Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Appearance Hacking
 
Books on Amazon
I 238
Appearance / HackingVsLocke: 1 public representation (all intellectual are public) - 2 Concept of reality - 3 from criticism: the thought of mere appearance - Locke: reverse

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Consciousness McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 113 ff
Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. ---
I 113 ff
Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. ---
I 126/27
Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. ((s) Breathing does not need a criterion for air, important as air may be). ---
I 127
Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. ---
I 128
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). ---
I 129f
McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of ​​continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of ​​the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Consciousness Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
V 139
Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness is a fact about our concept of consciousness - problem: truth does ultimately depend on our cultural standards.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Continuants Simons
 
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I 117
Continuant/Broad: has no temporal parts, only spatial parts - Contrast: Event: spatial and temporal parts - Continuant: E.g. human - Point: that is why he is able to change - ((s) otherwise question of whether he remains the same) - Contrast: Occurrence/Broad: event - event cannot change - ((s) human (continuant) can grow old - event cannot grow old.)
I 127
Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants - and they are used in the argument of the RT that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light.
I 173
Continuants/Locke: constant clusters of matter - cannot lose or gain any parts - SimonsVsLocke
I 175
Temporal Part/Continuants/Mereology/SimonsVsAll: Thesis even continuants can have temporal parts - i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable - Simons Thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence.
I 176
Continuants/Simons: not all have to be material things: e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things.
I 180
Def Coincidence/Continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a < I 187
Continuant/ChisholmVsAll: Thesis: is mereologically constant - mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants - organisms only constructions.
I 305
Event/Continuants/Simons: Event: Here, a formula like "a I 350
Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected - Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant.
I 351
Continuant/Temporal Relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but his life story - HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: reduction to events, continuants mere clothesline - whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it -" I 353 Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Disjunction Sellars
 
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I 50
Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of ​​being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! - VsLocke: he thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided".

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Empiricism Locke
 
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Euchner I 169
Locke / Euchner: today: his empiricism overcame the old worldview of divinely revealed knowledge - thesis: "there is nothing in the mind, which was not previously in the senses" - LeibnizVsLocke: "apart from the mind itself" - KreimendahlVsLocke: by limiting knowledge to the ideas he questioned his own empirical program. - - -
Arndt II 177
Locke / Arndt: ancestor of empiricism - knowledge should be treated language dependent.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Loc II
H.W. Arndt
Locke
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg), Göttingen 1997
Epistemology Berkeley
 
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I 213
Knowledge / Berkeley / VsLocke: if our knowledge is based only on feelings, it must be shown conversely, how the outside world may be the result of a production, which is based solely on our sensory perceptions - 1. Perception must be purified from all mind ingredients - 2. reality must not become a figment of imagination.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Epistemology Locke
 
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Rorty I 159
Epistemology: Problem, how can we know whether our internal representations have accuracy. Locke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our mind with a "foundation of our knowledge claims."
Rorty I 160
SellarsVsLocke: same error as the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt to completely dissolve epistemic facts in non-epistemic facts. How could he be of the opinion, a causal theory about how an opinion is acquired, is an indicator of entitlement, with which you have that opinion? Rorty: because he did not think of knowledge simply as a justified true opinion, because he did not think of our knowledge as a relation between a person and a proposition (see: Rorty).
---
Euchner I 17
Knowledge/Locke: basis: sensations (sensory impressions) - they must be processed by reason and reasoning ability to conclusions - they help to recognize the existence of God.
I 30
Knowledge/Locke: not logical deduction but observation of mental processes - "inner sense".
I 31
Both perception and reflection are passive. ---
Arndt II 193
Definition knowledge/Locke: Perception of the relation or conflict of ideas - real knowledge: determinism of ideas (necessary but not sufficient condition.) - Definition Real Truth/Locke: not only verbal.
II 195
Demonstrative knowledge: through mediation of other ideas - sensitive knowledge: existence of things that are present to the senses - intuitive knowledge: the certainty that the perceived idea is such a one as the mind perceives it- intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible safe knowledge - VsDescartes: not recognizing predetermined conceptual content - instead empirically simple given ideas in mind.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Loc II
H.W. Arndt
Locke
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg), Göttingen 1997
Experience Hume
 
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I 80
Experience / Hume: each has the same weight - only the larger number counts - but the number must also be determined
I 134
Experience / Hume: is not constitutive - principles are constitutive!
Vollmer I 20
HumeVsLocke: conclusions from the experience are merely habit, not a logical deduction -
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Ideas Locke
 
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Euchner I 19
Ideas/Locke: The sensations and their processing cause in our mind "simple ideas" (simple ideas), for example: from heat, light, hard, soft, certain colors and flavors (these are unmistakable) - the "first objects of our understanding" - things/objects/Locke: are not captured by a single, but only with a bundle of many "simple ideas": "complex ideas"- they correspond with objects. ---
I 27
Idea/Locke: each object of the mind (understanding) - concept, idea, may also be an illusion-, any content of consciousness. ---
I 33
Ideas/Locke: Modes: Ideas that represent the states or properties of other ideas or constructs of ideas - simple ideas: caused by a sense: E.g. colors, light, sounds. ---
I 38
itself neither true nor false, but instruments. ---
I 42
LockeVsAristoteles: Reason can trace without clattering syllogisms the "natural order of connecting ideas". ---
I 35
complex ideas/Locke: here the spirit is active (in the simple passive).
I 36
E.g. lie - E.g. substance (!). ---
I 35
simple idea/Locke. E.g. room - modes: distance, infinity, figure - simple idea: E.g. pain, joy - modes: hope, love, fear, envy. - - -
Holz I 45/46
Ideen/Wahrnehmung/Locke: es gibt "Ideen", die durch mehr als einen Sinn vermittelt werden: z.B. die Ideen Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Bewegung usw. Ideen/Wahrnehmung/LeibnizVsLocke: diese "Ideen" (Ausdehnung, Dauer, Gestalt usw.) stammen aus dem Geist, nicht aus der Wahrnehmung.
Sie sind die "Ideen des reinen Verstandes". Sie haben aber einen Bezug zur Außenwelt und sind so der Definition und des Beweises fähig.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Ideas Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
V 58
Ideas/language/QuineVsLocke: Language is not used for the transmission of ideas - (> nominalism VsLocke). - How do we know that our ideas would be the same? - we learn to apply "red" on blood and tomatoes - the idea may be anything.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Ideas Leibniz
 
