Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 54 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Hacking | I 238 Appearance/HackingVsLocke: We start with public representations (all spiritual representations are public), then we form the concept of reality, as soon as the number of representational systems increases, we become skeptics and form the idea of mere appearance. >Appearance, >Other minds, >Representation, >Intersubjectivity, >Skepticism, >Reality, >Observation language. Locke: Locke proposes the reverse direction. >Ideas/Locke, >John Locke. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Consciousness | McDowell | I 113 ff Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Cartesianism, >Dualism, cf. >Skepticism. I 113 ff Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. >Person. I 126/27 Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. >Experience/McDowell, >Awareness/Chalmers. I 127 Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. I 128 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). >Given, >Reality, >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. I 129f McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Consciousness | Putnam | V 139 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness is a fact about our concept of consciousness. >Concepts/Putnam. Problem: truth does ultimately depend on our cultural standards. >Description dependence. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Continuants | Simons | I 117 Continuant/Broad: a continuant has no temporal parts, only spatial parts. Contrast: event: an event has spatial and temporal parts. Continuant: e.g. human. N.B.: that is why he is able to change. ((s) Otherwise there is the question of whether he remains the same.) >Temporal identity, >Personal identity. Contrast: occurrence/Broad: an event cannot change. ((s) A human (continuant) can grow old - an event cannot grow old.) >Humans, >Events, >Persons. I 127 Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants and they are used in the argument of the Relativity Theory that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light. >Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity Theory. I 173 Continuants/Locke: continuants are constant clusters of matter. They cannot lose or gain any parts (SimonsVsLocke). >J. Locke. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll other authors: thesis: even continuants can have temporal parts, i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable. Simons: thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence. >Existence. I 176 Continuants/Simons: not all continuants have to be material things, e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things. I 180 Def coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a ‹ ›t b ≡ a ‹t ∧ b ‹t a For a similarity of parts in terms of the mutual inclusion see Identity/Simons. I 187 Continuant/ChisholmVsAll other authors: thesis: a continuant is mereologically constant. Mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants. Organisms are only constructions. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event: here, a formula like "a‹b" is complete. Continuants: we need an additional time index here: ((s) with quantification) "(∃t)[a‹t b]". I 350 Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (or life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected. Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant. I 351 Continuant/temporal relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but its life story. HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: continuants bring about a reduction to events, they are mere clotheslines. Whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it. I 353 Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Disjunction | Sellars | I 50 Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! SeallarsVsLocke: Locke thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided". >Idea/Locke, >Disjunctive predicates, >Generalization, >Generality, >Ideas. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Empiricism | Locke | Höffe I 244 Empiricism/Locke/Höffe: [Locke's empiricism has, initially] two dimensions. 1) According to the "empiricism of principles and ideas" even these come from experience (Book 1-111) (1). 2) According to the "Empiricism of Statements", all statements about facts are to be checked against experience (Book IV). 3) "Empiricism of language": according to him, words that neither directly nor indirectly refer to experience, nor - like "and", "also", "or" - serve these words, are considered meaningless. According to the first dimension, experience is not preceded by elements free of experience, neither finished ideas (basic elements of knowledge) nor finished theoretical or practical principles. Even an imperative as basic in moral and legal terms as the fundamental imperative, the prohibition of harm ("no one harms the other!"), is not considered innate. >Innate/Locke. 1. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Euchner I 169 Locke / Euchner: today: his empiricism overcame the old worldview of divinely revealed knowledge - thesis: "there is nothing in the mind, which was not previously in the senses". LeibnizVsLocke: "apart from the mind itself". KreimendahlVsLocke: by limiting knowledge to the ideas he questioned his own empirical program. Arndt II 177 Locke/Arndt:Locke is the ancestor of empiricism - knowledge should be treated language dependent. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Epistemology | Berkeley | I 213 Knowledge/Berkeley/VsLocke: if our knowledge is based only on feelings, it must be shown conversely, how the outside world may be the result of a production, which is based solely on our sensory perceptions. 1. Perception must be purified from all mind ingredients 2. Reality must not become a figment of imagination. >Knowledge, >Reality, >World, >Perception. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Epistemology | Locke | Rorty I 159 Epistemology: Problem, how can we know whether our internal representations have accuracy. Locke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our mind with a "foundation of our knowledge claims." Rorty I 160 SellarsVsLocke: same error as the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt to completely dissolve epistemic facts in non-epistemic facts. How could he be of the opinion, a causal theory about how an opinion is acquired, is an indicator of entitlement, with which you have that opinion? Rorty: because he did not think of knowledge simply as a justified true opinion, because he did not think of our knowledge as a relation between a person and a proposition. >Naturalistic fallacy. --- Euchner I 17 Knowledge/Locke: basis: sensations (sensory impressions) - they must be processed by reason and reasoning ability to conclusions - they help to recognize the existence of God. >Sensory impression. I 30 Knowledge/Locke: not logical deduction but observation of mental processes - "inner sense". I 31 Both perception and reflection are passive. >Perception/Locke, >Reflection. --- Arndt II 193 Definition knowledge/Locke: Perception of the relation or conflict of ideas - real knowledge: determinism of ideas (necessary but not sufficient condition.). Def Real Truth/Locke: not only verbal. >Truth/Locke. II 195 Demonstrative knowledge: through mediation of other ideas. Sensitive knowledge: existence of things that are present to the senses- Intuitive knowledge: the certainty that the perceived idea is such a one as the mind perceives it. - intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible safe knowledge. VsDescartes: not recognizing predetermined conceptual content. - Instead empirically simple given ideas in mind. >Idea/Locke, >Recognition. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Experience | Hume | I 80 Experience/Hume: each experience has the same weight. Only the larger number counts but the number must also be determined. I 134 Experience/Hume: experience is not constitutive. Principles are constitutive! >Principles/Hume. --- Vollmer I 20 HumeVsLocke: conclusions from the experience are merely habit, not a logical deduction. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Fairness | Rawls | I 108 Fairness/Principles/Rawls: our principles of justice concerned institutions and the basic structure of a society. When it comes to individuals, the principle of fairness is relevant. I 110 Individuals/Principles: this is, among other things, about what obligations we have. However, a certain basic structure of a company to be established is assumed from the outset. Rawls: here it can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and that the content of equitable institutions must therefore be determined before demands can be made on individuals. I 111 Right/legality/conformity/Rawls: intuitively, we can say that the notion of being right is synonymous with one's being consistent with those principles which, in a society's initial state, would be recognised as being applied to the relevant problems. If we accept that, we can equate fairness with rightness. Individuals/fairness: first of all, we must distinguish between obligations and natural duties. >Duties, >Natural duties. Principle of fairness: requires a person to fulfil his obligations as established by an institution, under two conditions: 1) The institution is fair, i. e. the institution fulfils the two principles of justice >Principles/Rawls. I 112 2) The arrangement has been voluntarily approved. This means that those who have agreed have a right to expect this from others who benefit from this arrangement(1). >Reciprocity. It is wrong to assume that justice as fairness or contract theories would generally follow that people have an obligation to unjust regimes. >Justice. VsLocke/Rawls: Locke in particular was wrongly criticized for this: the necessity of further background assumptions was overlooked(2). >J. Locke, >Contract Theory, >Contracts. 1. See H.L.A. Hart „Are There Any Natural Rights?