Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Colour Nida-Rümelin
 
Books on Amazon
Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn, München 1995
Metzinger I 264
Color Researcher Mary/Terminology/Nida-Rümelin: non-phenomenally believe: from the use of language - e.g. the sky is blue - in that, you can believe yourself that it is about "red" - believe phenomenally: "The same color as this" or also "know-how" - Form of thought - I 273 but she does not acquire new knowledge simply by getting to know colors from her own experience.
Metzinger I 273
Color Perception/Color Words/Colors/Mary/Marianna/Nida RümelinVsJackson: better two stages: 1) she finally sees colors in the house - only now can she ask if the sky looks redp, bluep, greenp or yellowp for people with normal vision - before: she could not consider the alternatives - but still no acquisition of knowledge - 2nd stage: she steps outside and sees that the sky is blue - so she knows which alternative is true - thus, her own de-se belief that the sky is redp is disproved - therefore, she corrects her mistake about the meaning of color words.


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Epiphenomenalism Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Boatman I 152
Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982, 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities.
Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena.
Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen.
SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P.
---
I 153
But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all?

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Identity Theory Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Knowledge Lycan
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 141
Wissen/Farbenforscherin Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995): es gibt einen Unterschied in der Intensionalität zwischen "Diese Flüssigkeit ist Wasser" und "Diese Flüssigkeit ist H2O". In einer Weise drücken beide Sätze dieselbe Tatsache aus, aber ein Satz kann gewusst werden, ohne dass der andere gewusst wird. Chalmers: diese Lücken entstehen wegen der Differenz zwischen primärer und sekundärer Intension (lokalisiert bzw. nicht-lokalisiert in der aktualen bzw. in einer möglichen Welt).


Lyc I
W. G. Lycan
Modality and Meaning


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein, Paderborn, München 1995

Metzinger II 274
"Knowing how it is"/Qualia/Jackson/LewisVsJackson: Knowledge-how is no knowledge: since it does not exclude alternatives. Instead: knowledge-how is the ability to recognize something.
---
Nida-Rümelin II 280
Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: the argument should show in the original version that there are no physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Knowledge Horgan
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 141
Knowledge/HorganVsJackson/Horgan/Chalmers: (Horgan 1984b) E.g. The knowledge about Clark Kent and the knowledge about Superman differ intensionally. Knowledge/ChurchlandVsJackson: likewise, the knowledge about temperature differs from knowledge about medium kinetic energy. (Churchland 1985).
Solution/Chalmers: a posteriori the intensions coincide.

Horg I
T. Horgan
Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009

Horg II
T. Horgan
The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge Tye
 
Books on Amazon:
Michael Tye
Chalmers I 141
Knowledge/Color Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986): There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world).

Tye I
M. Tye
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how Loar
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 142
Wissen-wie/Qualia/Intension/primäre/sekundäre Intension/LoarVsJackson/ LoarVsMaterialismus/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) geht in seiner Kritik tiefer als Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): die Beispiele mit Wasser/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent usw. erlauben immer noch, dass die physikalischen bzw. phänomenalen Begriffe unterschiedliche primäre Intensionen haben. Bsp Wärme und z.B. mittlere kinetische Energie designieren dieselbe Eigenschaft (sekundäre Intension) aber führen gleichzeitig verschiedene Eigenschaften (primäre Intensionen) ein! Aber das wird nicht a priori gewusst. Pointe: dann war Marys Wissen über die phänomenalen Eigenschaften von Farben
I 143
schon ein Wissen über physikalische bzw. funktionale Eigenschaften, aber sie konnte die beiden zuvor nicht verbinden. VsJackson/Chalmers: Weitere Einwände: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: selbst für ein allwissendes Wesen gibt es eine Lücke zwischen physikalischem und indexikalischem Wissen (siehe Bsp Rudolf Lingens mit Gedächtnisverlust liest in der Bibliothek seine eigene Biografie).
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: der Mangel an phänomenalem Wissen ist ein ganz anderer als der an indexikalischem Wissen. Wissen/Indexikalität/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): es gibt hier eine ontologische Lücke.
ChalmersVsNagel: wir können viel direkter argumentieren: es gibt keine vorstellbare Welt, in der die physikalischen Fakten sind wie in unserer Welt, in der jedoch die indexikalischen Fakten sich von unseren unterscheiden.


Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors...
---
I 143
... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
---
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Materialism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Stalnaker I 242
Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996, 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. ---
Chalmers I XIII
Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. ---
Chalmers I 41
Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. (> Supervenience/Chalmers) ---
I 42
Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism:
Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364).
---
I 123
Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world
2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts.
4. Therefore, materialism is wrong.
---
I 124
The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain.
The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism.
---
139
MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989.) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities.
ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility).
E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color.
---
I 144
Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990) and Nemirov (1990): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible.
---
I 145
Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities.
Loar: (1990) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this."
DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment.
ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Necessity Stalnaker
 
Books on Amazon
I 18
Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from optional descriptive semantics that happen to ​​characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references - StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics - they are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all.
I 53
Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds - in order to know that it is true - i.e., that the real world is within this set - for that you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. - Necessary truth is not made true by the facts.
I 64
Metaphysical necessity/Metaph. possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify about it - the modal operators are then just the quantifiers. - Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be.
I 189
Necessary a posteriori/Contingent a priori/Stalnaker: Assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent - both contingent: because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. - Necessary: ​​because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains.
I 201
Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual - Quine: one must ever be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. - Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori - thereby separatation epistemic/metaphysical.
I 202
Def Nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x) means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x - ((s) relative to ppossible world x) - Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN//Staln: Thesis: Laws of Nature are contingent - they do not apply possible worlds - Some authors: LoN are metaphysically necessary. - Logic/Stalnaker/(s): Cannot show what is metaphysically possible.
I 204
Necessity/Conceptual/Metaphys/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. - Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. - Possibilities: would be the same, even if we had never thought of them - conceptually possible: are simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine.
I 205
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Necessity Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Schwarz I 226
A posteriori NotwendigkeitenJackson /Schwarz: folgen a priori aus kontingenten Wahrheiten über die aktuelle Situation. (Lewis 1994b,296f,2002b, Jackson 1998a: 56 86). ---
Stalnaker I 18
Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality.
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context.
---
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Qualia Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Pauen V 179
Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike nail. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum.
E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space.
Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences.
2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism).
---
V 180
Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand.
JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people.
What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not.
Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities.
---
V 181
LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected.
A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson.
---
V 182
Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all.
N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states.
LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities.
Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions!
---
V 183
This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible".
Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios.
In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity.
VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena.
   1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties.
---
V 184
2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Supervenience Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Stalnaker I 106
Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Definition Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson:
For all worlds w and w' if w and w' are exactly the same descriptively, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view.
((s) That is, the ethical supervenes on the descriptive.)> WilliamsonVsJackon.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chalmers, D. Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 194
Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w..
Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context)
I 195
defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token).
Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference.
StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device.
Difference:
a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning,
b) not as meaning.
Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth.

I 202
Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but
Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages.
I 210
Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended
b) meta-semantically.
I 211
Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference
StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently.
Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts.
Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has?

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Identity Theory Jackson Vs Identity Theory
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Introspection Read Vs Introspection
 
Books on Amazon
Read III 92
Def Robustheit: (Jackson) eine Aussage ist robust, wenn ihre Behauptbarkeit von dem Erwerb von Informationen unberührt bleibt. Die Pointe für Jackson: bei Bedingungssätzen kommt der modus ponens ins Spiel.
Bedingungssätze sind nicht robust im Hinblick auf die Falschheit ihrer Hinterglieder.
III 93
Jackson: Behauptbarkeit wird durch bedingte Wahrscheinlichkeit gemessen. Es gibt eine spezifische Konvention über Bedingungssätze: nämlich, dass sie robust im Hinblick auf ihre Vorderglieder sind, und deshalb nicht unter Umständen behauptet werden können, wo bekannt ist, dass ihre Vorderglieder falsch sind. ReadVsJackson/ ReadVsGrice: beides ist unhaltbar. Die problematischen Bedingungssätze treten bei eingebetteten Kontexten auf. Bsp Entweder, wenn ich recht hatte, hattest du auch recht, oder, wenn du recht hattest, hatte auch ich recht.
III 94
Behauptung und Behauptbarkeit: sind Begriffe, die auf vollständige Aussagen angewendet werden, nicht auf deren Teile! Bedingungssätze sind nicht wahrheitsfunktional.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Re IV
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic 1st Edition Oxford 1995
Jackson, F. Lewis Vs Jackson, F.
 
