Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Inverted Spectra Chalmers I 99
Inverted Spectra/Consciousness/Chalmers: in order to demonstrate the lack of explainability of our consciousness, it suffices to show the logical possibility of a physical world with our identical world where facts about our conscious experience differ from those in our world. This is about positive facts, not about a lack of facts. >Facts/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Qualia, >Possible worlds.
I 100
Someone who lives in my world might experience something as blue that I perceive as red. Of course, he would call it "red" just like me. The rest of its color perception would be arranged so that no differences could be noticed. Explanation: The simplest explanation would be that two of the axes of our three-dimensional color space are interchanged, the red-green axis and the yellow-blue axis. (An enlightening discussion of the human color space can be found in Hardin, 1988(1)). This is not only conceptually consistent and it does not appear to be excluded from neurophysiology either.
HarrisonVsInverted spectra/HardinVsInverted Spectra/Chalmers: (Harrison 1973(2), Hardin 1987(3)): Thesis:
The human color space is asymmetric so that such a reversal is not possible. For example, warm/cold colors associated with different functional roles ("positive", "negative").
ChalmersVsVs:
1. Nevertheless, nothing is conceptually contradictory in inverted spectra. 2. Instead of an inversion of red and blue, one could assume an inversion of only slightly different color hues (Levine 1991)(4).
I 101
There is also no reason why an inversion of the spectrum needs to use only natural colors. 3. (Shoemaker, 1982)(5): Even though our color space is asymmetric, there is no reason to believe that there might be creatures with a symmetric color space that are physically identical to us.
Conceivability/Reductive explanation/Chalmers: if such assumptions are conceivable, this has an impact on the question of the possibility of reductive explanations.
>Conceivability/Chalmers, >Explanation, >Reduction/Chalmers.
Consciousness: both the conceivability of zombies as well as the one of inverted spectra show that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. At most the existence of conscious experience could be explained reductively, but not the specific character of our experience.
>Experience.
I 263
Inverted Spectra/Chalmers: we must exclude the possibility of inverted spectra for functionally isomorphically structured systems. Inverted Qualia come first in John Locke.
I 264
VsChalmers: even materialists argue that the nature of experiences is based on the physiological nature, that is to say, in the case of differently constructed systems (for example, machines). >Materialism.
Inverted Spectra/Schlick (1932)(6): they cannot be ascertained verificationistically. Therefore, there can be no real difference.
ChalmersVsSchlick: this is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that there is no fact here in regard to conscious experiences, namely, because the nature of Qualia is conceptually not linked to behavior. ((s) > nonfactualism).
I 265
Invariance Principle/Chalmers: the principle is not shaken by the natural (not only logical) possibility of inverted spectra. It is also not shaken by examples of reorganization, rewiring, etc. (Gert, 1965(7), Lycan 1973(8), Wittgenstein, 1968(9)). It is also not shaken by kidnapping to a twin earth with a yellow sky. (Block 1990)(10). Here the representations after an acclimatization period will be about yellow. The invariance principle (the preservation of conscious experiences with a changed physical structure of a functionally consistent system) remains.
>Invariance principle.


1. C. L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis 1988.
2. B. Harrison, Form and Content, Oxford, 1973
3. C. L. Hardin, Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 281-98
4. J. Levine, Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4, 1991: pp. 27-40
5. S. Shoemaker, The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982: pp. 357-81
6. M. Schlick, Positivism and Realism, Erkenntnis 3, 1932
7. B. Gert, Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16, 1965: pp. 44-47
8. W. G. Lycan, Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15, 1973: pp. 315-19
9. L. Wittgenstein, Notes for lectures on "private experience" and "sense data". Philosophical Review 77, 1968
10. N. Block, Invereted earth, Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79 (1990)

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Qualia Dennett Vs Qualia Block I 200
Dennett: contents of consciousness consist only of judgments. Qualia are probably no judgments (opinions). Then they are spurious theoretical entities that we propose to explain the desire to predict anything about what is going on in our minds. BlockVsDennett: he has the same relation to qualia, which has the American Air Force to Vietnamese villages: he destroys them, to save them.
PauenV 142
Qualia/DennettVsExplanatory Gap: nothing but complexes of dispositions. If you say: "This is my Quale", then you single out this complex whether you want to or not. It only seems as if you were referring to a private incomprehensible something before the eyes of the mind, but it only seems to be that way. Explanatory GapVsDennett: According to the representatives of this argument it is possible that differences exist on the phenomenal level, which do not correspond to any functional differences.
E.g. Argument of inverted spectra, argument of mising qualia (see below).
Inverted Spectra/Pauen: Argument: it is possible that two people have conflicting color perceptions, but have no differences on the physical level.
Neither behavior nor neuronal level show the difference.
V143
If we accept that, then phenomenal states could not be grasped in behavioral dispositions, not even in functional descriptions. Problem: this triggers the undesired consequences of epiphenomenalism if mental differences may not be noticeable at the neural level.
Inverted Spectra/DennettVsInverted Spectra/Pauen: behavior and phenomenal experience cannot be separated, because they are intertwined on the neural level. Therfore awareness and behavior are inseparable.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996