Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Appearance Leibniz Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general".
---
I 129
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
---
I 130
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
---
I 131
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Brain/Brain State Bieri I 65
Brain/Bieri: e.g. suppose there is a tour guide through our brain, who explains everything to us during a visit. "It is a principle of nature that, when certain processes take place here, the human feels certain things".
Bieri: that is not our problem, we do not doubt that there are laws and necessities. What we do not understand is why they exist. We cannot see what makes it necessary in the brain for the human being to experience something.
The tour guide asks, what do you want to know? (a) why a particular happening here just brings about this experience, or (b) why there is an experience at all?
Bieri: the two questions are the same problem
I 69
Brain/consciousness/Bieri: our guide could give us a detailed circuit diagram of the brain. "Functional architecture". "They could also be realized with a different material". (Turing machine). So:
I 70
There is no more inner connection between the function and the quality of experience than between material structure and quality of experience. Tour guide: "one must not look at the brain in isolation from the body"
Bieri: then one could say VsLeibniz:
1. the happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is legally connected to events outside, which represents it by virtue of this connection
2. by the fact that the event in question assists the whole human being in a situation-appropriate behavior.
But: our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but experience content!
I 71
Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: cannot we be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? No, if we do not reach the questionable understanding, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective in our behavior, so we do not understand our own subject-being.
The physiological process is causally complete. There is no place in the clockwork where episodes of experience would be necessary for it to continue.
That is, there is a complete causal explanation for everything that takes place in our brain, in which we as subjects and humans do not occur at all!
       Therefore, consciousness seems to be of no importance to any causation. It could just as well be missing, and we would stumble through the world just as we do.
((s) We need to recognize the consciousness on something else).
Our whole behavior could be alienated. This cannot be excluded because of the causal completeness.
I 72
Causation/Bieri: If we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to change somewhere on the physiological level. But then we have changed the subject!
I 74
Brain/Bieri: the problem is not that we do not see something in the "factory". From this one could conclude that it is caused by something else ... Vs: but nothing else is conceivable! But that is precisely the hypothesis that we cannot think otherwise. We cannot disprove this hypothesis.
But it would sound adventurous that the facts which are relevant for the experience have nothing to do with the facts which are otherwise relevant for the functioning of the brain.
We have considered:
Causal understanding,
Structural understanding,
Functional understanding,
Understanding the whole from parts.

Bieri I
Peter Bieri
Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel?
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Bieri III
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007

