Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libertarianism | Pogge | Gaus I 128 Libertarianism/rights/harm/Pogge/Gaus/Mack: (... ) a (...) 'leftward' (statist) push comes from attempts to widen the concept of harm, such that almost any economic activity constitutes a harm to others. Cf. >Property/Hillel Steiner, >Jobs/Van Parijs, >Egalitarianism/Gaus. Thomas Pogge (2002)(1) has recently argued along these lines. Pogge builds his case on what looks like the liberty tradition's understanding of negative rights, in particular the right not to be harmed (...). PoggeVsLibertarianism: However, he argues that 'simple libertarianism' is flawed because it fails to appreciate how institutions create harm (2002: 172). In particular, Pogge insists that the imposition of the 'global economic order' causes harm: it 'engenders war, torture and starvation' (2002(1): 173), and so anyone who participates in that order is contributing to injustice (2002(1): 211). Indeed, all participants help starve the poor (2002(1): 214). Egalitarianism: Thus global redistribution is required to compensate for harms done, as well as to satisfy a version of the Lockean proviso (2002(1): ch. 8; compare Steiner, 1994(2): ch. 8). GausVsPogge: Note how this argument depends on the idea that there exists an overall global system which is to be the object of our evaluation (rather than, say individual actions), that this system is coercively imposed on the poor, that as a consequence of this system the poor are harmed, and that each one of us is 'deeply implicated' in the harm perpetrated by the system (2002(1): 142). Individuals/libertyGausVsPogge: it is important here to note, though, the way that the argument seeks to avoid the normative individualism of the liberty tradition (...). 1. Pogge, Thomas (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights. Oxford: Polity. 2. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Libertarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 229 Libertarianism/Political philosophy/Lamont: (...) fruitful arguments for libertarianism are based on the value of liberty itself. The most famous twentieth-century champion of such arguments was Friedrich Hayek (1944(1); 1976a(2); 1976b(3)), though there are many varieties, often inspired by John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty (1982)(4). This group of libertarians have responded to critics with greater depth. To see this, consider two of the more general criticisms of libertarianism (Haworth, 1994)(5). 1) VsLibertarianism: First, critics complain that libertarianism excludes state measures to improve the lives of the people, including the provision of public goods (Morris, 1998(6): ch. 9; Van Parijs, 1995(7)). 2) VsLibertarianism: Second, libertarianism is also charged with preventing state measures to alleviate deprivation and suffering. Lamont: Most ownership-based libertarian theories have failed to respond to the first criticism, parting com- pany at this point with neoclassical economists, who have generally taken the public goods problem more seriously than political libertarians. The most common responses to the second criticism have been various versions of 'tough luck': while it might be nice if individuals transfer some of their property rights to others in order to relieve suffering, people cannot justly be coerced to do so. >Coercion, >Property, >Society, >Equality, >Egalitarianism. Nozick: Nozick's view, for instance, is that respect for people's absolute property rights is more important than improving the lot of the least fortunate. The harshness of this reply has been unappealing to the majority in liberal democracies. >Liberalism, >Democracy. Hayek/Mill: Millean and Hayekian versions of libertarianism have been able to provide more fruitful replies, by appealing more directly to the values of liberty and autonomy (Lomasky, 1987)(8). >J. St. Mill, >F. A. v. Hayek. People's optimism about the government's ability to aid and empower people grew in the first 60 years of the twentieth century, but stalled in the late 1960s and the 1970s. VsInterventionism: Greater government intervention in the economy, particularly to increase welfare in the general population rather than just for the most needy, proved considerably less successful than preceding interventions targeted only to the poor. Hayek's explanation for this failure was that governments do not, and never will, have the information required for successful intervention to help the majority of the population. Mill: In agreement, Mill 's view was that individuals themselves are in the best informational position for improving their own situation, so the government should allow them the liberty to act upon it. Gaus I 230 Interventions/costs: a related contribution of Millean and Hayekian libertarianism is to highlight the costs of govern- ment intervention. >Interventions, >Interventionism. Public choice: Public choice theorists, inspired by libertarians such as James Buchanan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985(9); Buchanan and Tullock, 1962(10); Buchanan, 1975(11); Rowley et al., 1988(12)), also argued forcefully that increasing government size substantially increases rent-seeking by lobby groups, professions, and other powerful groups, distorting economic distribution in their favour. Lamont: Once these and other consequences are taken into account, the success of government interventions in realizing their intended benefits is quite uncertain, compared with the clear and demonstrable detrimental effects these interventions have on people's liberty and autonomy. >Freedom, >Autonomy. 1. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge. 2. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976a) Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 2, The Mirage ofSocial Justice. London: Routledge. 3. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976b) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge. 4. Mill (1982. 4. Mill, J. St. (1892) On Liberty. London: Longmans, Green 5. Haworth, Alan (1994) Anti-Libertarianism. London: Routledge. 6. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real FreedomforA11: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michi Press. 11. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 12. Rowley, C. K., R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Pogge | Gaus I 128 Rights/libertarianism/harm/Pogge/Gaus/Mack: (... ) a (...) 'leftward' (statist) push comes from attempts to widen the concept of harm, such that almost any economic activity constitutes a harm to others. Cf. >Property/Hillel Steiner, >Jobs/Van Parijs, >Egalitarianism/Gaus. Thomas Pogge (2002)(1) has recently argued along these lines. Pogge builds his case on what looks like the liberty tradition's understanding of negative rights, in particular the right not to be harmed (...). PoggeVsLibertarianism: However, he argues that 'simple libertarianism' is flawed because it fails to appreciate how institutions create harm (2002: 172). In particular, Pogge insists that the imposition of the 'global economic order' causes harm: it 'engenders war, torture and starvation' (2002(1): 173), and so anyone who participates in that order is contributing to injustice (2002(1): 211). Indeed, all participants help starve the poor (2002(1): 214). Egalitarianism: Thus global redistribution is required to compensate for harms done, as well as to satisfy a version of the Lockean proviso (2002(1): ch. 8; compare Steiner, 1994(2): ch. 8). Cf. >Liberalism/Locke. GausVsPogge: Note how this argument depends on the idea that there exists an overall global system which is to be the object of our evaluation (rather than, say individual actions), that this system is coercively imposed on the poor, that as a consequence of this system the poor are harmed, and that each one of us is 'deeply implicated' in the harm perpetrated by the system (2002(1): 142). 1. Pogge, Thomas (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights. Oxford: Polity. 2. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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