Dictionary of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Democratic Theory Barber Brocker I 681
Democratic Theory/Democracy/Barber: Barber understands democracy not only as a decision-making process, but as an overarching way of life that a self-governing political community is able to support. Thus, his work Strong Democracy (1) is an attempt to re-found a participatory theory of democracy. 1. BarberVsLiberalism: Barber criticizes liberal concepts of democracy
2. Barber pro Pluralism, Barber pro Individualism
3. Thesis: a "strong democracy" ((s) participatory democracy) can be achieved in a targeted manner in contemporary society. See Democracy/Barber.
Brocker I 682/683
Def Anarchist Disposition of traditional Democratic Theory: this reflects the power-critical side of liberalism, e.g. Locke and Robert Nozick. Def Realistic Disposition: can be found in Machiavelli and Hobbes in particular: it is domination affine because it assumes that politics cannot bind people by inner beliefs, but rather requires external sanctions and incentives.
BarberVsLiberalism: the conflict between power-critical-anarchistic and power-affinity-realistic disposition leads to schizophrenic features (2)
Def Minimalist disposition: (e.g. Rawls and Mill): aims to resolve this disunity by advocating a "policy of tolerance". (3)
Solution/Rawls/Mill: Protection against intolerant majorities and goods distribution on the basis of reciprocity.
Barber pro Minimalism: in this way beyond liberalism, but without revealing the view to "more creative forms of politics" (4). See also Terminology/Barber.


1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994.
2. Ibid. p. 47
3. Ibid. p. 49
4. Ibid. p. 55.
Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolBarb I
Benjamin Barber
The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Equal Opportunities Pettit Brocker I 854
Equal Opportunities/Pettit: Pettit emphasizes the primal equality of all individuals, to whose protection the political sphere and the interventions of the state must contribute. (1) For Pettit, this does not mean that all individuals should be treated equally. On the contrary: unfavorable starting positions
Brocker I 855
and lack of equal opportunities must be compensated as far as possible. This can also include deep interference in the unimpeded material self-development of particularly privileged citizens, i.e. making group-specific restrictions on freedom necessary. Equality does not mean individual freedom of choice in every respect. (PettitVsLiberalism.)


1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 110f


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Equality Pettit Brocker I 854
Equality/Pettit: Pettit emphasizes the primal equality of all individuals, to whose protection the political sphere and the interventions of the state must contribute. (1) "In order to be a free citizen, one must enjoy lack of control in such a spectrum of choice and on the basis of such state resources and protection that one is on an equal footing with others" (Pettit 2015 (2) and Pettit 2012 (3)).
It does not follow for Pettit that all individuals should be treated equally. On the contrary: unfavourable starting positions
Brocker I 855
and lack of equal opportunities must be compensated as far as possible. This can also include deep interference in the unimpeded material self-development of particularly privileged citizens, i.e. making group-specific restrictions on freedom necessary. Equality does not mean individual freedom of choice in every respect. (PettitVsLiberalism.) Pettit himself describes this pattern of reasoning as "consequentialist". The conceptualisation of the granted state's regulatory potential is measured by the consideration of the consequences it will have for the creation of the greatest possible equality for each individual. (4)



1.Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 110f
2. Philip Pettit Gerechte Freiheit. Ein moralischer Kompass für eine komplexe Welt, Berlin 2015, S. 98, vgl. S. 112
3. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 2012. S. 90
4.Pettit 1997, S. 113
Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Good Sandel Brocker I 677
Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. (1) Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. (2)


1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975)
2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982),


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Individualism Kelsen Brocker I 139
Individualism/KelsenVsIndividualism/Kelsen: Kelsen's criticism of individualism is amazing. In "Wesen und Wert"(1) Kelsen assumes a transformation of the individual to the collective freedom of the individual. >Freedom/Kelsen. KelsenVsLiberalismus: in statements before the First World War he certifies that contemporary liberalism has an apolitical basic attitude, which is explained by its individualism.(2) For Kesen, economic liberalism does not necessarily belong to democracy.


1. Hans Kelsen, »Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981).
2. Hans Kelsen »Politische Weltanschauung und Erziehung«, in: Annalen für soziale Politik und Gesetzgebung 2, 1913, S. 7


Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Kant Sandel Brocker I 670
Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Sandel Brocker I 668
Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls.
Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all.
A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia),
Brocker I 669
are usually called teleological. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them.
B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. example.
HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself.
Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life.
Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom.
State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good.
Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself.
SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (1)
Brocker I 676
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x.
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Morgenthau Brocker I 280
Liberalism/MorgenthauVsLiberalism/Morgenthau: Thesis (1948): European liberalism, historically derived from the internal political struggle against absolute violence, was transferred to the completely different field of interstate relations by academic and foreign elites in Washington. A denatured liberalism of this kind was not able to eliminate the - according to Morgenthau, anchored in humans themselves - elementary power of the political, but rather the objectivity in dealing with the political. America was biased in a tangle of desirables, deceptive hopes and abstract ideals, in simplifying schemes and recipes that supposedly dispensed with the confrontation with power-political reality.
Brocker I 286
MorgenthauVsLiberalism: he tries to negate in a decadent way the everywhere existing striving for power, which determines the political. This striving for power is inherent in human nature and dominates both private and social life. See Politics/Morgenthau, Power/Morgenthau. VsMorgenthau: this realistic view was hostile to his American contemporaries ((s) at the end of the 1940s), something Morgenthau had not reckoned with. For Morgenthau, however, this description was morally indifferent. Morgenthau did not realize that his diagnosis could and was understood as a moral affirmation of power and power politics.


Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pol Morg I
Hans Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948
German Edition:
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism MacIntyre Brocker I 661
Liberalism/MacIntyreVsLiberalism/Modernism/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, the liberalism of modern societies is little more than "a collection of strangers, each chasing its own interests under minimal restrictions. (1) Modern nation: be only a traditionally forgotten collection of "citizens of nowhere". (2)
Rationality/MacIntyre: In a "world of profane rationality", "any public, common logical basis or justification" (3) for our moral orientations is missing. We are victims of a pluralism that threatens to overrun us. (4). See Modernism/MacIntyre.
Brocker I 664
University/MacIntyreVsLiberalism: MacIntyre advocates an idea of the university that sees it as its stage on which divergent points of view are presented in order to be able to view the central conflicts. Instead, he diagnoses a real university conflict avoidance strategy disguised as liberality. (5)

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 334
2. Ibid. p. 210
3. Ibid. p. 74
4. Ibid. p.. 301.
5. Alasdair MacIntyre , Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Encyclopedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Gifford Lectures 1988) Notre Dame, Ind. 1990 p. 231.

Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Barber Brocker I 681
Liberalism/BarberVsLiberalism/Barber: Thesis: in American democracy reigns a "lobbyist policy" "politics of images", a "politics of mass society" instead of genuine citizen participation. (written in 1984). (1) Liberalism or the concept of representation associated with liberalism, which destroys participation, was responsible for this. (2)
Brocker I 682
Liberal Democracy/Barber: focuses on individual rights and an electoral government. Problem: liberalism misunderstood "politics as keeping predators".
Brocker I 683
The core of liberalism is an instrumental understanding of democracy. Politics is then there to protect individuals against external interference and to achieve this protection in such a way that it is compatible with the supposedly unchanging characteristics of individuals. Liberalism tends to summarize the characteristics of individuals in pessimistic descriptions.
Brocker I 684
Liberalism/Barber: the pre-conceptual framework is characterized by ideas such as "property", "territory", "borders", "sanctions", "freedom" and "power". Aspects such as human interdependence, mutual assistance, cooperation, membership, brotherhood, community and citizenship are neglected. (3) Method/Liberalism/Barber: the methodology of liberalism is a "Cartesian" one, i.e. knowledge is gained through the application of a reliable method.
BarberVsLiberalism: Politics is not the application of truth to the problem of human relationships, but the application of human relationships to the problem of truth. (4)
Brocker I 685
BarberVsLiberal Democracy: thesis: liberalism creates a type of person whose psyche is susceptible to the totalitarian temptation by throwing the human back on itself. (Haus: here parallels to Hannah Arendt's thinking are revealed.) Nevertheless: BarberVsArendt/BarberVsStrauss, Leo: these are nostalgic theories. (5)


1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 12.
2. Ebenda S. 13.
3. Benjamin Barber Strong Democray. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Twentieth-anniversary edition, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2003 S. 34f.
4. Ibid. p. 64f.
5. Ibid. p. 100.
Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolBarb I
Benjamin Barber
The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberty Pettit Brocker I 851
Liberty/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: Pettit criticizes the liberal fixation on a "negative freedom": this is all too one-sidedly aimed at maintaining the distance between the individual and the state. Here there are two shortcomings:
a) The necessary protective functions of the state for the free self-development of the individual and
b) to recognize and appreciate the benefits of the participation of individuals in political decisions. See also Liberalism/Pettit.
With liberalism, Pettit shares concerns about a dominant state that restricts individual choices and ultimately denies political participation. His model-theoretical and programmatic key goal derived from this is therefore: freedom without dominance, but certainly state support for the attainment of individual freedom.
Forms of freedom/Pettit: in addition to the traditional understanding of freedom "to" or "of" something, Pettit introduces a third form: a form of "non-domination": bringing: freedom from domination, compulsion and arbitrariness, from "domination" and "mastery", which however does not stand in the way of freedom for political participation. (1)
Problem: An arbitrary ruling position of persons or institutions restricts an individual's freedom of choice through open or covert power of disposal, through the impairment of freedom of will or through manipulation of individual behavior.
Non-domination/Pettit: Solution: to distance oneself from arbitrary rule- (2) The state is primarily understood as a political agency with the task of promoting the freedom of the individual and protecting it from foreign domination. See State/Pettit, Republicanism/Pettit.
Brocker I 853
Pettit polemicizes against those republican variants that consider "bourgeois-humanist" freedom of political participation as the most important characteristic of the political sphere. In his opinion, they underestimate the notorious tendency of the state to dominate, to which the individuals, as participants in public life, suddenly surrendered themselves. Pettit calls this republicanism, rather unusual and in the expression of contempt, "populist" or "communitarian". (3) PettitVsCommunitarianism. See Governance/Pettit, State/Pettit.


1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 22
2. Ebenda S. 66
3. Ebenda S. 8


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Political Science Honneth Brocker I 789
Political Theory/Honneth/Sigwart: in political theory, Honneth's social theory is close to republican positions and to the concerns of "perfectionist liberalism". ((s) See Perfectionism). HonnethVsLiberalism: the pronounced liberalism ("the official current of modern liberalism"(Honneth (1)) understands the basic principles of freedom and self-realization firmly as principles mediated intersubjectively and to be realized in concrete political institutions. On the other hand Honneth:... See also Liberalism. See Recognition/Honneth.


1. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 40

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics Sandel Brocker I 676
Politics/Principles/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/Sandel: Taking into account the dimension of inter-subjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice that would then, as it were, only be administered by politics and jurisdiction for all time. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community.
Brocker I 677
Thus Sandel is in the tradition of Aristotelianism and republicanism. (1) (RepublicanismVsKant, RepublicanismVsLiberalism, AristotleVsKant). HegelVsKant/Rothhaar: this is also an echo of Hegel's criticism of Kant: Kant neglects the subjects' inter-subjectivity; for Kant, the subject is ultimately oriented towards the transcendental subject. (2) (See Intersubjectivity/Sandel, Principles/Rawls.)
Politics/Morality/Sandel: Sandel's design of a political philosophy strongly recalls the concept of "morality" that Hegel develops in the basic lines of the philosophy of law. (3)
The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice.


1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 4-8.
2. Steven B. Smith, Hegel Critique of Liberalism. Rights in Context, London/Chicago 1991, p. 4.
3. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge/New York 1991, p. 202.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics Barber Brocker I 684
Politics/BarberVsLiberalism/Barber: Politics is not the application of truth to the problem of human relations, but the application of human relations to the problem of truth. (1)
Brocker I 685
Following Aristotle and Dewey, Barber defines politics as a "way of life". See Democracy/Barber, Liberalism/Barber, Participation/Barber.

1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democray. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Twentieth-anniversary edition, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2003 p. 64f.

Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolBarb I
Benjamin Barber
The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Republicanism Pettit Brocker I 850
Republicanism/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: as an outstanding representative of Republicanism, Pettit resolutely stands against liberalism: his complex model, however, bears some resemblance to a "liberal" understanding of politics. LarmoreVsPettit: Pettit is actually a disguised liberal with his guiding goal of individual independence within the logic of collective coexistence. (1)
See State/Pettit, Liberalism/Pettit, Interventions/Pettit, Individual/Pettit.
Brocker I 852
Def "Neo-Roman" variant of republicanism: historically refers to the republicanism of Roman antiquity and stylizes it as the propagation of a rule of law that is regarded as a means against personalized arbitrary rule and which assigns a central role to the freedom-guaranteeing action of political institutions. Pettit considers himself part of this movement. In this variant, the concern to encourage political participation takes a back seat to the maintenance of the institutional guarantee for the Republic as a state unit. This is also the position of Quentin Skinner in 1998(2).


1. Larmore, Charles, »A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism«, in: Philosophical Issues 11, 2001, 229-243.
2. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998.


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Self Sandel Brocker I 676
Self/Sandel: Sandel thesis: for the identity and individuality of subjects, their respective self-understanding as members of a community and bearers of a story, as well as their beliefs of what constitutes good for people, is constitutive. (1) SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: N.B.: if these moments of community are not "possessed" and thus ultimately remain external, but rather constitute the identity of subjects, then people cannot "leave them behind them" when they enter the "space of the political".
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 179
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 1996.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018