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Holz I 45/46
Ideas/perception/Locke: there are "ideas" mediated by more than one sense: e.g. The ideas expansion, shape, movement, etc. Ideas/perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (extent, duration, shape, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception.
They are the "ideas of the pure understanding." But they have a relation to the external world and are thus capable of definition and proof.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Identity Locke
 
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McDowell I 126/7
Consciousness / apperception / criterion / KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity.
Euchner I 53f
Identity / person / personal identity / Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life - we have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas - Def life: the substance of this trias - Def person: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times).

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Information Evans
 
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Gareth Evans
I 327
Prevailing information/Kaplan/Evans: not "liveliness" (VsLocke) but set and also weight. Identification: in the end, you may not have any false information about the twin, but a wrong opinion on when you first met the twin. ---
Frank I 488
Information/Evans: Contact: one can have "information that ..", without being of the opinion that .. - Information can be non-conceptual: non-conceptual content of perception. ---
Frank I 495
Information/I/Evans: the information state does not have the perception of the blue necktie as its object but the necktie itself. Problem: What kind of object is related to information about "I"? - Evans: it refers to bodies of flesh and blood.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Innateness Leibniz
 
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Holz I 44
Congenital "innate" ideas/LeibnizVsLocke: do not originate in sensuous perception, but originate from reflection. ((s) not from birth?). Reflection: nothing but attention to what is in us. Reflection finds that in our mind is much innate, because we are, so to speak, self-innate.
E.g. being, unity, substance, duration, change, activity, perception, pleasure and a thousand other objects.
---
I 45
They are the prerequisite for the determination of objective being as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us with being, as a formal determination of being. What remains open here is how these innate ideas are the "first truths" that stem from sense perception.
Sense-perception/Leibniz: this cannot prove the unity of perception itself (see above), because every proof presupposes the unity (substance) which is the foundation of the characteristics, already as a reason of experience from which the proof must be led.
The unity does not have to be proved, it is irrefutable and intuitive (simple) given in the perception.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Language Berkeley
 
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Avr I 140
BerkeleyVsLocke: no "generalizing forces" - linguistic generalization is no generalization of mind. - Singular names do not have to give rise to the understanding of ideas. - It is not the main purpose of language to evoke ideas - instead: even eliciting of passion discouraging and encouraging of actions, etc.
Breidert I 228ff
Language / Berkeley: philosophical errors are often explained linguistically. - Incorrect projection:the idea of a thing - ambiguity: something or a thing - applicable to ideas or acts of will. - Ideas: ideas of things perceived - notion: concept of a mind and its activities.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Language Kripke
 
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Rorty II 130f
Positivists/Rorty: Replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) - but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVslinguistic turn). ---
EMD II 335
Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts - Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language". ---
EMD II 338
KripkeVsDavidson: We just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker). ---
EMD II 397
Language/Infinite/Kripke: If the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. - ...Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Language Strawson
 
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Meg I 297
Lie / Strawson: no correct use of language
Strawson VII 114
Language / Strawson: two types of conventions: 1st Reference Rules: "About What"- 2nd attribution rules: "what do you say about it" (predication) - VsLocke: the difference was not clear to him - reference: it requires circumstances, time, location, etc.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Maximum Leibniz
 
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Holz I 86
World/totality/Leibniz: the construction of the totality corresponds to the calculus. Maximum: is the infinite set of different substanceialities. (World)
Minimum: is the representation of the whole in the individual. (Representation).
---
I 87
LeibnizVsLocke: the connection of the infinite set of predicates and the idea of infinity as unity: that is the exact opposite of the mere addition of manifold. This excludes the idea of infinity from the range of quantity!
There is no "infinite number". Also no infinite line.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Meaning Theory Fodor
 
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II 120
Meaning Theory/m.th. / Meaning / Essence / Idea / FodorVsLocke / FodorVsHume: m.th. that refer to beings or ideas, do not say anything because they do not show the cases in which two expressions express the same nature or the same idea.
IV 70
m.th. / Davidson / Fodor / Lepore: there can be several m.th. because of the semantic indeterminacy - RI: is about the problem of finding the correct m.th..

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Morals Locke
 
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Euchner I 22
Morality / ethics / Locke: (late): there are quite real rules for good and evil. Natural law (stemming from God)
Euchner I 66
Morality / ethics / VsLocke: motive of the decision for the good for Locke is ultimately a benefit intended for pleasure / displeasure. - He has never clarified this.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Mysticism Leibniz
 
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Holz I 96
LeibnizVsLocke: one should not take refuge in miracles (God), or accept unexplainable forces.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Positivism Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
II 130f
Positivists / Rorty: replace "experience", "Ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities are no longer in closer relation to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke) - but exactly this thesis was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Progress Hobbes
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 251
Progress/HobbesVsLocke/HobbesVsAristotle/Hobbes/Adorno: unlike Aristotle and Locke, Hobbes did not make the progress dependent on any positive, original qualities of the human's nature, but of the necessity and the contradiction directly justified by the incompatibility of competing individual interests... ---
XIII 252
...of individuals by a bourgeois primacy principle. > Freedom/Kant.