Completeness Hacking I 162
Description/StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: "complete description" is pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal Realism: requires the idea of ​​a "full description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Contingency Leibniz Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: Every thing is contingent - if another thing were different, it would not be thus - all things are causally connected - causes: their number can be unlimited - there is not necessarily a temporal beginning. - Sufficient reason: must then lie outside the world - therefore there must be a necessary being - VsLeibniz: How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? - KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof of God is based on the implicit (disproved) ontological argument.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Cross World Identity Hintikka II XV
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: cross-world identity remains a crucial problem. Thesis: it is to trace an object (or its trace) in the worlds that it has in common. That is, it boils down to a re-identification, between time slices of the same event development. It is a matter of continuity.
The problem corresponds to the stability theory of sets of differential equations.
II XVI
Catastrophe theory/René Thom/Hintikka: the problem is closely related to the catastrophe theory. Cross-world identity/Hintikka:
Quine: considers it a hopeless problem.
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it to be guaranteed. He cheats.
Worldline/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow that some objects not only exist in certain possible worlds, but that their existence is unthinkable there! That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: this is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (religious logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and description.
---
II 78
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. the problem can be an intentional (opaque) context (belief contexts). Here the existential generalization (EG) fails. That is, if a sentence A[b] is true for a subject, we cannot conclude that there is an object from which the sentence A is true (Ex) A [x].
II 79
Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the solution is to accept different individuals in different worlds. If the semantics of possible worlds is right, we somehow manage to determine the cross-world identity. Knowledge/knowledge-who/knowledge-what/semantics of possible worlds: E.g.
(4) (Ex) Victoria knows that Lewis Carroll is x.
Model-theoretically, this means that "Lewis Carroll" picks out the same individual in all the worlds that are compatible with Victoria's knowledge.
This is synonymous with
(5) Victoria knows who Lewis Carroll is.
II 80
Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross-World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: when worlds are whole universes, the framework between them changes too often that it is questionable how to re-identify individuals.
II 80
Cross-world identity/cross-world identification/Hintikka: normally we hold a large part of the world fixed when we identify two individuals. Comparability Hintikka/(s): thus alternatives become comparable. To make alternatives to different parts comparable, we extend them. The extensions should have a part in common.
In an extreme case, they share their story. Identical: two individuals are indentical when their story coincides. This leads to the fact that cross-world identification is partially reduced to re-identification. That is, it becomes the problem. How space-time can be traced back to a common basis.
Advantage: we do not have to consider every single possible world.
I 81
Cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: Thesis: Causation plays an important role.
I 205
Cross-world identification/cross-identification/perception/Hintikka: here we have to assume a situation when it comes to perceptual identification. For there must be in them a perceptible, and the different situations (worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Semantics of possible worlds/perception/HintikkaVsSemantics of possible worlds: Hintikka has overlooked this point.
Situation/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: Furthermore, the semantics of possible worlds should investigate relations between smaller and larger situations.
I 206
Descriptive cross-world identification/descriptive/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world that are larger than the actual perceptual cross-identification. So a comparison between "bigger" and "smaller" situations.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Descriptions Hacking I 162
Description/StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: complete description pointless! - VsPutnam: Internal realism requires the idea of ​​a "complete description" because of ideal acceptability.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Dissimilarity Democritus Adorno XIII 202
Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. ---
XIII 203
Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. ---
XIII 204
AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: the objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. Natural science: modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside.
This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff.
Group: Leibniz, Wolff pro Aristotle.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Identification Strawson I 57
Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing.
I 64
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being.
I 65
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves.
I 66
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable.
I 87
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things.
I 153
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term - Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual - that is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness).
I 245
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. - But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you" - crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it.
VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b ) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. - E.g. "Scott is Scott". ---
Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson: a) Showing - b) Description, spacetime points - TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders - Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora) - difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" - Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Identity Quine I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". - (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a)
in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa.
From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with:
(2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a.
---
Geach I 240
But Geach per relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
Identity/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap.
---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity).
2. disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms.
---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII (d) 65ff
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Wessel I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. ---
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time - WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. ---
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact (> Identity/Russell). ---
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? - Definition diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = definition E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) - ((s), there are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.) - identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. <((S) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.) ---
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order - 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact). Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Justice Rawls I 3
Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems.
Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter)
---
I 4
The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice.
---
I 5
Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. ---
I 6
Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. ---
I 54/55
Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. ---
I 310
Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness". (Cf.: W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930, pp. 21,26-28,57f; Leibniz,"On the Ultimate Origin of Things" (1697) ed. P. P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353) The theory of justice as fairness rejects such ideas. Such a principle would not be adopted in the initial situation. Such criteria could not be defined there. ---
I 311
What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. ---
I 312
The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Leibniz Principle Adams Millikan I 261
VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s)> nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances.


Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Leibniz Principle Millikan I 259
Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y]
Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic).
Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state.
Quantification/properties/2nd level logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates.
False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property).
If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties).
Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category.
How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent?
---
I 260
Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties".
Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington"
N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington".
Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle.
MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property.
Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to...
---
I 261
...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category.
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place.
((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below).
Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!)
Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half.
Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances.
Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true.
This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Order Leibniz Holz I 76
Order/structure/world/Leibniz: the assumption of an invariable lawfulness of the material world presents us with the task of a priori establishing the being of nature as a whole before a single natural being. The whole must be certain before the formulation of its partial course rules, so that the intelligibility of the individual is guaranteed.
Thus the axiom "Only one being is necessary" gains its importance.
---
I 77
For it follows from it: "The necessary being contains in itself all the conditions of things." A finite being cannot be understood from within itself.
But the whole is absolutely necessary because there is nothing else besides it.
---
Holz I 95
World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: precisely the specificity of the context of the world remains unclear in Leibniz, since the "unmoved mover" must be thought of as located outside. Leibniz/Holz: they develop a unity of metaphysics and physics.
---
I 96
Order/World/God/Leibniz: God does nothing except order. It is not even possible to devise events that are not according to the rule! The mechanism is sufficient to explain the emergence of all animals. Organic preformation in the seed.
Mechanism, however, must be presupposed, and this can only be determined a priori by means of metaphysical reasoning.
---
97
The world is from the beginning a system of interactions.
The principle of the particularity of each individual is at the same time the principle of the universality of the connection of all beings.
Universal Harmony/Leibniz: universal harmony is the structural title for the system of substances. Not later, but from the nature and concept of the monads.
Pre-stabilized harmony/Leibniz: pre-stabilized harmony is in contrast to a widespread misunderstanding the special case of consistency between physical and mental aspects of substantial being.
---
I 98
Thus between "body" and "soul", between material processes in the res extensa and representations in the res cogitans. Holz: one could also speak of pre-stabilized harmony between extensional and intensional aspects of the logical mapping of ontological relationships.
For the world concept, the more general version of the universal harmony is decisive.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Possibilia Hintikka II 40/41
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. Possible worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds.
The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole.
Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world.
Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather being well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then?
II 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of Possibilia necessary. (Unrealized Possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Possible Worlds Hintikka II 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: Possible worlds seem to take the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia as ((s) self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: thesis: there is a determined set of worlds among which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: that is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
II 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: one can build a theory of questions and answers on the semantics of possible worlds.
II 76
This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/semantics of possible worlds: here it is not enough to accept only the referents which have our expressions in the actual world.
II 196
Possible world/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could make them different. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds hould be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be ruled out.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Possible Worlds Leibniz Hintikka I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
---
I 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. ---
Holz I 120
Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position.
Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity.
Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity).
---
I 122
One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence.
World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals.
Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one.
Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of!
Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds.
It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds.
Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking.
---
I 122/123
Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing.
This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter.
The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!)
Nothing/Leibniz: is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Possible Worlds Schopenhauer Pfotenhauer IV 26
Possible World/Voltaire/SchopenhauerVsLeibniz/Schopenhauer: (A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. II 4th book, p. 669): I cannot concede to de Theodicee, this methodical and broad unfolding of optimism, in such a property, any merit other than that it later gave rise to the immortal "Candide" of the great Voltaire; as a result of which, however, Leibnitz's often repeated and lame excuses for the world's evils, namely that the bad sometimes brings about the good, receive an unexpected evidence. Even Leibnitz's palpable, sophistical proofs that this world is the best and the most possible can be seriously and honestly proved to be the worst among the possible. (p. 669).


Pfot I
Helmut Pfotenhauer
Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985
Proofs Vollmer I 234
Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be proven logically - that have seen KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff - but it also cannot be empirically verified - Kant had learned that from Hume.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Rationalism Leibniz Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final justification leads to a different epistemological level. Danger of an irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proving them from the "evidence of identity" (with themselves).

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Realism Kant Strawson V 230
Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. - Kant: we may only speak of terms instead.
Stroud I 134
Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. - Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. -
Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before.
Stroud I 135
Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself.
Stroud I 136
It is not about lack of generality- ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3)!.
Stroud I 162
Definition Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. - Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Reality Leibniz Holz I 61
Reality/Leibniz: what is possible to think of is reasonable and could be, purely logical, possible as well. ---
Holz I 125
Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility.
Reality/Leibniz: reality always has the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio".
Best world/best of all possible worlds/Leibniz: that is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which results from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not mutually prevent each other.
To this extent, this world is by no means accidently the same as it is.
Translating this into theology, it means that God has created the world neccessarily according to his own rationality because it is the optimization of the processes caused by this rationality.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Ironization of Leibnizian Theory.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Science Kant Vollmer I 234
Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton s theory can not be logically proved - that had KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff realized - but it can not be empirically verified - that Kant had learned from Hume.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Space Kant I 85
Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. - KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. ((S) It would have to, if only the relations played a role.) - ((S) chirality/VsRelationismus). ---
Strawson V 28
Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. - Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. ---
Stra V 48
Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. ---
V 49
Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Substitution Quine VII (b) 29
Substitutability/substitution/QuineVsLeibniz: the strength of this requirement varies with the richness of the language -we need both single- and multi-digit predicates, truth functions (not, and, or, etc.), classes, classes of classes, descriptions, singular term - this language is then extensional: any two predicates that match extensionally (are true for the same object) are substitutable salva veritate - but that does not secure cognitive synonymy. ---
VII (c) 56
Substitutability/Quine: question salvo quo? Something is always changed. ---
IX 9
Replace/substitution/Quine: if in a statement that has been substituted for "Fx" free variables other than "x" occurr, then they may not be such that fall under the scope of quantifiers that occur in the scheme in which the substitution was made.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Thing in itself Kant I 17
In itself/Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? ---
Strawson V 33/34
Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. ---
Stra V 95
Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz). ---
Stra V 168
Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism/Kant). - But Kant does not accept this! - Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. ---
Adorno XIII 40
Thing in itself/VsKant/Adorno: it has been argued against Kant that if the things in themselves, and with this the causes of the phenomena, are wholly unknown, how can we then speak of them at all, and know about them.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Ultimate Justification Leibniz Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). ---
Holz I 51
Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: logic has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content.
---
I 52
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. ---
Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
---
Holz I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
---
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
---
Holz I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
---
I 124
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 36 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R. I 27
Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not!
2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible.
3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning).
Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception.
I 45
Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different.
Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia).
Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up!
VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies.
I 52
Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought.
Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have
I 53
given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet.
LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below).
I 54
Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis,
I 55
it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form.
That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach).
Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view.
II 189
Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge.
II 190
Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke).
II 195
Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Kant Leibniz Vs Kant Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4


Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes).
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other.

I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Kant Quine Vs Kant Danto I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.

Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!

Quine VII (b) 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII (b) 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.

Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.

Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
Stroud I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
Stroud I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
Stroud I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Leibniz, G.W. Berkeley Vs Leibniz, G.W. Ber I 228
BerkeleyVsInfinitesimal Calculation/BerkeleyVsLeibniz: consequence of his denial of divisibility beyond the perceptible. But Berkeley had to admit, that mathematics led to useful results. Solution/Berkeley: the mathematicians do not make only one mistake, but two, which cancel each other out by chance.
The idea of error compensation was later taken up by Lagrange.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Leibniz, G.W. Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 39
Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g.
(DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history.
(DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history.
I 40
FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Leibniz, G.W. Fraassen Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 209
FraassenVsLeibniz: we have learned to acknowledge the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" as illegitimate. But we still consider to be legitimate to ask I 210 "Why is the world like this and not different?" But both of these questions may not be answered with "by chance", or "because that is the way it is".

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Leibniz, G.W. Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 31
Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1 one can prove it, in a way.:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true.
I 44
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4   So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc.
  Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing.
(see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant)
FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable.


Leibniz I 38f
Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences".
Contrast: Prove by reason.
  I 46
  "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones.
  I 48
  "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning?

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Leibniz, G.W. Heidegger Vs Leibniz, G.W. II 87
VsLeibniz: legitimizes metaphysics as subjectivity.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993
Leibniz, G.W. Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. Descartes I 139
Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic.

Descartes I 142
KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion".
Kant I 34
Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made ​​the subject of metaphysical teachings.
I 85
Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity.
Strawson V 227
Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist.
V 228
KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist.
V 228
Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning.
V 229
Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But:
V 230
KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts.
I 234
Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Leibniz, G.W. Locke Vs Leibniz, G.W. II 190
Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: is linked to its namability for him. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Leibniz, G.W. Quine Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 209
Identity/QuineVsLeibniz: confusion of characters and object: When Leibniz explains the relationship betw characters instead of as a relationship btw the named object and itself "Eadem sunt quorum potest substitui alteri, sava veritate".

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Leibniz, G.W. Russell Vs Leibniz, G.W. Chisholm II 183/184
RussellVsLeibniz: his metaphysics has the same consistency as fairy tales: these also claim to be true. ---
Russell VI 72
Syllogism/Mode Darapti/Russell: E.g. All chimeras are animals
All chimeras breathe flames,
So some animals breathe flames.
---
VI 73
Mode Darapti: All A is B
All B is C
So some B are C.
RussellVsLeibniz: he could not eliminate this fallacy out of respect for Aristotle, although he has seen it.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W. Hacking I 162
Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! ---
VII 116
StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Leibniz, G.W. Verschiedene Vs Leibniz, G.W. Metz II 70
Bieri: you could say VsLeibniz:   1. what is happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is lawlike linked to events outside, it represents by virtue of this link,
  2. the fact that the events in question give the whole person an adequate behavior in a certain situation.
  But our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but content of experience.
Leibniz I 125
Perfection/Existence/Leibniz: for example, assuming that A,B,C,D are of equal rank, but D is incompatible with A and B, but the others are all compatible with each other except with D, then it follows that A,B and C exist to the exclusion of D. This is the principle of compressibility.
Reality/Leibniz: in each case the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio".
Best world/best of all possible worlds/possible world/Leibniz: this is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which follows from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not exactly hinder each other.
In this respect, it is not by chance that this world is the way it is.
Translated into theology this means that God necessarily created the world according to his own rationality, because it is the optimization of the processes conditioned by this rationality.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds".
Kripke I 9
Leibniz' Principle of the Indistinguishability of the Identical/Kripke: always seemed evident to me. VsLeibniz: when some philosophers doubted it, it always turned out that areas were confused that do not express real properties in contexts, or it concerned the collapse of individuals, with which identity was confused between individuals.





Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Leibniz, G.W. Poundstone Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 343/344
Leibniz: E.g. enlargement of the brain to walk-in dimensions, or machine with gears and pistons, etc. PoundstoneVsLeibniz: the example is not mandatory. Modern versions: Office building full of employees talking on the phone, different states which correspond to feelings of motivation and disinclination would be impossible to determine.
W. Poundstone
I W. Poundstone Im Labyrinth des Denkens, Reinbek 1995
Leibniz, G.W. Hintikka Vs Leibniz, G.W. II 40/41
Non-existent Objects/Possible Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/Hintikka: But are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: Thesis: Yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona Fide Object/Hintikka: can exist in one Possible World and be absent in another. World Line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-definedness. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object exists in several possible worlds. Question: if residents of two different possible worlds may then be identical, when are they?
II 74
VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: problem: it seems to absolutize possible worlds and complete sets of possibilia ((s) takes them for granted). Possible Worlds/Leibniz: Thesis, there is a fixed set of possible worlds, under which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
II 80
Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: if possible worlds are entire universes, the frame between them changes too strongly so that it is questionable how individuals should be re-identified.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Leibniz, G.W. Berka Vs Leibniz, G.W. Berka I 7
Leibniz/Logic/Berka: three requirements: 1. characteristica universalis: a system of signs whose basic signs are characters of basic concepts and whose combination should result in the characters of all other concepts.
2. calculus ratiocinator: calculus which allows a purely mathematical treatment of all statements expressed in the characters of the characteristica universalis.
3. ars iudicandi: a decision-making procedure to determine from the statements whether they are true or false. This corresponds today to:
"Leibniz Program"/Modern:
1. Establishment of a system of definition rules
2. Logic Calculus
3. Decision Procedure
VsLeibniz: the program is not realizable, i.e. not in application to an entirety, an area understood as totality, but only to partial areas. ((s) Otherwise circles, paradoxes).
I 84
FregeVsLeibniz: his project of the calculus philosophicus (ratiocinator) was too huge. He underestimated the problems. Solution: his project can be realized for single areas: e.g. geometry, chemistry, arithmetic.
Begriffsschrift (Concept-Script): should then fill the gaps.