Books on Amazon
V 154/155
robust/LewisVsJackson: There are two form of robusticity: Def robust1: A is robust1 with regard to B, if P(A) and P(A I B) are close and both are high (like Jackson). (prblty).
Def robust2: A is robust2 with regard to B, if P(A) is high and remains high, even when we learn that B. (Learning!)
Bsp A is robust1 with regard to only B, but not with regard to B and E together. Then A will not be robust2 with regard to B.
A: "I will not believe that Reagan works for the KGB!"
B: "Reagan works for the KGB".
E: Not A. (I believe that Reagan works for the KGB.)
((s) robust1 on only B: even if "...I will not believe this" But only if both probabilities are high!)
not robust2: (learning): When I learn that he works for the KGB, I need to believe it.
Lewis: If the KGB is so successful to have one of their people on the presidential seat, then they will also control the news so that we do not learn about this. So P(A) and P(A I BE) are equally high.
But naturally P(A I BE) = 0. (If I believe that Reagan works for the KGB, I will not believe that he does not work for them = 0).
Learning: What I learn is what I need to believe (in order to have been able to learn). And this contrary to my initial original conviction that the KGB is going to deceive me.
Also ist A nicht robust2 im Hinblick auf B.
Bsp Richmond Thomason: ein Mann akzeptiert: "Wenn meine Frau mich betrügt, werde ich es nicht glauben (weil sie clever ist)".
Aber er meint nicht, dass wenn er dazu gebracht wird, das Antezedens zu glauben, dass er dann das Konsequens glauben wird.
((s) Konditional/(s): das A kann hier immer wahrscheinlicher werden, ohne dass der Sprecher das glaubt, aber wenn die Wschk für den Sprecher höher wird, wird er das ganze Konditional ablehnen.)
robust/Konditional/Lewis: welche der beiden Arten von Robustheit betrifft nun das indikative Konditional?
Es kommt auf robustness2 an: sie signalisiert mehr Information.
V 15
Andererseits ist robustness1 viel leichter festzustellen. Beide sind äquivalent unter der Annahme, dass der Lernende konditionalisiert.
R1 ist ein guter Leitfaden für R2, auf die es wirklich ankommt. Es überrascht nicht, dass wir R1 signalisieren können, selbst wenn sie klar von R2 divergiert!
Bsp Ich kann sehr wohl behaupten: "Wenn Reagan für den KGB arbeitet, werde ich es niemals glauben!".

Stalnaeer I 269
Def Phänomenal Information/Terminologie/Lewis/Stalnaker: sei - jenseits physikalischer Information - eine irreduzible andersartige Information. Die beiden sind voneinander unabhängig. Stalnaker: es ist die Art Information, die Jacksons Farbenforscherin Mary erwirbt.
Sie muss in einer nichtzentrierten Beschreibung der Welt enthalten sein.
Lewis/Stalnaker: hatte sie für eine mögliche Antwort LewisVsJackson konzipiert. Aber:
I 270
LewisVsPhenomenal Information/LewisVsJackson: eine Anreicherung unserer Beschreibung der Welt würde von sich aus keine Lösung bringen für das Problem was es ist, was Mary nicht weiß. Lewis: Bsp Parapsychologie: könnte man die Wissenschaft der nicht-.physikalischen Dinge nennen. Angenommen, wir lernen so viel über Parapsychologie wie überhaupt nur möglich ist. Dennoch würden wir immer nicht wissen "wie es ist,..."
Stalnaker: das ist das gleiche Argument wie das von Nagel gegen die ontologische Sicht der Selbst-Lokalisation. Es ist vergebens, eine Objektivierung einer bestimmten Art von Information versuchen zu wollen, denn die Information "wie es ist..." wird immer ausgelassen werden.
Objektivierung/VsVs: könnte dann antworten, dass diese spezielle Information eben nur dem Subjekt zugänglich ist. (s.o. wie Frege).
Intentionalität/Stalnaker: damit wird ein Zugang zur Intentionalität erforderlich, die erklärt, wie objektiver Inhalt diesen besonderen Status haben kann.
semantische Diagnose/Stalnaker: scheint mir die Versuchung zur Objektivierung des Inhalts zu dämpfen.
StalnakerVsObjectivation: (von subjektiven Inhalten)
1. nimmt eine extravagante Metaphysik auf sich.
2. erfordert eine Erklärung der besonderen Relation, die wir immer noch dazu haben müssten.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Jackson, F. Bigelow Vs Jackson, F.
 
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I 117
Strong centering/Lewis: Axiom (strong Centring): (a and b)> (W a > W b)
Translation into everyday language/(s): everything that is true is linked by Counterfactual Conditional.
I 150
Strong centering/Solution/Jackson, Frank: accepts the strong centring at the price that he rejects the following assumption: "If a then probably b" entails that if a, then it could be that b and it could be that it is not b".
BigelowVsJackson, Frank: We reject the strong centering (BigelowVsStrong centring).