A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Propositional Knowledge Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 165
Propositional Knowledge/Insight/KantVsLocke/Rorty: Error: knowledge after the model of vision - confusion of the "succession of apprehensions with the apprehension of a succession": E.g. objects and properties take turns to perceive instead of the features typical of an object. - False: to want to reduce "Knowing that" to the "knowledge of" - ((s)> propositional knowledge) - Property/Kant: is always the result of a synthesis.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Qualities Berkeley
 
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Putnam II 167f
Qualities / BerkeleyVsLocke: Vs primary and secondary qualities - only Locke s "simple Qu of sensation" - secondary qu. / Locke: perceptible only as an asset, in relation to us - KantVsLocke: this applies to everything, including primary qu. - no reason to distinguish
Stegmüller IV 380
primary qualities / BerkeleyVsLocke: certain values ​​of primary qualities such as distance and speed are always only relative sizes! This shows that they are "only in our minds" exist - Vs (see below) -
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Qualities Hume
 
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I 97
Qualities / HumeVsLocke: Vs distinction primary / secondary qualities - (perception does not allow the distinction) HumeVs substance - I 105 the negation of the principle of sufficient reason corresponds to the negation of the primary qualities.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Qualities Kant
 
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Strawson V 52
Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: when we abstract from color and hardness and all sensation, we retain no terms but just empty words - Kant: "pure intuitions" are something other than "primary qualities". ---
Adorno XIII 39
Qualities/Mediation/Kant/Adorno: Kant attempted to take the so-called objective, the primary qualities into the subject, but not to grasp them as sensual moments, but to derive them from the context of consciousness, from categorial forms. This is an example of mediating thinking.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Qualities Wright
 
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I 251
Explanation/facts/secondary qualities: colors, sounds, tastes, smells show indeed the necessary explanation diversity. It is not a conceptual error to assume that (colorblind) bulls are set in rage by red cloths.   Also, the colors of a negative can be explained by reference to the original colors.
   secondary properties, VsLocke: E.g. the cat sits by the fire, because it is warm there.
---
I 252
extensive cosmological role: it is not their job to sabotage all statements that are not formulated using the strict vocabulary of the primary qualities of theoretical science. (Cosmological role see content).


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Relativism Putnam
 
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Horwich I 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Horwich I 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. ---
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. ---
I 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Representation Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 162
Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions) - SellarsVsLocke: puts both together.
I 278~
R: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.
II 76
Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey - later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
II 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.
VI 45
R/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
R/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.) - RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
VI 63
R/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71~
Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
VI 107f
R/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. - (Taylor: handling) - Coping is more primary than representation. - Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Sensory Impressions Berkeley
 
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I 215f
Senses / Perception / Mind / Berkeley: separates the benefits of the senses sharp and so displays the proportion of the mind - VsLocke: then spatial extent is no primary quality but relative -
I 216
Synthesis Problem: the sensed object is not the same as the visual object - still the same thing - N.B.: no matter whether you deny the material things with Berkeley - solution / Berkeley: all perceptions are mine - the sensed object / visual object: such as character and object, are one by habit.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Sensory Impressions Leibniz
 
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Holz I 43
Sensory impression/empiricism/Leibniz: what is given by the senses is unprovable. Impression/Sensory Impression/Identity/Leibniz: therefore Leibniz does not rely on the "impression" (terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression").
LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: in the sensible givenness itself lies the identity relation.
---
Holz I 45/46
Sensory perception/proof/Leibniz: sensory perception is unprovable. Only what can be traced back to simple terms (by definition) from complex concepts can be proved. "Chain of definitions".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Species Sellars
 
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I 50
SellarsVsLocke: he should have allowed not only conjunctive but also disjunctive ideas. Not only the idea of being A and B but also the idea of being A or B.
I 51
Disjunction: the idea of a genus is the idea of the disjunction of all its species. So the idea of the triangular is the idea of the inequilateral or equilateral. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it was the idea of the inequilateral and equilateral. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Thinking Avramides
 
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I 104
Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts.
I 113
Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language mere vehicle for communication - Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings.
I 115
Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical) - Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them! - Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism - Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded.
I 142f
DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: wrong code concept of language for ideas - significance is not explained by thoughts - where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance - then mother tongue like foreign language - Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. "square": sort out square things -then no representations to connect sentences with thoughts - understanding instead of association - AvramidesVsDummett: but allows no thinking without language.
I 15
Thinking/Dummett: can only be investigated through language (not through behavior) - AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle
 
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I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Berkeley, G. Kant Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Putnam I 167
Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth.
I 167/168
KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory".
BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Conceptualism Martin Vs Conceptualism
 
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Arm II 159
VsKonzeptualismus/Place: (extreme Form): der sagt, nur ED existieren, und die Klassifikationsfähigkeit von Organismen, die auf Ähnlichkeiten reagieren. PlaceVsKonzeptualismus/extreme Form: diesen K kann man herausfordern, indem man fragt, wie er denn so sicher sein kann, daß ED begriffsunabhängig existieren, wenn diese Frage überhaupt erst gestellt werden kann, wenn die ED als Inst unter ein U subsumiert sind.
Klassifikationsfähigkeit/Place: wir müssen, um nicht in den Anti Realismus (In Bezug auf U) abzurutschen, sicher stellen (wie Martin), daß die Klassifikationsfähigkeit überlebensnotwendig für den Organismus ist. ((s)Evolutionstheorie, Überlebensfähigkeit als Grundbegriff?).
PlaceVsLocke: aber es ist nicht nur biologische Plausibilität, die uns zeigt, daß Locke falsch lag:
Locke: das Verhalten der allgemeinen Ideen zeigt den Unterschied zwischen Mensch und Tier.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Conceptualism Place Vs Conceptualism
 
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Arm II 159
VsConceptualism/Place: (extreme form): he says only particulars exist, and the classification ability of organisms that respond to similarities. PlaceVsConceptualism/Extreme Form: we can challenge this conceptualism by asking how it can be so sure that particulars exist independent from concepts if the question can only ever be asked when the particulars are subsumed as Inst under a universal (U). Classification Ability/Place: to avoid sliding into anti-realism (with regard to U) we need to ensure (like Martin) that the classification ability is vital for the organism. PlaceVsLocke: but it is not only biological plausibility that shows us that Locke was wrong: Locke: the behavior of the general idea shows the difference between humans and animals.

