Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| de re | Searle | II 247 De dicto: de dicto concerns only the mental contents. De re: de re concerns relationships between people and objects. SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. II 271 De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: de re and de dicto is a distinction between different types of report. Intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves. There is no "de re-setting", only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry). >Indexwords, >Indexicality. --- IV 182f De re/de dicto/Searle: de re and de dicto are not two different beliefs. Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit him- or herself. Ralph cannot express this difference. The >truth conditions are the same. >Belief/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| I, Ego, Self | Kaplan | Frank I 412 Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> vivid name/Locke). - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I". I 430 I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation, >Denotation. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 --- I 459ff I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs. I 469 Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion". >Pronoun, >de re, >de dicto. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Reference | Searle | II 283 Self-reference/Searle: self-reference is shown, but not seen. Twin Earth: "this man" has a different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged. >Twin earth. Self-reference/Frege: "completing sense": intentional contents are never undetermined (SearleVsQuine: no undetermined sailboat can be desired). >Fregean sense. II 275F Indexicality/completing Fregean sense/Heimson/SearleVsKaplan: I, you, this, here, etc. always have a form of self-reference: they always express an intentional content because the speaker refers to a particular entity. This is Frege's "sense of proper names". >Heimson example. II 278 Self-reference/Searle: e.g. there is a hand, and because there is a hand it is causing this visual experience. The self-reference is shown, but not seen - the one of the indexical statements is also shown but not claimed. II 284f SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential - they express different levels of intentional content. The use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it applies. III 62 Circles: there is a problem in definition, but not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need to define the word. Linguistic explanations are no circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language. >Circle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Kaplan Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 484 Singular Term/Frege: is not limited to standing for an object, but always has a special way of being given. ("sense", intension). Index words/indexical/Perry/VsFrege/KaplanVsFrege: this model is tailored to descriptions and names and fails with references to the first person. EvansVsPerry/EvansVsKaplan: 1. there is no reason to suggest that Frege said that the object of a singular term is always given by the fact that a certain description applies to it, 2. the peculiarities of the indexical reference are to be uncovered precisely by a theory of the non-descriptive ways of the given connected with it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Kaplan, D. | Brandom Vs Kaplan, D. | I 763 Kaplan: "Vivid name" BrandomVsKaplan: Which privileged class of designators corresponds to the "know who" or the "know what", varies in a manner with the various situations that makes a previous systematization impossible. E.g. If Holmes believes the killer has left footprints, he can pick out this person in two ways: he has epistemically stronger beliefs than the inspector who can relate "the murderer" only. Of course, he does not know for a long time, who is the murderer. ((s)> strong / weak). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kaplan, D. | Evans Vs Kaplan, D. | I 326 Reference/Perception/Evans: "predominant amount of information": E.g. the girl is perhaps not the wife of the colleague, but it is the source of my opinion that she has pretty legs. "predominantly" comes from Kaplan. EvansVsKaplan: but I want to have nothing to do with vividness (> Locke?). Prevalence/Evans: we want to allow that continual misidentification may cause a bunch of information about a thing that is different from the original thing. I 327 E.g. With twins who are confused later, there may be a period of transition, where the source of the prevailing information changes. In the end you might not have false information about the other twin, but a wrong opinion about when you first met him. Prevalence is not only a question of quantity, but also of the weight of information. I 327/328 E.g. An imitator took over the role of Napoleon after 1814 (Elba). If the date of the change had been earlier, the predominant source would have occurred accordingly. Depending on that you have a wrong opinion about who fought the Battle of Waterloo, or just about how the career of General went. Conclusion: Generally, we speak about the thing that is the source of the prevailing information; this will not change from one occasion to another, depending on the topic. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Kaplan, D. | Searle Vs Kaplan, D. | II 275 Indexicality/SearleVsKaplan: we need to show that the statements made by an indexical expression can have a "completing >Fregean sense". By this, however, no >third realm is postulated. We restrict ourselves to respect participating indexicals: me, you, this, that, here, now, he, she, etc .. The phenomenon of indexicality is however very general and not limited to such expressions. II 276 Background: meets the indexical function. It is in fact relative to our world. If it turned out that 80 billion years ago someone already had invented glasses, that would not affect my background. II 285 SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential. They express different intentional contents. The use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it is true. >Heimson example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Kaplan, D. | Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D. | I 206 Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.). Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here. I 207 Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values. Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b) StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts. Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts. Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension. Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit. I 208 Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally. II 5 Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w. Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated. Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values. 