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Jackson, F. Stalnaker Vs Jackson, F.
 
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I 18
Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: n.a.p. is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It arises from an optional descriptive semantics that characterizes the random natural languages: a mechanism for determining of references. Thesis: there could also be languages without determined reference that says even to some extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: but if the reference-determining mechanisms are part of a meta-semantically story they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our statements and internal states can ever have representational properties. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality.
two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: can show that the possible and the true interact that means separate semantically from factual questions in the context.
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could give a neutral view of the possibility space.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Jackson, F. Schwarz Vs Jackson, F.
 
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Schwarz I 226
A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind.
Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark.
Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori.
Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities.

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Jackson, F. Williamson Vs Jackson, F.
 
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Stalnaker I 106
Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: so wie Jackson global supervenience definiert, ist sie nicht hinreichend für starke Supervenienz. Def Global Supervenience/Ethik/Jackson:
(s) für alle möglichen Welten (poss.w.) w und w’ wenn w und w’ deskriptiv exakt gleich sind, dann sine sie auch in ethischer Hinsicht exakt gleich.
D.h. das Ethische superveniert auf dem Deskriptiven.
I 107
WilliamsonVsJackson: zeigt, dass globale Supervenienz in diesem Sinn auch gelten kann, wenn die starke supervenience nicht gilt: Def uniforme Eigenschaft/Williamson/Stalnaker: sei eine Eigenschaft, die entweder wahr von allem oder von nichts ist. ((s) dann unterscheiden sich poss.w. unter Umständen darin, dass in einer alle Dinge u sind, in der anderen poss.w. kein Ding u ist).
((s) uniforme Eigenschaft/(s): Bsp Selbstidentität Bsp Verschiedenheit von anderen Individuen).
U: sei die Menge von uniformen Eigenschaften
Pointe: dann U = U’ (der Schließung auf der Menge der U, Eigenschaften, die definierbar sind in Begriffen von uniformen Eigenschaften sind selbst uniform).
Bsp Angenommen, w und w’ seien gleich im Hinblick auf alle uniformen Eigenschaften, dann w = w’.
((s) D.h. sie sind überhaupt gleich).
So dass alle poss.w. die gleich sind im Hinblick auf uniforme Eigenschaften auch gleich sind im Hinblick auf alle Eigenschaften! ((s) Weil F-Eigenschaften noch nicht eingeführt sind, s.u.).
Dann superveniert die Menge aller Eigenschaften global auf den uniformen Eigenschaften.
Aber das gilt nicht für starke oder sogar schwache Supervenienz! Denn zwei Individuen die in derselben poss.w. existieren werden dieselben uniformen Eigenschaften haben, aber können sich im Hinblick auf nicht-uniforme Eigenschaften unterscheiden.
StalnakerVsWilliamson: das stimmt, aber es nützt eben die Lücke aus, die wir im Text geschlossen haben. Daher betrifft es nicht unser Ergebnis.
Lücke:
F: sei eine Eigenschaft, die auf einige aber nicht alle Dinge in Welt w zutrifft.
((s) D.h. F ist keine uniforme Eigenschaft, d.h. dass es noch andere Eigenschaften außer u-Eigenschaften gibt).
f: sei irgendeine Abbildung von Welt w auf sich selbst, die alles was in w F ist, auf etwas, das nicht F ist in w abbildet.
w. wird U-ununterscheidbar von sich selbst sein relativ zur Abbildung f, aber nicht {F}-ununterscheidbar von sich selbst. ((s) Einfach, weil nicht alle Dinge F sind, obwohl alle u sind.)
Daher wird jede Menge von Eigenschaften, die F enthält, global auf U supervenieren.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Materialism Jackson Vs Materialism
 
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Frank C. Jackson
Schiffer I 152
Frank JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the criticism of materialism is based on an overly optimistic view of the animal man is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: argues only that qualia are epiphenomena. (camp). Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain type if one has no coherent account of how and why that is supposed to happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P causes having B, then it should be possible to subsume this under a psychophysically sophisticated causal law. At least some mechanism should explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does most likely not exist (especially considering that it should be possible that different physical states have B!) And what ever should a non-statutory mechanism be?