Place I
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Correspondence Theory Putnam Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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Horwich I 409
Qualities/Primary/Secondary/KantVsLocke/Putnam/Field: (Putnam, V.W u G, p. 60 64): Thesis: Kant extended what Locke said about secondary qualities (SekQ) to primary qualities (primQ). E.g. Locke: Secondary qualities do not resemble our ideas directly.
Field: many other authors have extended that also to primary qualities. (namely so, because the image theory is now dead).
primary qualities: E.g. length, size, shape
secondary qualities: E.g. color.
I 410
Putnam/Field: Putnam has much more in mind, however: he means that properties such as color are nothing else but the power to affect us in a certain way. The extension to primary qualities is then that even length, size, charge and mass are nothing but powers to affect us. Expansion of Locke/EwLPutnam/Field: Putnam goes even further in expanding the position of Locke:
1) he does not only want to apply it to properties of external objects, but also to properties of sensations.
Vs: that might seem inconsistent: how can a property of sensations just be a force that evokes sensations? ((s) Circular). But that is not what Putnam means. He means powers that affect us. And that is coherent.
2) This position implies the assumption of a Noumenon ((Def Noumenon/Field: an object that can have no other properties but affecting an observer) for every phenomenal object.
Phenomenon/Phenomenal Object/Putnam/Field: should read: object in our representation of the world.
Problem: if electrons do not exist in the world (as Noumena), then they do not exist at all. The existence of our representation does not guarantee the existence of "phenomenal" electrons.
EwL/Putnam: abandons this assumption altogether by not attributing the power to affect us to a "noumenon", e.g. that underlies a brown chair, but he attributes this power directly to the world.
PutnamVsCorrespondence: But even if the world now has such powers, there need be no one to one correspondence between objects in the world (noumena) and objects in our representation (phenomena).
Def phenomenon: object in our representation
Def Noumenon: what is responsible in the world for that we experience the phenomenon.
EwL/Field: we want to call this the "expanded Lockean view". Putnam offers it in two respects
1) as an interpretation of Kant
2) as the actual view of internal realism. (Field: = internalism).
PutnamVsCorrespondence Theory: comes up to a rejection of the correspondence theory.

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Dennett, D. Brandom Vs Dennett, D.
 
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I 113
Meaning / intentional systems / BrandomVsDennett: understanding belongs to meaning, and such systems do not understand.
II 54
BrandomVsDennett: if you have to distinguish derivative intentionality from the primordial intentionality of the interpreter then a regress threatens. BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist).
We are cultural and not merely natural beings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Evans Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I 497
EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas.
I 522
Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 27
angeborene Ideen/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: es gibt keine angeborenen Ideen! Weder im spekulativen noch im praktischen (moralischen, theologischen) Denken, auch nicht in Form von "Maximen", also unmittelbar einleuchtenden Prinzipien. 1. spekulative Prinzipien: wären sie angeboren, müssten sie bei noch nicht durch Vorurteile verbildeten Menschen nachweisbar sein, als z.B. bei Kindern oder Geistesschwachen, und das sind sie nicht!
2. wären Wahrheiten in Form von Sätzen angeboren , so müssten dies auch die dazugehörenden Begriffe sein, sogar die Folgerungen aus diesen Sätzen! Derartige Annahmen dehnten den Bereich angeborener Begriffe und Sätze aber ins Unübersehbare aus.
3. Maximen: die spontane Zustimmung zu ihnen bedeutet, dass sie zuvor nicht gewusst wurden! Angeborenes müsse aber immer präsent sein.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): würde einwenden, dass Grammatikregeln auch erst ins Bewusstsein treten. Da geht es um die Leichtigkeit des Lernens).
angeborene Ideen/Locke: die Annahme, Denken beginne mit der Anwendung angeborener Denkgesetze oder erster Prinzipien, die mehr seien als bloß instrumentales Denkvermögen, ist eine Täuschung.
I 45
Körper/Ausdehnung/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: Ausdehnung und Körper sind daher nicht identisch! Es ist auch gar nicht ausgemacht, dass sie der Geist vom Körper unterscheiden lassen muss. (Riskierte den gefährlichen Vorwurf des Materialismus). Die Idee der Ausdehnung und die Idee des Körpers sind verschieden.
Ausdehnung: schließt weder Festigkeit noch Widerstand gegen Bewegung (Trägheit) ein.
Raum: kann nicht geteilt werden, weil sonst Oberflächen entstünden!
VsCartesians: diese müssen zugeben, dass sie in Anbetracht der Unendlichkeit des Raums entweder Körper als unendlich denken, oder aber zugeben müssten, dass Raum nicht mit Körper identifiziert werden kann.
I 52
res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: Welt der Körper und des Denkens strikt zu trennen.
Locke: gibt zu bedenken, ob es nicht ausgedehnte Dinge, also Körper geben könnte, die denken, etwas fließende Materiepartikel. Jedenfalls ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Gott in seiner Allmacht "Materiesystemen" die
I 53
Kraft der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens gegeben oder "übergestülpt" habe. Dadurch fühlten sich zeitgenössische Theologien, besonders sein Kontrahend Stillingfleet provoziert.
LockeVsDescartes: führt auch zu Problemen mit der menschlichen Identität (s.u.).
I 54
Identität/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: das Verhältnis von Substanz und Person, wenn die Denkfähigkeit allein einer immateriellen Substanz zugeschrieben wird. Bsp so wäre es denkbar, dass jemand die Überzeugung vertreten könnte, er sei dieselbe Person wie Nestor. Wenn man nun die Richtigkeit der Cartesianischen These voraussetzt,
I 55
so sei es denkbar, dass ein zeitgenössischer Mensch tatsächlich die Person Nestor sei. So sei er deshalb aber doch nicht der Mensch Nestor, eben weil die Idee des Menschen nicht von seiner körperlichen Gestalt ablösbar sei.
Das ist für uns heute abstrus. (> Geach).
Locke relativiert die These damit, dass es für das Bewusstsein auf die Beschaffenheit der Substanz gar nicht ankomme, weshalb er diese Frage offen lassen wolle - er vermittelt dabei den Eindruck, dass er der materialistischen Sichtweise zugeneigt ist.
- - -
II 189
Klarheit/LockeVsDesacrtes: kein Wahrheitskriterium, sondern weiterer Sinn: auch im Bereich bloß wahrscheinlichen Wissens.
II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus. (>Sprache).
II 195
Erkenntnis/Locke: intuitive und demonstrative Erkenntnis bilden nach Locke eine vollständige Disjunktion der möglichen sicheren Erkenntnis. VsDescartes: diese besteht nicht in einem Erkennen vorgegebener begrifflicher Gehalte, das sich in deren Anschauung vollzieht, sondern konstituiert sich erst auf der empirischen Grundlage einfacher Ideen in der Verstandestätigkeit.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Descartes, R. Vollmer Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Vollmer I 14
LockeVsDescartes: keine angeborenen Ideen! Seele bei Geburt weißes Papier, tabula rasa, Wachstafel. Sinneserfahrungen bringen Ideen hervor, die vorher nicht vorhanden waren. These: "Nichts ist im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen gewesen ist". (DescartesVs).
Dennoch reicht das nicht als Beweis, dass nicht einige Ideen doch schon bei Geburt vorhanden sind. Locke braucht dafür Beweise, die jedoch
LeibnizVsLocke: zu schwach sind.
Locke: muss sicherstellen, dass die Ideen die Welt auch richtig abbilden:
primäre Qualitäten: vom Körper untrennbar, konstant bei allen Veränderungen: Bsp Festigkeit, Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Bewegung oder Ruhe, Zahl. (objektiv)
sekundäre Qualitäten: nichts in den Gegenständen selbst, sondern nur das Vermögen, mittels ihrer primären Qualitäten in uns verschiedenartige Empfindungen hervorzurufen.: Bsp Farben, Töne, Geschmacksarten, auch Wärme (!) usw. (subjektiv).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Functionalism Newen Vs Functionalism
 
