Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introspection | McGinn | I 55 Introspection/perception/McGinn: the subjectivity of the human visual sense is in the connection with this sense secondary properties, namely the colors and not in the manner in which they impress our introspection ability. >Subjectivity. Because even if we had no such higher ability, the experience possessed nevertheless subjective character. The subjectivity of perception/experience depends on how the world is perceived. Hidden structure of consciousness: conscious states conceal covert facilities, through which they acquire the ability to hook to brain states. But this is a knowledge-like and no objective obstacle. I 70ff Introspection: is "single-channel": A cognition ability is limited by its corresponding patterns of causal sensibility: it can only represent with what it can engage itself causally determined. The immovable this causal dependency relationship between the states of the ability and the states of the objects in question, the less this ability will report on the objects. It is such a very rigid and limited resonation ability of knowledge/cognition. For detecting the states of consciousness there is not rich variety of process options that would correspond to the five senses, which is subjected to a variety of causal channels. E.g. pain. >Pain. --- II 64f Consciousness/McGinn: E.g. Suppose there is a property "C", which explains how consciousness arises from neuronal tissue. We do not know what "C" is, but we know that there must be this property. How should we identify this property? The introspection cannot, because it ends at the surface of consciousness. Introspection says what is happening at present in the consciousness, but not how it happens that it exists. "C" is too close to the brain. Introspection does not see how consciousness is embodied in matter, it does not see it as an aspect of the physical brain. The infamous incorrigibility arises from the fact that it actually has no sense to imagine that states of consciousness could elude the reach of introspection. II 135f But it is not so that the states of consciousness always and necessarily touch the inner receptors and one would never come to err. The idea of touching and not touching is rather pointless. McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness. Thesis: In the consciousness there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is also beyond the appearance. Consciousness has a hidden structure. >Incorrigibility, >First Person. This does not mean that there is both a conscious and an unconscious mind. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Other Minds | Ryle | I 249 Other minds/Ryle: our self-talk is not something that is reserved for us. ((s) Explanation: we think about ourselves in a public language.) RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Privileged Access | Ryle | Frank I 638 RyleVsAll other authors: VsPrivileged Access: privileged access is only a better position of the speaker - you cannot discover facts of a different type.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), pp. 101-111. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Ascription | Ryle | Frank I 650 Self-Ascription/Ryle: self-ascription is like foreign attribution. We observe ourselves as we observes others (WittgensteinVs - DavidsonVs). First, I usually know what I think before I pronounce it. Second, I may be wrong - but still there are the same criteria as for foreign attribution.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987), 441-4 58. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idealism | Evans Vs Idealism | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). E.g. "I was nursed" E.g. "I was unhappy on my first birthday" E.g. "I rolled around last night in my sleep" E.g. "I was dragged through the streets of Chicago being unconscious" E.g. "I’m going to die" That means that our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. ((s) we can identify ourselves like other objects and apply properties to ourselves in a second step which we could attribute to other objects, or to decide which properties we can not attribute to ourselves in contrast to some objects outside of us). I 505 EvansVsIdealism/EvansVsIncorrigibility: we can still be wrong here: gap between evidence and conclusion remains. Common misunderstanding: The fact that I can identify myself with an objectively considered person leads to a misleadingly ideal verificationist interpretation of the fact. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Introspection | McGinn Vs Introspection | II 160 Introspection can not even say that I have a brain! >Mind Body Problem II 162 McGinnVsIncorrigibility/introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in the consciousness! Thesis Aware that there is a level of reality that is not available to us, which is well beyond appearances. Consciousness has a hidden structure.This does not mean that it are both a conscious and an unconscious mind. >Incorrigibility. Consciousness/McGinn: if we were completely transparent that would constitute something unique in nature! Everything else in nature allows a distinction between its outer appearance and its reality. Nature has its unobserved side. >Consciousness/McGinn. II 164 There are two separate areas, which shut out introspection: the consciousness associated with the unconscious and the flipside of consciousness itself. >Nature/McGinn. The very conscious desire has its own hidden dimension that is not revealed to us. The introspection suffers then from a double blindness in respect to the whole truth about the mind. >Blind Spot. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Malcolm, N. | Rorty Vs Malcolm, N. | Frank I 610 Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility. >Certainty, >incorrigibility. Rorty I 238 MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here. I 239 RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior. I.e. applies 2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Dawkins Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 644 DavidsonVsIncorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty/DavidsonVsShoemaker: I will ignore the incorrigibility and put something less powerful in its place: something that comes to terms with the authority of the first person. Important Point: Shoemaker does not combine incorrigibility with a kind of knowledge, but with a class of expressions (instead of propositions as meanings). Explanation/Davidson: this could lead to an explanation of the authority, if the class of the corresponding expressions could be specified purely syntactically ((s) otherwise circle). DavidsonVsShoemaker: unfortunately it does not work! The speaker must know that he uses the privileged kind of sentence! If he does not, he does not use the language correctly. Fra I 645 What would be considered as such an abuse of language? Precisely asserting a proposition for which no such authority exists. Perhaps this is true, but this only repeats the uninformative and unfounded assertion that attribution of mental predicates is a language convention. DavidsonVsShoemaker: from the point of view of the interpreter this means that the interpreter should interpret self-attributions in a way that they come out as true. According to Shoemaker, the point of view of the interpreter is the only one that we can take, and that robs the principle of independent application: our only reason to say that the speaker occasionally enjoys special authority is that we are ready to treat his expressions as a self-attribution! But this was the initial problem. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introspection | McGinn, C. | II 162 McGinnVsIncorrigibility / introspection: appearance and reality do not coincide in consciousness! In awareness there is a level of reality that is not accessible to us, which is well beyond the appearances. Awareness has a hidden structure. This does not mean that it is both a conscious and an unconscious mind is. |
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