Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anthropomorphism Jonas Brocker I 618
Anthropomorphism/BirnbacherVsJonas/Jonas: When Jonas speaks of nature, he uses terms and metaphors taken from the realm of human practice: His teleology sets purposes of nature as if it wanted something or as if it ((s) acted as "wrong subject"). This is an anthropomorphism (1). Brocker: The methodical admissibility of this figure of thought is contested by many in contemporary philosophy. ((s) This is about attributing quasi-human traits of an acting or wanting subject to nature.)


1.Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, S. 146.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Democracy Jonas Brocker I 611
Democracy/Politics/Ecology/JonasVsDemocracy/Jonas/Brocker: In order to make the "no to non-existence" (1) of human and nature effective, Jonas would rather rely on political elites (2) and state coercive means than on the power of argument in a deliberative democracy in which the citizens themselves bring about the necessary changes. (Context: See Ethics/Jonas, Ecological Imperative/Jonas).
Brocker I 612
Democracy/Jonas: must at least be "temporarily (...) suspended". (3) Responsibility/BrockerVsJonas: here it remains open how "responsibility" is to be assumed in concrete terms. (See Responsibility/Jonas.)


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 250.
2. Ibid. p. 263
3. Hans Jonas, »Naturwissenschaft versus Natur-Verantwortung. Hans Jonas im Gespräch mit Eike Gebhardt«, in: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.), Ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 211.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Duty Jonas Brocker I 608
Duties/Generational Justice/Responsibility/Jonas: Why should the living today be responsible for the future of humanity? According to Jonas, there is no duty towards individual future generations to guarantee their existence: the sought-after and "necessary" new ethic of the future is outside the individual legal obligation field, because there can be no reciprocity with individual future generations, since they do not yet exist (1). Solution/Jonas: there is a commitment to humanity as a whole, a duty to preserve humanity. This should be thought in the form of a categorical imperative, as "an unconditional duty of humanity to exist" (2). See Ethics/Jonas.
Brocker I 615
Intuitionism/Jonas/Brocker: Jonas argues intuitively: the infant serves him as an example of the "self affirmation of being" (3). The sight of a helpless infant is sufficient to convey directly the realization of a duty to care for it. For Jonas, this is an "ontic paradigm": the coincidence of existence and value. (4) See Being/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Existence/Jonas.
Brocker I 616
WernerVsJonas: the example of the infant is not culturally invariant. (5) Example: In Sparta, an infant did not trigger a general sense of responsibility. Problem/BrockerVsJonas: Future generations, not yet born, just cannot appeal to our commitment in the same way as the infant in Jonas' example.
VsJonas: Ultimately, according to Jonas, even a person who remains childless violates universal duties, since he/she does not guarantee the preservation of humanity.
VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? With bacteria? In cancer cells?


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 84
2. Ibid. p. 80
3. Ibid. p. 234-242.
4. Ibid. p. 235.
5. Micha H. Werner, „Dimensionen der Verantwortung. Ein Werkstattbericht zur Zukunftsethik von Hans Jonas“. In: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.) ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München, 1994, p. 303-338.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Ecological Imperative Jonas Brocker I 609
Ecological Imperative/Jonas: based on Kant's Categorical Imperative, Jonas develops an "ontological imperative" based on being itself. JonasVsKant: his categorical imperative is located differently. Def ontological imperative/Jonas: "Act in a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth. "Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite survival of mankind." (1)
Elsewhere, this Jonasian imperative is also called "ecological imperative".
Another formulation by Jonas: "Act in a way that the consequences of your actions are compatible with a future humane existence, i.e. with the claim of humanity to survive for an unlimited time". (2)
Brocker: The formulations show that Jonas is not only concerned with physical survival, but also with the quality of this life ("real human life").
(s)VsJonas: the formulations are, if one does not want to call them circular anyway, weaker than the ones by Kant, because they do not refer to a principle.
Solution/Jonas: Jonas makes demands that should determine individual and collective life from now on:
"Heuristics of Fear"/Jonas: Starting from a "Heuristics of Fear" (3), everyone must gather as much knowledge as possible about the conceivable consequences and "distant effects" of their actions before taking any action (4). The bad prognosis must always be given priority over the good prognosis.
For ethical reasons see Teleology/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Being/Jonas.


