Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colour | Nida-Rümelin | Metzinger I 264 Color Researcher Mary/Terminology/Nida-Rümelin(1): non-phenomenally believe: from the use of language - e.g. the sky is blue - in that, you can believe yourself that it is about "red" - believe phenomenally: "The same color as this" or also "knowing how". >Color researcher Mary, >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. Metzinger I 273 But she does not acquire new knowledge simply by getting to know colors from her own experience. >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge. Color Perception/Color Words/Colors/Mary/Marianna/Nida RümelinVsJackson: we better assume two stages: 1) she finally sees colors in the house - only now can she ask if the sky looks redp, bluep, greenp or yellowp for people with normal vision - before: she could not consider the alternatives - but still no acquisition of knowledge. 2nd stage: she steps outside and sees that the sky is blue - so she knows which alternative is true - thus, her own de-se belief that the sky is redp is disproved - therefore, she corrects her mistake about the meaning of color words. >Color words. 1. Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn, München 1995 |
Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Jackson | Schiffer I 152 Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982(1), 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. >Dualism, >Monism. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena. Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all? >Phenomenalism. 1. Jackson, Frank. 1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136 |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Identity Theory | Jackson | Lanz I 285 Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out. >Materialism, >Qualia. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! >Information, >Discriminations. The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. >Representation. ((s) For Identity theory see also >Type/Token-Identity, >Type/Token, >Physicalism, >Token-physicalism, >Reductionism.) |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Implication | Jackson | Read III 92 Implication/Jackson/Def Robustness: (Jackson) a statement is robust if its assertiveness remains unaffected by the acquisition of information. III 93 The punch line for Jackson: the modus ponens comes into play for conditional sentences. Condition sets are not robust with respect to the falsity of their consequents. >modus ponens, >Conditional, >Implication paradox. III 94 Jackson: Assertiveness is measured by conditional probability. There is a specific convention about conditional propositions: namely, that they are robust with respect to their antecedents, and therefore cannot be claimed in circumstances where it is known that their antecedents are false. ReadVsJackson/ReadVsGrice: both are untenable. The problematic conditional sentences occur in embedded contexts. Example: Either if I was right, you were right, or if you were right, I was right. Assertion and assertiveness: are terms that are applied to complete statements, not to their parts! Conditional sentences are not truth functional. >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Knowledge | Horgan | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/HorganVsJackson/Horgan/Chalmers: (Horgan 1984)(1) E.g. The knowledge about Clark Kent and the knowledge about Superman differ intensionally. >Intensions, >Content, >Conceptual Content, >Inferential Content , >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought, >Existence, >Non-existence, >Description levels. Knowledge/ChurchlandVsJackson: likewise, the knowledge about temperature differs from knowledge about medium kinetic energy. (Churchland 1985)(2). Solution/Chalmers: a posteriori the intensions coincide. 1. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-52. 2. Patricia Smith Churchland. (1985). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief. Philosophical Review 94 (3):418. |
Horgan I T. Horgan Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Horgan II T. Horgan The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge | Jackson | Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein, Paderborn, München 1995 Metzinger II 274 "Knowing how it is"/Qualia/Jackson/LewisVsJackson: Knowledge-how is no knowledge: since it does not exclude alternatives. Instead: knowledge-how is the ability to recognize something. >Knowing how. --- Nida-Rümelin II 280 Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: the argument should show in the original version that there are no physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary. >Qualia/Chalmers. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger |
| Knowledge | Lycan | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995)(1): there is a difference in intensionality between "This liquid is water" and "This liquid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without knowing the other. >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Twin Earth, >Implication, >Stronger/weaker. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intensions (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intension, >Secondary Intension, >Possible Worlds, >Actual World. 1. William G. Lycan (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information". In: Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58 (1995) |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge | Tye | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Colour Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986)(1): There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H2O". >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Reference. In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intensions, >Secondary Intensions, >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia. 1. Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17. |
Tye I M. Tye Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Chalmers | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Loar | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Materialism | Chalmers | Stalnaker I 242 Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996(1), 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. >Supervenience. 1. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers I XIII Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. Chalmers I 41 Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. >Supervenience/Chalmers. I 42 Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism: Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994)(1): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364). >F. Jackson, >Possible Worlds. I 123 Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world 2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world. 3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts. 4. Therefore, materialism is wrong. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 124 The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. >Inverted spectra. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain. The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism. >Dualism, >Property dualism. I 139 MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989 (1).) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities. ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility). >Modality, >Possibility, >Necessity. E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color. I 144 Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990)(3) and Nemirov (1990)(4): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible. I 145 Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities. Loar: (1990)(5) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this." DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991)(6) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment. ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge. >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. 