Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Democracy Johnson Morozov I 107
Democracy/Politics/Steven Johnson/Morozov: Steven Johnson celebrates in his Future Perfect (1) the advantages of switching to what he calls "liquid democracy": In a traditional democracy, citizens elect representatives to legislate on their behalf; in a liquid democracy, citizens do not have to vote for representatives - they can simply transfer their votes to those who, in their opinion, know better about the issue.
I 108
Morozov: the idea is not new. Lewis Carroll already suggested something similar. (2) MorozovVsJohnson: this does not take into account the fact that the legislative process also includes discussion, negotiations, compromises and reflection.
I 109
The model of Johnson and Miller (3) assumes that politics is only a kind of referendum. But such referendums only paralyze democracy (4).
I 110
MorozovVsJohnson: he seems to think, just as we ask our friends where best to eat, we would do the same with political decisions. How strange!

1. St. Johnson, Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age (New York: Penguin, 2012), 170
2. Lewis Carroll, The Principles of Parliamentary Representation (London: Harrison and Sons, 1884).
3. James C. Miller, “A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process,” Public Choice 7, no. 1 (1969): 107– 113.
4. see Yannis Papadopoulos, “Analysis of Functions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives,” Politics & Society 23 (December 1995): 421– 448.

JohnsonSt I
Steven Johnson
Future Perfect: The Case For Progress In A Networked Age New York 2012


Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014
Determinates/ Determinables Bigelow I 51
Definition Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently strong in them. For example, mass. Definition Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (simultaneously). For example a mass of 2.0 kg.
Both together show what is common and what is different. (> Problem of Quantities, Participation/Plato).
Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: the approach is still incomplete:
---
I 52
Either the relation between determinates and determinables is objective or it is not objective. A) objective: if it is objective, we need an explanation in which it exists.
B) non-objective: then it is arbitrary to assert that objects that have different Determinates fall under that same Determinable.
W.E. Johnson: our approach is based on one of Johnson's: in it, both are Determinables and also Determinate properties of individuals.
Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: we can start with a special property for each individual (Determinate, e.g. color shading). Then we define the common: color, this commonality is a property of 2nd level
Definition 2nd degree property/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. the commonality of all shades of a color.
---
I 53
Hierarchy: can then be continued upwards. E.g. to have a color at all is one level higher. Level/degree:
E.g. pain: is having a 2nd level property.
Functional role/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a commonality, so there is a property 2nd level to have a certain functional role.
Hierarchy: then consists of three sets of properties.
1. Property 1st level of individuals. All other properties supervene on them.
2. Properties of properties 1st level: = properties of 2nd degree (commonality of properties)
3. Properties 2nd level of individuals: = the property to have that or that property of the 1st level which has that or that property of the 2nd degree.
Problem of Quantities/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter:
1. Objects with different Determinates are different because each has a property of 1st level that another thing does not have.
2. they are the same because they have the same property of 2nd level.
Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: are in close logical relations: to have a Determinate entails to have the corresponding Determinable.
---
I 54
But not vice versa! Having a Determinable does not require possession of a particular Determinate! But it requires some Determinate from the range. BigelowVsJohnson: he could not explain the asymmetry.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: properties of 2nd level.
Problem: our theory is still incomplete!
Problem: to explain why quantities are gradual. This does not mean that objects are the same and different at the same time.
New: the problem that we can also say exactly how much they differ. Or, for example, two masses are more similar than two others.
Plato: Plato solves this with the participation.
Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution: > Relational theories.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Berkeley, G. Verschiedene Vs Berkeley, G. I 218
Reality/Existence/Ontology/Samuel JohnsonVsBerkeley: his solution also seems paradox. In particular, it violates everyday experience. ((s) not perception, because it could be the same. Experience).
I 219
Example Johnson: hit a stone with his foot. VsJohnson: at most showed that he had misunderstood Berkeley's thesis. Berkeley had such objections in mind from the beginning.
Berkeley: also according to his immaterial hypothesis, e.g. "the horse stands in the stable", "the wall is white", etc.




Russell, B. Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. Carnap VI 58
Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein.
(Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements).
E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal":
both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement).
"The class of humans is included in the class of mortals".
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Tugendhat I 453
Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water.
I 470
Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability.
Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities.
Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole.
Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals).
E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function.
---
Wittgenstein I 80
Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic.
This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class.
This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world.
I 81
1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects.
N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else:
I 82
The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality).
I 86
Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects.
I 94ff
This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45).
I 95
According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use).
I 107
Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world.
They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data.
I 108
For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also:
Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world".
I 114
Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena."
I 115
Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects."
Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul".
I 143
Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object."
I 144
Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence.
I 286
Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory.
I 287
And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images.
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Wittgenstein II 35
Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally.
WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original.
---
Wittgenstein II 74
Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions.
2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal."
Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x).
II 75
But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans.
II 79
Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear.
II 80
WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke.
II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning.
II 123
Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy.
II 137
Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent.
All S are P: (x) gx > .fx
No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx
This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns.
II 152
WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles.
WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square."
Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"?
II 157
Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.
Wittgenstein II 306
Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive.
Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such.
II 307
We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man.
Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things.
This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties.
A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property).
II 308
WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them.
That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name.
II 309
What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square?
II 311
Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Various Authors Bigelow Vs Various Authors I 222
Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus assumption/Qualification/Qualified law/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if there are no other disturbances": 1) Problem: this threatens to let a law become a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move in this and that way, unless they do not." 2) Problem: The range of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing is included by it anymore. On the other hand it will be said that a law has no positive instances at all if one interprets it strictly. ((s)> Cartwright). Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the mystery can be solved by understanding how laws contain modalities. Def Laws/law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about possibilia.
I 204
Property theory/World properties/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: contradictory predicates: do not correspond to any properties. E.g. round and square.
I 210
Accessibility: such possible worlds are then not accessible for one another. One is nomically impossible from the standpoint of the other. VsProperty theory/VsWorld-properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is faced with the accusation of circularity, but we hope to resolve the objection.
I 53
Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: stand in close logical relations: having a D-ate (determinate) entails having the corresponding D-able (determinable).
I 54
But not vice versa! Having a D-able does not require possession of a certain D-ate! But it does require possession of some D-ate from the area. BigelowVsJohnson, World properties: but this could not explain the asymmetry.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 2nd order properties.
Problem: our theory is still incomplete!.
Problem: explaining why quantities are gradual. And this is not about whether objects are the same and different at the same time.
New: The problem that we can also still say exactly E.g. how much they differ. Or E.g. that two masses are more similar than two others.
Plato: Plato solves this with participation.
Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution.
Bigelow I 234
Natural necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Bigelow/Pargetter: Dramatic turn Vs Natural necessity! Also later Wittgenstein.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990