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Leibniz, G.W. Hegel Vs Leibniz, G.W. Descartes I 47
Leibniz: model of the organism as mechanism. HegelVsLeibniz: organic models > romantic philosophy of nature. Prehistory: Descartes: movement emancipates itself, space geometrizes itself. The concept of space is then detached from the bodies that behave towards each other in space.
Newton: "Absolute space" as a prerequisite of classical physical theory.
Leibniz, G.W. Chisholm Vs Leibniz, G.W. III 86
Incompatibilities/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: E.g. "being red excludes being blue" ChisholmVsLeibniz: that leads to problems of a different nature than the ones above: some philosophers have tried to make it look analytical, but they failed.
Paranormal/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: "Paranormal element in knowledge": certain ethical sentences. Leibniz: "... because the senses could not bring to the knowledge what is supposed to be or could not be otherwise."
This would then have to be synthetic a priori:

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. Chisholm II 186
SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads.
Simons I 319
Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything.
Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads).
Solution/Simons: actually the two already distinguished in the concept of dependence:
Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7").
Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence: ("7").
This has severe consequences:
Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity.
Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements?
If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals:
Whole/Leibniz: cease to exist if a part is lost.
Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts.
Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him always means "real part".
Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independently.
That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (first?) member.
Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this
(1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts)
(2) every part is essential
(3) therefore each composite depends on its parts
(4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts.
(5) But each chain of dependencies is founded
(6) Therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts
(7) Therefore, there is simple (monads, atoms).
SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. Vs mereological essentialism:
2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it?
Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Holz Vs Leibniz, G.W. Leibniz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final justifications leads to another epistemological level. Danger of the irrationalistic turnover.
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz insists, however, that they must be proved from the "evidence of identity" (with oneself).
I 95
World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: especially the specificity of the connection of the world remains unclear with Leibniz, because the "unmoving mover" (Aristotle) has to be thought outside. Leibniz/Holz: develops a unity of metaphysics and physics.

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Leibniz, G.W. Meixner Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 27
Property/Meixner: according to Quine ("no entity without identity"), it could happen that it is found that there are no good identity conditions for properties and, as a consequence, the expression "property" is incomprehensible. But then we cannot judge that he "applies to nothing"! Identity/Identity Conditions/Meixner: there should be no too far-reaching conclusions drawn from the non-answerability!
After all, every entity in each category is identical with itself and with nothing else.
Identity/Meixner: can be conceived as "maximum similarity"!
Distinctness/Meixner: at least minimal dissimilarity. (Leibniz)
VsLeibniz: even maximum similarity is not conceptually sufficient for identity.
Def "Naked Distinctness"/Black: distinctness without even minimal dissimilarity.
Identity/MeixnerVsVs: The objection VsLeibniz is based on the non-consideration of the fact that the degree of similarity between the similars is not based only on aspects intrinsic to them (Leibniz: assumed that it was based only on intrinsic aspects), but also on extrinsic relational aspects.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
MillikanVsLeibniz.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Leibniz, G.W. Genz Vs Leibniz, G.W. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 57
Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a beam scale can also be stable in an inclined position! - The equilibrium is indifferent. LeibnizVs: e.g. Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, none will occur -Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium >
LeibnizVsSubstantialism: there can be no independent space - otherwise the universe in it could be shifted (senseless) - today:
VsLeibniz - Solution: spontaneous symmetry calculation.
Sentence of the sufficient reason/Leibniz: for example Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation to the right or left, none will occur.
VIII 59
Leibniz: there is never an indifferent balance. (today: wrong! (see above)) E.g. (Leibniz) If two incompatible things are equally good, God will not create either of them.
VIII 60
Space/Leibniz: so there can be no independent space, independent of things, because otherwise the world could be settled in it here and there. The same applies to the time and time of the creation of the world.
Spontaneous symmetry calculation: e.g. the pencil does not stand on its tip, but falls to one side.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002
Leibniz, G.W. Saussure Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 21
SaussureVsLeibniz: the meaning of a language expression can be produced with the help of the elements of a grammar, but not by them alone and without the intervention of a speaker.
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)
Leibniz, G.W. Schurz Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 129
Representativity/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible.
I 130
Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in a qualitative property. If we now vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance to find falsifying individuals in the A sample. (> sufficient reason).
Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had regarded this as a metaphysical necessity.
SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful.
Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to Popper's so-called strict verification: the expansion during heat should not only be investigated on metals.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent!
World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning!
Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world!
IV 389
He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason?
2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself?
If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason!
KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency.
Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different.
The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible.
Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist.
IV 392
This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either:
1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them.
2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed!
Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world.
Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through.
MackieVs: that is not true at all!
IV 393
We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Leibniz, G.W. Thomas Aquinas Vs Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller IV 395
Cause/Chain/Thomas AquinasVsLeibniz/ThomasVsLeibniz: the chain of causes cannot be endless.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987
Leibniz, G.W. Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 221
Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties.
In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates.
In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language.
Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects:
Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life.
In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it.
I 228
Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate.
x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa).
WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true.
Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that".
Identity/Peirce:
x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged!
Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable.
(x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e)
and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle):
(x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n)
Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae
P(x) ↔ P(y) and
-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y)
are not equivalent.
Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988):
the same predicates must also be denied!
strict identity:
x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))).
WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded!
I 229
In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. I 37
Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
I 38
Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi).
N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history).
((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.)
Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical?
I 42
Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example:
(1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll
one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that
(2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x.
And therefore
(3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll.
(2) and (3) say the same thing as
(4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was.
But this is not entailed by (1).
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects.
The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness.
However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons.
Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x".
Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails.
Peirce, Ch.S. Wessel Vs Peirce, Ch.S. I 228
Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "Its principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that".
Identity/Peirce:
x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially burdened.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Phenomenalism Smart Vs Phenomenalism Fraassen I 209
Regularity/Fraassen: we can then perceive them a) as accidental, then we cannot know them at all as regularities! Because then they would not have to happen at all.
b) as of underlying reasons.
But we know about certain regularities, so there must be underlying reasons.
Scientific Realism/Peirce/Smart/Fraassen:
Peirce: ~ confidently predict that the stone will fall to the ground if I let it go.
Theoretical Entities/SmartVsPhenomenalism: if he were right (disbelieving in theoretical entities), everything would be a cosmic coincidence. Then statements about electrons are only instrumentalistically useful.
FraassenVsLeibniz: We have learned to recognize the question "Why is there something and not nothing?" as illegitimate.
But we still consider it legitimate to ask:
I 210
"Why is the world like this and not rather different? But both questions must not be answered with "by chance" or "because it is so". ("as a matter of fact").

Smart I
J. J. C. Smart
Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Substantivalism Leibniz Vs Substantivalism Field I 39
Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!).
Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world.
LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd.
FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well?
e.g.
(DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile.
(DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history.
I 40
FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference.
Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 57
Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Thomas Aquinas Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas Stegmüller IV 394
proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!:
VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future.
2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap.
IV 395
VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance.
3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists."
Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything.
HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence).
If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them, Cf. Round Square/Frege).
Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing.
Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other.
But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things.
IV 396
For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause.
MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one.
Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes!
VsVs: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain.
Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on...
Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member.
IV 397
Thomas Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi). Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself.
Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything.
Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back.
MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas.
IV 398
Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason.
Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Thomas' argument.
Conclusion:
MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause).
IV 399
"Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception?
Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Tradition Simons Vs Tradition I 291
Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: Thesis: Integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected(> microstrukture, MiSt).
Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle. (1960,98)
Object/thing/object/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia.
Individual/Leibniz: must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz).

I 306
Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: may very well exis: that means such that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: E.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious.

I 342
Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition delivered according to the tradition the copula: copula/VsTradition: occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated parts of a sentence.
Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: connection simply common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection.
Unsaturatedness/Simons: perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others!

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Various Authors Mackie Vs Various Authors Stegmüller IV 399
"Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds!
MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy.
IV 400
Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason?
2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable!
God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems:
1. Has God simply emerged with the time?
2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced!
3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again.
Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume:
a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and
b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable.

IV 401
Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not.
a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses.
b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself!

Stegmüller
IV 447
Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole.
MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act.

IV 472
Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive.
Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent.
MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all.

IV 271
Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic.

Stegmüller IV 502
Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition!
When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe.
Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life.
IV 503
Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct.
Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld.
The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing.
IV 504
According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume.
Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions.
Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense.
IV 504/505
Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes!
PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements.
MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood!
IV 506
MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism.
Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference!

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989