1. F. Jackson, Finding the mind in the natural world. In: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White, eds. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 2. C. McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98, 1989: pp.349-66 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 5. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 6. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Jackson | Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Qualia | Jackson | Pauen I 179 Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum. E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space. Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences. 2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism). >Epiphenomenalism, >Mary-example, >Monism, >Knowing how. I 180 Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand. JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people. What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not. Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities. I 181 LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected. A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson. I 182 Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all. N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states. LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities. Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions! I 183 This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible". Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios. In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity. VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena. 1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties. I 184 2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable. >Qualia/Chalmers. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Supervenience | Jackson | Stalnaker I 106 Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Definition Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson: For all worlds w and w' if w and w' are exactly the same descriptively, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view. ((s) That is, the ethical supervenes on the descriptive.)> WilliamsonVsJackson. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chalmers, D. | Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. | I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Identity Theory | Jackson Vs Identity Theory | Lanz I 285 Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation). |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Jackson, F. | Lewis Vs Jackson, F. | V 154/155 Robust/LewisVsJackson: There are two form of robustness: Def robust1: A is robust1 with regard to B, if P(A) and P(A I B) are close and both are high (like Jackson). (probability). Def robust2: A is robust2 with regard to B, if P(A) is high and remains high, even when we learn that B. (Learning!) E.g. A is robust1 with regard to B only, but not with regard to B and E together. Then A will not be robust2 with regard to B. A: "I will not believe that Reagan works for the KGB!" B: "Reagan works for the KGB". E: Not A. (I believe that Reagan works for the KGB.) ((s) robust1 on B only: even if "...I will not believe this" But only if both probabilities are high!) not robust2: (learning): When I learn that he works for the KGB, I need to believe it. Lewis: If the KGB is so successful to have one of their people on the presidential seat, then they will also control the news so that we do not learn about this. So P(A) and P(A I BE) are equally high. But naturally P(A I BE) = 0. (If I believe that Reagan works for the KGB, I will not believe that he does not work for them = 0). Learning: What I learn is what I need to believe (in order to have been able to learn). And this contrary to my initial original belief that the KGB is going to deceive me. So A is not robust2 with regard to B. Example Richmond Thomason: a man accepts: "If my wife cheats on me, I won't believe it (because she is clever)". But he doesn't mean that if he is made to believe the antecedens, he will believe the consequences. ((s) Conditional(s): the A can become more and more likely here without the speaker believing it, but if the probability function for the speaker gets higher, he/she will reject the whole conditional. Robust/Conditional/Lewis: which of the two types of robustness affects the indicative conditional? It depends on robustness2: it signals more information. V 15 On the other hand, robustness1 is much easier to determine. Both are equivalent on the assumption that the learner conditionalizes. R1 is a good guide for R2, which is really important. It is not surprising that we can signal R1, even if it clearly diverges from R2! Example I can very well say: "If Reagan works for the KGB, I'll never believe it!". Stalnaker I 269 Def Phenomenal Information/Terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: is - beyond physical information - an irreducible different kind of information. The two are independent of each other. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It must be included in a non-centered description of the world. Lewis/Stalnaker: had designed it for a possible response LewisVsJackson. But: I 270 LewisVsPhenomenal Information/LewisVsJackson: enriching our description of the world would not in itself solve the problem of what it is that Mary does not know. Lewis: For example parapsychology: is what one could call the science of non-physical things. Suppose we learn as much about parapsychology as possible. Yet we would always not know "what it is like..." Stalnaker: this is the same argument as Nagel's against the ontological view of self-localization. It is in vain to try to objectify a certain type of information, because the information "as it is..." will always be omitted. Objectification/VsVs: could then answer that this special information is only accessible to the subject. (see above: like Frege). Intentionality/Stalnaker: this requires access to intentionality, which explains how objective content can have this particular status. Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: seems to me to dampen the temptation to objectify the content. StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1. takes on an extravagant metaphysics. 2. requires an explanation of the special relation we should still have additionally. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Jackson, F. | Bigelow Vs Jackson, F. | I 117 Strong centering/Lewis: Axiom (strong Centring): (a and b)> (W a > W b) Translation into everyday language/(s): everything that is true is linked by Counterfactual Conditional. I 150 Strong centering/Solution/Jackson, Frank: accepts the strong centring at the price that he rejects the following assumption: "If a then probably b" entails that if a, then it could be that b and it could be that it is not b". BigelowVsJackson, Frank: We reject the strong centering (BigelowVsStrong centring). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Jackson, F. | Stalnaker Vs Jackson, F. | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: n.a.p. is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It arises from an optional descriptive semantics that characterizes the random natural languages: a mechanism for determining of references. Thesis: there could also be languages without determined reference that says even to some extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: but if the reference-determining mechanisms are part of a meta-semantically story they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our statements and internal states can ever have representational properties. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: can show that the possible and the true interact that means separate semantically from factual questions in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could give a neutral view of the possibility space. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Jackson, F. | Schwarz Vs Jackson, F. | Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Jackson, F. | Williamson Vs Jackson, F. | Stalnaker I 106 Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Def Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson: (s) for all possible worlds (poss.w.) w and w' if w and w' are descriptively exactly the same, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view. I.e. the ethical supervenes on the descriptive. I 107 WilliamsonVsJackson: shows that global supervenience in this sense can also apply if the strong supervenience does not apply: Def uniform property/Williamson/Stalnaker: be a property that is either true of all or nothing. ((s) then possible worlds may differ in that in one all things are u, in the other possible worlds is no thing u). ((s) uniform property(s): e.g. self-identity e.g. difference from other individuals). U: be the set of uniform properties N.B.: then U = U' (the closure on the set of U, properties that are definable in terms of uniform properties are themselves uniform). For example, suppose w and w' are equal in terms of all uniform properties, then w = w'. ((s) I.e. they are equal at all). So that all possible words which are the same in terms of uniform properties are also the same in terms of all properties! ((s) Because F properties are not yet introduced, see below). Then the set of all properties supervenes globally on the uniform properties. But this is not true for strong or even weak superveniences! Because two individuals existing in the same possible world will have the same uniform properties, but may differ in terms of non-uniform properties. StalnakerVsWilliamson: that is true, but it exploits the gap we have closed in the text. Therefore, it does not affect our outcome. Gap: Q: be a trait that applies to some but not all things in world w. ((s) I.e. F is not a uniform property, i.e. there are other properties besides u properties). f: be some picture of world w on itself that maps everything what is in w F, on something that is not F in w. w. will be U-indistinguishable from itself relative to figure f, but not {F}- indistinguishable from itself. ((s) Simple, because not all things are F, although all are u.) Therefore, any set of properties containing F will supervene globally on U. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Materialism | Jackson Vs Materialism | Schiffer I 152 Frank JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the criticism of materialism is based on an overly optimistic view of the animal man is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: argues only that qualia are epiphenomena. (camp). Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain type if one has no coherent account of how and why that is supposed to happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P causes having B, then it should be possible to subsume this under a psychophysically sophisticated causal law. At least some mechanism should explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does most likely not exist (especially considering that it should be possible that different physical states have B!) And what ever should a non-statutory mechanism be? |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Various Authors | Jackson Vs Various Authors | Field II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: Counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: Although the conclusions are not assertible, they are nevertheless true. (Assertibility/Truth). Field: in explanation of non-assertibility the classical truth conditions do play a role, but not an indispensable one. Conventional Implicature/Jackson: Thesis: there is a conventional implicature for that if we assert "if A then B" not only the probability P(A>B) is high, but also the conditioned probability P(A>BIA). A violation of this implicature would be very misleading. ((s) I.e., we assume that the premise is realized when we express a conditional). Important Argument/Field: the requirement that P(A>BIA) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the non-factualist that P(BIA) is high. Field: thus, Jackson arrives at the same assertibility conditions as non-factualism. EdgingtonVsJackson/Field: (Edgington, 1986, standard objection): it seems that we do not not only assert things like E.g. Clinton/de Vito, but we actually do not believe them, too!. JacksonVsEdgington/Field: would probably say that the conventional implicature makes it even inappropriate to even "assert it mentally". The perceived invalidity then consists in that these conclusions do not receive mental assertibility, although they received truth. So we get both: surface and logic "deeper logic". |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Color Research | Jackson, F. | Metzinger II 259 Frank Jackson: "Knowledge argument" - "Argument of incomplete knowledge": For example, color researcher Mary grows up in a closed room, the only contact to the outside world is a black-and-white monitor. She learns everything about colors, but not "how it is" to see colors. Thesis: by being released and seeing colors for the first time, she acquires new knowledge. VsJackson: the majority of authors argue that the argument does not lead to the intended result of the existence of non-physical facts. Problem: how to describe the increase in knowledge at all. Nida-RümelinVsNagel: Thesis: the phrase "as it is" misses the point. II 265 Nida-Rümelin thesis: it cannot be inferred from all these cases or examples that a Qualia exchange would be possible with functional agreement. II 275 Knowledge/Belief/Nida-Rümelin: Thesis: Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge in the strict sense: namely, knowledge about something that is the case. II 280 Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: The thesis should show in the original version that there are non-physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary. Pauen I / V 179 Color Researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism - Thesis 1: Neurobiological knowledge is in principle incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences - 2. Monism is wrong, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neuronal characteristics! Phenomenal characteristics are causally ineffective side effects of mental states - epiphenomenalism. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| necessary .a post | Jackson, F. | Staln I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism of determining referents - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of metasemantics, the reference-determining mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the representation of why internal states can be representative at all - thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference that even says to some extent how things are, and without necessary truths a posteriori. |
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| necessary a post | Stalnaker, R. | I 18 necessary a posteriori / Jackson is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it arises from a semantics randomly describing natural languages: a mechanism for determining of reference - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of the metasemantics, the reference-fixing mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the presentation, why internal states can be representational at all - there could be languages that have no specific reference that says to a certain extent, the way things are, without a posteriori necessary truths. |
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| Two Dimensional Sem. | Stalnaker, R. | I 201/202 Two-Dimensional Semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: Thesis: I think this shows something about the nature of mental representation and not just about the contingent functioning of languages. I 204 Two-dimensional Frame/Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret it. a) semantic, b) metasemantic. Thesis: with this distinction I would like to reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. Thus the problem of intentionality can be solved. |
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