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I40
Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech.
- - -
NS I 16
Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. - - -
NS I 27
Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Hume, D. Brandom Vs Hume, D.
 
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II 54
BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as naturalist).   We are cultural and not merely natural beings.
II 58
Tradition (Hume): leads standards back to requests. Request / BrandomVsHume: is explained here by committing to certain patterns of practical inference, i.e. in terms of what is a desire for something, and not vice versa.
II 112
Justify /justification/ Hume: consider all possible aspects. BrandomVsHume.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Hume, D. Leibniz Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 43
Impression/Sensory impression/Identität/Leibniz: Therefore, Leibniz does not use the "impression" ["Eindruck"](Terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: The identity is in the sensory reality.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hume, D. Quine Vs Hume, D.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Hume I 115
Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume).
Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure.
I 178
The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. - - -
Quine V 19
Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem.
- - -
V 88
Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as
V 89
e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times.
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that.
- - -
V 177
Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition.
Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist.
But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images:
a) Fantasies
b) Memories.
V 178
QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation
Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory.
Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways:
a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit"
b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation.
V 179
Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete.
- - -
Quine VII 65
Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of ​​physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute!
QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it.
- - -
Quine XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved?

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hume, D. Wittgenstein Vs Hume, D.
 
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Stegmüller IV 63
Impressions/experience/sensation/introspection/WittgensteinVsHume/WittgensteinVsLocke: those "inner impressions" do not exist. This is not a behaviorist criticism Witt's, but happens on a genuinely introspective basis.
Introspection/Wittgenstein: provide us with an image that completely differs from that of the empiricists. "capturing meaning" does not exist as a state.
The so-called "aha-moment" cannot be it: two people can fully agree in their inner experiences, however, one could mean "plus" and the other "quus".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Idealism Frege Vs Idealism
 
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Frege V 105
FregeVsIdealism: Idealism is useless because it can not represent the effect of the language.
Avramides I 140
FregeVsIdealism:
Language/Ideas/DummettVsLocke: the entire analytical school is a rejection of the idealistic conception, first clear rejection by Frege with the distinction of sense/meaning.
I 141
And this, in turn, explained as different from the associated idea. (Frege 1982, p.59))

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Locke, J. Berkeley Vs Locke, J.
 
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Danto2 I 211
Berkeley assumes that the world is perceived by God. BerkeleyVsLocke: he casts a externalist view on a whole inevitably internist position.
- - -
Avramides I 140
BerkeleyVsIdealismus/BerkeleyVsLocke/Avramides: (18. Jahrhundert): Locke: "der Geist hat die Kraft, abstrakte Ideen zusammenzufügen (zu setzen, erfassen, ersinnen "to frame"). Sprache/Berkeley: Lockes Fehler liegt darin zu glauben, daß die Sprache keine andere Funktion habe, als unsere Ideen zu kommunizieren (zu übermitteln) und daß jeder bezeichnende Name für eine Idee stehe. (vgl. Berkeley 1710, Absch.10ff)
Das führt dazu anzunehmen, daß sprachliche Verallgemeinerung ein Ausdruck von Verallgemeinerung (Allgemeinheit) im Denken sei.
Aber man muß das nur abstreiten um solche verallgemeinernde Kräfte des Geistes nicht mehr postulieren zu müssen. Berkeley stritt es ab:
BerkeleyVsLocke: es ist nicht notwendig, daß Einzelnamen in uns das Verstehen von Ideen hervorrufen, für die sie stehen sollen.
Kommunikation/Berkeley: ist auch nicht der Hauptzweck der Sprache, es gibt andere Zwecke der Sprache wie Bsp das Hervorrufen von Leidenschaft, Anregen zu oder Abhalten von Handlungen, den Geist in eine bestimmte Disposition versetzen.
Avramides: es dauerte aber noch mehr als ein Jahrhundert, bis der idealistische Griff gelöst wurde und idealistische Theorien als völlig fehlgeleitet enttarnt wurden.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 379/380
Realität/Welt/Berkeley: es besteht Einigkeit, dass Ideen nur im Geiste bestehen. (i) Frage: kann es Dinge außerhalb des Geistes geben, die den Ideen ähnlich sind?
Nein: nur eine Idee kann einer Idee ähnlich sein.
(ii) BerkeleyVsLocke: dieser erkennt an, dass es Ideen von sekundären Qualitäten (Gerüche, Farben, Töne usw.) gibt, die nicht Ebenbilder von etwas sind, das außerhalb unseres Geistes existiert.
Berkeley: er gibt aber keine Gründe dafür an, warum es für die primären Qualitäten (Gestalt, Ausdehnung, Bewegung) anders sein sollte! Außerdem können wir nicht einmal die Idee eines Körpers bilden, der nur primäre, nicht jedoch sekundäre Qualitäten hat.
(iii)
Relation/Berkeley/Stegmüller: bestimmte Werte primärer Qualitäten wie Entfernung und Geschwindigkeit sind immer nur relative Größen! Das zeigt, dass sie "nur in unserem Geiste" existieren.
(iv)
Substanz/Substrat/BerkeleyVsLocke: dieser gibt zu, dass sie das "unbekannte Etwas" sind. Aber das Wort "tragen" ist nicht mehr als eine metaphorische Bezeichnung.
(v)
Skeptizismus/Berkeley: wenn wir uns eine materielle Welt auch vorstellen können, so bleibt der Skeptizismus immer noch möglich. Wir werden es niemals wissen.
(vi)
Ideen/Berkeley: selbst bei Annahme einer äußeren Welt können unsere Ideen nicht erklärt werden, da es unerklärlich ist, wie materielle Körper auf unseren Geist einwirken können.
(vii)
primäre Qualitäten/BerkeleyVsLocke: Ideen sind passiv und kausal wirkungslos. Gäbe es Ausdehnung und Bewegung, die unseren Ideen ähnlich sind, so wären auch sie passiv und könnten nicht die Ursachen unserer Ideen sein!
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Locke, J. Brandom Vs Locke, J.
 
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II 54
BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should downplay, what they have struggled with: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist).   We are cultural and not merely natural beings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Locke, J. Chomsky Vs Locke, J.
 
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Noam Chomsky
Danto2 I 114
Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs) we cannot imagine simple ideas. ---
Chomsky I 284
ChomskyVsLocke: his arguments cannot cooperate with the dispositional nature of the congenital structure. That is why they pass the point.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Locke, J. Dennett Vs Locke, J.
 
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Metz II 701
tabula rasa / consciousness / DennettVsLocke: no tabula rasa could ever be impressed with knowledge through experience.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Locke, J. Descartes Vs Locke, J.
 
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I 89
Innate Ideas/DescartesVsLocke: pro
Locke, J. Frege Vs Locke, J.
 
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Stepanians I 75
Number/Recognition/Knowledge/Frege/Stepanians: how do we know about numbers? This is the most difficult, crucial question. Neither through causation nor through pictorial imagination.
I 76
Solution/Frege: through an explanation of the sense of numerals: with the help of the context principle: only in the context of the sentence the words have a meaning. (Gla § 62)
I 77
Sense/Frege/Stepanians: (later, in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", 1892): the manner of givenness. Number/Sense/Grasping/Frege/Stepanians: the numbers are given to us by grasping the meaning of expressions of the form "the number of F".
Context Principle/FregeVsLocke/Frege: without this, you would almost be forced to assume internal images or deeds of the soul as the meaning of words.
I 78
It is suffices for sentence as a whole to have a meaning, thereby the parts obtain their contents. (Gla § 60). Knowledge/Frege/Stepanians: expresses itself in true judgments. (Not in single words).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Locke, J. Hacking Vs Locke, J.
 
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Appearance / Locke: first we have the phenomenon, then we compose mental representations and at last we search the reality. I 238
Appearance/ HackingVsLocke: the opposite is the case: 1. public representations (all mental representations are public), then we form the concept of reality as soon as the number of display systems increases, we become skeptics and shape the idea of a mere appearance.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Locke, J. Hume Vs Locke, J.
 
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I 97
Mind/Hume: the mind is delirious! It is demented! Closed systems, synthesis and cosmologies are only imaginarily possible.
I 98
Here, principles are not exceeded subsequently, but in principle! Ancient philosophy: would have made use of the 'substance' to secure long-term survival, HumeVsSubstance.
modern philosophy: has its own phantoms: distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, which is no less crazy! HumeVsLocke.
I 105
HumeVsLocke: Perception allows us no distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. ((s) Because perceptions are individual.) - - -
Quine I 235
 'Nothing' and 'nobody' is an indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has caused a lot of confusion.  HumeVsLocke: supposedly, he succumbed to the same confusion ('nobody overtook me') Locke: If a process had no cause, then it would have nothing as its cause, and nothing could not be a cause.
Quine: This is 'quite humorless' (also Heidegger, PlatonVsParmenides) of indeterminate singular term 'nothing' has the unfortunate tendency to pose as determinate singular term.
Cause: parallelism to 'everyone', which already reminds of the indeterminacy by sheer manifold, this reminder is absent in 'no'.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 347
Religion/Belief/Theology/HumeVsLocke: (Hume, Treatise, 10th Sect.): The Christian religion cannot be believed by any rational person without seeing in this belief itself a miracle. (Mackie pro). - - -
Vollmer I 20
Hume: (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) (Vollmer: much more astute than Locke). HumeVsLocke: innate ideas. In particular, the reasoning from experience, the inferring from the past to the future, is based on a habit that cannot be equated with rational deduction.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Locke, J. Kant Vs Locke, J.
 
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McDowell I 126/127
Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: wit with him (paralogism-chapter): it is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity! The subject does not need to make an effort to focus attention on one and the same thing!
- - -
Putnam I 168
Kant Locke/Putnam: we should read Kant in such a way that he proposes what Locke said about the secondary qualities is valid for all objects, even for primary and simple objects. There is no reason to distinguish between them. All are secondary, that is, the object is such that its effect affects us in a particular way.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Locke, J. Leibniz Vs Locke, J.
 