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Various Authors Jackson Vs Various Authors
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Field II 255
Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: Counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: Although the conclusions are not assertible, they are nevertheless true. (Assertibility/Truth). Field: in explanation of non-assertibility the classical truth conditions do play a role, but not an indispensable one.
Conventional Implicature/Jackson: Thesis: there is a conventional implicature for that if we assert "if A then B" not only the probability P(A>B) is high, but also the conditioned probability P(A>BIA). A violation of this implicature would be very misleading. ((s) I.e., we assume that the premise is realized when we express a conditional).
Important Argument/Field: the requirement that P(A>BIA) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the non-factualist that P(BIA) is high.
Field: thus, Jackson arrives at the same assertibility conditions as non-factualism.
EdgingtonVsJackson/Field: (Edgington, 1986, standard objection): it seems that we do not not only assert things like E.g. Clinton/de Vito, but we actually do not believe them, too!.
JacksonVsEdgington/Field: would probably say that the conventional implicature makes it even inappropriate to even "assert it mentally". The perceived invalidity then consists in that these conclusions do not receive mental assertibility, although they received truth.
So we get both: surface and logic "deeper logic".

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Color Research Jackson, F.
 
Books on Amazon
Metzinger II 259
Frank Jackson: "Knowledge Argument" - "Argument des Unvollständigen Wissens: Bsp Farbenforscherin Mary wächst in einem abgeschlossenen Raum auf, einziger Kontakt zur Außenwelt ist ein Schwarz-Weiß-Monitor. Sie lernt alles über Farben, aber nicht, "wie es ist" Farben zu sehen.
These dadurch, dass sie freigelassen wird und zum ersten Mal Farben sieht, erwirbt sie neues Wissen.
VsJackson: die Mehrzahl der Autoren argumentiert, daß das Argument nicht zu dem intendierten Resultat des Existenz nichtï·"physikalischer Tatsachen führe.
Problem: wie der Wissenszuwachs überhaupt zu beschreiben wäre.
Nida-RümelinVsNagel: These die Formulierung "wie es ist" verfehlt den Kern -
II 265
Nida-Rümelin These es läßt sich aus allen diesen Fällen oder Beispielen nicht ableiten, daß eine Qualia-Vertauschung bei funktionaler Übereinstimmung möglich wäre.
II 275
Wissen/Glauben/Nida-Rümelin: These bei phänomenalem Wissen handelt es sich um Wissen im strengen Sinne: nämlich, um Wissen über etwas, das der Fall ist.
II 280
Argument des unvollständigen Wissens/Jackson: These sollte in der ursprünglichen Fassung zeigen, daß es nichtï·"physikalische Tatsachen gibt, d.h. solche Tatsachen, die in physikalistischem Vokabular nicht formuliert werden können.
Pauen I / V 179
Farbenforscherin Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonismus - These 1. Neurobiologisches Wissen ist im Hinblick auf phänomenale Erfahrungen prinzipiell unvollständig - 2. Der Monismus ist falsch, phänomenale Eigenschaften können nicht identisch mit neuronalen Eigenschaften sein! Phänomenale Eigenschaften sind kausal wirkungslose Nebeneffekte mentaler Zustände - Epiphänomenalismus -

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
necessary .a post Jackson, F.
 
Books on Amazon
Staln I 18
notwendig a posteriori/Jackson: These: ist ein Resultat von relativ oberflächlichen linguistischen Tatsachen - es entsteht aus einer optionalen beschreibenden Semantik die zufällig natürliche Sprachen charakterisiert: ein Mechanismus der Festlegung von Referenten - StalnakerVsJackson: als Teil der Metasemantik, sind die Referenz-festlegenden Mechanismen nicht optional - sie sind Teil der Darstellung, wieso interne Zustände überhaupt repräsentational sein können - These: es könnte auch Sprachen ohne festgelegte Referenz geben, die sogar in gewissen Maße sagt, wie die Dinge sind, und zwar ohne notwendige Wahrheiten a posteriori.
necessary a post Stalnaker, R.
 
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I 18
necessary a posteriori / Jackson is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it arises from a semantics randomly describing natural languages​: a mechanism for determining of reference - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of the metasemantics, the reference-fixing mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the presentation, why internal states can be representational at all - there could be languages ​​that have no specific reference that says to a certain extent, the way things are, without a posteriori necessary truths.
Two Dimensional Sem. Stalnaker, R.
 
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I 201/202
zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker VsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: These ich denke, das zeigt etwas über die Natur mentaler Repräsentation und nicht nur über das kontingente Funktionieren von Sprachen.
I 204
zwei-dimensionaler Rahmen/Stalnaker: ich werde die zwei Arten, ihn zu interpretieren aufzeigen a) semantisch
b) metasemantisch.
These mit dieser Unterscheidung möchte ich Notwendigkeit a posteriori reduzieren wie es Jackson und Chalmers getan haben. Damit kann das Problem der Intentionalität gelöst werden.