2. Kaplan second modification: Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited: Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.) Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w.. II 6 Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this. II 10 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens. This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur. This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues. II 162 de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction. de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification. Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge. Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions 1. for the content 2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief. KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal. StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise. Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined. StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach. 2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects). II 163 At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w.. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kaplan, D. | Chisholm Vs Kaplan, D. | I 166 Planet Ex/Kaplan: Proposal: you cannot say of someone that he has an opinion with respect to the numeral nine if his opinion cannot be expressed in a sentence that contains a name which "necessarily" denotes "the numeral nine", rather: there must be a proper name a so that 1) a necessarily denotes the numeral nine and 2. you accept the proposition expressed by the sentence, which results from replacing x with "is x". I 167 ChisholmVsKaplan: since we emphasize the primacy of intentionality, we cannot accept a linguistic expression like "to name" as a basis. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Chisholm Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 92 Name/ChisholmVsKripke: one should not place too much emphasis on the first use of a proper name. (also ChisholmVsKaplan). I 109 Possible worlds/Po.wo./Kripke/Chisholm: Kripke sees possible worlds as certain things, although an indefinite number are such that it can be said of the particulars of the real world that they exist in it. ChisholmVsKripke: there is no reason to believe that there are possible particulars that are worlds, and that some of these particulars are able to include particulars that reside in this world. But for Kripke’s distinction rigid/Non-rigid this ontology need not be provided. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Lewis, D. | Kaplan Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 43 Possible World/Schwarz: one can perhaps imagine possible worlds as a kind of contingent extension of reality. Kaplan: Possible World/Telescope/KaplanVsLewis/Schwarz: (1979(1),93) for possible worlds we need special modal telescopes: Def "Verneoscope" (terminology), also: "modal intuition". This may tell us that there are universes with talking donkeys, but none where Kripke has other ancestors. (Plantinga 1987(2),212, Skyrms 1976(3)). Possible World/LewisVsKaplan/LewisVs Telescope Theory: possible worlds cannot be any different than they are, (i.e. not contingent) they cannot be explored with verneoscopes. 1. David Kaplan [1979]: “Trans-World Heir Lines”. In [Loux 1979], 88–109 2. Alvin Plantinga 1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Brian Skyrms [1976]: “Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics”. Philosophical Studies, 30: 323–332 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Kaplan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Stalnaker II 162 De re/Belief/Attribution/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Attribution/Kaplan: (like Quine) no particular belief is attributed. De re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re attribution: existential quantification. Truth Conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: attributions of de re are only true if the believer must stand in a relation of acquaintance. Reinforcement: the name must denote the individual. Example "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt but there are additional conditions 1. for the content 2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. N.B./Stalnaker: It is still possible that all conditions are fulfilled by two different names. This allows the examples to be described without having to attribute contradictory beliefs. KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases where Quine's analysis was too liberal. StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise. Acquaintance/Attribution/Stalnaker: in semantic analysis acquaintance is self-evident, without it one cannot believe anything. One cannot believe a proposition without capturing the occurring expressions in the terms in which they are defined. StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. the requirement of acquaintance loses its motivation, however, if it is grafted onto the Quinnian approach. 2. Kaplan retains the artificial assumption that de re attributions do not attribute a particular belief and that they are bound to sententialism (sentences as objects of belief). II 163 At least they must be sentence-like objects with name-like constituents. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 71 Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism". I 72 Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz. Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w.. I 201 Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable. II 24 Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition. Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided. StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case. De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague, II 25 but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it. Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content. II 160 Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions). Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual. Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual. StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine. II 161 De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way? Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe? bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here. Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them. 1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it. 2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions. Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible. Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself. b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts. 1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat 2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach. II 162 Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between. II 163 De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship. That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition. Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set. Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| |||