: Problem: every complex number other than 0 (Ex -1) has two roots. (actually BrandomVsFrege, BrandomVsLogicism).
"Number i": this term has introduced as a standard for one of the two, (-i is then of course the other one).
Problem: even if we assume that we have somehow defined which objects are the complex numbers, which subset of them are the real numbers, and which functions of them are addition and multiplication, then our use of these expressions still leaves undetermined to which of the two roots of -1 our expression "i" refers. ((s) Because of the symmetry, it is impossible to make out a difference).
Complex Numbers/Interior/Exterior/Theory/Field: within the theory of complex numbers there is no way to distinguish i and -i. There is no predicate A(x) that does not itself contain "i" and that is true of one but not of the other.
Complex Numbers/Field: Of course, the practical applications are no help in distinguishing them either!.
Problem: even if you say that "i" is simply a point in the system of complex numbers, the indeterminacy continues, because the complex number plane contains two structurally identical positions for the roots of -1, without distinguishing properties.
4) Incompleteness"/Mathematics/Numbers/Field: numbers are more or less incomplete objects: E.g. 2 has properties such as being the predecessor of 3 and being a prime, but no property that determines whether it is a quantity!.
FieldVsStructuralism: This fourth way of seeing it is certainly not the best way to capture the "structuralist insight".
II 332
Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical domains must not be indistinguishable.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Various Authors Feyerabend Vs Various Authors
 
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I 355
Incommensurability: FeyerabendVsCritics: Incommensurability does not apply to all competing theories and it applies to theories only if they are interpreted in a certain way, for example, without reference to an "independent observation language"! This restriction has been overlooked by most critics. I do not claim the incommensurability of all theories!
II ~ 10
FeyerabendVsEthics: it assumes that man is entirely a worldly being (materialism).
II 31
"Objectivity"/FeyerabendVs: supposed to conceal a position or tradition. Position a participant who abstains from his skepticism.
II 74
FeyerabendVsLogic: the objection assumes that the class of the consequences of a scientific sentence is fixed irrespective of the treatment of the sentence and according to the rules of propositional logic. This assumption has never been substantiated. The propositional logic is only one among many logical systems, there are also intuitionistic logics within them without Foreclosed Third.
II 162
VsAstrology: it is criticized that stars lead to tendencies but not to constraints. Astrology/Feyerabend: connects their success with making money!

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Various Authors Mates Vs Various Authors
 
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I 281
Renaissance/Humanismus/Logik/Neuzeit/Mates: HumanistsVsLogicians: barbarischer Stil, langweilig, Männer mit wissenschaftlicher Neigung fanden die Syllogistik des Aristoteles schlimmer als nutzlos. Mates: die nächsten 4 Jahrhunderte waren in bezug auf logische Literatur bedeutungslos.

Petrus Ramus: (1515 72) (wurde in der Bartholomäusnacht ermordet und Märtyrer der Protestanten):
Mates: Ramus leistete der Logik den Dienst allen ernstes zu fragen, ob Aristoteles nicht solche Syllogismen hätte zulassen müssen:
Bsp "Octavius ist Cäsars Erbe; ich bin Octavius; also bin ich Cäsars Erbe".
VsRamus/Mates: die Verteidiger des Aristoteles fanden sich in der verzweifelten Lage, argumentieren zu müssen, diesem Syllogismus müssen man umformulieren: "Was immer Octavius ist, ist Cäsars Erbe; was immer Ich ist, ist Octavius; also ist, was immer Ich ist, Cäsars Erbe".

I 83
künstliche Sprache L/Interpretation/Mates: Vs vollständige Interpretation: wir wollen aber nicht dadurch eingeschränkt sein, dass wir nur solche Bereiche zulassen, für die es in L genug Individuenkonstanten (Namen) gibt, daher bleiben wir bei der alten Definition. Wir wollen nämlich Bsp über die reellen Zahlen Aussagen machen.

Mate I
B. Mates
Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969

Mate II
B. Mates
Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981
Wittgenstein, L. Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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I 55
CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. ---
Hintikka I 133
... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege.
Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski)
CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that).
---
I 134
But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Positivism Versus Quine XII 10
QuineVsPositivism - Quine: per more radical empiricism - instead VsLogical Empiricism: no analytic truths.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Empiricism, Logical Versus Quine2 XII 10
QuineVsPositivism - Quine: per more radical empiricism - but VsLogical Empiricism: no analytic truths.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mathematics Kant, I.
 
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Field I 79
Def Logicism / Field: is the thesis that mathematics is part of logic. This is   VsKant: who denies that mathematics is analytic, because the calculations are synthetic. And for the calculations we need the numbers as entities.
LogicismVsKant - KantVsLogicism.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980