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I 34/35
LeibnizVsLocke: Innate ideas are an ontological problem.
I 44
Innate Ideas [Eingeborene Ideen]/LeibnizVsLocke: Their origin does not lie in the sensory perception, but in the reflection. Reflection: Nothing else than the attentiveness for what is in us. The reflection finds that there is much innate in our mind because we are self innate.
e.g. being, unity, substance,duration, change, activity, perception, lust, and many other objects.
I 45
They are the condition for the objective being to be determined as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us together with the being, and are a formal determination of the being. It is not established how those innate ideas behave when meeting the "initial truths" [erste Wahrheiten], the latter which are derived from sensory perceptions.
- - -
I 46
Ideas/Perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (expansion, duration, appearance, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception! They are the "ideas of the pure reason". However, they are connected to the exterior world; as such, they can be defined and proved.
- - -
I 86
World/Totality/Leibniz: The construction of totality corresponds to calculus. Maximum: the infinite quantity of different substantialities.(World)
Minimum: Representation of the whole in the individual.(Representation).
I 87
LeibnizVsLocke: The connection of the indefinite quantity of predicates and the idea of the infinite as unity: this is the complete opposite of a pure addition of various things. As such, the idea of infinity is excluded from the realm of quantity!
There is no "infinite number". There also is no infinite line.
- - -
I 96
Miracle/Mysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: You should not seek refuge in miracles (God) or accept unexplainable forces. - - -
Vollmer I 17
Leibniz/Vollmer: 1704. New treatise on human reason. LeibnizVsLocke: Vs wax tablet, Vstabula rasa. Even though there might be nothing written on the wax tablet, it has nevertheless a certain structure right from the beginning, particularly a certain surface. It depends on the type and the number of the sensory organs which signals are processed as sensory perceptions.
A propos: "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in some manner in the senses." ["Es gibt nichts im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"]: Leibniz: Except the mind itself!
Like Aristotle: Thesis: The mind has particular characteristics right from the beginning.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Locke, J. Quine Vs Locke, J.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 411 ff
Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties)
I 412
For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is.
So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property.
Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about".
Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties!
Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply.
- - -
V 59
Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words.
Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke).
Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same?

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Locke, J. Rorty Vs Locke, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 159
Locke/RortyVsLocke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our minds with a "foundation of our knowledge claims".

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Locke, J. Sellars Vs Locke, J.
 
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I 50
SellarsVsLocke: should have allowed not only conjunctive but also disjunctive ideas. Not only the idea of the A- and B-being but also the idea of A- or B-being. (Disjunction).
I 51
Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: the idea of a class is the idea of the disjunction of all their species! So the idea of triangular is the idea of inequaliterality or equilaterality. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it would have to be the idea of the inequaliterality and the equalilaterality. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility!
Berkeley: asserts the idea of A cannot be the idea of B simultaneously. Had he taken this step it could not be regarded as deterministic thought the sensation of something crimson.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Locke, J. Strawson Vs Locke, J.
 
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VII 120
Substance/Locke: our ideas of substances are the summaries of simple ideas. "Forces account for a lot of our ideas of substances".
Idea/Locke: Simple ideas: identity of the real and the nominal nature.
Substance: non-identity of real and nominal nature.
StrawsonVsLocke: he needs "substance", because he does not comprehend the linguistic difference of predication and reference.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Locke, J. Wittgenstein Vs Locke, J.
 
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Avramides I 141
Language/ideas/WittgensteinVsLocke/Avramides: Wittgenstein goes further than Frege, who still allows private ideas or views): he doubts the coherence of an approach that leaves undetectable things outside from communication. He doubts a private realm of ideas. We have no coherent concept of such a realm. (> Dummett 1973 S.638f)

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Locke, J. Wright Vs Locke, J.
 