“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955) p. 185f. 2. See Locke's thesis that conquest does not create justice: Locke, Second treatise of Government, pars. 176, 20.) |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Human Rights | Locke | Höffe I 249 Human Rights/HöffeVsLocke/Höffe: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property")(1) could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes time and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is therefore necessary is ceded to a strong majority, but not distributively and collectively to everyone. VsLocke: Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists as in Locke's letter of tolerance. >>Toleration/Locke, >State/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, § 93 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Humans | Fukuyama | Brocker I 808 Human/Recognition/History/FukuyamaVsHobbes/FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsRousseau/Fukuyama Thesis: History can ultimately be understood as progress towards the establishment of democracies, but the ultimate driving force for human beings is their own individual struggle for recognition (see Recognition/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama). The central characteristic of the human for Fukuyama is the ability to sacrifice his/her life for prestige reasons. Brocker I 809 Freedom/Fukuyama: Thesis: only those who have the will to die for prestige alone show that they have the ability to make a truly free choice, i.e. to be able to choose against their natural needs and against their instinct. In liberal democracy, where the struggle for recognition is largely realized, there are few social differences. Human development Brocker I 810 is finished. The type of human being that has emerged is the last of its kind ("Last Man"/Fukuyama). Problem: this state has new problems, e.g. boredom (Fukuyama relies on Nietzsche here). People rebel against being undifferentiated members of a universal and homogeneous state. The mutual recognition of people leads to a value relativism that leads to the dissolution of a firm attachment to tradition, authority and community-building values. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ideas | Leibniz | Holz I 45/46 Ideas/perception/Locke: there are "ideas" mediated by more than one sense: e.g. The ideas expansion, shape, motion, etc. Ideas/perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (extent, duration, shape, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception. They are the "ideas of the pure understanding." But they have a relation to the external world and are thus capable of definition and proof. >Definition/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz, cf. >Ideas/Kant, >Ideas/Locke. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ideas | Locke | Euchner I 19 Ideas/Locke: The sensations and their processing cause in our mind "simple ideas" (simple ideas), for example: from heat, light, hard, soft, certain colors and flavors (these are unmistakable) - the "first objects of our understanding". >Color, >Sensory impression, >Idea/Locke, >Imagination. Things/objects/Locke: are not captured by a single, but only with a bundle of many "simple ideas": "Complex ideas"- they correspond with objects. I 27 Idea/Locke: each object of the mind (understanding) - concept, idea, may also be an illusion-, any content of consciousness. >Deception. I 33 Ideas/Locke: Modes: Ideas that represent the states or properties of other ideas or constructs of ideas - simple ideas: caused by a sense: E.g. colors, light, sounds. I 38 itself neither true nor false, but instruments. I 42 LockeVsAristoteles: Reason can trace without clattering syllogisms the "natural order of connecting ideas". I 35 complex ideas/Locke: here the spirit is active (in the simple passive). >Mind/Locke. I 36 E.g. lie - E.g. substance(!). >Substance/Locke. I 35 simple idea/Locke. E.g. space - modes: distance, infinity, figure Simple idea: E.g. pain, joy - modes: hope, love, fear, envy. Holz I 45/46 Ideas/Perception/Locke: There are "ideas" that are conveyed by more than one sense: e.g., the ideas of extension, shape, motion, etc. deas/perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (extension, duration, shape etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception. They are the "ideas of the pure mind". But they have a reference to the outside world and are thus capable of definition and proof. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ideas | Quine | V 58 Ideas/Language/QuineVsLocke: Language is not used for the transmission of ideas - (> nominalism, VsLocke). How do we know that our ideas would be the same? We learn to apply "red" on blood and tomatoes - the idea may be anything. VII (c) 48 Ideas/Quine: are worse than bad if they are to serve as a counterpart like a linguistic form. Example Molière's virtus dormitiva. I was under the illusion of having explained something. >Mentalism, >Ideology. VII (g) 132 Ideas/Quine: "Ideas of ideas" can be dropped completely together with "ideology" (expressability). We are more interested in definability (in a theory). III 260 Unrealized Possibilities/Quine: it may be useful to accept such things as long as some significant differences are taken into account. We have already conditionally tolerated the so-called ideas presented above. For example, platonic ideas can also be accommodated. They only have to be named characteristically: III 261 Metaphysics/Quine: is here above all a matter of convention. If we agree on them, everyone can stick to their preferred metaphysics. IV 401 QuineVsIdeas: trusting in "ideas" has further disadvantages: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another. IV 402 2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would be easy to link words to pre-existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning sink to idle questions about the causal linkage of ideas. 3) The false tendency to treat the different parts of the speech equally in semantic terms is reinforced. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: this is based on the acceptance of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. The picture of the relationship between languages and theories is too simple. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Identity | Locke | McDowell I 126/7 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. >Apperception. Euchner I 53f Identity/person/personal identity/Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life. We have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Person/Locke. Def life/Locke: the substance of this trias. Def person/Locke: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times). >Personal identity. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Individuals | Nietzsche | Danto III 173 Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy(1), where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... Danto III 174 ... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules. >Language and thought/Ancient philosohy, >Language/Hobbbes, >Social contract/Hobbes, >Language/Locke, >Social contract/Locke. Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial". NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,... Danto III 175 ...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity. >Consciousness/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Information | Evans | I 327 Prevailing information/Kaplan/Evans: not "liveliness" is decisive for prevailing information (VsLocke) but the amount of information and also its eight. Identification: in the end, you may not have any false information about one of two twins, but a wrong opinion on when you first met the twin. Cf. >Meaning (Intending)/Evans. --- Frank I 488 Information/Evans: Contact: one can have "information that ..", without being of the opinion that .. - Information can be non-conceptual: non-conceptual content of perception. Frank I 495 Information/I/Evans: the information state does not have the perception of the blue necktie as its object but the necktie itself. Problem: What kind of object is related to information about "I"? - Evans: it refers to bodies of flesh and blood. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Innateness | Leibniz | Holz I 44 Congenital "innate" ideas/LeibnizVsLocke: ideas do not originate in sensuous perception, but originate from reflection. >Ideas/Leibniz, >Ideas/Locke. Reflection: nothing but attention to what is in us. Reflection finds that in our mind is much innate, because we are, so to speak, self-innate. E.g. being, unity, substance, duration, change, activity, perception, pleasure and a thousand other objects. I 45 They are the prerequisite for the determination of objective being as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us with being, as a formal determination of being. What remains open here is how these innate ideas are the "first truths" that stem from sense perception. Sense-perception/Leibniz: this cannot prove the unity of perception itself (see above), because every proof presupposes the unity (substance) which is the foundation of the characteristics, already as a reason of experience from which the proof must be led. The unity does not have to be proved, it is irrefutable and intuitive (simple) given in the perception. >Perception/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Interpretation | Macpherson | Gaus I 20 Interpretation/Macpherson/Marxism/Ball: One particularly important Marxian interpretation of key works in political theory is C. B. Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962)(1). By ‘possessive individualism’ Macpherson means the political theory that serves to support and legitimize those mainstays of modern capitalism – economic self-interest and the institution of private property. He finds Hobbes and Locke, in particular, to be ideologists and apologists for capitalism avant la lettre. Thus Locke, for example, ceases to be the good, grey, tolerant, proto-democratic thinker we thought we knew, and becomes instead an extraordinarily clever propagandist for the then-emerging capitalist order. MacphersonVsLocke: Macpherson makes much, for example, of Locke’s discussion of private property in the Second Treatise of Government (1690)(2). Locke’s problem was to justify the institution of private property, particularly since the Scriptures say that God had given the earth to all mankind. How then could any individual make any portion of that common property his own? Locke famously answers that one separates one’s own part from the common by mixing one’s labour with it (...) >Property/Locke, >J. Locke. Macpherson makes much of these passages, which he takes to represent a key juncture in Locke’s justification of capitalist accumulation and evergreater inequalities of wealth (1962(1)). VsMacpherson: Macpherson’s critics contend that it is anything but: that Locke was a devout Christian who had deep misgivings about money (the love of which is said in the Scriptures to be ‘the root of all evil’); that the word Locke uses in paragraph 48 is not ‘property’ – that which is properly and by right your own – but ‘possession’ (which is mere fact without moral or legal import: a thief may possess your wallet but it is not properly his, i.e. his property); hence the most we may conclude is that money, and therefore presumably capital itself, is ‘a human institution about whose moral status Locke felt deeply ambivalent’ (Dunn, 1984(4). 1. Macpherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962). 2. Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government (1690). 3.Macpherson ibid. 2p. 03–11, 233–5 4. Dunn, John (1984) Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 40 Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Strauss | Gaus I 24 Interpretation/Leo Strauss/Ball: Straussians – followers of the late Leo Strauss (1899–1973) – claim that a canon of works by Plato and a handful of other authors contains the Whole Truth about politics, a truth which is eternal, unchanging, and accessible only to the fortunate few (...). Gaining access to this truth requires a special way of reading and of interpreting what one reads. >Truth, >Plato. StraussVsLiberalism: (...) Strauss saw the history of modern Western liberal political thought as a story of degeneration and enfeeblement. He and his followers contrasted the vigour of classical Greek and Roman political thought with the resigned ennui of slackminded modern liberal thinkers. >Liberalism, >VsLiberalism. Modern liberalism is a philosophy without foundations. Having eschewed any grounding in nature or natural law, modern liberalism, from Hobbes to the present, is reduced to a spineless relativism and is therefore without the normative foundations and philosophical resources to resist the winds of twentiethcentury fanaticism blowing from both right and left. >Liberalism/Hobbes, >Th. Hobbes. StraussVsHistoricism: The present being bankrupt, students of political philosophy must look to the past for guidance; they must be historians but not ‘historicists’. >Historicism. Knowledge and guidance of the sort we require are not easy to come by, however. They require that we read these ‘old books’ aright - that we decipher Gaus I 25 the real meaning of the messages encoded by authors fearful of persecution and wishing to communicate with cognoscenti through the ages (Strauss, 1952)(1). >Theory change, >Meaning change. StraussVsLocke/StraussVsHobbes: To communicate with the great thinkers of antiquity is to appreciate how far we have fallen. The rot began in the seventeenth century, with the advent of modern liberalism, and that of Hobbes and Locke especially (Strauss, 1953)(2). >Liberalism/Locke, >J. Locke. They disavowed the ancient wisdom and the older idea of natural law, favouring instead a view of politics founded on security and self-interest. The ancient ‘philosophical’ quest for the good life was transmuted into the modern ‘scientific’ search for safety, security, and the accommodation of competing interests. 1) VsStrauss: Straussian interpretations have been criticized on a number of reasons. One is that they rely on the sort of supposed ‘insider’s knowledge’ that is available only to those who have been initiated into the mysteries of Straussian interpretation (and who in turn conveniently dismiss criticisms by non-Straussian outsiders as being hopelessly ignorant and uninformed). >Knowledge, >Understanding. 2) VsStrauss: Another is that they assume, without argument or evidence, that the ‘real’ text does not correspond, point for point, to the written and publicly available ‘exoteric’ text; the real or ‘esoteric’ text remains hidden from public view, its meaning inaccessible to the uninitiated and unworthy. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Texts, >Literature. 1. Strauss, Leo, 1952. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, IL: Free. 2. Strauss, Leo, 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
StraussDFr I David Friedrich Strauss Der alte und der neue Glaube Hamburg 2012 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Language | Berkeley | Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsLocke: no "generalizing forces" - linguistic generalization is no generalization of mind. - Singular names do not have to give rise to the understanding of ideas. >Generalization. It is not the main purpose of language to evoke ideas. Instead: even eliciting of passion discouraging and encouraging of actions, etc. >Ideas, >Understanding. Breidert I 228ff Language/Berkeley: Philosophical errors are often explained linguistically. - Incorrect projection: the idea of a thing. Ambiguity: "something" or "a thing": is applicable to ideas or acts of will. Ideas/Berkeley: ideas of things perceived. Notion/Berkeley: concept of a mind and its activities. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Ber I W. Breidert Berkeley In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Language | Kripke | Rorty II 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVsLinguistic Turn). >Positivism, >Linguistic turn, >Consciousness, >Ideas, >Experience. --- III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language". Cf. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker). >Axioms/Kripke. III 397 Language/infinite/Kripke: if the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. >Meta language. Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient. >Are there infinitely many possible sentences?. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language | Strawson | Meg I 297 Lie/Lying/Strawson: a lie is no correct use of a language. Strawson VII 114 Language/Strawson: two types of conventions: 1st Reference Rules: "About what". >Identification. 2nd attribution rules: "What do you say about it" >Predication. StrawsonVsLocke: the difference was not clear to Locke. Reference: it requires circumstances, time, location, etc. >Reference, >Circumstances, >Time, >Localisation, >Space/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Law | Kant | Brocker I 670 Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences. Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom. RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites. Brocker I 671 SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 304 Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical. Höffe I 306 Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work. For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings. What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"(1). Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people. KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant. 1. I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Laws | Locke | Höffe I 246 Laws/Locke/Höffe: Locke(1) [investigates] in the (...) experiments on natural law(1) (...) how those normative principles can be recognized which are called physei dikaion by the Greeks and lex naturae by the Romans, i.e. "natural law". There was widespread agreement on their content in the 17th century. The aforementioned prohibition of damage (...) is considered a fundamental obligation. >Natural justice. How do we recognize the laws? Because of the agreement on content, Locke essentially only has to deal with the question of recognisability. In accordance with his basic epistemological thesis, he rejects the view that this is innate knowledge. Rather, he argues that there is an obligation that is perceptible across all geographical and historical peculiarities and applies to the whole of humanity. However, it is only recognised with the help of natural light, which is formed by sensory perception and deductive thinking (lumen naturale). ((s) KantVsLocke: The moral law is supernatural). Lumen naturale/Locke: Behind it, there is a wise and powerful world author whose existence Höffe I 247 one could deduce from the wonderful order of the world. Locke refers here to the so-called physico-theological proof of God, which concludes from the observation of an order inherent in the world that there is a Creator God. >Proofs of God. 1. J. Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Market Anarchism | Liberalism | Gaus I 118 Market Anarchism/tratidional liberalism/Gauss/Mack: The liberty tradition’s doctrinal commitments easily endorse Market Anarchism (Friedman, 1973)(1). Liberty requires private property and a market order (>Order/liberalism, >Property7LIberalism). Gaus I 119 Individualism: desirable order emerges out of individual choices (>Individuals/Liberalism), the market uses the dispersed information of individuals, Coercion: the tradition is deeply sceptical of all coercion to the extent that most coercion is illegitimate, and, crucially, because the liberty tradition rejects an important distinction between public and private morality, the grounds for justified coercion must lie in the rights of private individuals. >Institutions/Liberalism. LockeVsAnarchy: Solution: each would agree to a political society, ‘all private judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent and the same to all Parties’ and where only some have the authority to interpret and enforce these rules (1960(2): 342). Marchet AnarchismVsLocke: Market Anarchists, however, do not concede the need for political authority to solve such disagreement. Order: Against Locke, the market anarchist argues that a market regime of multiple, competing, protective agencies will not produce disorder and strife – so long as there is a strong demand for the orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes. If we suppose that people desire the orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes strongly enough that the powers of a >minimal state would be confined to the provision of such resolutions, this very demand for orderly, peaceful, and just resolution of disputes would be strong enough to call forth their market provision. >Society/Market Anarchism. Market Anarchism/traditional liberalism/Gaus/Mack: LiberalismVsAnarchism: A member of the liberty tradition defending some form of government might reply to this anarchist case in two ways. 1) VsAnarchism: (...) the enterprise of producing and delivering the protection of rightful claims is especially subject to natural monopolies or cartelization. Gaus I 120 Monopoly problem: (...) judging and protection are characterized by increasing returns. If it is the case that over the full range of possible outputs, the (n + 1)th unit costs less to produce than did the nth unit, then the larger a provider already is, the less its marginal and average costs. This may well be the case with protection services. If increasing returns hold, a monopolistic provider is apt to arise in a free market. In two ways this takes the sting out of the anarchist’s condemnation of the government’s monopoly (Nozick, 1974(3): 52). >Society/Market Anarchism. Cartelization problem: A protective agency will be able to compete effectively in the provision of desired protective services only if it can offer to its clients the enforcement of the rights articulations, rules, procedures, and appeal mechanisms that emerge from agreements among the competing protective agencies. 2) VsAnarchism: a protective agency or confederation of such agencies that aspires to the status of minimal state can more readily permissibly suppress the putatively rights-protecting activities of its competitors than may at first seem to be the case (Nozick, 1974)(3). For such an agency or confederation may permissibly suppress activities that pose even a moderate risk of violating rights (at least if it will not be feasible for the boundary crossers to compensate the victims of their violations). >Minimal state/Gauss. 1. Friedman, David (1973) The Machinery of Freedom. New York: Harper and Row. 2. Locke, John (1960) Second Treatise of Government. In Peter Laslett, ed., Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Cowen, Tyler (1992) 'Law as a public good: the economics of anarchy'. Economics and Philosophy, 8:249—67. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Maximum | Leibniz | Holz I 86 World/totality/Leibniz: the construction of the totality corresponds to the calculus. Maximum: is the infinite set of different substanceialities. (World) Minimum: is the representation of the whole in the individual. (Representation). >Totality/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Infinity/Leibniz, >Representation/Leibniz. I 87 LeibnizVsLocke: the connection of the infinite set of predicates and the idea of infinity as unity: that is the exact opposite of the mere addition of manifold. This excludes the idea of infinity from the range of quantity! There is no "infinite number". Also no infinite line. >Unity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Meaning Theory | Fodor | II 120 Meaning Theory/m.th./meaning/essence/idea/FodorVsLocke/FodorVsHume: meaning theories that refer to beings or ideas, do not say anything because they do not show the cases in which two expressions express the same nature or the same idea. >Ideas, >Imagination, >Meaning, >Reference. --- IV 70 Meaning Theory/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: there can be several meaning theories because of the semantic indeterminacy. Radical Interpretation: the radical interpretation is about the problem of finding the correct meaning theory. >Radical interpretation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Miracles | Leibniz | Holz I 96 Miracles/Mysticism/LeibnizVsMysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: one should not resort to miracles (God) or accept inexplicable powers. >Ultimate justification/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Metaphysics/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Morals | Fukuyama | Brocker I 809 Moral/Fukuyama: Who can make decisions in principle independently of basic human needs (see Humans/Fukuyama), makes moral decisions and distinguishes himself/herself as a human being. Whoever makes moral decisions signals that he/she is prepared to risk his life for it. The clash of two moral people is therefore very likely to end in the fight for submission until death. FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsHobbes: the beginning and the core of a liberal society is not the mutual recognition of the right to life and property, but the mutual recognition of the dignity of the other. ((s) See Recognition/Honneth). Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Morals | Locke | Euchner I 22 Morality/ethics/Locke: (late): there are quite real rules for good and evil. Natural law (stemming from God). Euchner I 66 Morality/ethics/VsLocke: motive of the decision for the good for Locke is ultimately a benefit intended for pleasure/displeasure. - He has never clarified this. >Ethics, >Natural justice. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Mysticism | Leibniz | Holz I 96 Mysticism/LeibnizVsMysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: one should not take refuge in miracles (God), or accept unexplainable forces. >Ultimate justification/Leibniz, >Metaphysics/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Natural Kinds | Sellars | I 50 Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! SeallarsVsLocke: Locke thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided". >Idea/Locke, >Disjunctive predicates, >Generalization, >Generality, >Ideas. I 51 Disjunction: the idea of a genus is the idea of the disjunction of all its species. So the idea of the triangular is the idea of the inequilateral or equilateral. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it was the idea of the inequilateral and equilateral. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility. >Contradictions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Positivism | Rorty | I 128ff Positivists/Rorty: Thesis: We should replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" with the term "language". - Then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke). >Qualities/Locke. But exactly this thesis was revived by Kripke's revolution against Wittgenstein. >Rule following/Kripke. KripkeVsLinguistic turn. >linguistic turn. II (f) 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "Ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities are no longer in closer relation to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke) - but exactly this thesis was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Progress | Hobbes | Adorno XIII 251 Progress/HobbesVsLocke/HobbesVsAristotle/Hobbes/Adorno: unlike Aristotle and Locke, Hobbes did not make the progress dependent on any positive, original qualities of the human's nature, but of the necessity and the contradiction directly justified by the incompatibility of competing individual interests... --- XIII 252 ...of individuals by a bourgeois primacy principle. >Freedom/Kant. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Property | Locke | Mause I 36 Property/Locke: State purpose for Locke is the protection of property. Legitimate state power finds its limits in the property rights of citizens, whereby Locke understands "property" in a comprehensive sense as "life", "liberty" and "ownership". (1) 1.J. Locke, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Regierung, Hrsg. Walter Euchner, Frankfurt 1977 S. 253. Höffe I 249 Property/Locke/Höffe: Because the definition of political violence(1) cites property as the only basic good, Locke seems to represent exclusively economic liberalism, as some critics claim. By property, however, he understands, as was not uncommon in England at the time, far more than a material possession essential to the economy. For him, life and freedom are also important, and only then does possession rank. Furthermore, political power may only be used for the benefit of the common good. >Governance/Locke, >State/Locke, >Natural State/Locke. Höffe I 252 Property is (...) a necessary condition for human life; in working nature, humans procures for themselves the material conditions for their survival. Prehistory/Locke: [There is one] original common property, the property of all in the earth and its fruits. Höffe I 253 Private property: Personal property, private property, is created through agreements and contracts and is therefore already bound to a legal and state system. Natural state: In contrast, Locke(3) claims that one acquires property already in the natural state. God gave the earth and all lower living beings to all people together. In the natural state, however, there is also a non-collective ownership, as a quasi-divine fiefdom the ownership of one's own person. Acquisition of property: On the basis of this still pre-economic property, humans can acquire property through their activity in the usual economic understanding. The decisive, property-creating factor is thus the labour that is both commanded by God and forced by the needs of people. >Labour/Locke. (...) even the industrious [may] not acquire as much property as they like, because they are subject to a natural law limit, which of course cannot be justified so obviously by the prohibition of damage: One may only make oneself property to the extent that one "can use it to any advantage for one's life before it spoils"(4). Höffe I 254 HöffeVsLocke: two questions: 1) If the pragmatic argument "useless" already applies, why does the moral criterion of dishonesty still need to be applied? 2) And what about those who are neither hard-working nor sensible: should they starve? >Labour/Locke, >Money/Locke. 1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90 2. Ibid., Chap. V. 3. Ibid., §§ 27ff. 4. Ibid., § 31 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Property | Steiner | Gaus I 127 Property/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: SteinerVsLocke:(...) while Steiner(1) insists that we own our bodies (though not our 'germ line genetic information'), he rejects the simple version of Lockean theory, according to which simply by mixing our labour with an unowned resource we appropriate the resource. But if we cannot justly appropriate nature that way, how do we generate just claims over natural resources? Egalitarianism: Steiner is attracted to a quick route to egalitarianism. This quick argument for equality requires two premises: (1) justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal, and treating unequally those who are in relevant respects unequal; and (2) in these matters there are no relevant differences; so (3) justice demands equality. Gaus: This argument leads Steiner to the claim that everyone is entitled to equal freedom and so to some sort of equal share of natural resources (1994(1): 216, 235). This equality of ownership may also be depicted as a version of the Lockean theory, in which we originally hold the world in common (Otsuka, 1998)(2). GausVsSteiner, Hillel: Consider: (1) if justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal; and (2') because of thorough-going scepticism about public reasons, it cannot be shown that people are equal in any relevant way; then (3') justice doesn't demand treating everyone Gaus I 128 equally. 1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 2. Otsuka, Michael (1998) 'Self-ownership and equality: a Lockean reconciliation '. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (Winter): 65-92. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Rorty | I 165 Propositional Knowledge/Insight/KantVsLocke/Rorty: Error: knowledge after the model of vision - confusion of the "succession of apprehensions with the apprehension of a succession": E.g. objects and properties take turns to perceive instead of the features typical of an object. False: to want to reduce "Knowing that" to the "knowledge of". - ((s)> Propositional Knowledge). Object/Kant: is always the result of a >synthesis. See also >apprehension, >Knowing how. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Qualities | Berkeley | Putnam II 167f Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: Vs primary and secondary qualities. - Only Locke's "simple quality of sensation". Secondary qualities/Locke: perceptible only as an asset, in relation to us. >Qualities/Locke. KantVsLocke: this applies to everything, including primary qualities. - There is no reason to distinguish. >Qualities/Kant. Stegmüller IV 380 Primary qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: certain values of primary qualities such as distance and speed are always only relative sizes! This shows that they exist "only in our minds". |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Qualities | Hume | I 97 Qualities/HumeVsLocke: VsDistinction primary/secondary qualities: perception does not allow the distinction (HumeVsSubstance). >Substance. I 105 The negation of the >principle of sufficient reason corresponds to the negation of the >primary qualities. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Qualities | Kant | Strawson V 52 Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: when we abstract from color and hardness and all sensation, we retain no terms but just empty words - Kant: "pure intuitions" are something other than "primary qualities". --- Adorno XIII 39 Qualities/Mediation/Kant/Adorno: Kant attempted to take the so-called objective, the primary qualities into the subject, but not to grasp them as sensual moments, but to derive them from the context of consciousness, from categorial forms. This is an example of mediating thinking. >Subject/Kant, >Knowlegde/Kant, >Sensory impressions, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Qualities | Wright | I 251 Explanation/facts/secondary qualities: colors, sounds, tastes, smells show indeed the necessary explanation diversity. It is not a conceptual error to assume that (colorblind) bulls are set in rage by red cloths. Also, the colors of a negative can be explained by reference to the original colors. Secondary properties, VsLocke: E.g. the cat sits by the fire, because it is warm there. I 252 Wide cosmological role: it is not their job to sabotage all statements that are not formulated using the strict vocabulary of the primary qualities of theoretical science. Cosmological role: see content/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Relativism | Putnam | VII 436 Realtivism/Putnam: my main concern in the book "Truth, Reason and History": Putnam: thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat. "Companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens (PutnamVsHarman). --- Williams II 503 PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: e.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. >Cultural relativism. --- Putnam III 139f Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: Williams acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. --- V 141 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness, is a fact about our notion of consciousness. Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. V 165 Relativism/tradition: relativism is easy to refute, because relativsm itself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): it is a regress to say: "I think that I think that snow is white". PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. Modern Relativism/discourse relativity/Foucault: everything is relative, also the relativism. Vs: problem: if we say "absolutely true relative to person P", then there is no total relativism. No relativist wants the relativism apply to everything. --- I (i) 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture. >Assertibility. Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. PutnamVsRorty: justified assertibility exists regardless of the majority, but it is not a transcendental reality but a characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. I (i) 249 Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Representation | Rorty | I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sensory Impressions | Berkeley | I 215f Senses/perception/mind/Berkeley: separates the benefits of the senses sharp and so displays the proportion of the mind. >Reason, >Experience. VsLocke: then spatial extent is no primary quality but relative. I 216 Synthesis problem: the sensed object is not the same as the visual object - it is still the same thing - This holds true no matter whether you deny the material things with Berkeley. Solution/Berkeley: all perceptions are mine - the sensed object/visual object: such as character and object, are one by habit. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Sensory Impressions | Leibniz | Holz I 43 Sensory impression/empiricism/Leibniz: what is given by the senses is unprovable. >Provability/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz, >Perception/Leibniz. Impression/Sensory Impression/Identity/Leibniz: therefore Leibniz does not rely on the "impression" (terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). Cf. >Perception/Locke, >Sensory impressions/Hume. LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: in the sensible givenness itself lies the identity relation. I 45/46 Sensory perception/proof/Leibniz: sensory perception is unprovable. Only what can be traced back to simple terms (by definition) from complex concepts can be proved. "Chain of definitions". >Concept/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Signs | Quine | V 160 Sign/Interpretation/Quine: must not simply be reinterpreted, otherwise each string can have any meaning - N.B.: but terms can very well be reinterpreted. ((s) not signs). >Interpretation, >Meaning. VII (c) 53 Meaning/Sign/Quine: it is unsatisfactory to say that a significant sequence is simply a series of phonemes that are uttered by a speaker of a chosen population. We do not only want the expressed sequences, but also those that may yet be expressed. IV 396 Sign/Locke: ...but for two reasons we also need signs, which in turn stand for ideas: for the exchange of our thoughts and for their recording. These are the words. Behind them stand the ideas, as it were, as guarantors of meaning. Without them, words would merely be sounds. Words: are representatives of ideas. IV 397 QuineVsLocke: one should stick to what is true for everyone when openly observed. Language is also not something private, but something social. IV 398 Language: is a social skill acquired through the observation of social use. The externalisation of empiricism leads to a behavioural approach to meaning. (Behaviorism). V 165 Infinite/Name/Signs/Quine: Problem: which signs should we use when we need infinitely many as insertions for the number variables? One cannot say that every sign is a physical object, because then they run out soon. Wrong solution: to say that these signs are forms (as classes of inscriptions). Because these are again physical realizations of forms and there is not enough of them. Form/Quine: (to denote infinitely many natural numbers) here also not in the sense of analytical geometry, so that a form would become a class of classes of pairs of real numbers, because it does not help to explain the numbers by means of number signs, which are themselves explained by means of real numbers. >Infinity, >Numbers, >Denotation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Social Contract | Hegel | Höffe I 333 Social Contract/Hegel/Höffe: Within the considerations of the contract, Hegel rejects the modern patterns of state legitimation, such as the theory of the social contract advocated by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, and also by Kant. >Social contract/Hobbes, >Social contract/Locke, >Social contract/Rousseau. HegelVsSpinoza/HegelVsHobbes/HegelVsLocke/HegelVsRousseau/HegelVsKant: For whether one accepts a contract of all with all or a contract "of all with the prince or the government" - the state is subjected to the arbitrariness of the individual(1). In truth, everyone has always lived in a state that has the rank of an end in Höfe I 334 itself. >State/Hegel, >Society/Hegel. VsHegel/Höffe: Contract theorists such as Kant would not contradict the character of an end in itself, but would probably emphasize the legitimizing and critical task of the social contract. Social Contract/Kant: As an "original contract" and as a "mere idea of reason" he submits the "touchstone of legality of every public law": The legislator may (...) give his laws only in such a way "as they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people."(2) 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820, § 75 2. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. 1793, II. Folgerung |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Society | Fukuyama | Brocker I 809 Society/FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsHobbes/Fukuyama: the beginning and the core of a liberal society is not the mutual recognition of the right to life and property, but the mutual recognition of the dignity of the other. >Recognition/Honneth. State/Fukuyama: From a historical perspective, the liberal state is the form of state that best balances these competing claims because it is based on the principle of recognition. This liberal state is to be thought of as a universal state in which all people are recognized, and it is to be thought of as a homogenous state in which social differences are largely levelled. The possibility of a universal historical process ("end of history") ends with its extensive implementation. End of History/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama, Humans/Fukuyama, Recognition/Fukuyama. Brocker I 810 Problem: the liberal-democratic system must meet two conflicting requirements: a) It must achieve mutual recognition of the equivalence of all (universalism) b) It sees itself confronted with the permanent striving of the people Brocker I 811 who want to be better than the other. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Subjects | Dilthey | Gadamer I 227 Subject/Dilthey/Gadamer: (...) [Dilthey] agreed (...) with the historical school: there is not a general subject, but only historical individuals. The ideality of meaning is not to be assigned to a transcendental subject, but arises from the historical reality of life. It is life itself that unfolds and forms itself into understandable units, and it is the single individual who understands these units as such. This is the self-evident starting point for Dilthey's analysis. The interrelation of life, as it is revealed to the individual (and in the biographical recognition it is experienced and understood by others), is created by the significance of certain experiences. From them, as from an organizing centre, the unity of a life course is formed, just as the meaning of a melody is formed - not from the mere one after the other of the tones, but from the musical motifs that determine their design unity. >Interrelation/Dilthey. Gadamer I 250 Subject/DiltheyVsLocke/DiltheylVsHume/DiltheyVsKant/Gadamer: "In the veins of the recognizing subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct, real blood does not run".(1) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life", and very similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, and which was already an indicator of the tendency that later became widely accepted, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. W. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, Bd. 1. S. XVIII. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Thinking | Avramides | I 104 Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts. >Thinking without language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking, >Thoughts. I 113 Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language is a mere vehicle for communication. >Communication. Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings. >Communication/Schiffer. I 115 Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical). >Reductionism. Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them! Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism. Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded. >Terminology/Arvramides. I 142f DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: Locke proposes a wrong code concept of language for ideas. Significance is not explained by thoughts. - Where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - this does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance. - Then mother tongue would be like a foreign language. >Code, >John Locke, >Meaning, cf. >Language of thought. Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. thw word "square" sorts out square things. -Then no representations are needed to connect sentences with thoughts. >Representation. It is about understanding instead of association. >Association, >Understanding. AvramidesVsDummett: but this approach allows no thinking without language. I 15 Thinking/Dummett: thinking can only be investigated through language (not through behavior). AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior. >Behavior. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Toleration | Rawls | I 214 Tolerance/Toleration/Rawls: The characteristic feature of arguments for freedom of consciousness and thought is that they are based only on one concept of justice. Tolerance is not derived from practical necessities or reasons of state. Morality and religious freedom follow from the principle of equal freedoms for all. A limitation can only be justified by the fact that otherwise greater injustice or a loss of freedom would follow. Arguments for freedom are not derived from specific metaphysical or philosophical doctrines. Neither do they presuppose that all truths can be derived in a way that corresponds to the Common Sense, nor that everything in a definable sense is a logical construction of observable rational scientific studies. It is actually appealed to the Common Sense, but without these further assumptions. I 216 Tolerance/Locke/Rousseau/Th. Aquinas/Aquinas/Rawls: There is an important difference between Rousseau and Locke, who advocated for limited tolerance, and Thomas Aquinas and the Protestant reformers who did not(1)(2). Locke and Rousseau limited freedom on the basis of what they considered to be clear and obvious consequences of public order. If Catholics and atheists could not be tolerated, it was because it seemed obvious that one could not rely on such people to abide by the limits of civil society. RawlsVsLocke/RawlsVsRousseau: Perhaps a larger historical overview would have convinced the two of them that they were wrong. Intolerance/Protestants/Th. Aquinas/Aquinas/Rawls: for Thomas and the Protestant reformers, the reasons for intolerance are rooted in belief itself. That is a crucial difference, then at this moment they can no longer be refuted with empirical arguments. Intolerance/Rawls: must it be tolerated? For example, some political parties in democratic states would restrict constitutional freedoms if they had power. For example, there are people who hold positions at universities and at the same time reject intellectual freedoms. It might seem that tolerance towards them would be contrary to the principles of justice. We discuss this using the example of religious toleration: I 217 Question: 1. would a religious sect have any reason to complain if it is not tolerated? Under what circumstances do tolerant sects have a reason not to tolerate other intolerant sects? 3. if they have this right, for what purpose should it be exercised? Ad 1.: a person only has the right to complain if principles that he or she respects are violated. Otherwise, the person acts inconsistently. A problem may arise if a specific interpretation of a religious truth is to be extended to the community in its validity. I 218 Ad. 2.: Tolerant sects have no right to suppress intolerant sects. On the basis of the principle of justice, they would have the right to complain about a violation of the principle of justice. Question: Does a threat to the security of tolerant sects justify an exception? This follows from the right to self-preservation accepted in the initial situation of a society to be established. I 219 Ad. 3.: Basically, the stability of a well-ordered society is guaranteed by the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls). This stability also means that people trust that this prosperity is not immediately threatened by intolerant phenomena. An exception to this is a sect, which quickly becomes a threat. 1. For Protestant reformers see J. E. E. D. Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution" in The History of Freedom and Other Essay, London, 1907. 2. For Locke see J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, incl. The Second Treatise of Government, ed. J. W. Gough, Oxford, 1946, pp. 156-158. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Berkeley Vs Aristotle | I 230 General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Berkeley, G. | Kant Vs Berkeley, G. | Putnam I 167 Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth. I 167/168 KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory". BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Conceptualism | Martin Vs Conceptualism | Arm II 159 VsKonzeptualismus/Place: (extreme Form): der sagt, nur ED existieren, und die Klassifikationsfähigkeit von Organismen, die auf Ähnlichkeiten reagieren. PlaceVsKonzeptualismus/extreme Form: diesen K kann man herausfordern, indem man fragt, wie er denn so sicher sein kann, daß ED begriffsunabhängig existieren, wenn diese Frage überhaupt erst gestellt werden kann, wenn die ED als Inst unter ein U subsumiert sind. Klassifikationsfähigkeit/Place: wir müssen, um nicht in den Anti Realismus (In Bezug auf U) abzurutschen, sicher stellen (wie Martin), daß die Klassifikationsfähigkeit überlebensnotwendig für den Organismus ist. ((s)Evolutionstheorie, Überlebensfähigkeit als Grundbegriff?). PlaceVsLocke: aber es ist nicht nur biologische Plausibilität, die uns zeigt, daß Locke falsch lag: Locke: das Verhalten der allgemeinen Ideen zeigt den Unterschied zwischen Mensch und Tier. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Conceptualism | Place Vs Conceptualism | Arm II 159 VsConceptualism/Place: (extreme form): he says only particulars exist, and the classification ability of organisms that respond to similarities. PlaceVsConceptualism/Extreme Form: we can challenge this conceptualism by asking how it can be so sure that particulars exist independent from concepts if the question can only ever be asked when the particulars are subsumed as Inst under a universal (U). Classification Ability/Place: to avoid sliding into anti-realism (with regard to U) we need to ensure (like Martin) that the classification ability is vital for the organism. PlaceVsLocke: but it is not only biological plausibility that shows us that Locke was wrong: Locke: the behavior of the general idea shows the difference between humans and animals. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Correspondence Theory | Putnam Vs Correspondence Theory | Field IV 409 Qualities/Primary/Secondary/KantVsLocke/Putnam/Field: (Putnam, V.W u G, p. 60 64): Thesis: Kant extended what Locke said about secondary qualities (SekQ) to primary qualities (primQ). E.g. Locke: Secondary qualities do not resemble our ideas directly. Field: many other authors have extended that also to primary qualities. (namely so, because the image theory is now dead). primary qualities: E.g. length, size, shape secondary qualities: E.g. color. IV 410 Putnam/Field: Putnam has much more in mind, however: he means that properties such as color are nothing else but the power to affect us in a certain way. The extension to primary qualities is then that even length, size, charge and mass are nothing but powers to affect us. Expansion of Locke/EwLPutnam/Field: Putnam goes even further in expanding the position of Locke: 1) he does not only want to apply it to properties of external objects, but also to properties of sensations. Vs: that might seem inconsistent: how can a property of sensations just be a force that evokes sensations? ((s) Circular). But that is not what Putnam means. He means powers that affect us. And that is coherent. 2) This position implies the assumption of a Noumenon ((Def Noumenon/Field: an object that can have no other properties but affecting an observer) for every phenomenal object. Phenomenon/Phenomenal Object/Putnam/Field: should read: object in our representation of the world. Problem: if electrons do not exist in the world (as Noumena), then they do not exist at all. The existence of our representation does not guarantee the existence of "phenomenal" electrons. EwL/Putnam: abandons this assumption altogether by not attributing the power to affect us to a "noumenon", e.g. that underlies a brown chair, but he attributes this power directly to the world. PutnamVsCorrespondence: But even if the world now has such powers, there need be no one to one correspondence between objects in the world (noumena) and objects in our representation (phenomena). Def phenomenon: object in our representation Def Noumenon: what is responsible in the world for that we experience the phenomenon. EwL/Field: we want to call this the "expanded Lockean view". Putnam offers it in two respects 1) as an interpretation of Kant 2) as the actual view of internal realism. (Field: = internalism). PutnamVsCorrespondence Theory: comes up to a rejection of the correspondence theory. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dennett, D. | Brandom Vs Dennett, D. | I 113 Meaning / intentional systems / BrandomVsDennett: understanding belongs to meaning, and such systems do not understand. II 54 BrandomVsDennett: if you have to distinguish derivative intentionality from the primordial intentionality of the interpreter then a regress threatens. BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Descartes, R. | Vollmer Vs Descartes, R. | Vollmer I 14 LockeVsDescartes: no innate ideas! Soul at birth white paper, tabula rasa, wax tablet. Sensory experiences produce ideas that were not there before. Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind what was not in the senses before". (DescartesVs). Yet this is not enough to prove that some ideas do not exist at birth. Locke needs evidence for this, but it is not enough. LeibnizVsLocke: are too weak. Locke: must make sure that the ideas are the right reflection of the world: Primary qualities: inseparable from the body, constant in all changes: For example strength, expansion, shape, movement or rest and number. (objective) Secondary qualities: is nothing in the objects themselves, but only the ability to cause different sensations in us by means of their primary qualities: For example colours, tones, tastes, also warmth (!) etc. (subjective). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Functionalism | Newen Vs Functionalism | I40 Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech. NS I 16 Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. NS I 27 Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Hume, D. | Brandom Vs Hume, D. | II 54 BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. II 58 Tradition (Hume): leads standards back to requests. Request / BrandomVsHume: is explained here by committing to certain patterns of practical inference, i.e. in terms of what is a desire for something, and not vice versa. II 112 Justify /justification/ Hume: consider all possible aspects. BrandomVsHume. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Hume, D. | Leibniz Vs Hume, D. | I 43 Impression/Sensory impression/Identität/Leibniz: Therefore, Leibniz does not use the "impression" ["Eindruck"](Terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: The identity is in the sensory reality. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Hume, D. | Stegmüller IV 63 Impressions/experience/sensation/introspection/WittgensteinVsHume/WittgensteinVsLocke: those "inner impressions" do not exist. This is not a behaviorist criticism Witt's, but happens on a genuinely introspective basis. Introspection/Wittgenstein: provide us with an image that completely differs from that of the empiricists. "capturing meaning" does not exist as a state. The so-called "aha-moment" cannot be it: two people can fully agree in their inner experiences, however, one could mean "plus" and the other "quus". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Idealism | Frege Vs Idealism | Frege V 105 FregeVsIdealism: Idealism is useless because it can not represent the effect of the language. Avramides I 140 FregeVsIdealism: Language/Ideas/DummettVsLocke: the entire analytical school is a rejection of the idealistic conception, first clear rejection by Frege with the distinction of sense/meaning. I 141 And this, in turn, explained as different from the associated idea. (Frege 1982, p.59)) |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Berkeley Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 211 Berkeley assumes that the world is perceived by God. BerkeleyVsLocke: he casts an externalist view on a whole inevitably internist position. Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsIdealism/BerkeleyVsLocke/Avramides: (18th century): Locke: "The mind has the power to assemble (set, grasp, conceive, "to frame") abstract ideas. Language/Berkeley: Locke's mistake lies in believing that language has no other function than to communicate our ideas and that every descriptive name stands for an idea. (cf. Berkeley 1710, Absch.10ff) This leads to the assumption that linguistic generalization is an expression of generalization (generality) in thought. But one only has to deny it in order not to have to postulate such generalizing powers of the mind anymore. Berkeley denied it: BerkeleyVsLocke: it is not necessary for individual names to provoke in us the understanding of ideas for which they should stand. Communication/Berkeley: is also not the main purpose of language, there are other purposes of language like e.g. evoking passion, stimulating or stopping actions that put the mind into a certain disposition. Avramides: but it took more than a century for the idealistic grip to be loosened and idealistic theories to be revealed as completely misguided. Stegmüller IV 379/380 Reality/World/Berkeley: there is an agreement that ideas exist only in the mind. (i) Question: Can there be things outside the mind that are similar to ideas? No: only an idea can be similar to an idea. (ii) BerkeleyVsLocke: he recognizes that there are ideas of secondary qualities (odors, colors, sounds, etc.) that are not images of something that exists outside our mind. Berkeley: but he gives no reasons why it should be different for the primary qualities (shape, extension, movement)! Moreover, we cannot even form the idea of a body that has only primary but not secondary qualities. (iii) Relation/Berkeley/Stegmüller: certain values of primary qualities like distance and speed are always only relative values! This shows that they exist "only in our mind". (iv) Substance/Substrate/BerkeleyVsLocke: he admits that they are the "unknown something". But "to carry" the word is nothing more than a metaphorical term. (v) Skepticism/Berkeley: if we can imagine a material world, skepticism is still possible. We will never know. (vi) Ideas/Berkeley: even if we accept an external world, our ideas cannot be explained because it is inexplicable how material bodies can affect our mind. (vii) Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: ideas are passive and causally ineffective. If there were expansion and movement similar to our ideas, they would also be passive and could not be the cause of our ideas! |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Brandom Vs Locke, J. | II 54 BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should downplay, what they have struggled with: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Locke, J. | Chomsky Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 114 Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs) we cannot imagine simple ideas. --- Chomsky I 284 ChomskyVsLocke: his arguments cannot cooperate with the dispositional nature of the congenital structure. That is why they pass the point. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Locke, J. | Dennett Vs Locke, J. | III 701 tabula rasa/consciousness/DennettVsLocke: no tabula rasa could ever be impressed with knowledge through experience. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Locke, J. | Descartes Vs Locke, J. | Holz II 89 Innate Ideas/Innateness/DescartesVsLocke: Descartes per innate ideas. >Innateness. |
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| Locke, J. | Frege Vs Locke, J. | Stepanians I 75 Number/Recognition/Knowledge/Frege/Stepanians: how do we know about numbers? This is the most difficult, crucial question. Neither through causation nor through pictorial imagination. I 76 Solution/Frege: through an explanation of the sense of numerals: with the help of the context principle: only in the context of the sentence the words have a meaning. (Gla § 62) I 77 Sense/Frege/Stepanians: (later, in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", 1892): the manner of givenness. Number/Sense/Grasping/Frege/Stepanians: the numbers are given to us by grasping the meaning of expressions of the form "the number of F". Context Principle/FregeVsLocke/Frege: without this, you would almost be forced to assume internal images or deeds of the soul as the meaning of words. I 78 It is suffices for sentence as a whole to have a meaning, thereby the parts obtain their contents. (Gla § 60). Knowledge/Frege/Stepanians: expresses itself in true judgments. (Not in single words). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Locke, J. | Hacking Vs Locke, J. | I 238 Appearance / Locke: first we have the phenomenon, then we compose mental representations and at last we search the reality. Appearance/ HackingVsLocke: the opposite is the case: 1. public representations (all mental representations are public), then we form the concept of reality as soon as the number of display systems increases, we become skeptics and shape the idea of a mere appearance. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Locke, J. | Hume Vs Locke, J. | I 97 Mind/Hume: the mind is delirious! It is demented! Closed systems, synthesis and cosmologies are only imaginarily possible. I 98 Here, principles are not exceeded subsequently, but in principle! Ancient philosophy: would have made use of the 'substance' to secure long-term survival, HumeVsSubstance. Modern philosophy: has its own phantoms: it distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, which is no less crazy (HumeVsLocke). I 105 HumeVsLocke: perception allows us no distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. ((s) because perceptions are individual.) --- Quine I 235 'Nothing' and 'nobody' is an indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has caused a lot of confusion. HumeVsLocke: supposedly, Locke succumbed to the same confusion ('nobody overtook me'). Locke: if a process had no cause, then it would have nothing as its cause, and nothing could not be a cause. Quine: this is 'quite humorless' (also Heidegger, PlatonVsParmenides) of the indeterminate singular term. 'Nothing' has the unfortunate tendency to pose as a determinate singular term. Cause: parallelism to 'everyone', which already reminds us of the indeterminacy by sheer manifold, this reminder is absent in 'no'. --- Stegmüller IV 347 Religion/belief/theology/HumeVsLocke: (Hume, Treatise, 10th Sect.): the Christian religion cannot be believed by any rational person without seeing in this belief itself a miracle (Mackie pro). --- Vollmer I 20 Hume: (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) (Vollmer: much more astute than Locke). HumeVsLocke: these are innate ideas. In particular, the reasoning from experience, the inferring from the past to the future, is based on a habit that cannot be equated with rational deduction. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Locke, J. | Kant Vs Locke, J. | McDowell I 126/127 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: wit with him (paralogism-chapter): it is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity! The subject does not need to make an effort to focus attention on one and the same thing! Putnam I 168 Kant Locke/Putnam: we should read Kant in such a way that he proposes what Locke said about the secondary qualities is valid for all objects, even for primary and simple objects. There is no reason to distinguish between them. All are secondary, that is, the object is such that its effect affects us in a particular way. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Locke, J. | Leibniz Vs Locke, J. | I 34/35 LeibnizVsLocke: Innate ideas are an ontological problem. I 44 Innate Ideas [Eingeborene Ideen]/LeibnizVsLocke: Their origin does not lie in the sensory perception, but in the reflection. Reflection: Nothing else than the attentiveness for what is in us. The reflection finds that there is much innate in our mind because we are self innate. e.g. being, unity, substance,duration, change, activity, perception, lust, and many other objects. I 45 They are the condition for the objective being to be determined as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us together with the being, and are a formal determination of the being. It is not established how those innate ideas behave when meeting the "initial truths" [erste Wahrheiten], the latter which are derived from sensory perceptions. I 46 Ideas/Perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (expansion, duration, appearance, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception! They are the "ideas of the pure reason". However, they are connected to the exterior world; as such, they can be defined and proved. I 86 World/Totality/Leibniz: The construction of totality corresponds to calculus. Maximum: the infinite quantity of different substantialities.(World) Minimum: Representation of the whole in the individual.(Representation). I 87 LeibnizVsLocke: The connection of the indefinite quantity of predicates and the idea of the infinite as unity: this is the complete opposite of a pure addition of various things. As such, the idea of infinity is excluded from the realm of quantity! There is no "infinite number". There also is no infinite line. I 96 Miracle/Mysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: You should not seek refuge in miracles (God) or accept unexplainable forces. Vollmer I 17 Leibniz/Vollmer: 1704. New treatise on human reason. LeibnizVsLocke: Vs wax tablet, Vstabula rasa. Even though there might be nothing written on the wax tablet, it has nevertheless a certain structure right from the beginning, particularly a certain surface. It depends on the type and the number of the sensory organs which signals are processed as sensory perceptions. A propos: "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in some manner in the senses." ["Es gibt nichts im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"]: Leibniz: Except the mind itself! Like Aristotle: Thesis: The mind has particular characteristics right from the beginning. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Locke, J. | Quine Vs Locke, J. | I 411 ff Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties) I 412 For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is. So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property. Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about". Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties! Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply. V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke). Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Locke, J. | Rorty Vs Locke, J. | I 159 Locke/RortyVsLocke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our minds with a "foundation of our knowledge claims". >Knowledge/Locke, >Representation/Locke, >Thinking/Locke. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Locke, J. | Sellars Vs Locke, J. | I 50 SellarsVsLocke: should have allowed not only conjunctive but also disjunctive ideas. Not only the idea of the A- and B-being but also the idea of A- or B-being. (Disjunction). I 51 Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: the idea of a class is the idea of the disjunction of all their species! So the idea of triangular is the idea of inequaliterality or equilaterality. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it would have to be the idea of the inequaliterality and the equalilaterality. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility! Berkeley: asserts the idea of A cannot be the idea of B simultaneously. Had he taken this step it could not be regarded as deterministic thought the sensation of something crimson. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Locke, J. | Strawson Vs Locke, J. | VII 120 Substance/Locke: our ideas of substances are the summaries of simple ideas. "Forces account for a lot of our ideas of substances". Idea/Locke: Simple ideas: identity of the real and the nominal nature. Substance: non-identity of real and nominal nature. StrawsonVsLocke: he needs "substance", because he does not comprehend the linguistic difference of predication and reference. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Locke, J. | Wittgenstein Vs Locke, J. | Avramides I 141 Language/ideas/WittgensteinVsLocke/Avramides: Wittgenstein goes further than Frege, who still allows private ideas or views): he doubts the coherence of an approach that leaves undetectable things outside from communication. He doubts a private realm of ideas. We have no coherent concept of such a realm. (> Dummett 1973 S.638f) |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Wright Vs Locke, J. | I 251 Explanation/Facts/Secondary Properties: colours, tones, tastes, smells do indeed show the necessary variety of explanations. It is not a conceptual error to assume that (colour-blind) bulls are put into rage by red cloths. The colours of a negative can also be explained by reference to the original colours. I 252 Secondary Properties/VsLocke: For example the cat sits at the fire, because it is warm there. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Locke, J. | Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. | VsLocke Locke I 26/27 Knowledge/VsLocke: Problem: the ideas have to be fixed in words, but that does not mean recognizing yet, because the words have to be processed into statements. Locke, however, develops his idea analysis first in isolation. (Thereby lengthy repetitions arise). Locke I 42 VsLocke/VsSensualism: the critique of Locke always misses a clarification of the necessary preconditions of human knowledge in the subject itself. This is caught by Locke's introduction of reason at the end of the essay. Locke I 66 Ethics/Locke: the suspension force is of utmost importance for Locke's ethics: the "Angel" around which the freedom of rational beings revolves. Thus the possibility of a free decision for the morally good is to be justified. (Despite hedonism). VsLocke: this is not contradictory, but not very plausible. It has been criticized time and again that the motive of moral decision is not the independent value of the morally good, but the benefit determined according to desire/displeasure. Locke never clarified this despite the pressure of his contemporaries. Locke I 169 Sensualism/VsLocke: an old tradition of Locke-Criticism considers sensualism naive. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind that was not in the senses before". LeibnizVsLocke: "except the mind itself!". Curl I 170 KantVsLocke: there are a priori forms of perception that enable us to have experiences in the first place. Language/Knowledge/VsLocke: (today): Locke misjudges the irreducible linguistic foundations of empirical perception. But in his thinking the correction is already applied in order to also include abstract and general ideas under the empirically given, from which every reconstruction of knowledge must already start. (L. Krüger). Economy/EuchnerVsLocke: Contradiction: Locke's mercantilism and its simultaneous praise of world trade. Locke I 188 Knowledge/Reality/KreimendahlVsLocke: restricts possible statements of reality to the realm of ideas and the "nominal" entities formed by them. In doing so, he questions his own empirical program. On the one hand it is correct that there can be no knowledge without mediation of ideas, which in their complex form are human art products, while on the other hand he claims that the source of all ideas is experience (circular). Experience/Locke: the combination of sensory experience and reflection ("inner experience"). Gravity/Locke: "Hoop and Ribbon" (Euchner: that was more naive than it should have been at the time). Locke II 187 Complex ideas/Locke: e.g. friend: from simple ideas: human, love, willingness, action, happiness, which in turn can be traced back to even simpler ideas. LambertVsLocke: he did not recognize the necessary connections of the terms. ArndtVsLambert: Locke was not interested in an axiomatic system. He was interested in separating the realm of "real knowledge" (mathematics) from the empirical, in which the complex idea is based solely on the observable factual co-existence of qualities. In empiricism, no necessary connection can be observed! Locke I 62 Law of Nature/EuchnerVsDoctrine of the Law of Nature: Locke does not treat it systematically, otherwise he would have had to deal with the following problems: the world as an order of creation, to the legal order of political structures under the aspects of natural and human law, as well as the the legal position of the individual, to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason, and to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason. Reasons why the principles of natural law and morality are recognised as binding and followed. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Locke, J. | Avramides Vs Locke, J. | Avra I 2 Meaning/Locke: (Essay Concerning Human Understanding): words are signs for ideas. Communication/Locke: occurs when the words trigger the same ideas in the listener. I 3 Ideas/Locke: (empiricist): all result from experience. AvramidesVsLocke/GriceVsLocke: That raises the question of how we are to understand the significance (signification, meaning) which the ideas have themselves! Saying that they arise from experience is only brandishing in the direction in which we should look. Moreover: if ideas are to depend on the subject it is difficult to see how references to the ideas could be used to explain the universality (commonality) of language. Another problem: how the alleged significance of the ideas should be transferred from them to the statements. Saying that words are "external signs" suggests that words encode ideas. GriceVsLocke: that only describes the problem, instead of explaining it. (for example, Armstrong 1971) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Stegmüller Vs Locke, J. | Stegmüller IV 421 Consciousness/Locke: how could consciousness arise in a material universe? This is the original version that is still relevant today. Locke still had an idea far too primitive. VsLocke: Self-Contradiction: if he claims that matter can only have consciousness because of a divine intervention, he contradicts his claim that we know a priori that matter cannot have consciousness. But if it now has consciousness, why should it be impossible for it to have developed in the course of evolution? |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Reductionism | Dummett Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 146 DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subjectivism | Versus | Newen / Schrenk I 12 Semantic Realism / Realistic Meaning Theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism |
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| Semantic Realism | Pro | Newen / Schrenk I 12 Semantic Realism / realistic meaning theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism. |
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| Inferentialism | Versus | Vollmer I 17 Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: LeibnizVsTabula Rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with finished structures. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Inferentialism | Pro | Vollmer I 17 Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: VsTabula rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with him finished structures. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Belief | Rorty, R. | VI 426 Experience/Locke/Rorty: thesis: the adult's mind differs from that of the child in that it is more complex. There is a development of addition in which one moves from simple ideas to compound ideas. VI 427 Belief/RortyVsLocke: (mirror of nature): this also blurs the distinction between the question "What causes our beliefs?" and the question "What justifies our beliefs? >Belief/Davidson: Difference justifies, origin forms the basis. |
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| Positivism | Rorty, R. | II 130f Positivists / Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities become more closely related to reality than secondary (VsLocke) - but that this theory was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). |
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