1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, 75-86.
3. Jonas 1979, p. 8, 64
4. Ibid. p. 9, 28.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Existence Jonas Brocker I 612
Existence/Jonas: Jonas' Ecological Imperative (see Ecological Imperative/Jonas) states that we "do not have the right to choose or even dare the non-existence of future generations because of the existence of the present. Why we do not have this right, why on the contrary we have an obligation towards what is not yet and 'in itself' and does not have to be, at least what is non-existent has no claim to existence, is theoretically not easy at all and" - he typically adds - "perhaps not at all to justify without religion" (1). Philosophy/Jonas/Brocker: Thus Jonas clearly expresses that he does not consider a philosophical argument in the present question
Brocker I 613
sufficient or compelling enough to change beliefs and behaviour in the long term. BrockerVsJonas: this is a performative contradiction to Jonas' own actions. Furthermore, it is questionable how religious foundations, which Jonas assumes have largely disappeared (2), can achieve this. (3)
Existence/Jonas: simply because humanity exists, it is worth preserving. (4) The existence of humanity should not be regarded as a contingent biological fact, as an accidental result of evolutionary development processes, but as a setting of value from nature. See also Intergenerational Justice/Jonas.
Problem/JonasVsKant, one must, despite Kant, allow for the possibility of rational metaphysics.
Solution/Jonas: the question, why something is at all and not nothing, must be reformulated to what it is worth to exist.
Brocker I 614
Teleology/Solution/JonasVsAristoteles: we must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (5) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (6)

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36.
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, S. 76, 80.
3. Vgl. Oelmüller, Willi, »Hans Jonas. Mythos – Gnosis – Prinzip Verantwortung«, in: Stimmen der Zeit 206, 1988, p. 349-350.
4. Jonas 1979, p. 92-100.
5. Ibid. p. 138
6. Ibid. p. 142f.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Generational Justice Jonas Brocker I 613
Generational Justice/Ethics/Justification/Jonas: Jonas' thesis: traditional ethics cannot prove why current happiness should not be bought with the misfortune or non-existence of future generations and that "the series [....] should continue" (1). This would require a different foundation of ethics than Kant, for example, knew how to give. In order to be able to deliver them, Jonas leads the triad "Purpose - Value - Duty" into the field. Being/Should/Ancient Philosophy/Brocker: for ancient philosophy, unlike for modernism since the Enlightenment, there was a close connection between "being" and "should". (See Naturalistic Fallacy).
Jonas: ties in when he says that becuase humanity exists, it is worth preserving. (2)
Brocker I 618
WolfVsJonas: Jonas' reasoning shows that he himself wants to grant future generations a right to be preserved (by us) only if they correspond to our present values (or rather to the values accepted by Jonas). (3) Contradiction/BrockerVsJonas: but if we are not allowed to technologically shape the world of action of future generations in our image (see Technology/Jonas): Why are we allowed to do this ethically?


1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 35.
2. Ibid. p. 92-100.
3. Cf. Jean-Claude Wolf „Hans Jonas. Eine naturphilosophische Begründung der Ethik“, in: Anton Hpgli/Poul Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Bd. 1, Reinbek 1992, p. 228.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Hypostasis Kant Brocker I 618
Hypostasis/Objectification/Reification/Nature/Humanity/Action/Kant: According to Kant, "humanity" or "nature" are mere hypostases and as such cannot be a correlate of a human action (cf. Birnbacher (1)). Hypostasis/Kant: the act of reifying something that exists only in thought, as it were, under the hand ("subreption") and attributing to it, wrongly, the same quality as a real object: in his view, an illicit philosophical operation.
Brocker: KantVsJonas: see Values/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Naturalistic Fallacy/Jonas.


1. Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, S. 145.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Hypostasis Jonas Brocker I 618
Hypostasis/Objectification/Reification/Nature/Humanity/Action/Kant: According to Kant, "humanity" or "nature" are mere hypostases and as such cannot be a correlate of a human action (cf. Birnbacher (1)). Hypostasis/Kant: the act of reifying something that exists only in thought, as it were, under the hand ("subreption") and attributing to it, wrongly, the same quality as a real object: in his view, an illicit philosophical operation.
Brocker: KantVsJonas: see Values/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Naturalistic Fallacy/Jonas.


1.Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, p. 145.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Naturalistic Fallacy Jonas Brocker I 617
Naturalistic Fallacy/Being/Should/Jonas: Jonas expressly declares that the "separation of 'being' and 'should' (according to which nature is value-free factuality, from which no principles, norms or values can be derived) represents a philosophical dogma to which he does not want to submit. (1) VsJonas: it is controversial in research whether Jonas could be accused of "naturalistic fallacy". (2)(3)(4)
Gethmann-Siefert: defends Jonas against this criticism, but accuses him of a "circular justification". (5)
Brocker I 618
Karl-Otto Apel: defends Jonas against the accusation of a naturalistic fallacy, but accuses him of violating Kant's verdict against "dogmatic metaphysics". (6)

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 92f.
2. Anna Claas, Lässt sich das ‚Prinzip Verantwortung‘ doch noch verteidigen? Versuch der Begründung des ‚Prinzips Verantwortung‘ von Hans Jonas auf der Basis der diskursiven und neo-pragmatistischen Ethik von Albrecht Wellmer, Marburg 2011, p. 14, 80-82.
3. Wolfgang-Erich Müller, Hans Jons, Philosoph der Verantwortung, Darmstadt 2008, p. 210ff.
4. Wolfgang Kuhlmann, „‘Prinzip der Verantwortung‘ versus Diskursethik“ in: Dietrich Böhler (hg.) Ethik für die Zukunft, IM Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 282
5. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, ‚Ethos und metaphysisches Erbe Zu den Grundlagen von Hans Jonas‘ Ethik der Verantwortung“, in: Herbert Schnädelbach/Geert Keil (Hg.) Philosophie der Gegenwart – Gegenwart der Philosophie, Hamburg 1993, p. 190-195, 200.
6. Karl-Otto Apel, „Die ökologische Krise als Herausforderung für die Diskursethik“, in: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.) Ethik für die Zukunft, Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 389.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Technology Jonas Brocker I 612
Technology/Jonas/Brocker: Ultimately, Jonas does not develop precise criteria for how a technology is to be applied, but leaves it at the question of "whether at all": according to Jonas, the mere possibility that a technology could pose a threat to the biosphere is obviously sufficient to prohibit it. (1) See also Ethics/Jonas, Democracy/Jonas. BrockerVsJonas: a deliberative democracy ((s) against which Jonas is also opposed) would be best able to come to terms with the ambivalences of technology.
Brocker I 619
BrockerVsJonas: Contradiction: if we have to slow down our technology according to Jonas (1), for example to reduce the emission of harmful climate gases, we would have to expand our technology at the same time, in order to protect humanity, for example, against comet impacts that threaten the population of our species in the same way.

1. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, p. 83.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Values Jonas Brocker I 614
Values/Moral/Jonas: Jonas represents a moral realism for which there is objective value recognition. Axiology is part of his ontology (1. according to which there are values in nature that commit us directly. The "should" is founded "in the being" of nature itself (2). The "call," according to Jonas, comes from the outside, not - as with Kant - from (pure practical) reason (3). The human is consequently "placed under a duty to be, as a mandatary, so to speak, of a will of nature" (4). See Ethics/Jonas, Teleology/Jonas, Being/Jonas.
Brocker I 617
VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? In bacteria? In cancer cells? See Duties/Jonas.

1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, S. 153
2. Ebenda S. 8
3. Ebenda S. 164, 168-171
4. Hans Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung, Frankfurt/M. 1985.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018