Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analysis Katz
 
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Cresswell I 21
Lexical decomposition/analysis/Katz/word meaning/list/Cresswell: (Katz 1972, p. 49). Example: "Chair":
(10) (object), (physical), (non-alive), (artifact), (furniture), (portable), (something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a sitting space), (seat for one).

Problem: Katz declines to say what, e.g. an (object) is.
N.B.: even in recent times (Harrison 1974, 601 ff), we find this "object" as an English word (!) ((s) i.e. not perceived) as a physical object.)
Cresswell: that's all right, as long as we consider e.g. (seat for one) to be sufficiently similar to an electron in a physical theory.
---
I 32
CresswellVsKatz: we simply have no idea what the most basic entities of his decomposition should be. On the other hand, we have an idea of it in the semantics of possible worlds. ---
I 21
Semantics of possible worlds/word meaning/CresswellVsKatz: Example "chair": a function , so that for each world w and thing a, w ε ω (a) iff. a is a chair in w. See below I 51: omega/ω: evaluation of the predicate, w: possible world. ((s) ε ω (a)": the world w is an element of the set of the worlds in which this object is a chair "/" ω (a)": the function ω makes the object "ω(a)") from this object. ---
I 32
Problem: this is not quite accurate: just as there is a reference to different worlds, there should also be one to different moments, where something is in one moment a chair, but not in another. Context dependence/Cresswell: is taken into account both in the semantics of possible worlds (Cresswell 1973, 180) and in the Katz/Fodor semantics. (Katz, 1972, 303ff). Circularity is only apparent here: if I use "chair" in my meta-language, I have, of course, presupposed the knowledge of the reader of this meta-language. So that the way in which the set of worlds where x is a chair was presented, the word "chair" was used.
Katz/Fodor semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: one can connect both: e.g. "chair": we would not treat "chair" as a single symbol whose meaning is w, but as a complex expression of the form
(x is an object) & ... & (x is a seat for one).

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Competence Katz
 
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Cresswell I 12
Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable.
Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things:
A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect.
B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence.
---
Cresswell I 12
Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Features Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
I 47
Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. ---
I 48
For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112; Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994. In particular Katz and Fodor (1963), R. Lakoff (1971), Schank, (1975), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976).
Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis.
Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).
Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Katz
 
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Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect.
Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein).
---
I 103
Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite.
VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition?

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Semantics Katz
 
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Cresswell I 20 f
Katz-Fodor semantics/Cresswell: Thesis: meanings are theoretical constructions. - E.g. lexical decomposition: (object), (Physical), (not alive), (artifact), (furniture), (portable), (Something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a seating area) (seat for one). - CresswellVs: that does not explain what "object" is. - Problem: "Electron" has no intelligible theoretical construction. - What should be the "most basic" construction? -> Possible worlds (poss. w.). Semantics/Word Meaning/CresswellVsKatz: E.g. "chair": a function w so that for every possible world w and thing a, w ε w (a) iff. a is a chair in w.
---
I 32
Problem: this is not entirely accurate: as there is a reference to various possible worlds, there should also be one for various moments where something is a chair in a moment, but not in another. ---
I 22
Katz: Thesis: the distinction between "logical" and "descriptive" words is arbitrary (Cresswell pro). CresswellVsKatz: he, of all things, uses implicit logical constants - and therefore relies on the distinction


Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Situations Katz
 
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Eco II 118
Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... ---
II 119
...how and why the sentence has to be used in one sense or another. Unambiguity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity.
EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor:
1. if you stop at the distinguishers, you do not measure all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are sings or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial sign. (>Problem of interpretation).
3. the family tree of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be...
---
II 120
...taken into account, nor the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Eco I
U. Eco
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Situations Eco
 
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Eco II 118
Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components must not depend on the situation or circumstance to be interpreted (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... --
II 119
...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meanings, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity.
EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. if you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme.
Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (>Problem of interpretation).
3. the lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be...
---
II 120
...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community.

