Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 112 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Kant I 14
WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the absolute, there is nothing to see.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Analogies Kant Strawson V 102
Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition - "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions" - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori - Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles.
V 104
Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences.
Stra V 105
1. Analogy/Kant: Quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased.
V 106
Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent.
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial.
V 108
StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains.
Stra V 112
2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: Time difference
V 115
2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal
Stra V 116/117
3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions- Strawson: unlike causality.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Analyticity/Syntheticity Quine I 120
Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity.
I 339
Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms.
V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs.

VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine.
---
VII (b) 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative.
VII (b) 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried.
VII (b) 28ff
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma.
VII (b) 37
Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same.
VII (b) 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement.
VII (i) 161ff
Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Appearance Leibniz Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general".
---
I 129
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
---
I 130
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
---
I 131
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Appearance Nietzsche Ries II 29
Appearance/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: Vs Differentiation of "Apparition" and "Thing in itself" (in Schopenhauer the will). This distinction no longer exists, it was based on Plato. ---
Ries II 65
Appearance/Nietzsche: the only real reality of things. "A certain name for this reality would be the will to power", that is, from within, and not from its unfathomable liquid proteus nature." ---
Ries II 101
Dionysos/Nietzsche: the mystery remains unresolved: is Dionysos himself appearance or the other of appearance? ---
Danto III 135
Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e. g. "matter", "mind" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We got rid of materiality. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Axioms Genz II 184
Axioms/Mathematics/Einstein/Genz: the axioms themselves are not safe, only their connection with their conclusions. And thus the consequences of the axioms are not safe either. ---
II 188
Axioms/Recognition/Logic/Kant/GenzVsKant: Kant still thought that the content-related axioms of the Euclidean geometry with the parallel axiom were just as certainly true as the connections of geometry created by the logical conclusions. So there was safe knowledge for him.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Categorical Imperative Cavell Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 196
Categorical imperative/CavellVsKant: the categorical imperative should be better a categorical declarative: a description of what it means to be moral. ---
II 197
Categorical declarative: says what you actually do when you are moral. It cannot guarantee that one will not act immorally.

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Categorical Imperative Rawls I 251
Categorical Imperative/moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins by rationally choosing and rationally judging moral principles. ---
I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to the moral law. On the other hand, if he/she yields to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will," Mind, vol.13, 1888, pp. 511-516). ---
I 255
Kant now fails to explain according to Sidgwick why the villain in his bad life does not express his selfhood as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant has not shown that our action out of the moral law shows our nature in a recognizable way, as acting on contrary principles would not.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of non-knowledge corrects this deficiency: we only have to show that our chosen principles are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one considered by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles.
At the same time they want to express their rationality in the lifeworld, i.e. their independence from contingent features of nature and society. If the argument from the contract theory is correct (see Contract theory/Rawls), only those principles define the moral law.
---
I 256
Our desire to be righteous arises, in part, from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a cause of shame when we misbehave and not as a cause of guilt.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Categorical Imperative Mead Habermas IV 142
Categorical Imperative/Kant/Mead/Habermas: Mead takes up Kant's thoughts from the general public of our judgments. But he adds: We are what we are, through our relationship with others. Our goal must therefore inevitably be a social goal. (1) Habermas: this gives the Kantian argument a characteristic twist: the question as to why moral norms may claim social validity because of their universality is thus answered in social theory:
Habermas IV 143
The unity of the collective is at stake in safeguarding the general interest. MeadVsKant: "Kant was of the opinion that we could only generalize the form. However, we generalize from the goal." (2)
Habermas IV 144
Problem: how do we recognize the other and broader interests and bring them into a rational relationship? (3) The impartial consideration of all interests already presupposes a moral attitude. Solution/Mead: we must replace the categorical imperative with a process of discursive decision-making.
Habermas IV 145
The subject cannot examine on its own whether an existing or recommended standard is in the general interest, but only in cooperation with all other parties concerned. Habermas: The process of internalization reaches its limits here (See Internalization/Mead, Internalization/Habermas). The actor can anticipate a reaction, but cannot foresee it.

1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S.429f
2.Ebenda S. 430
3.Ebenda S. 439

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Categories Kant I 91
Categories/Kant: "Terms of terms" - These principles are the principles of presupposing the general nature of a possible object of sensuous intuition - in an assessment a subject is determined in four ways: quality, quantity, relation, modality. ---
Strawson V 71
Categories/StrawsonVsKant: Cannot be derived from the concept of objective judgment. ---
Stra V 98
Categories/StrawsonVsKant: He derives them from the form of the assessment as a list - they are said to have non-sensuous meaning. - StrawsonVs: We cannot trust it, we can also not trust the synthesis. ---
Vollmer I 25
Categories/Kant/Vollmer: Nowadays, it is not believed anymore that his categories are necessary. ---
Bubner I 106
Categories/judgments/Kant: categories make knowledge possible in the first place, whereas real knowledge depends on the contingency of the experience. ---
Adorno XIII 67
Categories/Kant/Adorno: Kant calls all his categories functions.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Causality Kant Danto I 298
Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but condition or form of experience - idea of ​​causality not causality itself. ---
Kant I 26
Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). - KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. - VsKant: he does not stick to it himself - mind: has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". ---
I 32
Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. ---
Vaihinger I 280
Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of ​​such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. ---
Vollmer I 25
Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Causality Nietzsche Danto III 120
Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: since there are no objects for Nietzsche, the causality concept ((s) for which separate objects have to be accepted) is also a fiction. For Nietzsche, the truth is that there is a continuum ahead of us. (F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. p. 151). ---
Danto III 135
Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: the causal necessity is "not a matter of fact, but an interpretation" (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540). It turns out that it is based on a distinction between subject and object. If we give up the concept of the "thing" and thus the subject and object, our concept of causality will inevitably become invalid. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then also the belief in effective things, in interaction, cause and effect falls away between those phenomena that we call things.
Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e.g. "matter", "spirit" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We are rid of materiality. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f).
---
Danto III 262
Causality/Will/Nietzsche/Danto: let us assume with Nietzsche that the will is causally effective. This hypothesis does not contradict his polemic against that idea, the concept of will can serve as an explanation. In a non-revised analysis, Nietzsche expresses the idea that human beings would catch causality in the act as soon as they perform introspection with regard to the mode of action of their own will. Then the methodical monism ((s) Danto's expression) would have to see will as the only form of causality. But Nietzsche's conception of the will is not purely psychological. Rather, it determines all acting forces as a will to power (F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 51). See Power/Nietzsche, Process/Nietzsche, Will/Nietzsche.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Causes Nietzsche Ries II 100
Cause/Effect/Nietzsche: If we no longer believe in the subject, then also the belief in working things, in interaction, cause and effect disappears. Also, the "thing per se" falls because this is basically the conception of a "subject per se". The contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable, so the term "appearance" also falls. (NietzscheVsKant).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
Communitarianism Barber Brocker I 690
Communitarianism/Barber: Barber is not considered communitarian by all authors, but he does represent the typical topoi of communitarian politics: - rejection of a political philosophy based on abstract principles ((s)
CommunitarianismVsKant),
- the accusation of the separation of the individual from social ties ("atomism") and
- dissatisfaction with a purely instrumental view of political institutions.
BarberVsCommunitarianism: in contrast to the chief theorists of communitarianism, Barber participated in the communitarian reform movement around Amitai Etzioni.
Variants of communitarianism: a) substantialistic: here the community is seen as a given, against it:
b) procedural: this is about the common practice of counselling and decision-making. Barber is to be attributed to the latter variant. (1)(2)
BarberVsMacIntyre, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsTaylor: Considering theorists like Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as sceptics of a national policy of democratic society and as supporters of a civil society perspective (3), Barber's programme of a strong democracy had to appear as a quite radical and reasonable position because it ultimately gave a high rank to the national political community and participation in political decisions. (BarberVsTaylor, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsMacIntyre).


1. Hartmut Rosa, „Fremde zu Nachbarn: die Vision einer demokratischen Bürgerschaft. Rezension zu Benjamin Barber, „Starke Demokratie“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43/6, 1995 S. 1066-169.
2. W. Jay Reedy, „The relevance of Rousseau to Contemporary Communitarism. The Example of Benjamin Barber”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 21/2, 1995
3. Michael Haus, Kommunitarismus. Einführung und Analyse, Wiesbaden 2003

Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolBarb I
Benjamin Barber
The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Concepts Brandom I 152
Concept: One must have many concepts in order to get an idea. ---
I 948
Definition concept/Frege: the concept is the semantic correlate of predicates, namely their "meaning" not their "sense". So concept defined by reference. ---
I 599f
Concept: LL: Mere distinctive reactivity is not enough to recognize the application of concepts. ---
I 601
Rationalist addition: the inferential role of reaction is critical. ---
I 852
Concept/BrandomVsKant: should not be separated dualistically from the non-conceptual. ---
I 853
Concept/Conception/Kant/Brandom: B relates to A as 1) form to matter - 2) general to particular - 3) spontaneity (activity of the intellect) to receptivity - BrandomVsKant: these are orthogonal and independent - no contrast to the non-conceptual - Content of the judgment also conceptual - Brandom: ad 1: if the mind does not change its material, it is superfluous (> Hegel, Phenomenology) - ad 3) contrast between conceptual/causal order: Kant was unable to construct this as a contrast between concepts and causes. ---
I 856
Definiton concept/Brandom: inferential role - it is about relations between concepts (East/West) not about relations between concept and object. ---
I 860
Conceptual structure/Brandom/(s): by repetition (anaphora) - necessary for cognitive purposes - conceptual content: by substitution? - ((s) or, more precisely: exchange of frames?). ---
I 862
Inferential structure: ideally allows costruing thinking and the world as represented with an identical structure - conceptual structure of assertions: about E.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Concepts Heidegger Concepts in: M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1993

Heidegger III
Abhängigkeit (der Realität von der Sorge) 212
Angst 182,186, 342
Antike Ontologie (logos bei Platon, Aristoteles, copula) 159,160 Augenblick 427
Auslegung (Vorhaben, Vorsicht, Vorgriff) 150
Ausrichtung 108
Aussage 154 ("als"):158
Aus-sein auf 261
Bedeuten 87
Bedeutsamkeit 364
Begegnen (Ganzheit) 85
Bewandtnis 84
Besorgen 56/57
Bestehen (nicht vorhanden, nicht zuhanden) 333
Bezirk 67,114,248 (Metaphysik),283,398

Charaktere 250 (Existenz: sich vorweg gericht in die Zukunft)
(Faktizität: schon sein in Gewesenheit)
(Verfallenheit: sein bei Gegenwart)


Da 132,263
"Da" (Vereinzelung) 263 Dasein (ist seine Erschlossenheit) 133,134 ("Dass es ist"), 284, (Dasein selbst: Erstreckung) 374

Ego cogito (ich denke etwas) 321
"Einfühlung" 125(Vs)
Ekstasen: Gewesenheit Zukunft Gegenwart 328 Entdecktheit (nicht Daseinsmäßiges) 85,218 (Wahrheit)
Ent-Fernung 105
Entschlossenheit 296/97, 305 Entwurf 145, (=Existenz): 284
Erbe (und Überlieferung) 383
Erkennen 202
Erschlossenheit 75,220,260
Erwarten 262
Evidenz (Vorhandenes) 265
Existenz (=Entwurf) 284
Existenzialien statt Kategorien 44
Existenzialität Struktur der Existenz 16
Existieren 263,284

Faktizität 56,135,222,250,259,284,241,362,379 (F. contra Tatsächlichkeit): 276
Freigabe (Woraufhin; verweist auf Phänomen Welt) 85/86
Freiheit 188
Furcht 140 (Näherung der Nähe)
Fürsorge 121
Gegend 103,368 (>Platz)
Gegenwart (eigentliche: Augenblick) 338
Gerede 168
Gewärtigen 337(uneigentliche Zukunft) Gewissheit 256/57,265
Gewesenheit Gegenwart Zukunft 327
Gewissen 270ff
Gewissenlosigkeit (Bedingung für existentiell "gutes" Handeln) 288
Gewaltsamkeit 311
Geworfenheit 135,179
Grund 284
Handeln (verantwortlich) 288,300

"Idee" (keine Deduktion) 182
Innerzeitigkeit 333
In-Sein, In der Welt sein 53 (wohnen bei, vertraut),188
Jemeinigkeit 240

Kant (VsKant: Zeit: unmittelbar physisch wahrnehmen) 419
Kants Dunkles Zimmer (Orientierung "rechts, links") 109

Lichtung (Erschlossenheit des Daseins): 170 (vor aller Zeitlichkeit): 350

Man 126
Man selbst 129
Mitdasein, Mitsein 118,120,121 (Mitsein als Umsicht) 123
Möglichkeit 187
Neugier (Zerstreuung) 172
Nichtigkeit 285,305
nicht 283,284
"Nichts" 279
Nietzsche (zur Historie) 396

ontisch-ontologisch 8,11,13,185

Platz 368

Raum 368 (109 113)
Region 64,114
Ruf 269ff "Rufer" 274

Sagen 169
Sein zum Tode 266 Selbstheit (Weise) 267ff (Bezeugung, Ruf)
Schicksal 384,386
Schuld (schuldig) 287
Sinn 151
Situation 299 Sorge 192 (sich vorweg schon sein in (der Welt) 198 (Sorge Gedicht, Herder,Vorrang der Sorge vor Leib und Geist)
"Subjekt" (ontologisch) 320,366
Substanz des Menschen ist die Existenz 212
Substanzialität: Seinscharakter der Naturdinge 63

Theorie 358ff
Tod 245,250,258 (Tod anderer, Vertretung): 237
transzendieren 363 (Schwere des Hammers setzt Objektivierung voraus, nicht zuhanden)

Uhr 413
Umschlag Besorgen/Entdecken 360,361
Umsicht 56,69,123,172
Unbestimmtheit 308 Unwahrheit 308

Verfallen 176, (ontisch/ontologisch) 293
Vergessen (Wiederholbarkeit) 399,342,344
Verschlossenheit 348
Verstehen 87,144,145,363 Verstehen (des Anrufs) 288
Verweisung 74,77,78,82 (Zeigen Verweisung Beziehung)
Volksgemeinschaft 384
Vorhandensein = "existentia" (trad.) 42
Vorlaufen 262
Wahl 268, 287
Wahrheit (Entdecktheit und Entdeckend sein) 218,316, (W. vorausgesetzt) 227,316
Welt, "Welt" 64/65, ("weltlich" = innerweltich Seiendes), Weltlichkeit, (die Welt ist nicht mehr) 380
Werden 243
Wiederholung 385
Wissenschaft 358ff
Worum willen (In der Welt Sein des Daseins) 84

Zeichen 76ff
Zeit ("wesentliche") 329, (Zeit Raum): 367, 408 (gewärtigen: Zukunft gegenwärtigen: jetzt, behalten: Gewesenheit) 408, ("Weltzeit" = innerweltliche Zeit, auch vorher) 424
zeitlicher Horizont 365
Zeitlichkeit des Seins, Seinsweise des Daseins temporal 19,23
Zeitlichkeit der Furcht (Angst) 342 (Zeitlichkeit: Seinssinn der Sorge)
Zeitlichkeit der Seinsmodi Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, Verfallenheit 350
Zeitmessung 414
Zeug (im Besorgen begegnend) 68 Zirkel (nicht vitiosus) 152/53,314 (als "Entwurf" zulässig, Grundstruktur der Sorge)
Zuhanden 69,71,324
Zukunft (Zeitlichkeit) 326, (Vorrang):329,330, (eigentliche Z.: Vorlaufen) 336,408

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993

Concepts Kant Term/Kant: "intuitions without concepts are blind." (KrV B 75)
---
Strawson V 22
Terms/Kant: not any arbitrary amount of terms is sufficient for us - there must be terms of persistent objects and re-identifiable objects in the room.
Stra V 23
The distinctions must be created in the terms themselves, because there is no "pure perception of a reference system".
Stra V 122
Terms/Kant/Strawson: objects can only be changed in the context of a recognition - respective restrictions must somehow be reflected in the terms - but it is not about a specific link but about the existence of any such links.
Stra V 123
Terms for objects are always summaries of causal law.
Stra V 128
Terms/StrawsonVsKant: terms are not yet socially characterized by him. ---
Tugendhat I 191
Term/Kant: a term is a general idea, mediate - intuition/Kant: immediately - Tugendhat: ambiguous: Imagined or subjective imagined - Kant pro the latter - objective meaning: "nota communis" common feature -> = species/Husserl. ---
Bubner I 105
Knowledge/judgment/Kant: knowledge is formulated in judgments which always presuppose concepts. Concept/Kant: in terms, must be done transcendentally, then the realization of knowledge must be guaranteed by judgments.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Conceptual Schemes Nietzsche Danto III 54
Conceptual Scheme/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: Unlike Kant, Nietzsche does not claim that a defined set of concepts is inherent in the human mind, regardless of all differences between human beings. For Nietzsche, the conceptual schemes vary according to society. According to Nietzsche, there are many ways of organising the experience, our experience is only one that has proven itself to us, but in which nothing is invariable, untouchable or necessary. There is nothing to prevent the (...) unconventional experiences (under a different structure) from becoming exemplary, so that the unconventional language here and now would be one day, and somewhere, a common speech.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Consciousness McDowell I 113 ff
Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. ---
I 113 ff
Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. ---
I 126/27
Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. ((s) Breathing does not need a criterion for air, important as air may be). ---
I 127
Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. ---
I 128
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). ---
I 129f
McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of ​​continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of ​​the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Consciousness Rorty Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of ​​a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. Rorty: there is no medium.
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of ​​the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424


Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality. >Mind.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. - In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. - Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. - Reason/Kant: general principles - FreudVsKant: return to the special. - Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. - Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Dialectic Plato Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. ---
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Definition "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
---
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
---
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Dissimilarity Democritus Adorno XIII 202
Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. ---
XIII 203
Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. ---
XIII 204
AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: the objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. Natural science: modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside.
This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff.
Group: Leibniz, Wolff pro Aristotle.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Duty Durkheim Habermas IV 75
Duty/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim's thesis: We will define the concept of duty empirically in a way that is very close to the Kantian concept. (1)
Habermas IV 78
MeadVsKant: Mead traces back the binding force of commitment to force and attraction at the same time. The morally good is also the desirable. It could not be effective as an ideal (...) if it did not promise the satisfaction of real needs. (2)

1. E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, p. 85
2. Ibid p. 96.

Durkheim I
E. Durkheim
The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895
German Edition:
Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Ecological Imperative Jonas Brocker I 609
Ecological Imperative/Jonas: based on Kant's Categorical Imperative, Jonas develops an "ontological imperative" based on being itself. JonasVsKant: his categorical imperative is located differently. Def ontological imperative/Jonas: "Act in a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth. "Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite survival of mankind." (1)
Elsewhere, this Jonasian imperative is also called "ecological imperative".
Another formulation by Jonas: "Act in a way that the consequences of your actions are compatible with a future humane existence, i.e. with the claim of humanity to survive for an unlimited time". (2)
Brocker: The formulations show that Jonas is not only concerned with physical survival, but also with the quality of this life ("real human life").
(s)VsJonas: the formulations are, if one does not want to call them circular anyway, weaker than the ones by Kant, because they do not refer to a principle.
Solution/Jonas: Jonas makes demands that should determine individual and collective life from now on:
"Heuristics of Fear"/Jonas: Starting from a "Heuristics of Fear" (3), everyone must gather as much knowledge as possible about the conceivable consequences and "distant effects" of their actions before taking any action (4). The bad prognosis must always be given priority over the good prognosis.
For ethical reasons see Teleology/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Being/Jonas.


1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, 75-86.
3. Jonas 1979, p. 8, 64
4. Ibid. p. 9, 28.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Enlightenment MacIntyre Brocker I 659
Enlightenment/Moral/Ethics/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, Enlightenment represents a failed attempt to overcome post-medieval pluralism and eclecticism with the help of universal moral based on reason. (1) The Enlightenment had wanted to take "incoherent fragments of a once coherent system of thought and action" (2) as a basis. Problem: there are breaks between a de-teleologization of the moral system and a simultaneous dependence on a teleological framework.
MacIntyreVsEnlightenment: the search for a moral standpoint that pretends to be independent of social order is an illusion. Obligations, rules and laws have replaced goods, traditions and social conditions.
MacIntyreVsKant: in his moral writings the "thought that moral is something other than following rules
Brocker I 660
got almost, if not completely out of sight".(3)

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), S. 61.
2. Ibid. p. 80
3. Ibid. p. 313f.

Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Epistemology Rorty I 16
Rorty thesis: knowledge has no foundations. >Ultimate Justification.
I 163
Def recognize/Aristotle: insertion of something material into the soul.
I 167
Epistemic problem: the next two centuries of philosophical thought might have been very different if the "epistemic problem" had been formulated in the terminology of relations between propositions and their degree of certainty, rather than in the terminology of alleged components of propositions. Kant: did not undertake the pragmatic turn. He did not talk about sentences, but but about inner ideas.
I 167
Knowledge/epistemic problem/Rorty: relations between propositions - not between components of propositions - VsKant: then you do not need synthesis - Kant/Rorty: he did not talk about sentences either, but about inner ideas.
I 175
Foundations/knowledge/Rorty: arguments instead foundations! - Before Locke, no one would have searched for a foundation of knowledge.
I 191
Def recognize/Rorty: the social justification of opinions. The contrasting of people and situations. This allows us to get rid of the mirror of nature.
I 210
Epistemology/SellarsVsEpistemology//Rorty: it confuses a theory of inner episodes with a theory about the right to make certain assertions.
I 248
Epistemology/Quine/Rorty: epistemology always wavered between two criteria: a) causal proximity to the physical stimulus - b) the focal point of consciousness.
I 249
Solution: The dilemma dissolves, if we merely speak of color spots - ((s)> sense data).
I 271
Rorty: there’s no way from psychology to epistemology. No way from the discovery of intermediary instances to a critique of opinions about the world. (RortyVsepistemology).
I 273
Epistemological Tradition: confused causal explanations of the acquisition of opinions with justifications of opinions.
I 278
Epistemology: can be done in an armchair, psychology cannot.
V 20f
Knowledge/Foucault/Rorty: knowledge and power can never be separated from each other. RortyVFoucault: but these are not rules of language

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Epistemology Searle III 184
Thing in itself SearleVsKant: from the fact that we cannot see it, it does not follow that it is different from what we perceive, and not that there is a different kind of reality. In particular, from the positioning within our cognitive system it does not follow that this knowledge could never be the knowledge of an independent reality. (independend from our knowledge). ---
III 194
Background: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box - the background helps us determine the truth conditions for our utterances.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Epistemology Vollmer I XX
EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz - two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory) - Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory) ---
I 16
Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective - with Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. ---
I 59
Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically - in contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water - VollmerVsLorenz: misleading terminology - solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil. ---
I 73
Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses. ---
I 173
Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? ---
I 293
Definition He: (1983.30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject - a) construct an internal image, b) compare the model with the stored engrams c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection - our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information - Stegmüller: three-digit relation: subject recognizes object as image. ---
I 296
Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge - knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. ---
I 310
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Eternity Nietzsche Ries II 12
Eternity/Nietzsche: Overcoming temporality at present to the eternity of the time circling in itself. The eternal being of the world wanting itself. ---
Danto III 135
Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e. g. "matter", "mind" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We are rid of materiality. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Ethics Husserl I 115 ff
HusserlVsHume: there is no ethics of feelings - HusserlVsKant: VsCategorical Imperative - /HusserlVsKant: a formal generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness. Husserl: a fictitious observer must be able to understand my assessment - a) passively, by chance in circumstances, b) acting on purpose, reasonable.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Ethics Kant Stegmüller IV 169
Def hypothetical imperative/Kant: if you want X, do Y "- which is based on causal knowledge - e.g. imperative of skill imperative of wisdom - without desire. > Categorical imperative. MackieVsKant: the categorical imperative is not objectively valid - in addition you need a premise in which occurs a fact about a decision.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Ethics Nagel III 109f
Ethics/Nagel. Consequentialism: thesis: the consequences of action are important - not how the action feels for the actor - NagelVs: it about the permission to lead one’s own life - III 111 internal perspective: Problem: that murder is prohibited does not command to prevent others from committing it - utilitarianism: good/bad - internal perspective: legal/illegal.
III 112
Ethics/Nagel: core question: how far may the internal point of view be included? - Life is always the individual life - it cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis - the limits are always the individual possibilities.
III ~ 87
Ethics/Nagel: the acting from one’s own perspective has such a strong value that deontological paradoxes cannot be excluded - they would only be avoidable at the cost of the impersonal world.
III 86
Parallel objectivity/consciousness/ethics/Nagel: the objective world must contain the subjective perspectives - ethics: the neutral reasons that consider the actions of the subject with all its seemingly superstitious reasons.
II 49
Determinism/ethics/Nagel: responsibility also exists in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic - actions determined by nothing are incomprehensible.
II 54
Ethics/law/moral/God/theology/Nagel: an act is not converted into something wrong just because God exists.
II 54
categorical imperative/NagelVsKant: nothing but a direct interest in the other can be considered as a basis of ethics - II 55 but: the reason not to do evil to someone else cannot be anchored in the individual person - II 61 Problem: Moral should not depend on the strength of interest in others.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Ethics Rorty III 310
Ethics/Rorty: it’s not about the fact that we are morally obliged to feel solidarity. Literature does not help with appeals, but with a detailed description.
III 314
Solidarity is made, not found. (RortyVsKant. (s) Kant proposes principles, Cf. >Categorical Imperative).
II (d) 79ff
Walzer, Michael: skeptical of terms like "reason" and "universal moral obligation." VsKant: there is no idea or principle common to all. Def "thin" morality: Kant’s image of the beginning: a basis that will be expanded. WalzerVs.
Def "dense" morality: Walzer: all morality is "dense" from the beginning: it is culturally integrated. The road goes from initially "dense" to a "thin", more abstract morality. (s): "dense" morality: morality of the clans. War of all against all!
II (d) 83f
RortyVsKant: we cannot dissolve conflicting loyalties by completely turning away from them towards something categorically different from loyalty - the universal moral obligation to act justly. We go with Hegel and Marx: the so-called moral law is, at best, a handy abbreviation for a specific tissue of moral practices.
VI 256
categorical imperative/moral/ethics/RortyVsKant: brotherhood of all humans cannot be justified by neutral criteria -

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ethics MacIntyre Brocker I 657
Ethics/Generality/Modernism/MacIntyre: MacIntyre's thesis: the quest of modernism's ethics for a universality that is free of any particularity is based on an illusion. (MacIntyreVsKant, MacIntyreVs Categorical Imperative). Virtues/MacIntyre: Thesis: Virtues can only be possessed as part of a tradition in which we adopt them and our understanding of them from the ancestors at the beginning of which are the heroic societies (1). See Ancient Philosophy/MacIntyre.


1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987) p. 170.


Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Existence Jonas Brocker I 612
Existence/Jonas: Jonas' Ecological Imperative (see Ecological Imperative/Jonas) states that we "do not have the right to choose or even dare the non-existence of future generations because of the existence of the present. Why we do not have this right, why on the contrary we have an obligation towards what is not yet and 'in itself' and does not have to be, at least what is non-existent has no claim to existence, is theoretically not easy at all and" - he typically adds - "perhaps not at all to justify without religion" (1). Philosophy/Jonas/Brocker: Thus Jonas clearly expresses that he does not consider a philosophical argument in the present question
Brocker I 613
sufficient or compelling enough to change beliefs and behaviour in the long term. BrockerVsJonas: this is a performative contradiction to Jonas' own actions. Furthermore, it is questionable how religious foundations, which Jonas assumes have largely disappeared (2), can achieve this. (3)
Existence/Jonas: simply because humanity exists, it is worth preserving. (4) The existence of humanity should not be regarded as a contingent biological fact, as an accidental result of evolutionary development processes, but as a setting of value from nature. See also Intergenerational Justice/Jonas.
Problem/JonasVsKant, one must, despite Kant, allow for the possibility of rational metaphysics.
Solution/Jonas: the question, why something is at all and not nothing, must be reformulated to what it is worth to exist.
Brocker I 614
Teleology/Solution/JonasVsAristoteles: we must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (5) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (6)

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36.
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, S. 76, 80.
3. Vgl. Oelmüller, Willi, »Hans Jonas. Mythos – Gnosis – Prinzip Verantwortung«, in: Stimmen der Zeit 206, 1988, p. 349-350.
4. Jonas 1979, p. 92-100.
5. Ibid. p. 138
6. Ibid. p. 142f.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Experience Dewey Suhr I 37
Experience/Dewey: he excludes from its essence completeness and finality.
Suhr I 71
Experience/Dewey: experience means to make an attempt with the world. It is not an experience when the child touches the flame. It is only an experience when the movement is associated with the pain.
I 72
DeweyVsKant: unlike Kant's idea of the synthetic activity of the mind, we are never dealing with a chaotic manifoldness. Our senses always supply already interpreted material.
Suhr I 102
Experience/Antiquity: the concept formed itself, when the arts were above all routine. Experience: experience is a collection of unreasonable customs. Skill, not insight. Experience/modern times: the concept formed itself, as the arts became more experimental!
I 141
Experience/Dewey: Things that interact in a certain way are experience! ("Double meaning" of the concept of experience, > Experience/James).
I 150
Experience/Dewey: cognitive experience is always embedded in non-cognitive experience. Pro empiricism.
Eco I 194
Def Erfahrung/Dewey: eine Erfahrung liegt dann vor, wenn das erfahrene Material in einem Abschluss und einer Vollendung zustrebt. Dann und nur dann integriert es sich. Ein Fließen von etwas zu etwas.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Experience Nietzsche Danto III 53
Experience/Nietzsche/Danto: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche: Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, KGW1/III, 2, p. 374f)). We are talking about metaphors. Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: Please note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible.
Intuition/experience/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls experience here intuition:
(From) Intuition does not lead a regular way into the land of ghostly schemes, of abstractions: the word is not made for them, the human being falls silent when he sees them, or speaks in banned metaphors and outrageous coincided concepts, in order at least to creatively correspond to the mighty current intuition through the smashing and derision of the old conceptual barriers. (F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, KGW1/III, 2, p. 382f)).
---
Danto III 54
Experience/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not approach Kant, who took it for granted that experience should correspond to the forms imposed on them by a fixed set of terms and categories, i. e. the conditions of each comprehensible experience. According to Kant, we do not recognize things as they are per se, but as they are presented to us through the logic of experience and as they are preformed by their a priori apparatus. Terms/Language/NietzscheVsKant/Danto: Unlike Kant, Nietzsche does not claim that a defined set of terms is inherent in the human mind, regardless of all differences between human beings.
For Nietzsche, the conceptual schemes (>conceptual scheme) vary according to society. According to Nietzsche, there are many ways of organising the experience, our experience is only one that has proven itself to us, but in which nothing is invariable, untouchable or necessary. There is nothing to prevent the (...) unconventional experiences (under a different structure) from becoming exemplary, so that the unconventional language here and now would be one day, and somewhere, a common speech.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Exterior/interior Stroud I 206
General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: Descartes with him the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. - VerificationismVsGeneralization: it considers it suspicious: not apply statements of the system to the system itself. - StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. - StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. - Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - so that the interior/exterior-problem is avoided. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori "knowledge".

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Forms Hegel Adorno XIII 70
Form/Content/Epistemology/finite/infinite/HegelVsKant/Adorno: in epistemology, Hegel rejects the Kantian separation of form and content as well as that of the knowledge of the finite and the infinite with extraordinary consistency. Material/Hegel/Adorno: the material, in Hegel, is nothing external or accidental, but also mind itself.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Foundation Rorty VI, 246f
Foundation / Dawkins / RortyVsDawkins: (thesis, that people are just vehicles for genes) - an inadequate thought of foundation - RortyVsKant: you should not hold on to an ahistorical "human nature" as well. >Ultimate Justification.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Generational Justice Kant Rawls I 291
Generational justice/Kant: he saw it as strange that earlier generations would bear their burden only for the benefit of later generations and that they would be the only ones who would be lucky enough to be allowed to live in a finished building. (Kant "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44.) RawlsVsKant: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Good Hegel Bubner I 182
Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of ​​the good under the caption of the idea of ​​"recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand.
I 184
Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of ​recognition", which in its turn is split into the
"idea of ​​truth"
and the
"idea of ​​the good".
Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of ​​the good" in practical action.
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience".

I 185
Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it.
I 186
Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good.
      The executed good would be the abolition of otherness.
With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed.
Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of ​​truth and the idea of ​​good is abolished.
Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality.
After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection.
I 187
Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression!


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
I, Ego, Self Kant Horwich I 404 f
I/knowledge/Kant: representations (according to Putnam) - "empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: is the author "in the game", not the right author - this is the transcendental ego (out of game). - Internal realism/PutnamVsKant: 1. authors in the plural (social) - 2. the ones in the story are real!
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: it would be "crazy" if these were only fictions because a fictional character cannot be a real author. - But these are true stories.
---
Stegmüller IV 322
I/Kant: "Empirical I": working as a cause and as effect - "Noumenal I": (metaphysical): superfluous, passive viewer - metaphysical I: addressee of the moral ought. ---
Strawson V 146
I/subject/Hume/Strawson: is obliged to explain the idea of ​​what "I" means - as anti-rationalist he must declare our fiction - KantVsHume: Kant does not need that, he needs empirical criteria for the subject's identity. ---
Bubner I 108
I/Kant/Bubner: there is not the I, to which representations adhere, but to speak of the different representations among themselves as mine means to create self-consciousness in the first place. ---
Adorno XIII 64
I/transcendental subject/KantVsHume/Adorno: precisely this I, which is denied by Hume per se, must in reality be presupposed to constitute something like experience. Kant, however, has seen that this transcendental subject, which is greatly independent of the content of experience, has in itself a dynamic which goes beyond experience. He has expressed this in the fact that reason, by going beyond its empirical use, is necessarily involved in contradictions, because thinking cannot be arbitrarily stopped once it comes into play.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism Kant Strawson V 211
Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. - StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. - And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. - N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. ---
Stra V 213
Definition Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) ---
Stra V222
Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. - StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". ---
Stroud I 129f
Definition Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. ---
Stroud I 130
Definition Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. - KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. ---
Adorno XIII 58
Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. In this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism James Diaz-Bone I 50
Idealism: JamesVsIdealism: VsEpistemological Criticism as a critique of the conditions of the possibility of cognition ("a priori metaphysics"; JamesVsKant). Idealism is not reality-related. ---
I 75
VsIdealism: Examples for idealism are also "The Absolute", "God", "Matter". These are "enigmatic" names. Context: E.g. Solomon knew the names of all spirits, and since he knew their names, he could submit them to his will. >Magical Thinking, >Absoluteness.