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I 251
Erklärung/Sachverhalte/sekundäre Qualitäten: Farben, Töne, Geschmäcker, Gerüche zeigen in der Tat die erforderliche Erklärungsvielfalt. Es ist kein begrifflicher Fehler anzunehmen, dass (farbenblinde) Stiere durch rote Tücher in Rage versetzt werden. Auch die Farben eines Negativs sind erklärbar durch Bezugnahme auf die ursprünglichen Farben.
I 252
Sekundäre Eigenschaften/VsLocke: Bsp die Katze sitzt am Feuer, weil es dort warm ist.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Locke, J. Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. VsLocke
Locke I 26/27
Erkenntnis/Wissen/VsLocke: Problem: die Ideen müssen in Wörtern fixiert werden doch das bedeutet noch nicht Erkennen, denn dazu müssen die Wörter zu Aussagen verarbeitet werden. Locke aber entwickelt seine Ideenanalyse zunächst isoliert. (Dadurch langatmige Wiederholungen).
Locke I 42
VsLocke/VsSensualismus: die Kritik an Locke vermisst immer eine Klärung der denknotwendigen Voraussetzungen menschlicher Erkenntnis im Subjekt selber. Das wird durch Lockes Einführung der Vernunft am Ende des Essays aufgefangen.
Locke I 66
Ethik/Locke: Die Suspensionskraft ist für Lockes Ethik von größter Wichtigkeit: die "Angel" um die sich die Freiheit vernunftbegabter Wesen drehe. So soll die Möglichkeit einer freien Entscheidung für das moralisch Gute begründet werden. (Trotz des Hedonismus). VsLocke: das ist nicht widersprüchlich, doch wenig plausibel. Es wurde immer wieder kritisiert, dass das Motiv der moralischen Entscheidung nicht der eigenständige Wert des moralisch Guten, sondern der nach Lust/Unlust bestimmte Nutzen ausschlaggebend ist. Locke hat das trotz Drängen seiner Zeitgenossen nie geklärt.
Locke I 169
Sensualismus/VsLocke: eine alte Tradition der Locke-Kritik hält seien Sensualismus für naiv. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: These: "nichts ist im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"
LeibnizVsLocke: "außer dem Verstand selbst!".
Locke I 170
KantVsLocke: es gibt apriorische Formen der Anschauung, die uns überhaupt erst ermöglichen, Erfahrungen zu machen. Sprache/Erkenntnis/VsLocke: (heute): Locke verkennt die irreduziblen sprachlichen Grundlagen empirischen Wahrnehmens. Aber in seinem Denken ist die Korrektur schon angelegt, um auch abstrakte und allgemeine Ideen unter das empirisch Gegebene aufzunehmen, von dem jede Rekonstruktion des Wissens bereits auszugehen habe. (L. Krüger).
Ökonomie/EuchnerVsLocke: Widerspruch: Lockes Merkantilismus und sein gleichzeitiges Lob des Welthandels.
Locke I 188
Erkenntnis/Realität/KreimendahlVsLocke: beschränkt mögliche Realitätsaussagen auf den Bereich der Ideen und der von ihnen gebildeten "nominalen" Wesenheiten. Damit stellt er sein eigenes empirisches Programm in Frage. Es ist auf der einen Seite schon richtig, dass es keine Erkenntnis ohne Vermittlung von Ideen, die in ihrer komplexen Form menschliche Kunstprodukte sind, geben kann, während er aber auf der anderen Seite behauptet, die Quelle aller Ideen sei die Erfahrung (zirkulär).
Erfahrung/Locke: die Kombination von Sinneserfahrung und Reflexion ("innere Erfahrung").
Gravitation/Locke: "Reifen und Bande" (Euchner: das war naiver als es zu der Zeit hätte sein müssen).
- - -
Locke II 187
komplexe Ideen/Locke: Bsp Freund: aus einfachen Ideen: Mensch. Liebe, Bereitwilligkeit, Handlung, Glück, die ihrerseits auf noch einfachere Ideen zurückführbar sind. LambertVsLocke: dieser habe nicht die notwendigen Verknüpfungen der Begriffe erkannt.
ArndtVsLambert: Locke ging es nicht um ein axiomatisches System. Ihm ging es darum, den Bereich des "realen Wissens" (Mathematik) zu trennen vom Empirischen, in dem die komplexe Idee lediglich in dem beobachtbaren faktischen Zusammen-Bestehen von Qualitäten beruht.
In der Empirie ist kein notwendiger Zusammenhang beobachtbar!
Locke I 62
Naturrecht/EuchnerVs Naturrechtslehre: Locke behandelt es nicht systematisch, sonst hätte er auf folgende Probleme eingehen müssen: auf die Welt als Schöpfungsordnung,
auf die rechtliche Ordnung der politischen Strukturen unter den Aspekten des natürlichen und menschlichen Gesetzes sowie der
Rechtsstellung des Individuums,
auf die Frage, wie sich das nicht offenbarte und niedergeschriebene natürliche Gesetz mit Hilfe der Vernunft erkannt werden kann, und auf die
Begründung, weshalb die Sätze des natürlichen Gesetzes und der Moral als verbindlich anerkannt und befolgt werden.




Locke, J. Avramides Vs Locke, J.
 
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Avra I 2
Meaning/Locke: (Essay Concerning Human Understanding): words are signs for ideas. Communication/Locke: occurs when the words trigger the same ideas in the listener.
I 3
Ideas/Locke: (empiricist): all result from experience. AvramidesVsLocke/GriceVsLocke: That raises the question of how we are to understand the significance (signification, meaning) which the ideas have themselves! Saying that they arise from experience is only brandishing in the direction in which we should look. Moreover: if ideas are to depend on the subject it is difficult to see how references to the ideas could be used to explain the universality (commonality) of language.
Another problem: how the alleged significance of the ideas should be transferred from them to the statements. Saying that words are "external signs" suggests that words encode ideas.
GriceVsLocke: that only describes the problem, instead of explaining it. (for example, Armstrong 1971)

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Locke, J. Stegmüller Vs Locke, J.
 
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Stegmüller IV 421
Bewusstsein/Locke: wie konnte in einem materiellen Universum Bewusstsein entstehen? Das ist die ursprüngliche Fassung, die heute noch aktuell ist. Locke hatte noch eine viel zu primitive Vorstellung. VsLocke: Selbstwiderspruch: wenn dieser behauptet, Materie könne nur aufgrund eines göttlichen Eingriffs Bewusstsein haben, widerspricht er seiner Behauptung, wir wüssten a priori, dass Materie kein Bewusstsein haben könne.
Wenn sie nun aber Bewusstsein hat, wieso sollte es unmöglich sein, dass es sich im Verlauf der Evolution entwickelt hat?

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Reductionism Dummett Vs Reductionism
 
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Avramides I 146
DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Subjectivism Versus Newen / Schrenk I 12
Semantic Realism / Realistic Meaning Theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism
Semantic Realism Pro Newen / Schrenk I 12
Semantic Realism / realistic meaning theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism.
Inferentialism Versus Vollmer I 17
Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: LeibnizVsTabula Rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with finished structures.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Inferentialism Pro Vollmer I 17
Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: VsTabula rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with him finished structures.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Belief Rorty, R.
 
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VI 426
Erfahrung/Locke/Rorty These der Geist des Erwachsenen unterscheidet sich von dem des Kindes dadurch, daß er komplexer ist. Es gibt eine Entwicklung der Hinzufügung, in der man von einfachen Ideen zu zusammengesetzten Ideen schreitet.
VI 427
Überzeugung/RortyVsLocke: (Spiegel der Natur): damit verschwimmt auch die Unterscheidung zwischen der Frage "Was verursacht unsere Überzeugungen?" und der Frage "was rechtfertigt unsere Überzeugungen?". >Ü/Dav: Untersch. Rechtfert, Urs bildet Grundlage
Positivism Rorty, R.
 
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II 130f
Positivists / Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities become more closely related to reality than secondary (VsLocke) - but that this theory was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn).