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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experiments | Hacking | I 287 Experiment/HackingVsLakatos/HackingVsFeyerabend: an experiment is neither a statement nor a report but an action, which is not about mere words. >P. Feyerabend. I 293 E.g. Herschel’s theory of thermal radiation was (falsely) aligned with Newton, but that did not affect his observation. He noted that infrared had to be included in the white light. A previously existing theory would have prevented him from this finding out. HackingVsTheory Ladenness of observation. >Theory ladenness, >Observation, >Method, >Discoveries. I 299 Observing is a skill (HackingVsHanson). I 380f Experiment/Hacking: an experiment is never repeated but always improved. An experiment usually does not work, therefore observation is not so important. I 418 Crucial experiment/experimentum crucis/Hacking: e.g. Michelson-Morley. >experimentum crucis. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Method | Feyerabend | Method/Feyerabend Thesis: the theory of Galileo (as well as other deficient theories) does not only correspond to the facts, but is also perfectly reasonable. Any attempt to implement some of the more familiar methodologies of the twentieth century, such as the Trial and Error method, would have had catastrophic consequences! Cf. >Trial and Error. I 270 Methodology/Method/Feyerabend: Observations that do not match are rightly regarded as indications of errors in the theories and not in methodology. This changes when the disturbances become overwhelming and surround every observation. (Feyerabend: "cosmological criticism", is preferable here). (VsLakatos). I 271/272 FeyerabendVsMethodology: (VsLakatos): it does not help to rationally reconstruct the dispute between the old and the new. At any rate, not at the time of the dispute. The methodology misses the tricks with which Galileo worked propagandistically. (...) (I 281) E.g. Research Programs/Feyerabend: Comparison between Einstein and Lorentz. Einstein's program begins to degenerate, while that of Lorentz advances. (+ ...) I 283 Research Programs/Feyerabend: The consistency of the speed of light arises from Lorentz' program as a random fact, and is therefore closer to the general theory of relativity than Einstein's program, where the consistency is a fundamental law. And his heuristics are at least as convincing as those of Einstein, for any law that follows from a research program can, of course, be used in its heuristics. The choice of research programs and competitors is quite arbitrary, and so are the judgments that are based on them. I 283 Speed of Light/Feyerabend: "E = mc²" was already deduced by Poincaré in 1900 without relativistic aspects. I 376 Sciences/Feyerabend: Sciences have no common structure. (Family similarity at most). Successful research does not obey general rules. --- II 54 Tradition/Feyerabend: Thesis 1: Traditions are neither good nor bad Thesis 2: A tradition obtains desirable or undesirable traits only if it is referred to another tradition. (When viewed as a participant of a tradition). II 55 Relativism/Feyerabend: the theses 1 and 2 lead to a relativism of exactly the kind that Protagoras seems to have defended. (Man is what matters). II 73 Scale/Feyerabend: the validity and usefulness of popular standards can only be determined by a research procedure that violates them. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Method | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 234 Method/Lakatos: Scientists often act like sleepwalkers, they think something is right, but do something quite different. >Science/Feyerabend, >Progress/Feyerabend. --- Hacking I 191 Knowledge sociology/LakatosVsKuhn: "Mobpsychology". Vs the tracing back of the history of science to sociology. This leaves no room for the sacrosanct values of truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: this attitude does not contribute to what one should reasonably believe. It is exclusively turned backwards. >History/Lakatos. Hacking I 193 Popper/Lakatos. Setting up drawers must go much faster than collecting facts. ("Leibniz Whewell Popper Demand"). |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Objectivity | Lakatos | Hacking I 202 Lakatos/Hacking: what does Lakatos want at all? He wants to find a substitute for truth. He is more radical than Putnam. He is no reborn pragmatist. This is in Hegelian tradition, no correspondence. Yet, like Peirce, he values a scientific objectivity that Hegel denied. >Truth/Putnam, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Pragmatism, >Correspondence, >Hegel, >Peirce. I 204 Objectivity/Knowledge/Lakatos: only afterwards! The only fixed point is that knowledge is increasing. HackingVsLakatos: his philosophy ignores the problem of representation. Lakatos thesis: we can easily see that knowledge is growing, regardless of our views on truth and "reality". I 205 HackingVsLakatos: there is nothing that has grown steadier and stronger over the centuries than the comments on the Talmud. These comments form the most elaborate texts we know at all! They are far better thought out than just all the texts of the scientific literature. Is this a rational activity according to Lakatos? |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Observation | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions: 1. There is a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences. 