Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Representation Husserl
Books on Amazon
I 36
Representational Content / Husserl: 1st sensation (perception) - 2nd phantasm (ideas) - 3rd character (conceptual, symbolic thought)
Tugendhat I 86f
Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not on an image - even Hegel, logic: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being, not an image, even Medieval results - TugendhatVsideas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them.
I 94
WittgensteinVsHusserl: he wrongly assimilated statements about the interior to those about appearance.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Ideas Quine Vs Ideas
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
III 254
Singular Term/Existence/Quine: can designate an object, or not, but in any case it has a meaning. E.g. "Cerberus" ((s) >Unicorn). Derivation: our techniques of QL (precisely with free variables) are very favorable for conclusions in which singular terms occur.
III 255
But only if we are sure that the objects really exist! Existence/Ontology/Quine: the question of existence therefore moves (for reasons of logical deduction) into the focus.
a) narrow view: existence as concrete presence in space and time. I.e. "exists" is equated with "is".
Advantage: then no difference needs to be placed in "being", when it is about e.g. the Parthenon or the number 7. This is at most a difference in the type of object (concrete/abstract), but certainly not in the sense of "to be".
Unicorn/Quine: E.g. there is nothing the word "Cerberus" denotes, neither in the past nor in the present nor in the future.
III 256
But this is not about a "shadowy existence" for fear the word might lose its meaning. Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer; it would also be impossible, e.g., to express the simple fact of the non-existence of Cerberus. ((s) difference reference/meaning - Terminology/Quine: speaks of designating instead of reference).
Idea/QuineVsIdea: false solution: speaking of Cerberus as an "idea": that would be doubling the existence: one in Athens and one in imagination. Or one in mythology, and one in the world. QuineVs: there is only one world)
Solution/Quine: Parthenon "refers to the Parthenon and only the Parthenon, while" Parthenon idea" refers to Parthenon idea and only Parthenon idea. "Cerberus idea" does not denote Cerberus!
Idea/Psychology/Quine: from the standpoint of practical psychology an idea could perhaps be explained as a tendency to certain reaction schemes to words. We can be as generous as we want with that. But to equate "Parthenon" with "Parthenon idea" would simply mean confusing one thing with another. And wanting to secure the existence of a thing like Cerberus through identification with an idea would be the same confusion.

IV 399
QuineVsIdeas: the idea of ​​the idea is of evil, because its use (just like a virtus dormitiva in Moliere) creates the illusion to have explained something.
IV 400
Explanation/Sense: ideas neurophysiology is in charge of the explanations. Our mentalistic concepts can likewise not gain importance by the fact that they "ultimately refer" to neural states. We learned this vocabulary on the basis of behavior, and to know something of neurological issues. You can master it completely and simultaneously have a wrong or no opinions about the brain!
Brain Condition/Predicates: with our predicates (folk psychology) things can be classified together that, seen neuro-physiologically, may be worlds apart!
IV 401
QuineVsIdeas: reliance on the "ideas" has other drawbacks: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another.
IV 402
2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would simply obtained to link words with previously existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning are degraded to idle questions about the causal connection of ideas.
3) The wrong tendency to handle the different parts of speech as semantically identical is reinforced.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Ideas Verschiedene Vs Ideas Prior I 118
Ideen/ReidVsIdeas/Tradition: viele Philosophen nehmen ein Objekt des Geistes neben dem Gegenstand an, der existiert. Und zwar deshalb, weil der Philosoph sagt: "wir können auch an ein Objekt denken, das gar nicht existiert, also muss ein unmittelbares Objekt geben, das existiert: die "Idee".
Manche sagen: ich kann nicht an einen Kentaur denken, ohne ein Vorstellung von ihm zuhaben, aber weil es keine Kentaur gibt, ist die Vorstellung (Idee) auch das einzige.
I 119
ReidVs: was ist dann diese Idee? Halb Mensch halb Tier? Nein. Das Objekt, an das ich denke, ist das Objekt selbst, nicht ein Bild von dem Objekt. (>Mach). Es ist ein Tier.
Prior: die Tradition, die Reid hier attackiert ist heute tot und aufgrund solcher Argumente, wie Reid sie vorgebracht hat.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Locke, J. Quine Vs Locke, J.
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 411 ff
Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties)
I 412
For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is.
So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property.
Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about".
Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties!
Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply.

V 59
Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words.
Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke).
Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same?

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003