Eco I
U. Eco
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972

Unambiguity Katz
 
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Eco II 118
Situation/Semantik/Katz/Fodor/Eco: nach Katz und Fodor dürfen die semantischen Komponenten, um interpretiert zu werden, nicht von der Situation oder dem Umstand (die sie settings nennen) abhängen dürfen, in denen der Satz ausgesprochen wird. Sie zeigen nämlich, verschiedene mögliche Lesarten auf, die Theorie will aber nicht festlegen,
II 119
wie und warum der Satz ihn dem einen oder dem anderen Sinn gebraucht werden muss. Eindeutigkeit/Katz/Fodor: die Theorie kann zwar erklären, ob ein Satz verschiedenen Sinn hat, nicht aber, unter welchen Umständen er seine Zweideutigkeit verlieren muss.
EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. Wenn man bei den distinguishers Halt mach, dann ermisst man nicht alle Konnotationsmöglichkeiten des Lexems.
2. Sowohl die semantic markers als auch die distinguishers sind Zeichen oder Zeichengruppen, die dazu dienen, das Anfangszeichen zu interpretieren. (>Problem der Interpretation).
3. Der Stammbaum von Katz/Fodor erkennt die gewöhnlich von einem Wörterbuch festgelegten Intensionen an. Der Code fällt also mit dem Wörterbuch zusammen. Die Existenz von besonderen Konventionen und Codes, die etwa andere Verzweigungen vorschlagen, wird nicht
II 120
berücksichtigt, ebenso wenig wie die Tatsache, dass in ein und derselben Gemeinschaft verschiedene Formen der Verzweigung nebeneinander bestehen können.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Eco I
U. Eco
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Unambiguity Eco
 
Books on Amazon
Eco II 118
Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... ---
II 119
...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity.
EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor:
1. if you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (>Problem of interpretation).
3. the lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be...
---
II 120
...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community.

Eco I
U. Eco
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Disposition Theory Kripke Vs Disposition Theory
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule?
No distinction possible between correct/incorrect.
Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein).
I 103
Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite.
VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition?
Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones!
I 104
Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to.
Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position
I 105
and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Katz, J. Vendler Vs Katz, J.
 
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I 260
Übersetzung/Wittgenstein: war sich dieser Schwierigkeiten bewusst: er verbot die Übersetzung seiner Werke nicht, bestand aber darauf, dass sie nur zusammen mit dem deutschen Original gedruckt wurden. Übersetzung/Philosophie/Sprache/Vendler: im Ungarischen ist der Gebrauch der Kopula eingeschränkt. Soll man daraus schließen, dass ein Ungar Aristoteles’ Sein nicht verstehen kann?
Notwendige Wahrheit/Übersetzung:
Bsp "Man kann nichts Falsches wissen" ist in allen Sprachen wahr, vorausgesetzt, es wurde gut übersetzt! Es ist eine notwendige Wahrheit. (Vendler: Tautologie) (>Tarski).
Man kann in Einzelsprachen eingebettete notwendige Wahrheiten finden. Dadurch kann man zu notwendigen Folgerungen kommen. Aber das gibt nicht viel her.
Die regulative Idee von Sprache und Denken an sich, gibt hier nichts her.
Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass wir im Begriffsystem unserer Muttersprache gefangen wären. Wir haben uns schon früher von Begriffen wie "Zauberkraft" usw. befreit.
I 261
Der Philosoph macht natürlich Verbesserungsvorschläge für die ungenaue natürliche Sprache. Aber er macht sie in seiner natürlichen Sprache!
I 262
Katz: These: wir dürfen nur diejenigen Aspekte einer Sprache für philosophisch relevant halten, die allen Sprachen gemeinsam sind. VendlerVsKatz: dazu sehe ich angesichts meiner obigen Ausführungen keine Notwendigkeit.

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Markerese Lewis Vs Markerese
 
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IV 189/190
Semantisch Markerese/semantische Marker/LewisVsKatz: (nach Jerrold Katz, ,Paul Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 1964). semantische Marker: sind Symbole, Gegenstände in einer künstlichen Sprache, die wir "semantisch Markerese" nennen können. Die semantische Interpretation durch dieses Mittel führt bloß zu einem Übersetzungsalgorithmus aus der Objektsprache in die Hilfssprache Markerese!
Aber dann können wir die markerese Übersetzung auch kennen, ohne irgend etwas über die Bedeutung des ursprünglichen englischen Satzes zu wissen! Nämlich ohne die Bedingungen zu kennen, unter denen er wahr wäre.
Semantik ohne Wahrheitsbedingungen ist keine Semantik! Die Übersetzung ins Markerese hängt entweder von unserer (zukünftigen) Kompetenz als Sprecher des Markerese ab oder von unserer Fähigkeit, Semantik wenigstens auf Markerese anzuwenden.
Dann würde aber Übersetzung ins Lateinische genauso genügen, wenn die Semantik für Markerese vielleicht auch etwas einfacher wäre.
Markerese/Lewis: pro: ist attraktiv, weil es nur mit Symbolen umgeht. Endliche Kombinationen vertrauter Entitäten bilden eine endliche Menge von Elemente mit endlichen Anwendungen endlicher Regeln. Kein Problem für die ontologische Sparsamkeit.
VsMarkerese: aber es ist gerade diese angenehme Endlichkeit die die Semantik des Markerese daran hindert, Relationen zwischen den Symbolen und der wirklichen Welt der Nicht Symbole zu knüpfen! Also ist es keine echte Semantik.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Truth-conditional Sem. Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem.
 
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II 145
Semantik/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 und viele andere Artikel). KatzVswahrheitskonditionale Semantik/KatzVswako: 1. (Katz 1982): alle anderen Ansätze außer Katz’ eigenem reduzieren Bedeutung auf etwas anderes, unter anderem auf WB.
VsKatz: seine eigene Kritik hängt davon ab, daß er schon weiß, daß WB etwas anderes sind als Bedeutung. ((s) Also können die von ihm kritisierten Ansätze nicht zirkulär sein).
CresswellVsKatz: seine Semantik ist nicht falsch, sie ist aber unvollständig.
Semantik/Cresswell: „semantische Daten“: Bsp Bedeutsamkeit von Sätzen, Bsp Synonymie von Satzpaaren usw.
II 146
KatzVs wahrheitskonditionale Semantik/Cresswell: 2. sie hat zur Folge, daß alle logisch äquivalenten Sätze dieselbe Bedeutung haben. Insbesondere in der Version der MöWe-Semantik. (1982, 190): Katz anerkennt, daß es Versuche zur Lösung gibt. Bsp Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz’ Ansatz scheint Strukturierte Bedeutungen zu verlangen.
lexikalische Dekomposition/Katz/Cresswell: diese wird von Katz gebraucht, um Bedeutungen auf semantische Grundbegriffe zurückzuführen.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Semantics Katz, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 20f
Katz-Fodor-Semantik/Cresswell: Thesis: Bedeutungen sind theoretische Konstruktionen - Bsp lexikalische Dekomposition: (Objekt), (Physikalisch),(Nicht-lebendig),(Artefakt),(Möbel), (Tragbar),(Etwas mit Beinen),(Etwas mit einem Rücken), (Etwas mit einer Sitzfläche), (Sitz für einen) - CresswellVs: erklärt nicht, was "Objekt" ist - Problem: "Elektron" ist keine verständliche theoretische Konstruktion - was sollte "grundlegendste" Konstruktion sein? - MöWe-Semantik/Wortbedeutung/CresswellVsKatz: Bsp "Stuhl": eine Funktion w, so dass für jede Welt w und Ding a, w e w(a) gdw. a ein Stuhl in w ist -
I 32
Problem: das ist nicht ganz akkurat: so wie es eine Referenz auf verschiedene possible worlds gibt, sollte es auch eine auf verschiedene Momente geben können, wo etwas in einem Moment ein Stuhl ist, aber nicht in einem anderen.
I 22
Katz: Thesis: Unterscheidung zwischen "logischen" und "deskriptiven" Wörtern ist nur willkürlich (Cresswell pro) - CresswellVsKatz: ausgerechnet er gebraucht implizit logische Konstanten - und stützt sich damit auf die Unterscheidung.
Cresswell II 27
nicht-funktional kompositional/Semantik/Katz/Cresswell: eine solche Semantik wurde von Katz vorgestellt. Aber er geht davon aus, daß Wahrheit und Referenz gar keinen Platz in einer semantischen Theorie haben.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Language Katz, J.
 
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Vendler I 262
Katz: we may keep only those aspects of a language as philosophically relevant that are common to all languages​​.   VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements.

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Vs Katz Vendler, Z.
 
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I 262
Katz: we take only those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages​​.   VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements.