Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Ideas Quine V 58
Ideas/Language/QuineVsLocke: Language is not used for the transmission of ideas - (> nominalism, VsLocke). - How do we know that our ideas would be the same? We learn to apply "red" on blood and tomatoes - the idea may be anything.
VII (c) 48
Ideas/Quine: are worse than bad if they are to serve as a counterpart like a linguistic form. Example Molières virtus dormitiva. I was under the illusion of having explained something. >Mentalism, >Ideology.
VII (g) 132
Ideas/Quine: "Ideas of ideas" can be dropped completely together with "ideology" (expressability). We are more interested in definability (in a theory).
III 260
Unrealized Possibilities/Quine: it may be useful to accept such things as long as some significant differences are taken into account. We have already conditionally tolerated the so-called ideas presented above. For example, platonic ideas can also be accommodated. They only have to be named characteristically:
III 261
Metaphysics/Quine: is here above all a matter of convention. If we agree on them, everyone can stick to their preferred metaphysics.
IV 401
QuineVsIdeas: trusting in "ideas" has further disadvantages: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another.
IV 402
2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would be easy to link words to pre-existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning sink to idle questions about the causal linkage of ideas.
3) The false tendency to treat the different parts of the speech equally in semantic terms is reinforced.
QuineVsBritish Empiricism: this is based on the acceptance of ideas (derived from Locke).
Uncritical mentalism. The picture of the relationship between languages and theories is too simple.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Representation Husserl I 36
Representational Content/Husserl: 1. sensation (perception) - 2. phantasm (ideas) - 3. character (conceptual, symbolic thought).
Tugendhat I 86f
Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not to an image. Even Hegel states logically here: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being arises but not an image. TugendhatVsIdeas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them.
Tugendhat I 94
WittgensteinVsHusserl: Husserl wrongly assimilated statements about the inner to those about the outer world.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Ideas Quine Vs Ideas III 254
Singular Term/Existence/Quine: can designate an object, or not, but in any case it has a meaning. E.g. "Cerberus" ((s) >Unicorn example). Derivation: our techniques of QL (precisely with free variables) are very favorable for conclusions in which singular terms occur.
III 255
But only if we are sure that the objects really exist! Existence/Ontology/Quine: the question of existence therefore moves (for reasons of logical deduction) into the focus.
a) narrow view: existence as concrete presence in space and time. I.e. "exists" is equated with "is".
Advantage: then no difference needs to be placed in "being", when it is about e.g. the Parthenon or the number 7. This is at most a difference in the type of object (concrete/abstract), but certainly not in the sense of "to be".
Unicorn/Quine: E.g. there is nothing the word "Cerberus" denotes, neither in the past nor in the present nor in the future.
III 256
But this is not about a "shadowy existence" for fear the word might lose its meaning. Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer; it would also be impossible, e.g., to express the simple fact of the non-existence of Cerberus. ((s) difference reference/meaning - Terminology/Quine: speaks of designating instead of reference).
Idea/QuineVsIdea: false solution: speaking of Cerberus as an "idea": that would be doubling the existence: one in Athens and one in imagination. Or one in mythology, and one in the world. QuineVs: there is only one world)
Solution/Quine: Parthenon "refers to the Parthenon and only the Parthenon, while" Parthenon idea" refers to Parthenon idea and only Parthenon idea. "Cerberus idea" does not denote Cerberus!
Idea/Psychology/Quine: from the standpoint of practical psychology an idea could perhaps be explained as a tendency to certain reaction schemes to words. We can be as generous as we want with that. But to equate "Parthenon" with "Parthenon idea" would simply mean confusing one thing with another. And wanting to secure the existence of a thing like Cerberus through identification with an idea would be the same confusion.

IV 399
QuineVsIdeas: the idea of ​​the idea is of evil, because its use (just like a virtus dormitiva in Moliere) creates the illusion to have explained something.
IV 400
Explanation/Sense: ideas neurophysiology is in charge of the explanations. Our mentalistic concepts can likewise not gain importance by the fact that they "ultimately refer" to neural states. We learned this vocabulary on the basis of behavior, and to know something of neurological issues. You can master it completely and simultaneously have a wrong or no opinions about the brain!
Brain Condition/Predicates: with our predicates (folk psychology) things can be classified together that, seen neuro-physiologically, may be worlds apart!
IV 401
QuineVsIdeas: reliance on the "ideas" has other drawbacks: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another.
IV 402
2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would simply obtained to link words with previously existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning are degraded to idle questions about the causal connection of ideas.
3) The wrong tendency to handle the different parts of speech as semantically identical is reinforced.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Ideas Verschiedene Vs Ideas Prior I 118
Ideas/ReidVsIdeas/Tradition: many philosophers assume an object of mind next to the object that exists. This is because the philosopher says: "we can also think of an object that does not exist at all, so there must be an immediate object that exists: the "idea".
Some say: I cannot think of a centaur without having an idea of it, but because there is no centaur, the idea is the only one.
I 119
ReidVs: then what is this idea? Half man half animal? No. The object I am thinking about is the object itself, not an image of the object. (>Mach). It is an animal.
Prior: the tradition that Reid attacks here is dead today because of arguments like Reid put forward.





Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Locke, J. Quine Vs Locke, J. I 411 ff
Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties)
I 412
For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is.
So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property.
Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about".
Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties!
Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply.

V 59
Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words.
Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke).
Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same?

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987