2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts. HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial. Lakatos has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos: That could not have been pure seeing. >Method, cf. >Instrumentalism. >Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Proofs | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 Experiment/Evidence/Lakatos: no fact-related statement can ever be proved by an experiment. Assertions cannot be proved by experience. This is a logical principle. HackingVsLakatos: this is a mirroring fight with the word "to prove". >Proof, >Experiment, >Method. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Science | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 284 Lakatos/Feyerabend: his case studies contain: (A) a discussion of certain sociological regularities (B) the proposal of arbitrary standards which have no methodological force (C) the submission that the regularities are not merely in the facts, but are the traits of reason. >Regularities. I 285 Lakatos/Feyerabend: all theories of knowledge start with the question: what is knowledge? The conventional answer contains a definition of knowledge. The answer of Lakatos is a huge improvement. His standards are much closer to science. The methods of revision refer to history. One can now discuss all the rules in a realistic context. >Knowledge, >History/Lakatos, >Progress. I 286 FeyerabendVsLakatos: he has not shown that his standards are those of sciences, and that they lead to important results. He neglects the "external" influences or distorts the history of the sciences by the imputation that the progress of the observed deviations from his standards is not necessary. (sic). --- Hacking I 193 Science/Research programs/Lakatos: 1. Specific plan of problem solving. (general). 2. Lakatos: abstract and historical: sequence of evolving theories over centuries. Definition "Heuristics"/Lakatos/Hacking: heuristics defines the importance of problems. I 198 Lakatos: "hard core" ("negative heuristics": this must remain untouched): the Gravitational law and the three laws of dynamics are irrefutable. I 199 "Protective Belt"/Lakatos: one only encounters a selection of problems with which one deals. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: therefore the verification has still a place! The researchers are choosing a few problems, refutations can be completely uninteresting! I 199 Degenerative/Lakatos: bad research programs: E.g. instead of malnutrition one mistakenly assumed a virus disease of the population. Instead of Beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition by new process of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory was not made before, but only after the observations. I 202 HackingVsLakatos: it does not help to choose new programs without proof of past performance. E.g. Is the attempt to find cancer viruses progressive or degenerate? We'll know that later. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Seeing | Lakatos | Hacking I 286 Seeing/Lakatos/Hacking: He has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope: This could not have been pure seeing. >Method, cf. >Instrumentalism. >Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification. Therefore: Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions: 1. There would be a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences. 2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts. HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Texts | Lakatos | Hacking I 212 Lakatos: you should read all the texts you can get hold of. Hacking and FeyerabendVsLakatos: this is an elitist demand! HackingVsCoherence theory: you can always fiddle the data situation! One can conclude that something is not an example! This does not mean that you are lying! >Coherence theory, >Coherence. But that withdraws the basics from Lakatos's historical analysis! According to Lakatos, we cannot rely on any other standards than the cognitive history as it is present. >History/Lakatos. FeyerabendVsLakatos: elitist. Rationality is simply defined by what is approved by a community. (Here, however, only the last 200 years). I 215 Lakatos/Hacking: Lakatos has attempted to characterize certain objective values of science without reference to copy theories of truth. (Increase in knowledge). >Science/Lakatos, >Progress, >Objectivity/Lakatos. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feyerabend, P. | Lakatos Vs Feyerabend, P. | Hacking I 206 Feyerabend / VsLakatos: (friends): his "methodology" is of no benefit if you need advice about current research. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Lakatos, I. | Feyerabend Vs Lakatos, I. | I 271 Methodology: observations that do not fit them, are rightly considered to indicate errors in the theories and not in the methodology. That changes when the disturbances abound and surround each observation. (Feyerabend: "cosmological criticism" is preferable here). (VsLakatos). FeyerabendVsMethodology: (VsLakatos): with it the dispute between the old and the new cannot be rationally reconstructed. At least not at the time of the dispute. Also, the tricks Galilei worked with for propaganda purposes escape the methodology. I 284 FeyerabendVsLakatos: his case studies contain (A) a discussion of certain sociological regularities (B) the proposal of arbitrary standards that have no methodological force (C) the assumption that the regularities do not only lie in the facts, but are traits of reason. I 286 FeyerabendVsLakatos: he has not demonstrated that his standards are those of science, and that they lead to important results. He disregards the ’external’ influences or distorts the history of science by the insinuation that progress does not require the observed deviations from its standards. I 295 FeyerabendVsLakatos: In addition, the standards of Lakatos are not always applicable. They presuppose that relationships can always be established between sentences that originate in various research programs. But the content classes of alternative theories are often incomparable in the sense that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be established between them. Such incompatibility surely exists between myths and scientific theories. They are found again in the most advanced, most generic and therefore most mythological parts of the sciences themselves. II 18 Lakatos: On the fact that today’s standards of rationality and logic are too tight and have hampered the progress of science. But requires research to have dynamic traits. FeyerabendVsLakatos: Just about any development matches this. Hacking I 212 Lakatos: you should read all the texts you can ever get hold of. Hacking and FeyerabendVsLakatos: this is an elitist demand. FeyerabendVsLakatos: elitist. Rationality is simply defined by what is approved by a community. (Here, however, only of the last 200 years). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Lakatos, I. | Hacking Vs Lakatos, I. | I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology". Vs reduction of the history of science to sociology. That leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: contributes nothing to what you should reasonably believe. Is exclusively turned backwards. I 202 Degenerative/Lakatos: poor research programs: E.g. Instead of malnutrition a viral disease of the population was erroneously assumed. Instead of beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition through new methods of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory has not been made before but only after observations (!)!. HackingVsLakatos: does not help to choose new programs without proof of previous performance. E.g. Is the attempt to identify cancer viruses progressive or degenerative? We will know that later. I 205 Objectivity/Knowledge/Lakatos: only with hindsight! The only fixed point is that knowledge increases. His philosophy ignores the representation problem. Lakatos Thesis: regardless of our views on the truth and "reality" we can simply see to it that knowledge grows. HackingVsLakatos: there is nothing that has increased more steadily and strongly over the centuries than the comments on the Talmud. These comments are the most thoroughly thought through texts that we know! They are far better thought out than almost all the texts of the scientific literature. Is that a rational activity by Lakatos?. I 206 Instead of increasing the knowledge he should say: increasing the number of theories!. I 207 External History/Lakatos: marginal conditions of research. Internal History/Lakatos: what people have believed, is inconsequential, story of anonymous and autonomous research programs. (HackingVs). I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: falsificationism cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. HackingVsLakatos: These assumptions have now been ridiculed for 15 years, but Lakatos’ reasoning is superficial. He only has one E.g.: Galilei’s observation of sunspots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos. this could not have been merely seeing. Experiment/Proof/Lakatos: no factual statement can ever be proved by an experiment. Assertions cannot be proved on the basis of experience. That is a logical principle. HackingVsLakatos: that is shadow-boxing with the word "prove". |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Skepticism | Feyerabend Vs Skepticism | II 94 FeyerabendVsLakatos: I am not a skeptic, as Lakatos represents it. For a skeptic all ideas are equally true. For me, the evaluation of ideas depends on the tradition. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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