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Infinity Kant Strawson V 174
Infinity/StrawsonVsKant: not Kantean: every cosmological series presents an infinite number of possibilities - but that does not mean that the answer involves an infinite number - but each of the infinitely many answers that mentioned a finite number may be true - that questions the term infinity with respect to sets with empirically distinguishable circumstances - this does not question the paradoxes of the concept of infinity, but empirical objects do not have to have these properties.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Infinity Cantor Thiel I 165
Infinity/CantorVsKant: "vague, instinctive use of the concept of infinity". Cantor: The thesis that the "potentially infinite" (process) presupposes the "actual infinite" ("a definite quantum fixed in all parts"), since "a leveled path and solid ground" are absolutely necessary to carry out a process.

If we want to introduce "measures of the size" of infinite sets in analogy to the basic numbers which measure the "size" of finite sets, then these new numbers will not be able to share all the properties of the basic numbers in the case of the becoming apart of size and clear assignability. Here n + n unequal n does not always apply. But ϑ + ϑ = ϑ applies.
---
I 166
Cantor has introduced the letter Aleph for the "amount". For Ao, the index means that this amount should be only the first in an infinite series of infinitely large amounts of the "transfinite" numbers. The property formulated as Ao + Ao + is not absurd, but a "law of computation" in the domain of the transfinite numbers. ---
I 167
WittgensteinVs: the doctrine of the transfinite numbers suffers from the fact that it is accompanied by false images. "Something is infinitely in it" suggests: "something about it is huge". But what about Ao is huge? Nothing. E.g. Wittgenstein: I bought something infinitely! It was a ruler with an infinite radius of curvature." ---
Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

17
Cantor/Russell: Cantor noted that all alleged evidence that spoke against infinity was based on a certain principle: The respective maxim is that a set contained in another has fewer elements than the set in which it is contained.
This maxim is valid only for finite numbers. This leads straight to the definition of the infinite:
Definition infinite: a set is infinite if it consists of sets containing as many elements as themselves.


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Internal/external Putnam I (f) 167ff
Truth/knowledge/Kant/Putnam: in Kant there is a separation of internal and external view for the first time: according to Putnam: what we say about qualities of objects, applies with equal force to our sensation ("objects of the inner sense"). PutnamVsKant/Vs "noumenal world": the question of whether my feelings at different times are "really" alike (have "same noumenal property"), is useless - my sensation "red" cannot be compared directly to noumenal objects.
Truth/Kant: "agreement of knowledge with its object" - Putnam: this is not a correspondence theory but any judgment says, the noumenal world is as a whole in such a way that this is the description that a rational being would construct, if it has the information that a being acquires through our senses. - Putnam pro: this is truth as an ideal fit.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Intersubjectivity Mead Habermas IV 146
Intersubjectivity/MeadVsKant/Mead/Habermas: If motives and goals of action are only accessible under tradition-dependent interpretations, the individual actor cannot himself/herself be the last authority for the further training and the revision of his interpretations of needs. Instead, his/her interpretations change in the context of the life world of the social groups to which he/she belongs. The monological principle of Kantian ethics, like any monological procedure, fails in this task.
MeadVsKant: from the Kantian point of view one assumes,
Habermas IV 147
that (in each case) the standard is given...But if you do not have a standard, you will not be helped in the decision. The simple generalization of one's own principle of action does not help here. (1)

1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S.432.

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Kant Putnam VI 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself.
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense is component of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly.
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary.
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I (c) 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?

I (f) 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
I (f) 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
I (f) 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Kant Nietzsche Ries II 81
Kant/NietzscheVsKant/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: he is also a pessimist: "the human is an animal".

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
Kant Rawls I 251
Kant/Justice/Principles/Categorical Imperative/Rawls: My interpretation of Kant focuses on the concept of autonomy. RawlsVsHare: We should not understand Kant primarily in terms of universality and generality. That would be too narrow a basis to construct a moral theory. (Cf. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1963, pp. 123f.)
Rawls: For a complete understanding of Kant's later writings, one has to consider Kant's later writings.
Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment.
---
I 252
As legislation for an empire of ends, moral principles must not only be acceptable to everyone, but must also be publicly known. They must be accepted by free and equally rational individuals. (See Autonomy/Kant/Rawls). Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: the veil of ignorance (in my theory) robs the persons in the initial situation of a society to be established of all information about their future position anyway, which at the same time guarantees that they decide as free and equally rational persons.
Rawls: this adds several things to Kant's concept: e. g. that the chosen principles are applied not only to individuals, but to society as a whole. Nevertheless, I think we'll stay close to Kant.
---
I 255
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do. Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense.
Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law.
---
I 256
Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt. ---
I 257
Society/election/self/Kant/RawlsVsKant/Rawls: in two points I deviate particularly from Kant's conception ((s) as it is laid out in the categorical imperative): 1. the choice (of the principles) as noumenal self I assume to be the choice of a collective (self). This choice must be acceptable to other selfs.
2. I assume that the parties know that they are subject to the conditions of human life. In the light of these natural limitations, the principles are chosen. In Kant's case, it appears that he also includes the freedom of God or the freedom of pure intelligences, but these are not subject to the restrictions that demand that others be recognized as equally rational and free beings.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Kant Sidgwick Rawls I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he/she gives in to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature. (H. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516). SidgwickVsKant/Rawls: according to Sidgwick, this idea collapses: it seems to him to be Kant's view that saints and villains have become what they are at their own free will (as a noumenal self) and at the same time are subject to the causal laws (as phenomenal self).
I 255
Kant now, after Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his/her bad life does not express his/her being himself/herself as much as the saint does in his/her life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.

Sidgwick I
Henry Sidgwick
Methods of Ethics 2017


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Kant Parsons Habermas IV 379
Kant/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons makes cursory reference to the three Kantian critiques and understands them as attempts to reconstruct the transcendental conditions for the objectivation of external nature (under cognitive-instrumental aspects), for the constitution of the contexts of action (under moral-practical aspects) and for the non-objectivating handling of one's own inner nature (under aesthetic aspects). (1) Religion/ParsonsVsKant: Religion can also be interpreted within the limits of reason if it is the hybrid result of an objectification of transcendental performances of order. That is not enough for Parsons. (2)



1.T. Parsons, Action Theory and Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 370f.
2.Ebenda S. 371

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Kant Sandel Brocker I 670
Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Knowledge Vollmer I 206
Knowledge / VollmerVsKant: according to Kantians, we can in fact know only what is given by the senses. - Then we can not know, for instance that the earth moves - E.g. that the space is non-Euclidean. - e.g. Then quarks and black holes should never be objects of empirical science, because they are not vivid.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Law Kant Brocker I 670
Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences.
Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom.
RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites.
Brocker I 671
SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Kant Brocker I 670
Liberalism/State/Kant: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead based himself entirely on a theory of the right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel. See Law/Justification/Kant.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Logic Kant Strawson V 64
Logic/Kant: logic does not contribute to the conditions the objects have to meet - logic uses terms, but not the content of knowledge - General Logic: abstracts - Transcendental Logic: is confronted with a manifold of sensory input. ---
V 68
There cannot be a specific way in which we need to think about the objects of experience, in order to enable the thtruth-functional composition of statements - the ability of the composition cannot depend on our disposal of any other a priori concept of an object in general - StrawsonVsKant: "metaphysical deduction": is a failed attempt to derive the categories of logic - Strawson: the logic did not help Kant to get ahead. ---
Bubner I 105
Logic/KantVsTadition: old: while conventional logic send the conceptual doctrine of the judgment doctrine based on it ahead,... New: ...the transcendental logic proceeds vice versa and orients the fundamental categories already on the synthesis performance of the judgments.
---
I 106
The categorial pre-structuring by concepts a priori constitutes objects as objects and thus "makes them" the subject of possible epistemological judgments ((s) reflexive, critique). For example, the "black human" and "the human is black": in the first case merely thought of as black (problematic).
In the second it was recognized as such!
But both times it is the same understanding by the same actions!
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Mathematics Frege I 121
Conclusion / Mathematics / Frege: mathematical inferences are included in the definitions already. - FregeVsKant: therefore they should be called not only synthetic but also analytical.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Metaphysics Rorty III 127 ff
Metaphysicisit: E.g. Hegel: despite historical realization of the truth still approaching something fixed. III Introduction Metaphysics: questions about the unchanging, possibly hidden things that underlie the phenomena. Typical: Socrates’ questions. ("Immanent nature"). (HeideggerVs). In this respect, coupled with common sense! He gives no redescription, but analyzes old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions. The metaphysicist calls everything else "relativistic". He assumes that our tradition cannot provide problems that it is unable to solve.
Metaphysics: thinks that there is a connection between redescription and power, and the right redescription could liberate us.
IV 77ff
Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: Heidegger thought he might escape metaphysics - (the idea of ​​a single truth) - by understanding being and truth historically -
VI 154ff
Metaphysics: wants to see our desire to be friendly supported by an argument that contains a self-description. It is supposed to throw a highlight on a thing common to all humans Transcendence: the assumption that there is something with which we may not be connected. RortyVs: it does not exist! Our beliefs themselves are secular objects in constant causal interaction with others.
Rorty: the fact that we keep open whether we describe the world differently later has nothing to do with transcendence.
VI 480
Transcendence/DavidsonVsKant/Rorty: not needed

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metaphysics Leibniz Holz I 13
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be understood from metaphysics. His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method.
LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way.
---
Holz I 24
Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form. ---
Holz I 81
Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God. But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link!
The circle is also preserved logically.
The system has to be interrupted somewhere:
Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside).
Leibniz is well aware of this break.
For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons.
---
I 82
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle. ---
Holz I 119
Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity. Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate Establishment/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Morals Kant Stegmüller IV 299
Morality/ethics/Kant: must necessarily apply. -> categorical imperative - as a hypothetical imperatives ("if you want that, do ...") they would be superfluous. ---
IV 429
Moral/Kant/Stegmüller: is autonomous: the morally right thing is right in itself and mandatory - it can be detected by practical reason. - Every rational being is competent enough to give the moral commandments themself. - If there was divine reward, morality would be corrupted by self-interest. -> Rawls: the veil of ignorance. ---
IV 430
God/practical reason/Kant: nevertheless, the moral asks us that we set ourselves the highest good for goal - therefore a cause different from nature must be demanded from nature. - The highest good is only possible in the world, if the highest cause of nature is assumed. ---
IV 431
In addition, the immortality is necessary so that an infinite progress for the first element of the highest good is possible. MackieVsKant: this is a false transition from "should" to "should be possible."
---
IV 433
MackieVsKant: The consistent recognition of the autonomy of moral should have brought him to a more stoic conception: that moral does not need any other bliss as the consciousness of righteousness itself. ---
Strawson V 134
Moral/Kant: we need that to ensure that the limitations of knowledge do not strengthen the materialism and atheism. ---
Vaihinger 306
Moral/Kant/Vaihinger: the theoretical reason forbids to accept a moral world order - the practical reason dictates that it is necessary to do good. ---
Rawls I 251
Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment. ---
I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that man expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he gives in to certain needs, he acts according to the law of nature. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516). ---
I 255
Kant now, according to Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his bad life does not express himself as much as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law.
---
I 256
Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Morals Walzer Rorty II 83
Moral / WalzerVsKant / Walzer/ Rorty: Def "thin morality": Kant s universalistic basis. - WalzerVsKant: these do not exist - on the other hand: "dense" moral / Walzer: culturally integrated - the road goes from an initial dense to a thin morality.
II 85
WalzerVsKant: loyalty before principles - (according to Rorty).


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Morals Durkheim Habermas IV 77
Moral/Durkheim/Habermas: a) Thesis: Moral begins where the attachment to a group of whatever kind begins. (1)
Habermas IV 78
b) Mead: Following Kant: a morally acting subject must submit to authority, (...) but in such a way that it itself assumes the obligations and makes the moral demands its own. The individual is not exposed to external force, but to an awe-inspiring authority. MeadVsKant: Mead: traces back the binding force of commitment to force and attraction at the same time. The moral good is also the desirable. It could not be effective as an ideal (...) if it did not promise the satisfaction of real needs. (2)
Habermas IV 79
The holy awakens the same ambivalent attitude as moral authority, for the holy is surrounded by an aura that at the same time frightens and attracts, terrorizes and enchants. (3) From this structural analogy Durkheim concludes on a sacral basis of morality.
Habermas IV 80
Moral/Durkheim: Thesis: the moral rules ultimately draw their binding force from the sphere of the holy. This explains why they find obedience without being linked to external sanctions. (4) Problem: how can secularized morality last? Certainly it will not last if secularisation has meant a profanation. (See Holiness/Durkheim). For this would make the basic moral phenomenon of the compulsory character disappear, as in all empirical ethics.
DurkheimVsSpencer: Spencer's ethics show a complete ignorance of the nature of commitment. For him, the punishment is nothing more than the mechanical consequence of the action. But that means misunderstanding the characteristics of the moral obligation from the bottom up. (5)


1. E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, p. 86f
2. Ibid p. 96.
3. Ibid p. 86
4. Ibid p. 125
5. Ibid p, 95

Durkheim I
E. Durkheim
The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895
German Edition:
Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Motion Leibniz Holz I 133
Movement/Leibniz: something takes the place of something else. ((s) It is not replacing a previously "empty space"). ---
I 134
What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is the epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material being-in-themselves to one another.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Naturalism Rorty I 169
Naturalism: thinking of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confused cause and reason).
I 324
Def naturalization: to call something the foundation. Cf. >Naturalized Epistemology.
VI 138
Def naturalism / Rorty: a) there are no inhabitants of the space-time, which would not be connected in a single network of causal relations with all the other residents        b) any explanation consists in assigning a place to an object in this network.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Naturalized Epistemology Stroud I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. ---
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. ---
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. ---
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too. ---
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Nature Kant McDowell I 122f
Nature/Kant/McDowell: according to him nature is the same as the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although he very well knows the concept of education. But not as a background. Second Nature/McDowell: thesis: there are rules of nature, regardless of whether one is susceptible to it or not. That is the consequence of correct education. "Naturalism of the second nature", "naturalized Platonism".
---
Vollmer II 48
Definition Nature/Kant: "The existence of things, as long as it is determined according to universal laws." Nature/VollmerVsKant: that is unnecessarily narrow and begging: because the generality of the categories thus becomes an analytical consequence of this definition - (circular).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Negation Frege Chisholm II 181 ff
Negation/Frege/Simons: Problem: negative facts. - Solution: simply two truth values ​​(true/false) and a function that swaps the two. WittgensteinVsFrege: connection should not be represented as a function - Operator N: forms a conjugates negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) is false.
Notation: x^: all values ​​of x.
Negation/Simons: negation only has the smallest range: atomic sentences.
Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. - Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N.

Frege IV 61
Negation/denial/judgment/FregeVsKant: Kant speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. - That’s quite unnecessary. - Even a negative one judgment is a simple judgment.
IV 64
Negation/Denial/Frege: is not equal to the judgments. - It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments.
IV 69
Description/subordinate clause/name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. - This individual thing is a notion. - The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.
IV passim
Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its denial as an independent second idea. - Thoughts are not made up, but grasped. - Their truth is not their being thought. - They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. - Thus, "today" becomes "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). - By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring.
Tugendhat II 66f
Negation/Frege: not a property - not always with the sign of negation. - E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. - The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. Proof: Negation in sub clauses: only the whole sentence is asserted. - In the clause (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset.
Tugendhat II 12
Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not to the assertion.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Norms Brandom I 83
Norms/standards/Brandom: not from collective action, that does not exist - Community must not be personalized - it is always about individual members. ---
I 84
Basic: I-You relationship - instead I-We-relationship. - Community: how much agreement is enough? - Brandom: there are always authorities and experts. ---
I 96
Normss/Brandom: from what we do, not part of the nature of things. ---
I ~ 105
Norms/standards/Brandom: depend on our community: they are our standards - concepts: irrespective of community, the facts decide about it - concepts are non-discoursive: Discussions do not decide about them. ---
I 867
Norms/standards/Brandom: normative attitudes prevail - definitions are not causally effective on their own - standards are not objects in the causal order - talking about status cannot replace talk about actually occupied positions - what follows from p cannot be identified with my actual accounting - A: phenomenalistic view the standards, but it is a normative phenomenalism. ---
I 898
Norms/Brandom: our own practices confront us already with internal standards - 1) in the guise of deontic status: definition and authorization - (in the eye of the beholder) - 2) The accuracies themselves are being reflected (account management). ---
II 52
Norms/HegelVsKant: not only noumenally but socially rooted. ---
II 54
Standards/Hume: attributed to wishes - BrandomVsHume: explanation by definition on patterns of practical inference - i.e. What is a desire and what is not?

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Perception Kant Strawson V 126
Perception/Kant/Strawson: between veridical and non-veridical perception we can only distinguish when the general conditions of objective determination of time (objective perception) have been met. ---
V 169f
Perception/Kant: it exists very well "in itself"! - Problem: then the question of the beginning of the series is repeated - StrawsonVsKant: always talks of our perception. - But your perceptions are not given to me. ---
Stroud I 164
Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept empirically direct perception of independent things, because he does not accept them transcendental. - Direct perception: only possible with dependent things . - E.g. representations. KantVsTranscendental realism: this would also have to take independent things. - Problem: then we would have to denote our representations inadequate as these things. - StroudVsKant: I'm trapped in my subjectivity. - Thus the transcendental idealism can hardly be distinguished from skepticism. - StroudVsKant: according to him the best science (physics, etc.) is possible, but still dependent on our subjectivity.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Phenomena Leibniz Holz I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: a phenomenon must not be regarded in Kant's way as separated from the essence! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". This is also not a duplication, but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substance itself, but under conditions of the imagination, for which space and temporality are decisive.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Politics Sandel Brocker I 676
Politics/Principles/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/Sandel: Taking into account the dimension of inter-subjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice that would then, as it were, only be administered by politics and jurisdiction for all time. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community.
Brocker I 677
Thus Sandel is in the tradition of Aristotelianism and republicanism. (1) (RepublicanismVsKant, RepublicanismVsLiberalism, AristotleVsKant). HegelVsKant/Rothhaar: this is also an echo of Hegel's criticism of Kant: Kant neglects the subjects' inter-subjectivity; for Kant, the subject is ultimately oriented towards the transcendental subject. (2) (See Intersubjectivity/Sandel, Principles/Rawls.)
Politics/Morality/Sandel: Sandel's design of a political philosophy strongly recalls the concept of "morality" that Hegel develops in the basic lines of the philosophy of law. (3)
The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice.


1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 4-8.
2. Steven B. Smith, Hegel Critique of Liberalism. Rights in Context, London/Chicago 1991, p. 4.
3. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge/New York 1991, p. 202.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Pragmatism James Diaz-Bone I 68
Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. ---
I 68f
Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. ---
I 70
Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being.
---
I 76
Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision.
---
I 78
We do not live to think, but we think to live. ---
79
Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability.
---
I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). ---
I 102
VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem).


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Proof of God’s Existence Kant Strawson V 194
cosmological proof of God / StrawsonVsKant: Kant: if there is an unlimited being, it exists necessarily - Strawson: we cannot turn it the other way round: if it is necessary, it is unlimited. ontological proof / Kant: from non-contradictory existence should follow necessary existence.
- KantVs: it is one thing to form an idea - it is another thing to declare that the idea ((s) concept) has an application.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Reality Goodman I 18ff
Reality/world/Goodman: The many materials from which one generates worlds - matter, energy, waves, phenomena - are produced together with the worlds. But not from nothing, but from other worlds. Our creation is re-creation. The beginning should be left to theology. No hope of firm foundation.
The talk of unstructured content or given contradicts itself, because speech cannot be unstructured.
I 18
Kant: the concept of a pure content is empty.
I 34
... should we stop speaking of right versions as if each world would be its own and should all be recognized as versions of one and the same neutral, underlying world? Goodman thesis: The world which is regained like this is, as noted earlier, a world without kinds, without order, without movement, without peace and without structure. - A world fighting for or against is not worth it.
II 70f
Reality/Goodman: the whole reality, also space and time are dependent on description, VsKant, VsSalmon, VsRead - conceivable: space-time points do not exist all the time. - Solution: sum object p + t
IV 44
Reality/Goodman: Nothing is realized by a mere decision. The admission that there are many standards of accuracy, can therefore not collapse the distinction between right and wrong.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Reality Kant Strawson V 76
Reality/StrawsonVsKant: why should the object of consciousness not have a distinct (from this independent) existence, even if they coincide point by point with the experience? ---
Stra V 156
"Everything else"/StrawsonVsKant: the term that everything would be arranged differently with respect to the present time, is completely empty (> Skepticism/Davidson). - Equally empty: the assumption of a change in the external temporal relations. ---
Stra V 231
Reality/appearance/Kant: it is pointless to deny that there is something beyond our experience, as it would be pointless for the blind to deny that the objects have further characteristics- what we must deny is that any other aspect of reality is in a kind of systematic connection with the aspects that we already know - noumenal world/StrawsonVsKant unnecessary to ever assume unperceivable - instead modest noumenon: that what we can still discover.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Reason Kant Bubner I 142
Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it cannot reject, nor answer. ---
Kant I 105
Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it - and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth - thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence. ---
I 105
Kant assumed reason in nature. ---
I 113
Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes aren not - we project reasonable causes into the object - however: this projection is necessary - but it is only a projection that justifies no real science. ---
Reason:
Definition Pure Reason/Kant: pure reason unifies ideas in an intuition by categories. - Definition Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment.
---
I 87
Definition reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality. ---
I 93
"Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations. ---
I 99
Reason/Kant: term - power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End- all three are forming the reason in a broader sense. ---
Münch III 327
Definition reason/Kant: the capability of rules. They are separated from intuition for Kant. Holenstein: modern: intelligence.
Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
---
Strawson V 24
Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories. ---
V 25
Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space. - transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience. StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed.
---
Bubner I 103
Kant/new: mind action consists in judging, a table of pure mind functions, which, however, are indeterminate with respect to all objects. The performance of union results from the act. It is not triggered from the outside! > Synthesis/Kant.
---
Adorno XIII 105
Mind/Kant/Adorno: as far as reason is concerned, which refers to the possibility of recognizing the content, the material, Kant speaks of reason. Mind activity/Kant: is the activity of reason, which refers to a material which belongs to the senses ir azus and which unifies them and deals with its synthesis.
Reason/Kant: here, this activity should be no longer bound to such a material but should be free of it. In the cognitive or noological meaning, reason gives us at least the regulative, in the sense of which our experience of the sensual is to proceed. Reason in this concise sense would be the ability to recognize ideas.
Reason/Kant/Adorno: in a third sense, reason gives in perfect freedom its objects to itself. This is the practical use of reason. Paradoxically, we are here, according to Kant...
---
Adorno XIII 106
...not bound to the topic. Practical reason/Kant/Adorno: our reason or we act practically, insofar as we act purely according to reason and according to its purposes, without letting these purposes be given to us.
Purpose/Kant/Adorno: Thus, we must only allow them to be given to ourselves by our own principle, the innermost principle of subjectivity itself.
Reason/Kant/Adorno: is then an absolute activity of the mind in contrast to one limited by materials. In this way it becomes a higher and, to a certain extent, a counter-instance of the reason.
---
Adorno XIII 110
Mind/Kant/Adorno: the reason activity which refers to the order functions which we are exercising against a material which comes to us from the outside and which is chaotic, unstructured and in itself quite undetermined according to Kant. Reason/Kant: once again reflects on the mind, on the use which the mind makes of itself and judges according to it, decides whether, in the sense of the purposes which it
Adorno XIII 111
gives to itself, is a more highly developed one. ---
Adorno XIII 112
Reason/Hegel/Adorno: in Hegel and already in Kant, there are reminiscences of the reification of reason in the sense that the common human should not think too much. ---
Adorno XIII 113
Reason/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: reason should be the principle of freedom, but at the same time also a law and in this respect something badly repressive. In its concept, however, the relation of freedom and coercion has not actually been articulated.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Reciprocity Rawls I 103
Reciprocity/Rawls: For example, two representative people in a society, A is less, B is more favoured. A can accept the benefits that come with B if this improves its own expectations. If B weren't in position, A would be even worse off. This presupposes a scheme of social cooperation without which no one would have a satisfactory life. Differential principle/Rawls: ensures that everyone agrees to this cooperation. (See Difference Principle/Rawls).
---
I 291
Reciprocity/Saving/generational justice/Rawls: generations should ask themselves how much they are willing to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. ---
I 288
Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. ---
I 290
Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving. ---
I 291
Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back. RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHerzen: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself.
---
I 292
Solution/Rawls: To accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. ---
I 293
No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part. People of different generations share duties and obligations as well as contemporaries. The present generation cannot do what it likes, but must behave in the manner prescribed by the principles that would be chosen in the initial situation where no one knows what role they themselves play.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Reductionism Damasio Churchland II 486
KantVsReductionism: the self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc.

Damasio I
Antonio R. Damasio
Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004


Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Relations Hume I 121/122
Relation/KantVsHume: relations are not externally to ideas. HumeVsKant: each relation is external in their terms - e.g. equality is not a property of the figures themselves - e.g. neighboring and distant figures do not explain what neighborhood and distance is - relation anticipates a synthesis - space/time: in mind only composition, bearing relation through fiction - E.g. association: creates relation, but does not explain that distance is a relation.
---
I 135
Relations/Hume: cannot be derived from experience, they are effects of association principles - external to the things (atomism). KantVsHume: not externally - Kant: therefore critical philosophy instead of empiricism.
---
I 139
KantVsHume: relations are so far dependent on the nature of things, as things presuppose a synthesis as phenomena that result from the same source as the synthesis of relations. - Therefore, the critical philosophy is not empiricism. - There is an a priori, that means, the imagination is productive. ---
I 145
Causality/Hume is the only relation, from which something can be concluded.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Relevance Leeds I 381f
Relevanz/Eindeutigkeit/Rolle/Erklärung/Wahrheit/Leeds: die Uneindeutigkeit von T zeigt aber nicht, dass T keine entscheidende Rolle spielt - es zeigt nur, dass andere, wahrheits-ähnliche Relationen gleich wichtig sind. Analogie zur Metrik: dass man Physik in Nicht-Standard-Raumzeit aufstellen kann, zeige nicht, dass Erklärungen, die von Metrik Gebrauch machen keine Erklärungen wären.
Erklärung/LeedsVs: das ist eine schlechte Analogie: der Grund, warum Physiker eine bestimmte Erklärung bevorzugen ist, dass es hier einen wohlverstandenen Sinn gibt, in dem konkurrierende Erklärungen als wesentlich äquivalent betrachtet werden können. - falsche Erklärung: "Die meisten Sätze unserer Theorie sind T": das ist ganz leer: Angenommen, die Theorie ist konsistent und unvollständig - dann würde folgen, dass sie als "wahr" herauskommt unter verschiedenen inkompatiblen W-Prädikaten. - "Erfolg" wäre dann, irgendeins der W-Prädikate zu akzeptieren. - Wenn wir die Atomphysik schon akzeptieren, brauchen wir keine W-Theorie die erklärt, warum die Atomphysik funktioniert.
Lösung/Leeds: das richtige Explanandum ist nicht, dass einige Theorien funktionieren, sondern, dass wir (zufällig?) einige Theorien haben, die funktionieren. - Pointe: T könnte doch noch wichtig werden: nur nach T wäre es kein Zufall.
I 384
Falsch: Wahrheit dann in Begriffen unserer Methode zu definieren. LeedsVsKant: das wäre wie seine Kopernikanische Wende: wir könnten beliebig unser Schema wechseln. - Problem: 1. Dann könnten wir nicht mehr sagen, dass unsere Induktion uns auch schaden könnte-
2. Wir könnten nicht mehr sagen, dass unsere Theorien erfolgreich sind weil sie wahr sind.

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Religion Parsons Habermas IV 379
Religion/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons makes cursory reference to the three Kantian critiques and understands them as attempts to reconstruct the transcendental conditions for the objectivation of external nature (under cognitive-instrumental aspects), for the constitution of the contexts of action (under moral-practical aspects) and for the non-objectivating handling of one's own inner nature (under aesthetic aspects). (1) Religion/ParsonsVsKant: Religion can also be interpreted within the limits of reason if it is the hybrid result of an objectification of transcendental performances of order. That is not enough for Parsons. (2)
Habermas IV 380
The system of order performance must be reinterpreted into a system of supreme control values or final structures such that it can interact as a world of supra-empirical entities with other worlds. HabermasVsParsons: As with Comte and the St. Simonists, Parsons, too, results in a powerless attempt to create a social theory substitute for the social integration functions of a religion whose substance has been attacked. (3)


1.T. Parsons, Action Theory and Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 370f.
2.Ebenda S. 371
3. A.W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Sociology, NY, 1974; (German) Hamburg 1974, S. 300ff.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Saving Rawls I 291
Savings/generational justice/reciprocity/Rawls: the generations should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. ---
I 288
Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. ---
I 289
However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later date. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals are subject to each other. No generation has special demands.
---
I 290
Savings/Saving Rate/Wealth/Rawls: the last stage of a society does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving.
---
I 291
Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back. (Kant "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44; quote A. Herzen from Isaiah Berlin's Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx.) RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHearts: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself.
---
I 292
Fairness of savings/fair saving/Rawls: we accept the fictitious initial situation of a society to be established as present and ourselves as participants. This situation involves members of all possible generations. No one knows what generation he belongs to. So there is no reason for anyone to save money - either previous generations have saved or not. You cannot change that now.
Solution/Rawls: to accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. (See Principles/Rawls.) Just as the first principle of justice and the principle of equal opportunity limits the application of the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) within a generation, the principle of fair saving limits its application between generations.
---
I 293
No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Self- Consciousness Castaneda Frank I 211ff
Self-consciousness / Fichte: all consciousness includes a s.-c. - CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves) - CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! - No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections - false problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self.
I 231f
Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations - lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident - postulates an infinite number of aspects.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Self- Consciousness Kant Strawson V 22
Self-consciousness / Kant: we need to distinguish between consequences of our experience and consequences of objects of the experience.
Stra V 215
Self-consciousness / Kant: a) "original": merely thinking, not watching - b) empirical - StrawsonVsKant: these are just spells when we are not allowed to apply time to "appear" - how should we then understand? - Should it atemporally be the case that something appears in time? - its an old belief that reason is atemporal and yet in us.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Signs Peirce Berka I 29
Sign/Logic/Peirce: in Logic all three types of signs must occur - symbols: without it there is no universality - universality: essential for conclusions.
Berka I 30
Problem: a symbol alone says nothing about the subject matter - a general term can only allude to an object. Conclusion/Peirce: needs in addition to symbol (for truth) and index (both together (for sentence formation) the 3rd character: the icon: because inference consists in the observation that where certain relations exist, some other relations can be found - these relations must be represented by an icon - e.g. the middle term of the syllogism must actually occur in both premises.(1)
Berka I 29
Symbol/Peirce: says nothing about the subject.(1)

1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249
---
Diaz-Bone I 68f
Sign/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental Subject: pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and mental communication and clear ideas. For Peirce, every thought is a sign. ---
Eco I 114
Sign/Peirce/Eco: triadic form: base: symbol (represented) object (that it represents) Tip: interpretant (many authors want to equate this with signifier or reference).

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Skepticism Kant Stroud I 128
Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. - KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((S) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.)
Stroud I 136
KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has managed) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence -
Stroud I 138
Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore.
Stroud I 142
Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. ---
Stroud I 140
Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself.
Stroud I 147
KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence) - more important: the conditions of possibility -> Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity - wrong. That our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa.
Stroud I 149
Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry). - Therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences.
Stroud I 163
StroudVsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic priority" (from Descartes).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Society Kant Rawls I 257
Society/election/self/Kant/RawlsVsKant/Rawls: in two points I deviate particularly from Kant's conception ((s) as it is laid out in the categorical imperative): 1. I assume the choice of (the principles) of the noumenal self to be the choice of a collective (self). This choice must be acceptable to other selfs.
2. I assume that the parties know that they are subject to the conditions of human life. In the light of these natural limitations, the principles are chosen. In Kant's case, it appears that he also includes the freedom of God or the freedom of pure intelligences, but these are not subject to the restrictions that demand that others be recognized as equally rational and free beings.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Space Kant I 85
Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. - KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. ((S) It would have to, if only the relations played a role.) - ((S) chirality/VsRelationismus). ---
Strawson V 28
Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. - Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. ---
Stra V 48
Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. ---
V 49
Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Space Leibniz Holz I 132
Space/Leibniz: space is the order. It is not an in-itself, but the structure of a material plurality, which in turn possesses the actual substantial in-itself in the self-limiting nature of the original force. There is no (infinite) "empty space". The idea of this would be a futile action: to work without doing something with it. There would be no observable change for anyone.
The space appears only in the mutual representation.
Spatiality is something different than space.
Space and time are something ideal.
---
I 133
Space outside the world is just imaginary. (Scholasticism already represented this view). Space/Leibniz: the arrangement of things causes the appearance of space in perception.
Appearance/"well-founded"/Leibniz: the appearance of space is "well-founded" when it is related to the multiplicity of things.
Space is "imaginary" or "ideal" when the multiplicity is seen as being isolated from the things. (s). e.g. as a set?
Movement/Leibniz: something steps into the place of something else. ((s) Not replacing a previously "empty space").
---
I 134
What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material in themselves to one another.
In-itself/Leibniz: in-itself is the force. Two aspects:
1. Intensional as a point of force.
2. Extensional in effects.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Spirit Hegel Adorno XIII 62
Subjectivity/Idealism/Spirit/Hegel/Adorno: ... one is then compelled to extend the subjectivity beyond the individual consciousness. In Hegel this means the idea (...), this is now nothing else than the principle of the spirit, which is to be independent of the individual human beings and their epitome, and which itself, and, in fact, motivated, should be the absolute, that first constitutes everything conditional. ---
XIII 63
The assumption that this consciousness is in the different individuals of the same kind of logicality and the same logic is implied. We/Idealism/Adorno: this "we" is, in fact, just the very epitome of the empirical subjects; it cannot be a constitutive, transcendental subject.
---
Adorno XIII 128
Spirit/Hegel/Adorno: if the truth is to be the whole in Hegel, then as a process, so that the truth is realized. ---
XIII 129
This is the new concept of the spirit in a concise sense, that is, spirit is the epitome of the world, or the epitome of reality as far as it has passed through the specific spiritual experience of the individual human being. HegelVsKant/Adorno: this knowledge determines the objects as things in themselves and not as mere phenomena.


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Subjects Hegel Bubner I 184
Subject/object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of cognition, Hegel determines the subject/object relationship on two sides: theory and practice. (Following AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "Radical separation of reason from experience". ---
I 185
Subject/object/antiquity/Bubner: the whole ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing of this at all.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Subjects Nietzsche Ries II 75
Subject/Predicate/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: create the agitation of "offender" and "doing". ---
Ries II 97
Subject/NietzscheVsKant: Fear that the subject will prove to be something primarily multifaceted. ---
Ries II 98
Subject/Nietzsche: Expression of our belief in unity. Fiction. ((s) NietzscheVsKant). ---
Ries II 108
Subject/Nietzsche: "I'm early." ---
Danto III 133
Subject/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's idea of an object is under suspicion, and thus also the idea of a thinking object or subject. ---
Danto III 134
Self/Nietzsche/Danto: The psychological and the grammatical subject are two sides of the same coin. Finally, we believe in our own invention and establish a "self" that is different from "one's" activities and has a causal relationship to them. Because the Ural-Altaic language family possesses a weakly developed subject form, everyone who grew up with such a language will most likely look differently into the world and can be found on other paths than Indo-Germanic or Muslim men (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 29).
---
Danto III 134
I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the I as being, in the I as substance and projects the belief in the I-substance on all things - it creates the term 'thing'... Being is thought of everywhere as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'... (F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 71.)

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Substance Kant Strawson V 187
Substance/StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then it is circlular. ---
Holz I 31
Substance/Spinoza: is according to him unique in its very nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thinking conditions of the substantial unity of the world and the experience conditions of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance in which "all that one had thought to be true, has perished".
This, however, reveals the actual thinking condition, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger.
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant draws from this the consequence of establishing the unity of the world in the priority of thinking. The unity is then only transcendental or subjectively idealistic justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to establish the unity of existence in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Substance Descartes Adorno XIII 68
Substance/Descartes/Adorno: in Descartes, the thinking substance is simply determined as a substance and not as an activity. DescartesVsKant, DescartesVsSpontanity.
Adorno XIII 154
Substance/Descartes/Adorno: in Descartes the term substance is defined as the, quod nulla re indiget ad existendum, which requires no other thing to exist. One could conclude that it must be with absolute necessity.
Esfeld I 212
Substance/Kant: only the whole of matter persists in all change. (Like Descartes).
Matter/Descartes: "physical", "material" and "extended" are synonymous with him.

EsfeldVsDescartes: his position is ambiguous:
a) no substance can cease to exist, so we can only allow one substance.
b) on the other hand, he assumes that the parts of the physical substance itself are substances! There should be a real difference between the parts.
Def Real Difference/Descartes: Difference between substances.
Matter/Space/Descartes/Esfeld: Matter = Space! Identifying matter with space implies that physics can be reconstructed without being confined to material things in addition to space.
Further consequence: Areas of space may have physical properties, but they cannot move.



A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Syntheticity Wittgenstein Hintikka I 204
Synthetic a priori/HusserlVsKant/WittgensteinVsKant/Hintikka: all examples stem from experience.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Syntheticity Nietzsche Danto III 112
Synthetic/Reality/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not agree with the Kantian Revision of the Empirism in all respects; (...) we cannot but think a priori in accordance with certain synthetic judgments: instead of asking how synthetic judgement is a priori possible, we should ask why it is necessary. Why they must be believed, and why they could still be wrong! (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 29).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Terminology Hume I 7
Affection/Hume: 1. affectivity (on sensations) - 2. The Social (above the reason)
---
I 23
Affect/affection/Hume: 1. Effects of the association (provides generality, rule) - 2. Effects of affect (gives content, allows practical and moral action) - affect is not a representation - reason: does not determine action - affect: determines the act. ---
I 31
Sympathy/Hume: leads us to abandon our interests - basis of morality - but only with respect to close loved ones, relatives-> partisanship. - The human being is less selfish than partisan - so the sympathy does not go beyond the individual interest or the affect. Human/Hume: naturally selfish - Moral/Hume: not dependent on instinct.
---
I 49
Vivacity/Hume: Problem: the general rule does not know an owner, it is abstract - uniformity of the true moral judgment: not alive. ---
I 56
general rule: unity of a reflection and an extension - (here always expansion) - the affect reaches beyond itself, because it reflects itself - the general rule is the reflected affect in the imagination. ---
I 66
Affect/imagination/Hume: Problem: how is their relationship that enables the affect to develop a complex effect? ---
I 67
Solution: the principles of affect exceed the mind (like the principles of association). - E.g. imagination goes easily from a remote thing to the next , but not vice versa - E.g. from brother to I, but not vice versa. - Affect: gives these connections a meaning. ---
I 71 f
Custom/Hume: Paradox: it is formed gradually and is also a principle of human nature. - A principle is the habit to adopt habits. - So the development is itself a principle (= experience). ---
I 89
Definition Purpose/Hume/Deleuze: The purpose (Deleuze: finalité) is thought not recognized as the original conformity of the principles of human nature with nature itself - unity of origin and the qualitative determination - four principles: reason, instinct, procreation growth. ---
I 118
Affect/Hume: is produced by the body: a) directly from within itself: E.g. Hunger - b) with other causes: joy, pride, humility, etc. - Nature has also provided the mind with certain instincts. ---
I 139f
Transcendence/Kant/Deleuze: the thinking goes beyond the imagination, without disengaging from it - the transcendental makes transcendence immanent. Something = X. - HumeVsKant: in his work nothing transcendental - instead: finality: the conformity of the subject with the given (not random). - (The conformity requires a connection of the moments of the subject.) ---
I 160
Vivacity/agile/Hume: origin of mind - basic feature of the impression - not a product of principles.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Terminology Jonas Brocker I 609
Terminology/Jonas: based on Kant's Categorical Imperative, Jonas develops an "ontological imperative" based on being itself. JonasVsKant: his categorical imperative is located differently. Def ontological imperative/Jonas: "Act in a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth. Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite survival of mankind." (1)
Elsewhere, this Jonasian imperative is also called "ecological imperative".
Another formulation of Jonas: "Act in a way that the consequences of your actions are compatible with a future humane existence, i.e. with the claim of humanity to survive for an unlimited time". (2)


1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, p. 75-86.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Thing in itself Kant I 17
In itself/Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? ---
Strawson V 33/34
Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. ---
Stra V 95
Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz). ---
Stra V 168
Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism/Kant). - But Kant does not accept this! - Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. ---
Adorno XIII 40
Thing in itself/VsKant/Adorno: it has been argued against Kant that if the things in themselves, and with this the causes of the phenomena, are wholly unknown, how can we then speak of them at all, and know about them.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Thing in itself Rorty IV 115
Thing in itself/RortyVsKant/Rorty: he needs the noumenal (thing in itself) only to introduce appearance - no appearance without appearing. - Like Aristotle requires a form of the formless - and e.g. Spinoza the distinct idea of ​​indistinct. - Similar: Wittgenstein's silence in the face of thediscrimination sensible/senseless - RortyVsWittgenstein: one has to know a lot before one can conclude that the metaphysician says something meaningless.
VI 129
Is/be/illusion/appearance/Rorty: false distinction between things - "in itself" and "for us" - RortyVsKant.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Thing in itself Searle III 184
Thing in itself: SearleVsKant: from the fact that we cannot see it, it does not follow that it is otherwise as we perceive it, or that there is a reality beyond our knowledge.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thing in itself Nietzsche Danto III 135
Thing in itself/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing by itself" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e.g. "matter", "mind" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We are rid of materiality. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Thing in itself Vaihinger Vaihinger I 333
Thing in itself / F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: if the thing itself is fictional, then so is his distinction of the phenomena.

Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924

Ultimate Justification Leibniz Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). ---
Holz I 51
Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: logic has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content.
---
I 52
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. ---
Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
---
Holz I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
---
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
---
Holz I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
---
I 124
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Unconscious Freud Searle I 197
Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. ---
Rorty V 47
Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational).
2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged.
---
V 47/48
Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I.
---
V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. ---
V 61
Definition Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Understanding Vollmer I 80
Def intuitiveness / Vollmer: something is clear, if it can be transformed. E.g. Planetarium - e.g. molecular models.
I 173
Understanding / VollmerVsKant: he deid not answer: why can t we understand each other? - How is intersubjective knowledge possible? - Can the categories be shown to be complete? - (Vollmer: No).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Understanding Vico Pfotenhauer IV 61
Truth/Vico: Thesis: verum et factum convertuntur - the truth is convertible with the thought, i. e. synonymous. See K. Löwith Vico's Principle: verum et factum convertuntur. In: Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophical-Historical Class, Heidelberg 1968. History/Vico/Understanding/Kant/Pfotenhauer: Kant took up this idea of Vico in a modified form. He assumed that practical action was possible as a reasonable activity.
This could become visible in opposition to the contingency of the mere factual event. The condition is that this practical action is subject to reason as a normative, value-setting force.
History/HegelVsKant/Hegel: Hegel, on the other hand, wanted the principle of practical philosophy as a binding statement about the actual direction of history to be understood. The events in history would therefore be interpreted as progressive self-realization of the human species under the sign of spiritual spontaneity.
---
Pfotenhauer IV 62
Understanding/Vico/Dilthey: Dilthey wanted to adhere to Vico's principle of the general comprehensibility of historical phenomena. This should be asserted against the positivist indifference that was determined to look at history and nature in the same way. (DiltheyVsComte). Dilthey's thesis: Dilthey proposed to interpret the event from the point of view of the objectives of interested, value-oriented subjects. (M. Riedel: Verstehen oder Erklären? Stuttgart 1978, p. 19ff).

Vico I
Giambattista Vico
Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009


Pfot I
Helmut Pfotenhauer
Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985
Unity Kant Strawson V 82
Unity/Consciousness/Thinking/Subject/StrawsonVsKant: the thesis of the unit itself is based on a deeper distinction: between intuition and concept. ---
Strawson V 83
Strawson: objects could be accusatives and form a sequence, so that no distinction between it and the result of relevant events can be made - such objects could be sense-data and the terms only about these. ---
Stra V 84
This could not be unified with the concept of an "object" - problem: the interest of the objects of experience is their percipi and vice versa - no reason for the distinction between esse and percipi. ---
Adorno XIII 103
Unity/Kant/Adorno: according to Kant, the unity moment of all the subjective abilities underlying the various criticisms is actually reason itself or the mind. ---
Adorno XIII 122
Unity/Subject/Object/Material/Content/Foundation/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: one has deduced from the identity of reason another concept of identity, namely that of the particular identity of the subject and the object. The I and the objective world are to be identical with each other, because every objective unity-consciousness is a unity-consciousness of reason. But since this objective identity in Kant is possible only by referring to a given, to the material of the senses, it is not purely consistent.
Material/Kant/Adorno: that what is underlying the objective in each case should not itself be a product of the reason activity.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
World Lorenz Vollmer I XIV
World view/LorenzVsKant: in no organism, we encounter a world view that would be contrary to what we humans think of the outside world - the comparison of world views of different kinds helps us to expect and to recognize the limitations of our own worldview apparatus.

Lo II
K. Lorenz
On Aggression


The author or concept searched is found in the following 83 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fodor Vs Analyticity IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Gradual Analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded.
IV 185
Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well.
Question: Is this also possible with systematicity (Systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity together?
Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts?
E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa.
E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?.
E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John?.
29 IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: You may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (camp), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages ​​are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity:
IV 245
E.g. "Brown Cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar".
Fodor/Lepore IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions?. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!".
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Aristotle Rorty Vs Aristotle IV 117
Comprehensibility/Rorty: It is difficult to explain what it means to say that tables and chairs are incomprehensible, but God is not (or vice versa!). The logical positivism with its formal speech is in saome way a solution. Comprehensibility/Rorty: Problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly trying to define "conditions of intelligibility of a statement ..." although this statement itself does not meet the conditions specified.
Comprehensibility/Aristotle/RortyVsAristotle: does not solve the problem at all, if he demands that the intellect become identical with the object, that renders the term "matter" incomprehensible.
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/thing in itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: in Kant, the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible, when he says an expression is meaningful if it stands for a mental content which forms a synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the mental).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Brandom, R. Rorty Vs Brandom, R. VI 195
De re/objective/subjective/Brandom: (according to Rorty): with de re attributions he wants to re-introduce the old distinction subjective / objective. Ex Mary thinks of a cow that it is a deer. >de re/>de dicto.
VI 196
RortyVsBrandom: instead: distinction between better and worse tools. Not "real properties". Progress/Brandom: more and more true assertions about the outside world.
Progress/RortyVsBrandom: ever better tools for ever better purposes. Brandom does secretly fancy a "bird's eye view", that he himself had declared impossible.
Norm/RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsKant: as Kant, Brandom endeavors too much to reach a compromise where none is tolerated! So he ends up between two chairs. When he says:
VI 197
"In our standards, the interest to represent things right is invested from the outset", then he is being interpreted differently by aggressive realists like Searle than by well-meaning pragmatists. Truth/Brandom: what corresponds to non-persons.
SearleVsBrandom: would ask him how he knew what these non-persons expect and deserve.
VI 198
Def fact/Brandom: "something claimable" (neologism of Brandom). There is the act of claiming, and there is "the alleged". Facts are not the "true alleged" but the claimable. Facts make assertions true. However, inferential!
VI 198/199
RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsInferentialism: that's like when I call Molière Ex "soporific power" (vis dormitiva) inferential, to make it seem beyond any suspicion. But that tells us nothing more than with the combination of two clauses: If something has soporific force, it will put people to sleep. "The claimable" is of no use to us, not even inferentially!
Reality/knowledge/world/BrandomVsRorty: it has paradoxical consequences, if one denies that there were truths regarding photons before the appearance of the word "photon". Ex chain of reason:
1. five million years ago there were photons.
2. It was then the case that there were photons.
3. It is true that it was then the case that there were photons.
4. It was then true that there were photons.
Rorty: of course, there is nothing to criticize about that, yet there were philosophers who did!
Heidegger:
Truth/person/reality/world/knowledge/existence/natural laws/NG/Heidegger/Rorty: "before Newton, Newton's laws were neither true nor false". (sic).
Rorty: Heidegger might have said: "Because the truth is a property of sentences, and since vocabularies are created by people, the same applies to truths."
Truth/Rorty: property of sentences!
RortyVsBrandom: Heidegger and I according to Brandom: paradoxical assertion, but perhaps it is just as paradoxical if Brandom denies dogs and toddlers convictions (unless in the "secondary meaning").

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Carnap, R. Kant Vs Carnap, R. Stroud I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Compositionality Fodor Vs Compositionality IV 64/65
Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W.
Problem: if it’s really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language! I.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But:
Non-Compositional Language/Non-Recursive/Recursive/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like
It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc., but not:
"Snow is white and grass is green" or
"Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc.
We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences.
It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white.
So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect).
IV 66
E.g. Suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary".
1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold"
2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary".
We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1.
Nevertheless: if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his statements.
Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound chains.)
Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold?
T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. grass is green.
Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none.
It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem:
 IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!"
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor IV
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992
Descartes, R. Brandom Vs Descartes, R. Brandom I 40
BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought.
I 131
BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding.
II 13
Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes.
II 17
BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto).
II 69
Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
II 213
Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Evans Vs Descartes, R. Frank I 497
EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas.
I 522
Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other.


Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Kant Vs Descartes, R. Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking.

Kant I 73
Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I ​​think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing.

Field I 80
KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral.
But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle!
For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.)
Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise.
Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence.
Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here).

Stegmüller IV 362
Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis.
2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed.
3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim).
IV 364
VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic.
4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula).
MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it?
Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege.
IV 365
MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this.


Strawson V 22
"Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them.
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system!
V 103
KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis.

Strawson V 140
Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim.
KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity.
V 143
KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject.
V 145
Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Descartes, R. Freud Vs Descartes, R. Rorty V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equal. Mechanization, procedures to change ourselves.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dogmas (Quine) Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) Brandom I 854
DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma").
I 85
The idea of ​​a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for ​​our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme.
We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data."
I 89
Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content.
I 91
If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective.
DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Epiphenomenalism Verschiedene Vs Epiphenomenalism Münch III 270
Phenomenology/Kosslyn: he who calls a phenomenon as epiphenomenal, thus does not makes it disappear.
Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76

Frank I 31
Physical/Psychical/FrankVsEpiphenomenalism: 1. The assignment of causal roles (which only wants to explain the pain as a side effect of a C fiber irritation) goes through a field of unevident knowledge (it could be that it is not true),
I 32
2. The assumption cannot be proved that the level of physical phenomena is causally closed. Determinism, on the contrary, makes the counterfactual assumption (Peirce: not further justifiable, "necessitarism") that reality can be characterized nomologically at all.
FrankVsKant: or it justifies itself a priori, as in Kant's case, thus changing from the physical to the mental vocabulary.
Category Error: I base the nomological character of the physical world on a "necessary" quality of thought!
If I now say that this or that phenomenon is the cause of this or that mental state, then I explain the probable (but fallible) the cause of conscience that is not valid.





Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Fichte, J.G. Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G. Frank I 211
Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"...

I 244
Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference.
Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults.


Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Hare, R.M. Newen Vs Hare, R.M. NSI 155
"Good"/"Should"/Prescriptivism/Hare: Thesis: these words have even primarily prescriptive meaning. E.g. speaking about a good book, a good exhibition is to recommend these things. (s) VsHare: then it would be conceptually contradictory, e.g. to say of a finished exhibition that it was good. Or e.g. to praise for a sold-out book) Def Secondary Prescriptive/Hare: e.g. "proper", "hardworking". Universalizability/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: every should-statement contains a principle that this statement is applicable to all exactly similar cases.
E.g. Dagmar is pregnant, you should carry the groceries into her apartment for her. And that is what every healthy person should do who has nothing better to do at the moment.
This universalizability is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative which is, however, not linguistically motivated.
NS I 156 HareVsKant: it is the logic of language that imposes the categorical imperative on us.
Moral/Logic/Hare: Thesis: someone who acts contrary to a moral statement does not understand the meaning. Hare: e.g. in a train compartment it says: "Please do not smoke, there are children on board." If the smoker then says, well, I'll smoke next door where there are also children, he did not understand the meaning. On the other hand: e.g. "No smoking!" Such signs were distributed at random in otherwise identical compartments.
Point: there is no universalizable principle. Therefore, the sign expresses no moral should-sentence.
Moral Principles/Principle/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: how to generate moral principles. Problem: how to recognize the essential in a situation. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant. Is it necessary for the principle that she could swap roles with her husband? Is imaginability sufficient? VsHare: some authors see a fundamental impossibility when comparing such situations. Universalizability: must also accommodate subjective desires and dislikes. This makes the objective description of situations very difficult.
NS I 157
Utilitarianism/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Hare is close to utilitarianism in as far as a theory instructs to ensure the fulfillment of the preferences of the greatest number of parties. Universalizability/Generalizability/Moral/Descriptivism/Hare: moral judgments possess their descriptiveness because of their universalizability.
Newen/Schrenk: the descriptive portion then consists of the should-portion along with the situation in which it is expressed.
So moral statements can certainly be assessed as correct or incorrect.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Hegel, G.W.F. Leibniz Vs Hegel, G.W.F. I 13
Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be comprehended from the point of view of metaphysics. He can be positioned between Kant and Hegel: He shows the alternative of a scientific metaphysics to LeibnizVsKant by showing its method,
LeibnizVsHegel: shows the possibility of a metaphysics which is not based on an absolute idealistic method.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hegel, G.W.F. Vollmer Vs Hegel, G.W.F. I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Recognition/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when knowledge is valid. Such a criterion would now itself be a piece of knowledge and would again need a criterion of recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify knowledge. At most by further conventions. Recourse.
That is approximate:
SchellingVsKant: we need recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Investigation of cognition: cannot be carried out other than cognition. As if one wanted to learn to swim before going into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "double Nelson".
I 221
VollmerVsHegel: the argument is logically correct, but it does not claim that recognition as a whole would be impossible, but only in the aforementioned sense.
If we make ourselves the principle of doubting the validity of all knowledge, we come to skepticism, which (according to Russell) cannot be refuted either.
Epistemology does not prove the existence of recognition, it presupposes recognition.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Hume, D. Kant Vs Hume, D. Kant I 27
KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves.
Kant I 98
Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself.

McDowell I 123
McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms.
Hume I 37
Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation.
It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative).
Hume I 122
KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments.
DeleuzeVsKant.
Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison.
Hume I 133
Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen.
So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself.
I 138
If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature.
I 139
But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed:
The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Hume, D. Kripke Vs Hume, D. Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume).
E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45
A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Idealism Russell Vs Idealism IV 80
RussellVsKant/RussellVsIdealism: it is not the thinking that the truth of the sentence "I am in my room" generates (relation). (Making true; >thruthmaker). E.g. it could be that there is an earwig in the room, and neither I know about it, nor that the earwig may think these thoughts. The result is that we have to admit universals for the relations.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Intuitionism Mackie Vs Intuitionism Intuitionism
Stegmüller IV 175
MackieVsIntuitionism ethics: is not based on incorrect analysis but is a false (not some pointless) theory. (as objectivism).
IV 176
3. The mystery of accruing (Zukommen): what is the kind of relation between the natural fact that murder is a cruel act and the moral fact that it is morally wrong? Objectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: moral falsity "accrues" or was supervenient. Sometimes called "non-causal because": the action would be morally wrong because it would be an infliction of pain.
VsObjektivism: the meaning of this relation would have to be explained.
IV 177
Subjectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: for him there is no such problem. He invokes the fact that such acts are condemned socially.
IV 213
Ethics/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: five theses: 1. Anti-objectivism: there are no objective values and no metaphysical substantiation. No moral law, no good in itself for mankind, no categorical imperative. (MackieVsKant).
Mackie: "Argument of peculiarity": "Shall Be Done", etc. (as an entity), "Mystery of accruing". (see above).
2. VsIntuitionism: if objectivism is false, intuitionism is also based on a falsity: (special ability to recognize, moral "knowledge") .
IV 214
3. VsUtilitarianism: cannot answer important questions of moral philosophy and demands a change of mankind. 4. VsUniversalization: all descriptive interpretations are only of metaethical interest. In normative interpretations the issue of justification is unresolved. The third stage U3 is congruent with illusionary utilitarianism.
IV 215
5. confusion of ethics and metaethics: in normative interpretation we have 2nd order moral statements, which require moral justification themselves. "Metaethical fallacy": transition from opinions to the determination of truth.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Kant Black Vs Kant III 132
Lie/Kant: we have the absolute obligation not to lie. E.g. Even if this means showing a killer the way to his victim.
BlackVsKant.
III 133
Kant: the greatest damage caused by a lie is for mankind as a whole. BlackVsKant: that can be said about all misdeeds.
Language/Montaigne: as human beings we are held together by language.
Lie/language learning/language acquisition/Montaigne: if we were brought up by liars, we could not learn the language. Or if our teachers were lying at random occasions.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Kant Brandom Vs Kant I 852
Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs).
I 853
Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity.
I 855
Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity
Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through.
So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke)
II 13
Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes.
II 123
Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination".

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Kant Bubner Vs Kant I 80
Kant: defended himself against contemporary transcendental philosophy with the essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenen vornehmenen Ton in der Philosophie" ((1796) KantVsJacobi). Kant invents a position for his polemics that deals "enthusiastically instead of critically" with philosophy. He attributes this enthusiasm to Plato. Opposite position: attributed to Aristotle.
BubnerVsKant: both positions cannot be historically proven. Kant had very little knowledge of antiquity.
I 88
KantVsPlato: the mathematician Plato is not a good metaphysicist. An unfathomable confusion of view and concept.
"Intellectual view" erroneously brings together immediacy and discursivity.
There was no explanation of how the two came together.
"Undemocratic esotericism" is only understandable for members of a "club" > connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau's equality demands.
I 89/90
BubnerVsKant: the accusation of confusion can only be upheld if one accepts the Kantian premises. In reality Plato's text is different: the Phaidon praises the "flight into the Logos" as a way out of the immediateism of the pre-Socratics, the "second best journey" renounces the unbroken gaze and seeks the mirror of things in the speeches. The synthetic construction of logic is the access to the world to which we must confine ourselves. Plato is by no means inferior to Kant in his contempt of the "noble tone".
I 108
Synthesis/Kant: while the other syntheses find something else, which leads them by their doing to a unity ((s)so nevertheless??) which is again distinguished from it, the highest Synthesis has to do only with itself. Synthesis/VsKant: his followers have uncovered the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this chain of thought.
I/Fichte: action of the settling I
I/Hegel: vitality of the mind in constant self-mediation. (As an absolute principle).
I 109
"Intellectual View"/Bubner: the idea introduced by Kant's successors VsKant to bring together immediacy and reflexivity. BubnerVs: hermaphroditic. The anonymous author of the "Eldest System Program" follows this model.
They demand from the philosopher the aesthetic talent that breaks down the barrier to art production.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Kant Carnap Vs Kant Newen I 112
CarnapVsKant: no synthetic judgements are a priori possible.
Stroud I 171
Def Pseudo-Question/CarnapVsMetaphysics/CarnapVsKant/Stroud: are questions that cannot be answered because there is no possible sensory experience that decides the truth or falsity of the sentences in which certain expressions occur. ((s) e.g. metaphysical or transcendental expressions). Carnap: For example, two geographers want to find out whether a certain mountain in Africa is real or just a legend.
I 172
a) If they find a mountain there that more or less corresponds to what was assumed, they can say that it is real, that it exists. Reality/Carnap: thus, they use an empirical, non-metaphysical concept of reality. (Carnap, Chicago 1958, 207).
b) Assuming they were not only scientists, but also philosophers: one of them calls himself "2Realist", the other "Idealist":
"Realist"/Carnap: will say that the mountain not only has the qualities (characteristics) that one has discovered in it, but it is also real, i.e. independent of our perception.
"Idealist"/Carnap: denies that the mountain is independent of our perception. I.e. it is not real in the sense of the realist.
Sciences/Empiricism/Carnap: here this divergence between the two cannot arise at all. (333f)
But that does not mean that both theses are wrong.
I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that it could not be wrong because it is necessary to empirically clarify all other meaningful questions. CarnapVsKant: according to the verification principle, however, this is a "pseudo-theory" that cannot explain or guarantee anything.
Sense/Sensible/CarnapVsKant: for something to be sensible, we need to know the truth value (WW) of the sentences that contain the corresponding expressions.
Weaker: we must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something than its falsity.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Davidson Vs Kant Rorty VI 217
DavidsonVsKant: language behavior that is not ultimately interpreted by reference to its causal interactions is not interpretable. VsKant: VsMetaphors of fullness and emptiness.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Deflationism Vs Kant Field I 81
Def Deflationismus/Mathematik/Wissen/Field: die These, daß der Unterschied zwischen dem, der viel über Mathematik weiß und dem, der wenig darüber weiß, nicht darin besteht, daß der eine viel und der andere wenig weiß, sondern in zwei Arten von Wissen. Einiges von dem trennenden Wissen ist empirisch: Bsp "Wissen wie" man etwas beweist.
I 82
Bsp Wissen, was andere Mathematiker akzeptieren. Der Rest ist logisches Wissen.
Vorteil: das vermeidet die Notwendigkeit, nicht logisches mathematisches Wissen postulieren zu müssen, denn das müßte dann synthetisch a priori sein. (FieldVsKant/ DeflationismusVsKant). Also auch einen mysteriösen Zugang zu einem Reich von mathematischen Entitäten.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Kant Dennett Vs Kant I 703
DennettVsKant: categorical imperative: requires a deus e.g. machina, a master of ceremonies, who whispers in our ear, where the boundaries of the spectrum of "maximes" would have to be fixed. >Categorical Imperative.
I 704
Ethics/Dennett: no convincing ethical system ever was designed so that ​​it was accessible to calculation.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Kant Derrida Vs Kant I 137
DerridaVsKant: this "idea of an infinite justice" is not consistent with its identification as a "gift without exchange, without circulation". "Without calculus, without control, without reason."
Rorty III 203
DerridaVsKant: confusion of causal conditions with mysterious "transcendental" conditions.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Descartes Vs Kant Stroud I 131
World/reality/Kant: the outer things we know of must have a "reality" that does not allow them to be opened up inferentially (A 371). Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: direct consciousness of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality!
Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the "external perception" (Kant) provides the immediate proof of something real in space. (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so.
Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge. >Knowledge/Kant.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Dewey Vs Kant Suhr I 72
DeweyVsKant: in contrast to Kant s idea of ​​the synthetic activity of the mind, we never have to deal with a chaotic manifold. Our senses always deliver already interpreted material.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
Kant Esfeld Vs Kant I 180
Eigenschaften/Wesen/intrinsisch/Esfeld: es mag sein, daß wir die intrinsische Natur der Welt nicht erkennen können. Aber wir brauchen uns nicht auf eine solche Metaphysik festzulegen. (EsfeldVsKant). Selbst wenn alle Eigenschaften relational sein sollten, würde uns nichts daran hindern, die daraus resultierende Beschreibung der Welt als im Prinzip vollständig betrachten zu können.
Ob unsere Welt so ist, daß alle Eigenschaften relational sind, ist eine empirische Frage.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Kant Foucault Vs Kant Habermas I 300
FoucaultVsKant: no longer synthetic performance of a subject, but pure structuralist activity. (Structuralism, in Foucault: "pure, decentered, rule-guided activity with elements of a transsubjective system).

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Kant Frege Vs Kant I 30
HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature!
I 30
Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious.
I 41
Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds
I 42
Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!.
I 43
A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity.
I 120
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 121
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.

IV 61
Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic.
I 119
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 120
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection.
I 121
The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.
Stepanians I 34
Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics.
Stepanians I 34
pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view.
I 36
Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic.
Newen I21
Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical.
Quine X 93
Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory.
Tugendhat II 12
"Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kant Hacking Vs Kant I 344
reciprocal space / electron microscope: the points of the diffraction pattern behave inversely related to the atomic structure of a crystal. The conventional space is turned to the outside. The near is far and the far is near.
I 344
 The crystallographers find it the most natural! Do they see the objects in reciprocal space? VsKant: there is no unique perceptual space any more.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Kant Heidegger Vs Kant Derrida I 47
HeideggerVsKant: the "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas" this highest principle is metaphysical. - At the same time Kant is, for Heidegger, the "first and only" who thought the temporality of categories, since they have to be applicable to intuitions. Categories / Kant/Heidegger: makes clear, that Kant already thought the categories and their unit not as eternal and immutable principles, but as variable in time and through time!
II 87
VsKant: defines the being under the spell of being imagined.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Kant Husserl Vs Kant I 120
Ethics/Kant: can only be realized in autonomy, that is in distance to all the needs and inclinations. HusserlVsKant: for him missing and valuating acts are not already foreign regulations.
HusserlVsCategorical imperative: the empty way of generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness.
Ethics/Husserl: feeling or value predicates have their own legalism.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Kant Kripke Vs Kant I 135Kant: "All analytic judgments are based entirely on the principle of contradiction and by their nature are a priori knowledge, the definitions on which they are based on may be empirical or not. Since the predicate has been thought of in terms of the subject, it cannot be negated by the first."
I 181
That is precisely why all analytic propositions are a priori judgments even though their terms are empirical. E.g. gold is a yellow metal. In order to know this, I need no further experience beyond my definition of gold. If that makes up my definition, I am only able to segment my definition, I cannot look anywhere else for it. Kripke: Kant seems to say that gold means simply yellow metal.
KripkeVsKant: Is Kant right? According to scientists, it is very difficult to define what a metal is. We also need to know the periodic table. One might think that there are actually two definitions, a phenomenological and a scientific one, where the latter replaces the former. Phenomenological: Stretchable, deformable, scientific: Periodic table. (KripkeVs).
A posteriori: one can learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent, and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant)

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Kant Leibniz Vs Kant Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4


Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes).
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other.

I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Kant Locke Vs Kant Locke I 42
LockeVsKant: Locke is not interested in an analysis of the transcendental conditions of experiences, as Kant later did. That would have been outside his problem horizon.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Kant Luhmann Vs Kant AU Kass 7
Subject/LuhmannVsKant: Problem: is the transcendental subject (Kant) actually outside the world? Is it a logical consequence of transcendental philosophy, which does not want to be an empirical theory, but wants to refer to facts of consciousness, but these facts should not be empirical facts. Thus not differentiated into 5 billion different heads, but information about the necessity of the forms of thinking.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the transcendental subject exists outside the world.
But then one would have difficulties with the observer concept, because the observer has to operate and designate something, but that cannot be done outside the world, because one uses the distinction within/outside (of the world) and then somehow has to specify this designation.
This has been discussed in theology with the concept of God: how does God as the Creator differ from the world and how can he win a relationship to himself, if he has to practice the distinction in order to do that!
God/Theology: with him everything is different, respectively he has intuition, and can access without distinction!
God/Nikolaus von Kues/Cusanus/Luhmann: for God there is no distinction between God and the world.
Subject/Fichte: the subject is an individual.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Kant McDowell Vs Kant I 69
Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito.
McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality.
I 69
Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other.
I 109/110
Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell.
I 111
Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
I 122
Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world.
I 123
McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background.
I 126
Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm.
I 127
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Kant Moore Vs Kant Stroud I 83
Proof of Existence/Skepticism/E.g. Moore's Hands/Problem of the External World/Moore/Stroud: (Moore, Proof of the External World, 1959, 127ff "PP"). Moore: wants to remind philosophers that they indeed know many things they supposedly doubt.
Stroud: Moore actually achieves something, even if it turns out that it is not what he thinks he is achieving.
Kant/Moore/Stroud: Moore believes - what most authors consider more than questionable - that Kant allegedly laments that there has never been any proof of the existence of the outside world. ((s) Kant does not doubt the outside world, but our knowledge of it).
MooreVsKant/Stroud: Moore thinks he can provide proof of existence.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Nagel Vs Kant I 129
NagelVsKant: unrestricted judgments about astronomy belong to a worldview that, compared to the Kantian alternative, is quite durable! In a conflict with Kant both opinions would be in competition, as there is no independent position from which to assess them.

I 137
NagelVsKant: but to defend ourselves against Kant's limiting of the reach of reason, we have to claim more than this.
I 138
Kant admits that we cannot help but understand ourselves as part of an independently existing world, though. But his thesis is not a thesis about the phenomenal world, but one about the relation of the phenomenal world to the world itself.
I 139
But since he claims that the normal scientific thinking only applies to the phenomenal world, he exempts himself from the usual conditions of evaluation. The thesis of transcendental idealism is itself not one of the synthetic judgments a priori whose validity it claims to explain, but a thesis, a priori it still is. If this is unimaginable or self-contradictory, the story ends here. It implies, as Kant says, thesis: that Berkeley's idealism is inevitable if we assume that the things themselves have spatial properties!
Nagel: the whole idealism becomes a hypothesis. There is something wrong with insisting that we had a bare idea of ​​our position in an consciousness-independent world, while arguing the logical possibility of something that goes beyond it.
PutnamVsKant: (elsewhere) from the fact that we cannot recognize the world as such does not follow that it must be completely different from what we do recognize.

I 146
NagelVsKant: we note that our unrepentant empirical and scientific thinking unabatedly prevails even against Kant's skepticism. Kant is implausible for empirical reasons and thus simply implausible.
III 126
NagelVsKant: the step towards objectivity reveals how things are in themselves and not how they appear to be. If that is true, then the objective picture always omits something.

II 54
Ethics/Law/Moral/God/Theology/Nagel: an act does not become wrong by the fact that God exists. Murder is wrong per se and thus prohibited by God. (>Eutyphro). Not even the fear of punishment provides the proper motives of morality. Only the knowledge that it is bad for the victim.
NagelVsKant: categorical imperative: we could say that we should treat others considerately so that do likewise by us. That is nothing but good advice. It is only valid in as far as we believe that our treatment of others will have an impact on how they treat us.
Nagel: as a basis of ethics, nothing else is in question than a direct interest in the other.
II 55
Nagel: there is a general argument against inflicting damage on others which is accessible to anyone who understands German: "Would you like it if someone else did that to you?"
II 56
If you admit that you had something against someone else doing to you what you just did to him, you admit that he had a reason not to do it to you. Question: what is this reason? It cannot be anchored in the particular person.
II 57
It is simply a matter of consequence and consistency. We need a general point of view that any other person can understand.
II 58
Problem: this must not mean that you always ask if the money for the movie ticket would bring more happiness into the world if it was given to someone else. Because then you should no longer care more for your friends and family than for any stranger.
II 59
Question: are right and wrong the same for everyone?
II 60
Right/Wrong/Ethics/Morality/Nagel: if actions depend on motives and motives can be radically different in humans, it looks as if there could be no universal right and wrong for each individual. The possible solutions, all of which are not very convincing:
1) you could say: Although the same things for everyone are wrong or right, not everyone has a reason to do what is right and not to do what is wrong.
Only people with the "right moral motives" have a reason.
Vs: it is unclear what it would mean that it was wrong for someone to kill, but that he has no reason not to do it. (Contradiction).
2) you could say that the reasons do not depend on the actual motives of the people. They are rather reasons that modify our motives if they are not the right ones.
Vs: it is unclear what the reasons may consist in that do not depend on motives. Why not do something if no one desire prevents you from doing it?
II 61
3) you could say that morality is not universal. I.e. that someone would only be bound by morality if he had a specific reason to act like this, with the reason generally depending on how strongly you care for others. Vs: while making a psychologically realistic impression this conflicts with the idea that moral rules apply for everyone.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Kant Nozick Vs Kant II 12
Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible.
How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible.
One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant).

II 110
Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution:
II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception."
NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he?
2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment.
3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff.
II 112
A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property:
1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick"
2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that.
I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective.
Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it.
Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem:
1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring.
People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you,
II 113
but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ!
Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring!

II 318
Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance).
What are actions to be connected to?
Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best").
Then we need to know the relevant facts as well.
II 319
Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions:
(1) Action A is correct
(2) S does A on purpose (intentionally)
(III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally.
(IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A.
Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar:
"Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger.
Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others".
then:
correctness:
(3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A
(4) if A were mandatory, S would do A.
"the best":
(1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum)
(2) S does A intentionally
(3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A
(4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A.
II 320
So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present.
Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway.
NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4).
In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different.
E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods).
Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness.
Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions:
A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4).

II 352
Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result.
How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation?
II 353
Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused.
2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason
3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source,
II 354
but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) ​​Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature.
Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature?
Could external sources not be as binding for us?
Why should I want to be moral?
Do I have to wish to be happy?
Why should I want to be rational?
"Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature".
Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult.
"Your nature, that is you."
If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah?
"But you have no choice, you had to be what you are."
So, that is what you offer me as freedom.
Objective morality seems to be something inevitable.
Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows:
"Do this if you wish to be rational"
"Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command).
Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us.
II 355
Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature.
Nozick: but does that not bind us, too?
Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives?
NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear.
Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?"
Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good.
Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part!
Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.).

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Kant Peirce Vs Kant James I 68
Sign/thinking/thought/PeirceVsKant: Vs construction by the >transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method which enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce, every thought is a sign.

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011
Kant Popper Vs Kant Kanitscheider I 440
Infinite/Space/Time/Antinomies/PopperVsKant: Solution: all elapsed time intervals (for example, seconds) and all future points in time can be conceived both as a potentially infinite sequence on the other hand, and as infinite sets of periods. >Causality/Kant, Time/Kant, <Space/Kant. Therein lies the difference between past and future and the direction of the arrow of time.
Kanitscheider: but this difference does not affect the difference between the potentially and the actually infinite:
I 441
EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "before" and "later" can certainly relate to states before a fixed time t0 without assuming that all these states have really existed! Just as we can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even though we know that this temperature cannot be reached.
I 442
Scriven, Michael: Thesis: no verifiable statement can be made on the finite age of the universe: To find the meaning of the "temporal origin of the world" we have to depart from what we mean by
"Nothing exists at time T1",
because this is the only way the sentence:
"Time T2 is the first moment when something exists" can be understood.
E.g. "time without things" is like "color without object", "movement without a body".
       Solution/Scriven: meaning and verifiability must be kept apart! Our understanding fails at the latter. But we can certainly relate meaningfully to any point in the past, because our time scale has no zero. Neither from "time without things", nor from "time before the first thing" any empirical information can be expected.
I 443
Origin/Universe/Kanitscheider: the question of the finite or infinite age of the world is not empirically decidable. Temporal infinity cannot be defended by means of logic, but only through the success of a model.        Of course, we have well-functioning models with singularity, which can be shifted in time.
I 444
But even the models with the geodesic incompleteness (see above) never have an edge, i.e. the geodesists have no starting point. There are always precursors which are, however, ever more crowded.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Kant Putnam Vs Kant VI 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello).
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly.
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary.
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I (c) 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?

I (f) 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
I (f) 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
I (f) 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kant Quine Vs Kant Danto I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.

Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!

Quine VII (b) 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII (b) 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.

Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.

Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
Stroud I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
Stroud I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
Stroud I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Rorty Vs Kant I 166
Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas. >Cartesianism, >dualism.
I 169
Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here).
I 171
Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between persons and >propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box.
I 173
Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us.
RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal.
a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are
b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction!
I 174
Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making.
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual).
VI 256
Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria.
VI 257
This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand.
They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer.
VI 263
Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers.
RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment.
VI 264
RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of ​​"purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre:
Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Russell Vs Kant Rorty I 177
RussellVsKant: Kant was simply mistaken about the nature of mathematics. >Mathematics/Kant.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Sartre Vs Kant Kant I 12
I / Kant: general I (I, which is produced by the morality) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, In I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not necessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason.
Kant I 13/14
The unconditioned: necessary idea of ​​reason: to be able to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The contingent is pointless, it must be disposed of in the moral purification of the self. SartreVsKant: "For forty years I was moved by the Absolute, the Absolute neurosis is gone There remain tasks, countless...".

Rorty II 150
Kant/Sartre/SartreVsKant/Rorty: selbstbetrügerisches Streben nach Gewissheit. (Rorty pro Sartre).

Sart I
J.-P. Sartre
Being and Nothingness 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Searle Vs Kant II 169
SearleVsKant: we do not need an a priori concept of causation, just as we must not have a concept a priori of red. Kant was right in that the experiences have been coming already as causal to us. Cf. >causality/Kant, >a priori/Kant.
III 183
The idea of a reality outside is empty.
III 184
Such realism is not wrong, but ultimately incomprehensible. SearleVsKant: from the fact that all knowledge takes place within a cognitive system simply does not follow that no knowledge is ever direct knowledge of a reality that exists independently of all knowledge. It simply does not follow. Cf. >reality/Kant.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Kant Strawson Vs Kant Rorty VI 359
StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). ---
Strawson V 9
StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. ---
V 16
Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe.
---
V 19
StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. ---
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. ---
V 25
StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". ---
V 37
Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge.
E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas").
StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it?
---
V 29
StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. ---
V 32
Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle.
---
V 33/34
Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. ---
V 35
Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. ---
V 36
Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. ---
V 49
Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening.
---
V 50
StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. ---
V 58
StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills.
Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves.
StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us.
---
V 66
Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite.
---
V 73
StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. ---
V 75
StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? ---
V 83
StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge?
Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made?
E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles.
---
V 84
Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object".
StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two.
---
V 106
Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences.
---
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. ---
V 116
Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one.
---
V 118
Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects.
---
V 124
Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves.
---
V 128
StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. ---
V 157
StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. ---
V 163
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. ---
V 164
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. ---
V 178
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. ---
V 184
Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action.
---
V 194
StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. ---
V 222
Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our".
---
V 249
StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Tugendhat Vs Kant I 359
Object/Kant: the idea of an object only comes about through a "rule" which makes a "connection" of manifold "ideas" "necessary". TugendhatVsKant: misleading: it would have been clearer to speak of "objective connections".
Kant's question, however, is not how we relate to things, but to what extent the connections of our ideas are not merely subjective, but objective.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kant Wittgenstein Vs Kant Brandom I 75
WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. ---
Münch III 327
WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure.

Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
---
Kant I 12
I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. ---
Kant I 13/14
The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. ---
Kant I 14
WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." ---
Putnam III 220
WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed.
Wittgenstein II 35
There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. ---
IV 109
Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kant Verschiedene Vs Kant Kanitscheider I 434
KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible!
Kanitscheider I 441
EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached.
Kant I 28
VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause.
I 47
Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori."
I 49
Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events.
I 53
Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object).
I 52
For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent.
I 66
SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity.
I 67
Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68
I 69
MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods".
I 104
Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls)
RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes.
Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society.
Menne I 28
Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion.
Vaihinger I 333
Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical).
Vollmer I XIV
World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus.





Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Me I
A. Menne
Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997

Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Kant Mackie Vs Kant Stegmüller IV 319
KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism.
IV 320
VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement!
Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking?
Terminology:
Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless.

Stegmüller IV 171
Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made.
Stegmüller IV 323
Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events?
The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time.
metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought.
MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self.

Stegmüller IV 431
God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that.
Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense."
Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations:
1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts,
2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being.
IV 432
MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law.

MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted.
2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible.
Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking.
IV 433
MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason!
Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason.
MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being!
MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment.
The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith)..
Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence.
V 437
MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa!
Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently.
IV 461
Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)!
IV 462
Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations!
Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself.
MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different!
IV 463
autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength.
2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will.
Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense.
Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will).
Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem.
Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so.
IV 464
Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Kant Schopenhauer Vs Kant Berkeley I 236
SchopenhauerVsKant: the place of the thing itself is by no means empty with Berkeley, for the productive spirit in its spontaneity, which we know in ourselves as will, fills this place. Berkeley, however, in God's guarantee of reality, had a means at his disposal that Kant could not accept.
Kant Stroud Vs Kant I 145
Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)).
I 146
StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise.
I 159
Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism.
I 160
Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition.
StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle):
to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental.
I 161
2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions?
a) empirically:
For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that
the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens.
b) transcendental: other language use:
here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth.
((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant).
StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language.
KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible.
I 162
StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism:
Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level?
Why does Kant reject empirical idealism?
((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.)
Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first).
StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us?
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental?
Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true.
2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists:
This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism.
KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence.
Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses.
Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them!
StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something?
StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism?
Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one.
The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently.
Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us".
StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here
again:
I 164
shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken.
StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects.
Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge.
StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained.
Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known?
Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge.
Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.).
Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of.
StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible".
I 165
Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences.
StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic.
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all.
I 166
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description.
Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me.
I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity.
Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism.
I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level!
I 167
Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes.
StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity.
I 168
Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below).
KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Hegel Vs Kant Leibniz I 32
Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
---
Rorty II 153
HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible.
Rorty VI 195
HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism.
VI 203
HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. ---
Vollmer I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress.
This is approximately:
SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Kant Chisholm Vs Kant II 57
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: closer to Kant than most. Also synthetically a priori: Chisholm pro.
II 58
But in terms of the form of the sentences in which s.A. may occur: VsKant: very different ontological framework.
Content:
I. distinction synth./anal.
II. Property theory
III. Involvement of properties (with anal. judgments) ChisholmVsLanguage-related view. IV. Property inclusion and property existence. Result:
SauerVsChisholm: Thesis: neither a conception of sA nor one of the analyticity seem to be fundable with Chisholm’s property theory.
II 60/61
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there exist non-analytical a-priori propositions of the form "All S is P". Synth a priori/VsKant: He gives the E.g.: "Space is three-dimensional", but this is contradicted by Riemann. Kant’s criterion of "strict generality" can therefore not imply the form "All S are P".
II 62
Synth a priori/ChishomVsKant: Much more phenomenological than Kant, who overlooked in fatal restrictedness the material (synthetic) a priori. Husserl: "contingent a priori" (e.g. color sets).
II 76
Analytic/Synthetic/Kant/Sauer: for Kant the distinction serves only to prepare the question: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" That is the question of the "third party" on which reason is based and to recognize the predicate as belonging that is not in the concept of the subject. ChisholmVsKant: asks on the other hand, how truths of reason a priori propositions are possible.
I 77
SauerVsChisholm: it is difficult to see where the specific significance of a s.A. should lie, as he conceived it.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Kant Cavell Vs Kant II 196
Categorical Imperative/CavellVsKant: should better be a Categorical Declarative: a description of what it means to be moral.
II 197
Categorical Declarative: says what you actually do when you are moral. It cannot guarantee that one will not act immorally.

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Kant Leeds Vs Kant I 381f
Relevance/Unambiguity/Role/Explanation/Truth/Leeds: The ambiguity of T does not show, however, that T is not playing an important role, but that other truthlike relations are as important. Analogy to metric: Physics cannot be established in a non-standard spacetime, but it does not mean that explanations which use metric are not explanations. Explanation/LeedsVs: That is a bad analogy: Why physicists prefer a specific statement that there is a well-understood sense in which competing explanations can be equivalently regarded as essential - incorrect statement: "Most sentences of our theory are T".: that is completely empty: Suppose the theory is consistent and complete - then it would follow that it comes out as "true" under different incompatible W predicates - "success" would be to accept just any of the W predicates - if we already accept atomic physics, we do not need W theory that explains why the atomic physics work. Solution/Leeds: The right explanandum is not that some theories work, but that we (accidentally?) have some theories that work – Important Argument: T could still become important: But it would not be a coincidence according to T!
I 384
wrong: To define truth with terms of our method. LeedsVsKant: That would be like his Copernican revolution: We can arbitrary change our scheme. - Problem: 1. then we could no longer say that our induction could also harm us - 2. we could no longer say that our theories are successful because they are true.

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Kant Schlick Vs Kant Wittgenstein I 204
synthetically a priori/Schlick:/SchlickVsKant: "What can you answer a philosopher who thinks that the statements of phenomenology are synthetic judgments a priori?"

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Kant Kanitscheider Vs Kant I 438
Kant: "Cosmological age" is a meaningless term. (>antinomies).
I 439
Antinomies/space/time/cosmology/Kant: asymmetry between past and future: in the past, it is not possible to go through an infinite series of points in time. There must have been a time before the assumption of the beginning of the world. In such an "empty time", however, nothing can arise, since there are no distinguishing features that would prefer existence to non-existence.
I 440
Cosmology/Antinomies/KanitscheiderVsKant: too quickly adopts the absolutist point of view and does not consider the relational one, according to which spacetime itself could have arisen with the first event. Sets: actual infinite.
Follows/Kanitscheider: potentially infinite.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Kant Cantor Vs Kant Thiel I 165
CantorVsKant: "vague, instinctive use of the concept of infinity".

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Kant Vaihinger Vs Kant Vaihinger I42 ff
Def Practical Fiction/Freedom/Vaihinger: it does not correspond to anything in reality, but it is a necessary fiction. False concepts also have the value of an ideal. Ideal/Vaihinger: For example the unity of good and true is an ideal.
Kant/Vaihinger: Freedom: "the idea", i.e. as fiction.
VaihingerVsKant: the reactionary trait, which one also finds elsewhere with Kant, induced him to turn fiction into a hypothesis again, which was then transformed into a dogma by the epigones.
I 77
Thing/Kant/Vaihinger: assumed that the real world consisted of things in themselves, which were understood in mutual influences. VaihingerVsKant: made a hypothesis out of the fiction of the thing itself. (Wrong).
I 148
VaihingerVsKant: what Kant saw in others, he did not see clearly in himself that his thing itself was also a fiction.
I 173
Categories/Tradition/Vaihinger: the original psyche had more categories than today. Their traces can be found in all languages, they are simply analogies. So the categories are by no means innate. They have been applied and selected over the course of time. They have very different analogies in different languages. (VsKant.)

Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Kant Vollmer Vs Kant I 25
VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity!
I 84
Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms.
Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences.
I 103
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge.
He cannot answer the following questions:
How are our categories created?
Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories?
Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others?
Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems:
Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution?
Why can we understand each other?
How is intersubjective knowledge possible?
Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!)
Can they be scientifically justified?
I 193
Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible.
I 196
Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false).
For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws.
I 197
Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to
a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes.
2. Anticipations of Perception
a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes
3. Analogies of Experience
a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances.
4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions).
I 199
VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs).
Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause!
Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs).
Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation.
Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine.
Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them.
VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact.
Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE.
EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct.
2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success.
Kant does not make this distinction.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm.
I 304
Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer).
I 305
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena.
I 306
Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized!
II 48
Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Kripke, S. A. Brandom Vs Kripke, S. A. I 805/806
The legitimacy of a chain of name tokenings depends on how the reference is passed on, just like in an anaphoric chain. Caution: According to Kripke, different beliefs of the users of proper names do not change the reference of those Tokenings as long as the user "specifies that it is used in the name of references common in the community." (> Kripke).
I 965
BrandomVsKripke: That sounds as if one would need to have the concept of reference in order to use an expression in an anaphorically tranferring way. Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! The "Cicero" E.g. shows that not all need to belong to the same chain, but that there is also no need for quasi-names which would play a role that corresponds to quasi-indexical expressions in de-dicto attributions of strong de-re attributions.
Any belief, be it strong or be it weak, can be attributed de-re or de-dicto.
I 807
The fact that the anaphoric analysis does not come into play at Kripke is due to his "Millian" theory of the semantics of proper names. BrandomVsKripke: his front position between Millian and Fregean principle makes it unclear whether (Millian): direct attribution, direct reference, i.e. that it is not permitted to refer back to anything other than the reference.
It also does not seem reasonable to treat other cases like this. "This" and other demonstratives are not really "directly referential" but require implicit sortals.
I 855
BrandomVsKripke: difference descriptive/causally historical is alright, but it gets dark when he is alleged to have shown that these are two ways of looking at the relation of language and consciousness to the world. Because that is not applicable to predicates. Never was a descriptive theory of meaning drawn up by predicates. At least the basal predicates get their reference through connection with the properties. (see BrandomVsKant).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Leibniz, G.W. Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 31
Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1 one can prove it, in a way.:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true.
I 44
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4   So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc.
  Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing.
(see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant)
FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable.


Leibniz I 38f
Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences".
Contrast: Prove by reason.
  I 46
  "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones.
  I 48
  "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning?

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent!
World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning!
Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world!
IV 389
He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason?
2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself?
If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason!
KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency.
Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different.
The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible.
Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist.
IV 392
This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either:
1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them.
2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed!
Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world.
Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through.
MackieVs: that is not true at all!
IV 393
We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Mackie, J. L. Verschiedene Vs Mackie, J. L. Stegmüller IV 435
God/Newman: now there is no earthly person who would fully live up to this role! Belief/MackieVsNewman: arguments seldom create belief, even if they reinforce it.
NewmanVsMackie: in fact, it is rather the actual experience of conscience!
1. it commands legitimately (or authoritatively)
2. it points beyond the actor
3. the sanctions must come from a person, an intelligent being.
MackieVsNewman: 1. This does not lead to infinity attributes of God.
2. One can only agree to either the first or the other two premises.
Dilemma:
a) If conscience is taken as valid, it prescribes certain actions as reasonable. In the action itself this is a "should be done".
In this case one does not need to look beyond the action for a higher being.
IV 436
The fact that regrets, feelings of guilt, etc. occur here is natural: because conscience itself tells us that we should feel this way. In addition, the feelings of guilt appear against a (human) person whom we have treated badly, and not against God. b) If we do not simply accept conscience in this way, but try to interpret it critically, then we actually encounter people, but human and not divine ones. Parents, teachers, institutions, etc.
IV 437
There is either ethical objectivism and intuitionism or a naturalistic psychological interpretation of conscience as better hypotheses. MackieVs moral proofs of God: better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person.
Practical decisions must be based on factual beliefs and not vice versa!
We cannot use what we are inclined to regard as reasonable action as evidence of what is the case.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: difficulty of his moral argument: if a certain practical principle presupposes quite certain factual assertions, then reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have shown the validity of this practical principle if it has not independently proved the validity of the factual assertions in question.





Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Plato Aristotle Vs Plato Bubner I 23
AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king.
Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects.
Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it.
 I 119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
 I 120
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
 I 164
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.
I 184
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". ---
Kanitscheider II 35
Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe.
Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position).
"Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number".
II 36
Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement.
First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified.
World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time.
AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius:
Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help".
Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum.
II 37
Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Platonism Benacerraf Vs Platonism Field II 324
BenacerrafVsPlatonism/Field: standard argument: if there are objects as Platonism accepts them, how should we have an epistemic access to them? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: used an argument against the causal theory of knowledge at the time.
PlatonismVsBenacerraf: therefore attacked causal theory.
Field: but Benacerraf's objection goes much deeper and is independent of causal theory.
Benacerraf: Thesis: a theory can be rejected if it is dependent on the assumption of a massive chance. For example the two statements:´
II 325
(1) John and Judy met every Sunday afternoon last year at different places by chance, (2) they have no interest in each other and would never plan to meet, nor is there any other hypothesis for explanation.
ad (2): should make an explanation by some "correlation" impossible.
Even if (1) and (2) do not contradict each other directly, they are in strong tension with each other. A belief system that represents both would be highly suspicious.
N.B.: but then Platonism is also highly suspicious! Because it postulates an explanation for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and mathematical facts. (>Access, > Accessibility) For example, why do we only tend to believe that p, if p (for a mathematical p). And for this we must in turn postulate a mysterious causal relationship between belief and mathematical objects.
PlatonismVsVs/Field: can claim that there are strong logical connections between our mathematical beliefs. And in fact, in modern times, we can say that we
a) tend to conclude reliably and that the existence of mathematical objects serves that purpose; or
b) that we accept p as an axiom only if p.
FieldVsPlatonism: but this explains reliability again only by some non-natural mental forces.
VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. he "proves too much": if his argument were valid, it would undermine all a priori knowledge (VsKant). And in particular undermine logical knowledge. ("Proves too much").
BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Solution: there is a fundamental separation between logical and mathematical cases. Moreover, "metaphysical necessity" of mathematics cannot be used to block Benacerraf's argument.
FieldVsBenacerraf: although his argument is convincing VsPlatonism, it does not seem to be convincing VsBalaguer. II 326
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): other approach, (influential argument):
1.
For example, there are several ways to reduce the natural numbers to sets: Def natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and each natural number >0 is the set that contains the set that is n-1 as the only element.
Def natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: every natural number n is the set that has as elements the sets that are the predecessors of n.
Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or Neumann's approach "presents things correctly". There is no fact that determines whether numbers are sets.
That is what I call the
Def Structuralist Insight/Terminology/Field: Thesis: it makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. …+…

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Stegmüller Vs Quine, W.V.O. Stegmüller IV 390
Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existential quantifier is controversial!

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Redundancy Theory Kant Vs Redundancy Theory Metz II 486
KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Skepticism Kant Vs Skepticism Stroud I 129
Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable!
Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept.
"Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism.
Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all.
I 130
Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world.
Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors.
Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard.
Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition!
KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition.
KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it.
World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)).
immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371).
Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable.
Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge.
I 132
At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable.
Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives!
I 140
Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects.
I 141
Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible!
Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion.
Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes.
Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects).
I 142
We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge).
I 146
Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations).
I 147
Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases.
Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion).
KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions.
I 148
Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible:
no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us.
Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism.
KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge.
Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena.
KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false.
Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life.
I 159
Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things.

I 168
Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework).
KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Skepticism Quine Vs Skepticism Stroud I 231
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: what is wrong with it in Quine's view? How can it be avoided? Naturalism/Quine: Solution: reflection on knowledge takes place within science, not beyond it.
QuineVsSkeptcism: Thesis: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual possibilities of deception. But skepticism is not inconsistent in itself.
"Overreaction"/Stroud: it would be an overreaction if I rejected the entire science because of certain insecurities. E.g. if my car did not start on a particularly cold day and I scrapped it because of that, it would be an overreaction. But from the simple fact that deceptions sometimes happen we cannot infer that deceptions always happen or that we know nothing about the world. ((s) This is Quine's position!).
I 232
Skepticism/Stroud: comes into play when all sensory experience is compatible with competing theories. And that would be no overreaction. E.g. If I cannot say on the basis of my sensory experience whether it's a goldfinch, it is not an overreaction to say I do not know that it's a goldfinch. Stroud: it looks as if the skepticism is not as well confirmed as other views.
ScepticismQuine/Stroud: what Quine calls like this is far from where Descartes gets at the end of his first meditation.
DescartesVsQuine: does not claim that we should base our predictions on dreams. And if he rejects science as a source of knowledge, it does not mean that we cannot make predictions any more if we adhered to the science.
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: Quine speaks of future experience that could possibly support the skeptic, as if these doubts were not justified in this precise moment!
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not, is not something that will be decided by future experience or through experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine does - then we already know what future experience will be like! We will always be up against the question of the surplus of our rich output over the lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted with an experience today that undermines our belief, then skepticism is justified today. But: Important argument: it was just as justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with reductio ad absurdum. We'll have to rebuild the ship out at sea. The traditional epistemologist can saw out (identify!) the piece of the ship which represents the lean input.
I 248
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: Quine's idea is that if we deprive philosophy of its alleged "external position" that is sufficient to exclude that we arrive at a completely skeptical result in terms of our knowledge. That comes down to the naturalized as the only possible theory of knowledge. StroudVsQuine: I have shown, however, that this does not work as long as we understand our own knowledge as a projection.
This corresponds to Kant's objection:
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general separation between
a) everything we learn through the senses on one side,
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would exclude us forever from knowledge (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us with no independent reason to assume that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all information of external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from it? Do I not just contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment, and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he may also know - a lot of things that happen in the world, beyond those events. He himself will also know little about these events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would not come to any beliefs about the world at all.
I 250
Consciousness/Quine: we avoid the issue of consciousness by directly talking about the input.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Spinoza, B. Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. Leibniz I 31
Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger.
---
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking.
Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic.
HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history.

Rorty II 112
Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Goodman Vs Various Authors I 81
GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties.
II Preamble Putnam IX
GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of ​​an ontological basement independent from our theorizing
II 10
It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science.
II 67
The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German.
II 70
(s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music.
III 81
Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything.
III 224
GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself.
III 228
GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Various Authors Mackie Vs Various Authors Stegmüller IV 399
"Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds!
MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy.
IV 400
Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason?
2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable!
God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems:
1. Has God simply emerged with the time?
2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced!
3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again.
Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume:
a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and
b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable.

IV 401
Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not.
a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses.
b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself!

Stegmüller
IV 447
Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole.
MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act.

IV 472
Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive.
Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent.
MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all.

IV 271
Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic.

Stegmüller IV 502
Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition!
When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe.
Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life.
IV 503
Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct.
Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld.
The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing.
IV 504
According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume.
Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions.
Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense.
IV 504/505
Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes!
PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements.
MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood!
IV 506
MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism.
Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference!

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Various Authors Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors Kanitscheider I 433
Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics:
Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities.
LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today).
Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object.
I 434
NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable!
NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible!
Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle.
I 435
Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size?
Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number.
II 102
Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement.
II 103
Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche.
2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled.
3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness.
4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states.
(Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104).
I 423
Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive.
I 424
If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative.
Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years.
KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless.
I 296
Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Various Authors Vollmer Vs Various Authors II 169
Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then?
II 170
Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method.
II 97
DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually!
Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage.
Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn).
II 98
VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated.
2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated".
Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence.
I 40
VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it.
I 293
VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject.
VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong.
VollmerVsProjection Theory
II 90
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory.
VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties).
II 92
Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing.
II 93
VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory:
System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure.
Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon).
II 94
None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks.
I 282
VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism.
Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Vollmer, G. Kant Vs Vollmer, G. I 206
KantiansVsEvolutionary epistemology/EE/KantianismVsEvolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: if Kant is right, the limits of factual knowledge coincide with the limits of sensory experience.
Now, if the evolutionary epistemology detects a match with the reality, how can it claim to know what the objective reality truly is?
I 207
VollmerVsKantians: This transcendental argument is wrong. The earth seems to be stationary, yet it moves. The space seems Euclidean, but it is not. Therefore, our knowledge goes beyond the perception via our senses.
According to Kant, quarks, elementary particles, atoms, molecules, electromagnetic fields, neutron stars, black holes, quasars, etc. should never be objects of empirical science since they cannot be seen.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
eliminat. Materialism Pro Frank I 578
Rorty per eliminative materialism: is linked to Feyerabend - RortyVsKant, RortyVsDescartes
Fra I 584
Foucault: man disappears, Rorty: the mental disappears).
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mathematics Kant Field I 79
Def Logicism / Field: is the thesis that mathematics is part of logic. This is   VsKant: who denies that mathematics is analytic, because the calculations are synthetic. And for the calculations we need the numbers as entities.
LogicismVsKant - KantVsLogicism.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Moore s Hands Stroud, B. I 83
Existence proof/Skepticism/E.g. Moores hands/Problem of the external world/Moore/Stroud: (Moore Proof of the external world, 1959, 127ff "PP"). MooreVsKant: Moore thinks that he can deliver the proof of existence.
I 108
Stroud: it is not always possible to reject a denial of knowledge by referring to a particular known thing.
Realism Stroud, B. I 151
Metaphysical Realism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that there are things that are independent of us proves to be empirically true. Because of the empirical distinction between independent things (stones) and things dependent on us (dreams). B. (empirical epistemic realism).
"Independent"/epistemic/Kant/Stroud: the same can be said about the epistemic aspect: e.g. we distinguish in the experience between things we perceive directly (e.g. in daylight at medium distance) and those we perceive indirectly (e.g. via mirror or screen).
I 152
Solution (see below): even here there is a single distinction: the concept of "direct" perception should then not itself be understood as "empirical". The thesis of empirical realism is then itself a -"transcendental" thesis. Solution/Kant/Stroud: if he uses the words "dependently", "independently" and "transcendental", he is an idealist.
Transcendental/Stroud: a transcendental thesis cannot be empirically confirmed or refuted.
...I 163
StroudVsKant: this seems to be the thesis of the "epistemic priority" again:

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Morality Oakeschott, M. Rorty III 106
Moral/Oakeshott/Rorty: These »eine Moral ist wieder ein System allgemeiner Prinzipien noch Regeln, sondern eine Volkssprache. (VsKant).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Supernature Santayana, G. Rorty VI 263
Def "Supernaturalismus"/Santayana: die Verwechslung von Idealen und Macht. RortyVsKant: das ist der einzige Grund hinter Kants These, es sei nicht nur freundlicher, sondern auch vernünftiger, Fremde nicht auszuschließen.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997