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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Groupthink | Janis | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/Janis: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. Janis Thesis: Although Janis concluded that the CIA’s faulty planning and lack of effective communication was partially at fault for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he diagnosed the primary problem as stemming from social psychological processes operating within the president’s core advisory group. (Janis; 1972(1), 1982(2)). Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(3), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. Haslam I 184 Def Group think/Janis: ‘Groupthink’ [is] a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1972(1): 9) Janis thesis: a specific set of antecedent conditions can lead the members of a group to seek consensus with one another instead of engaging in careful and deliberative decision-making. Group think model/Janis: a) the antecedent conditions expected to produce this consensus-seeking psychology, (b) a set of observable symptoms that should arise from it, which in turn result in (c) a set of defective decision-making processes. The model suggests that these defective processes tend, much of the time, to produce suboptimal collective decisions. Antecedent conditions: highly directive (e.g., charismatic or authoritarian) leaders, limited information search, and insulation of the group from outsiders with the necessary expertise to make sound decisions. Especially important: important: a strong sense of group cohesion (i.e., a strong collective bond of some sort) and a context of high stress or crisis, especially likely when confronting a complex and consequential decision. ^Haslam I 185 Groupthink symptoms: (Janis 1971)(3) Over-estimation of group worth: 1.Illusion of invulnerability 2. Belief in morality of ingroup Closed-mindedness: 3. Collective rationalization 4. Stereotypic views of outgroups Pressures toward uniformity: 5. Self-censorship 6. Illusion of unanimity 7. Pressure placed on deviants 8. Mindguarding Problems: decision-making objectives are inadequately discussed, only a few alternative Haslam I 186 solutions are entertained, originally preferred solutions are not critically examined, initially discarded solutions are not re-examined, experts are not consulted, advice is solicited in a selective and biased fashion, and the group fails to develop contingency plans. Solution/Janis: group leaders should encourage all group members to be ‘critical evaluators’ such that they are able to freely express doubts or objections. Additionally, group leaders should avoid stating their initial preferences at the onset of any decision-making venture(…). Janis advocated for the creation of several independent groups, each with their own leader, to solve the same problem. (…) group members’ opinions should be frequently challenged, either by allowing different external experts to attend meetings, or by designating select members to serve as temporary ‘devil’s advocates.’ Finally, Janis stressed the importance of ‘second-chance’ meetings in which group decisions could be reconsidered one last time before being settled or made public. Haslam I 187 Examples for groupthink: the invasion of North Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and the Vietnam War escalation. Examples not exhibiting groupthink: the Marshall Plan and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Haslam I 189 Groups/Janis: thesis: the only goal of decision-making groups is to engage in measured deliberation to make accurate and logical decisions. VsJanis: Groups may have other goals in mind, such as gaining ‘satisfaction with and commitment to the decision,’ ‘improved implementation by group members’, or even ‘diffused responsibility for poor decisions’ (McCauley, 1998(4): 148). >Group think/psychological theories. KramerVsJanis: Roderick Kramer (1998)(5) suggested that at least some of Janis’ case examples are better understood as flawed decisions arising from politicothink rather than groupthink. President Kennedy (…) sought to make accurate decisions regarding what was the best political decision (e.g., would be popular domestically) to the detriment of making the best possible military decision. In other words, careful appraisal of choices Haslam I 190 (i.e., non-groupthink symptoms) in one domain may produce apparent groupthink in another. FullerVsJanis/AldagVsJanis: Sally Fuller and Ramon Aldag (1998)(6) argue that the easy popularity of the model has distracted social psychologists. They claim that researchers have focused on testing the original parameters of the groupthink model at the expense of asking broader questions about group decision-making. (…) – ironically – some of the best evidence for the groupthink model emerges from examination of the way in which groupthink research has itself been conducted. >Group think/psychological theories. 1. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1971) ‘Groupthink’, Psychology Today, November, 43–6: 74–6. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 6. Fuller, S.R. and Aldag, R.J. (1998) ‘Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a quarter century of the groupthink phenomenon’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 163–84. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | McCauley | Haslam I 191 Group think/VsJanis/McCauley: possibilities for group think are: a) uncertainty reduction, is largely consistent with Janis’ (1972(1), 1982(2)) original formulation. In this case, groups may come to premature consensus on a decision due to a desire to avoid the collective ‘discomfort of uncertainty about an important issue’ (McCauley, 1998(3): 153). (…) group members seek refuge in a shared reality, often in the form of premature consensus. b)‘a desire to avoid the discomfort of frank appraisal of ideas that have individuals attached to them’ (1998(3): 153). In this case, disagreement among peers is awkward and may be socially costly. McCauley (1998)(3) believed that evidence supporting the social discomfort account was stronger than that for uncertainty reduction. >Conformity. Haslam I 192 McCauley thesis: the social discomfort mechanism allows for a prediction about the type of group or consensus that should give rise to groupthink. Specifically, groups founded on friendly relations and cohesion based on personal attractiveness should be most likely to create a situation in which individual members are motivated to remain on good terms with their peers. McCauley drew on laboratory evidence to support his hypothesis, most notably an old experiment by Back (1951)(4) in which high (vs. low) levels of cohesion were manipulated in a variety of ways. >Group Cohesion/Psychological theories, >I. L. Janis. 1. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 4. Back, K. (1951) ‘Influence through social communications’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46: 9–23. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Packer | Haslam I 195 Groupthink/group behavior/individuals/PackerVsJanis/Packer: identified group members are not automations, blind pursuers of group norms even unto disaster. >Groupthink/Janis, >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Rather, they engage in critical evaluation of their groups’ behaviour, at least on occasion. And if they come to believe that group norms are harmful to group interests, they are frequently willing to articulate dissenting views; indeed, they are more likely to do so than weakly identified members who are less invested in group interests (Packer, 2008(1); Packer and Chasteen, 2010(2)). Even if the group as a whole has settled on a particular goal, an individual member may, on their own assessment of the situation, choose to pursue an alternate collectively oriented goal. To the degree that this entails the expression of divergent and dissenting views, it will tend to reduce many of the symptoms of groupthink. Haslam I 196 Situations: There are also situational effects. Perhaps most notable of these is an effect of abstraction such that identified and conscientious group members who are induced to think more abstractly (e.g., by adopting longer time perspectives) are also more likely to dissent from group norms (Packer, Fujita and Chasteen, 2013(3); Packer, Fujita and Herman, 2013(4)). 1. Packer, D.J. (2008) ‘On being both with us and against us: A normative conflict model of dissent in social groups’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12: 50–72. 2. Packer, D.J. and Chasteen, A.L. (2010) ‘Loyal deviance: Testing the normative conflict model of dissent in social groups’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36: 5–18. 3. Packer, D.J., Fujita, K. and Chasteen, A.L. (2013) ‘The motivational dynamics of dissent decision: A goal-conflict approach’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5: 27–34. 4. Packer, D.J., Fujita, K. and Herman, S. (2013) ‘Rebels with a cause: A goal conflict approach to understanding when conscientious people dissent’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49: 927–32. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/psychological theories: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. >Group think/Janis. Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(1), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. >Decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. >Group cohesion. Haslam I 187 Criticisms VsJanis: Philip Tetlock (1979)(2): Consistent with the groupthink model, public statements in groupthink cases were more simplistic and tended to make more ingroup-favouring references than public statements in non-groupthink cases. However, inconsistent with the model, public statements in groupthink cases were no more likely to make negative references to outgroups. Clark McCauley (1989)(3): three of [Janis’] cases (i.e., North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Watergate) indeed appeared to involve group members internalizing collective beliefs (i.e., privately agreeing with group decisions). However, he concluded that the Bay of Pigs invasion and Vietnam War escalation were better characterized as involving compliance – that is, members publicly expressed agreement with group positions without privately accepting them, presumably due to social pressures to conform. TetlockVsJanis: (Tetlock et al 1992)(4): The authors found some evidence consistent with the groupthink model: structural and procedural faults (e.g., directive leadership, decision-making procedures) predicted groupthink symptoms. However, in contrast to Janis’ original formulation, group cohesiveness and high stress conditions did not emerge as key antecedents to groupthink symptoms. Haslam I 188 PetersonVsJanis: (Peterson et al. 1998)(5) found support for the idea that decision-making styles and procedures have important implications for the success and failures of real corporations. However, there were some caveats: (…) ’unsuccessful groups’ identified by Peterson and colleagues did not resemble the sorts of groups likely to be plagued by groupthink as characterized by Janis; rather, they tended to have weaker leaders and less cohesion. In contrast, ‘successful groups’ were characterized by stronger leaders, greater willingness to take risks, and more optimism. Laboratory studies: have generally focused on manipulating groupthink antecedents (e.g., cohesion, decision-making procedures) to examine their effects on groupthink symptoms and decision quality. Cohesion has been manipulated in a variety of ways: giving false feedback regarding the compatibility of group members’ attitudes, offering rewards to Haslam I 189 successful groups, forming groups from friends vs. strangers, or highlighting shared group membership among individuals (for a review, see Esser, 1998(6): 127–133). Results: these laboratory studies have not found a consistent causal relationship between group cohesion and groupthink symptoms. However,(…) the inconsistency of these results may have much to do with inconsistency in the way cohesion has been defined and operationalized. VsJanis: although there are empirical observations that some of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents may produce certain groupthink symptoms, it seems fair to say that there is little or no evidence from either case or lab studies for a strict model in which all of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents must be present to elicit the symptoms of groupthink, or in which all groupthink symptoms necessarily co-occur. There is also little evidence for an additive model in which the accumulation of antecedents produces more or stronger symptoms (see Turner and Pratkanis, 1998b). Haslam I 193 Group dynamics: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(9) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. Baron (2005)(9) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. >Groupthink/Packer. 1. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 2. Tetlock, P.E. (1979) ‘Identifying victims of groupthink’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 1314–24. 3. McCauley, C. (1989) ‘The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 250–60. 4. Tetlock, P.E., Peterson, R.S., McGuire, C., Chang, S. and Feld, P. (1992) ‘Assessing political group dynamics: A test of the groupthink model’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 403–25. 5. Peterson, R.S., Owens, P.D., Tetlock, P.E., Fan, E.T. and Martorana, P. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in top management teams: Groupthink, vigilance, and alternative models of organizational failure and success’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 272–305. 6. Esser, J.K. (1998) ‘Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 116–41. 7. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 8. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 9. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
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