Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Rorty | VI 9 Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. >Justification. Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson). VI 28 Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance. >Correspondence theory. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Correspondence Theory | Rorty | I 255 Conformance/correspondence/Ryle: instead simply: he sees it. FodorVs: recognition is more complex and abstract, because surprisingly independent of differences. >Recognition, >Similarity, >Identification. I 363 Correspondence: can also mean something like relationship in general, does not have to be congruent. >Correspondence. Objective: ambiguous: a) conception that everyone would reach b) things as they really are. >Intersubjectivity, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. II (e) 102ff PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: the correspondence theory must be abandoned if one wants to recognize a language as privileged for representation. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between intellect and imagination, between clear and confused ideas. >Correspondence theory/Austin, >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Ayer, >Correspondence. II (f) 126 RortyVsCorrespondence theory: misleading: it could be judged on the basis of non-words, which words are appropriate for the world. >Language use. VI 28 Conformance/correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the absolute - with this he robbed the term of its actual core. VI 125 Correspondence Theory/Rorty: this phrase only says that the correspondence theorist needs criteria for the appropriateness of vocabularies. He needs the notion that one somehow "clings" better to reality than the other. Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine, but not that they represent the reality in a more appropriate way! >Vocabulary. Horwich I 452 Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence theory//Rorty: thesis: there is no correspondence between a conviction and non-conviction (object). >Beliefs/Rorty, cf. >Coherence theory. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Husserl | Gadamer I 252 I, Ego, Self/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. >Lifeworld/Husserl. But how is this validity to be justified from a performance of subjectivity? Constitution/Phenomenology: For the phenomenological analysis of constitution [this, the justification of validity], represents the most difficult task, the paradoxes of which Husserl has tirelessly reflected upon. How can something arise in the "pure I" that has no objective validity, but wants to be itself? >Constitution/Husserl. The reflective I knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the living world is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes. Idealism/HusserlVsIdealism: [Husserl] himself assures that as a result of his thinking he has thoroughly overcome the fear of generational idealism. His theory of phenomenological reduction rather wants to bring the true meaning of this idealism to the first implementation. Transcendental subjectivity is the "primal ego" and not "one ego". For it, the ground of the given world is suspended. It is the irrelative par excellence, to which all relativity, including that of the researching ego, is related. Gadamer I 253 Idealism/Husserl/Gadamer: Meanwhile, there is already a moment in Husserl's work that threatens to constantly break this framework. His position is in fact even more than a radicalization of transcendental idealism, and the function that the term gains with him is characteristic of this. >Life/Husserl. Husserl I 102 I, Ego, Self/principle of unity/Husserl: the I, ego or self remains identical through different acts of consciousness. I-Pole/Husserl: the I-pole means to be attentive, to be focused on, to be busy with, to take a stand. Here the ego centers functions. Stream of consciousness: is a temporal stream. The ego is identical. See also Person/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Idealism | Adorno | XIII Idealism/AdornoVsIdealism: there is an idealistic tendency to transcend to that, what is, to the affirmative, to affirm the world in its present form. Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. Schopenhauer would certainly have accepted this in spite of his epistemological idealistic initial position. >A. Schopenhauer. XIII 55 Idealism/Adorno: the concept of idealism actually had from the beginning in itself (...) the theme of the union or penetration of the subjective and the objective moment of konwledge and had from the beginning the tendency (...) to lift this knowledge problem on its part to the height of a metaphysics. >Recognition/Adorno, >Theory of Knowledge/Adorno. XIII 132 Idealism/Adorno: his problem is actually the object. >Idealism. Empiricism: its problem is the question concerning the unity of the categories. >Unity, >Categories, >Categorization, >Classification, >World/Thinking. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Idealism | Carnap | II 195ff CarnapVsIdealism-realism-debate: A meaningless debate about concepts. >Realism. II 196/7 Def idealism/Carnap: objects will only be considered as being, if we can form concepts about them. VI 248/249 Constitutional Theory/Carnap: agrees with the subjective idealism that all statements about objects of knowledge can be transformed into statements about structural connections. Agrees with transcendental idealism that all objects are "created in thought". >Constitution/Husserl. With solipsism: the given are my experiences. Constitutional theory is also compatible with phenomenalism. All do not contradict each other at any point as long as they do not enter the realm of metaphysics. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Idealism | Davidson | Horwich I 449 DavidsonVsIdealism: idealism is metaphysical and seeks ontological homogeneity - this is hopeless. - DavidsonVsPhysicalism: physicalism hopes to discover such homogeneity in the future. Cf. >physicalism. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Frege | Husted V 103 FregeVsIdealism/Husted: idealism is useless because it cannot represent the effect of the language. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Subject, >Predicate, >Object, >Sense, >Thought. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Idealism | James | Diaz-Bone I 50 Idealism: JamesVsIdealism: VsEpistemological Criticism as a critique of the conditions of the possibility of cognition ("a priori metaphysics"; JamesVsKant). Idealism is not reality-related. --- I 75 VsIdealism: Examples for idealism are also "The Absolute", "God", "Matter". These are "enigmatic" names. Context: E.g. Solomon knew the names of all spirits, and since he knew their names, he could submit them to his will. >Magical Thinking, >Absoluteness. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Idealism | Materialism | Adorno XIII 245 Materialism/MaterialismVsIdealism/Adorno: the anti-idealistic element of materialism is to assert the conceptual indissolubles to the outermost solely by the extreme nominalism. >Idealism, >VsIdealism, >Concepts, >Nominalism, >Irreducibility, >Reductionism. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Idealism | Nietzsche | Ries II 27 Idealism/NietzscheVsIdealism/NietzscheVsSokrates, VsPlato: VsEquation Reason = Being. >Idealism, >Socrates/Nietzsche, >Reason/Idealism. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Idealism | Quine | II 221 Idealism/QuineVsBradley, QuineVsIdealism: all of Bradley’s relations are real - there is no recourse: Definition from outside to inside. Basic: use of two-place predicates is no reference to an ever so real relation (otherwise abstract singular terms or bound variables). >Singular terms, >Abstract terms, >Abstract singular terms, >Bound variables, >Reference. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Idealism | Schopenhauer | Adorno XIII 77 Schopenhauer/Idealism/SchopenhauerVsIdealism/Adorno(1): If ((s) according to Hegelian idealism) the reality is the mind and is ultimately legitimated by the absolute which it is itself, there is also the tendency in it, to confirm, to glorify the world as it is. >World, >Absoluteness, >Reality, >Justification/Schopenhauer. Doubts on the fact that this creative mind is the good principle, such doubts are altogether alien to the mainstream of idealist philosophy. They have only become apparent in a counter-position (...) in Schopenhauer. He has named the mind, which is depersonalized,... Adorno XIII 78 ...which, therefore, (...) should have nothing in common with the subjective consciousness of the individual human being; consequently, the will, wherein also the moment of his blindness is affected, and, if you want, his demons, as well as that moment of the original creation of the apersonal, in the absolute activity ((s) spontaneity) taking place, which was the mind in Fichte. >Mind, >World/Schopenhauer, >Spontaneity, >Idealism. 1. Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Properties | Rorty | I 81 Properties: only few still worry about an ontological gap between entities that are referred to by names, and entities denoted by adjectives. Difficulty in findings in contrast to dispositions. I 81f State: some contemporary philosophers consider non-spatiality as a sign of the adjectival status of states. (RortyVs). >States. Relationships/idealism: thesis: all relationships are internal relations. Rorty pro. All objects are what they are by virtue of their relations with all other things in the universe. Idealists: Actually, there is only one large object, the >absolute. (>Holism). VI 154 RortyVsIdealism: we only need to give up the pursuit of transcendence so we can keep the holism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Rorty | Rorty VI 225 PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs). >Pragmatism. Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects. >Skepticism/Berkeley). Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist. PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation. RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear. >Criteria, >Causal explanation. I 448 Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped. >Correspondence, >Skepticism/James. Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting. Rorty I 129 Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen. >Skepticism/Descartes. VI 223ff Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem. >Skepticism/Stroud. Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together. >Skepticism/Michael Williams. Rorty: statements only make sense in a situation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Statements | Ayer | I 281 Statement/world/Ayer: anything in the world must be distinguished from the statement. I 289 Statements/Ayer: 3 conditions: a) they must be checked directly b) be simply c) absolutely specific - then "fact" is definable: I 290 "Great statement"/Hegel/Ayer: (paraphrased): "the whole truth". AyerVsHegel/AyerVsIdealism/AyerVsBradley: then all normal statements are wrong. Wrong solution: "partially true." AyerVs: that makes all statements indistinguishable - (> indistinguishability). >Statements, >Perception, >World, >Judgments, >Facts, >Indistinguishability. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theology | Barth | Brocker I 233 Theology/Barth: With his famous commentary on the Roman letters of 1922, the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) founded the "Dialectical Theology", which was to become the most successful theological movement of the 20th century. Barth's thesis: Legitimate theological knowledge may derive exclusively from the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ, as it is witnessed in the Bible, understood as a process of language. BarthVsSchleiermacher: Religious experience is to be consistently excluded as a theological source of knowledge. BarthVsIdealism: Natural or speculative reason is (also) to be excluded as a theological source of knowledge. Also BarthVsTroeltsch: History cannot serve as a theological source of knowledge. BarthVsNational Socialism: Barth's theology achieved a broader breakthrough in church politics through the struggle of the "confessing church" against the efforts of the early National Socialist state to achieve equalization. Barth's 1933 slogan of the "Theological Existence Today", which is decisive for the Church and the parish, concentrates entirely on proclaiming the sole reign of Jesus Christ and was thereby aimed at indirectly resisting the striving for totalization of the state Brocker I 234 as well as for pointing the way for the later "Barmer Theological Declaration" of 1934. >Christian Church. Brocker I 245 Theology/state/justification/Barth: Barth's basic idea: that theology "does not have to represent a theory necessarily peculiar to the various political figures and realities" (1). One can always only judge Christian-theological "from case to case, from situation to situation"(2). >State/Barth, Politics/Barth, Democracy/Barth. 1. Karl Barth, »Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde« (1946), in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998 (b), S. 56 2. Ebenda S. 58 Georg Pfleiderer, „Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht 1938)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Thinking | Avramides | I 104 Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts. >Thinking without language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking, >Thoughts. I 113 Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language is a mere vehicle for communication. >Communication. Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings. >Communication/Schiffer. I 115 Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical). >Reductionism. Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them! Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism. Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded. >Terminology/Arvramides. I 142f DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: Locke proposes a wrong code concept of language for ideas. Significance is not explained by thoughts. - Where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - this does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance. - Then mother tongue would be like a foreign language. >Code, >John Locke, >Meaning, cf. >Language of thought. Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. thw word "square" sorts out square things. -Then no representations are needed to connect sentences with thoughts. >Representation. It is about understanding instead of association. >Association, >Understanding. AvramidesVsDummett: but this approach allows no thinking without language. I 15 Thinking/Dummett: thinking can only be investigated through language (not through behavior). AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior. >Behavior. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Truth of Art | Idealism | Gadamer I 105 Truth of Art/idealism/Gadamer: if speculative idealism sought to overcome aesthetic subjectivism and agnosticism based on Kant by raising itself to the standpoint of infinite knowledge, then (...) such a gnostic self-redemption of finiteness implied the suspension of art into philosophy. >Art, >Artworks, >Aesthetics. GadamerVsIdealism: instead, we will have to fix the standpoint of the finite. >Subjectivism/Heidegger, >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Newen Vs Atomism | New I 76 Sense Data/Russell/Newen: are material entities! Otherwise Russell's position would be an idealistic one. But RussellVsIdealism. Intersubjectivity/Russell/Newen: is thus created to a certain degree. NewenVsRussell: but not the materiality of sense data. I 77 VsAtomism: the materiality of sense data are the weakest point of logical atomism. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Idealism | Armstrong Vs Idealism | Arm III 159 ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind. Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency? ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon. Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities? Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Idealism | Carnap Vs Idealism | VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Knowledge/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of provisions is sufficient. According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description admittedly remains incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Idealism | Davidson Vs Idealism | Horwich I 449 Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.) Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Evans Vs Idealism | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). E.g. "I was nursed" E.g. "I was unhappy on my first birthday" E.g. "I rolled around last night in my sleep" E.g. "I was dragged through the streets of Chicago being unconscious" E.g. "I’m going to die" That means that our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. ((s) we can identify ourselves like other objects and apply properties to ourselves in a second step which we could attribute to other objects, or to decide which properties we can not attribute to ourselves in contrast to some objects outside of us). I 505 EvansVsIdealism/EvansVsIncorrigibility: we can still be wrong here: gap between evidence and conclusion remains. Common misunderstanding: The fact that I can identify myself with an objectively considered person leads to a misleadingly ideal verificationist interpretation of the fact. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Idealism | Feyerabend Vs Idealism | II 45 Idealistic theory: the reason directs the practice. Problem :FeyerabendVsIdealism: the Idealist will not only "act rationally" he also wants that his actions lead to desired results. And these results are to occur not only under the idealization that he used, but also in the real world he inhabits. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Idealism | Field Vs Idealism | I 27 "Mathematical Idealism"/Field: mathematical entities as "mental constructions". FieldVs: that is obscure. Idealists: the representatives would argue that it is not difficult to explain the reliability of our belief in entities that we ourselves have constructed! FieldVsIdealism: 1) can extract no sense at all from classical mathematics, if it assumes constructions. (Brouwer and Heyting reacted to this with intuitionism). 2) those who designate the ME as mental constructions make no corresponding statements about physical entities, which makes applicability a mystery. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Foucault Vs Idealism | Habermas I 281 Nietzsche, Bataille, FoucaultVsIdealism against a dialectic inherent to reason. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Idealism | Frege Vs Idealism | Frege V 105 FregeVsIdealism: Idealism is useless because it can not represent the effect of the language. Avramides I 140 FregeVsIdealism: Language/Ideas/DummettVsLocke: the entire analytical school is a rejection of the idealistic conception, first clear rejection by Frege with the distinction of sense/meaning. I 141 And this, in turn, explained as different from the associated idea. (Frege 1982, p.59)) |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Idealism | James Vs Idealism | Dewey I 183 PragmatismVsIdealism/James: Instead of the concept of the Absolute, the idea is the meaning of God, cause, number, substance or soul in nothing other than the tendency to cause us to act. >Absoluteness. James I 50 JamesVsIdealism: Vs criticism of epistemology as a critique of the conditions of possibility of knowledge ("a priori metaphysics"). Not reality based. I 75 Names/James: E.g. Solomon knew the names of all spirits, and since he knew their names, he could submit them to his will. Cf. >Magical Thinking. VsIdealism: So are "The Absolute," "God," "matter" such "puzzle-solving" names. I 96 VsIdealism: Legacy of absolute theism: constitutes the human being as God-like, with a perfect consciousness and talent for reasonableness. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 |
| Idealism | Kant Vs Idealism | Stroud I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world, which is independent from us, is unknowable. Or that the latter is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Stroud I 142 Knowledge/KantVsMoore: the knowledge of everyday life must be shown "well-earned". But this is a philosophical task, not e.g. the problem if we are to believe a witness in court or the scientist. "Scandal"/Kant/Stroud: does not imply that the scientist or the person in daily life accepts the world only because of faith. Life/daily life/knowledge/Kant: Here knowledge does not have to be proved. It is complete and unproblematic. Knowledge/understanding/KantVsIdealism: but in order to understand our knowledge, the idealism must be rejected. Knowledge/How-is it-possible-question/Kant: if we think, "How’s that possible?", we are quickly turning to idealism. I 143 KantVsScepticism: he, however, gets into a predicament if he is needs to generally explain how our knowledge of the world is possible. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Idealism | Nietzsche Vs Idealism | Habermas I 281 Nietzsche, Bataille, FoucaultVsIdealism: against a dialectic that is supposed to be inherent to reason. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Idealism | Peirce Vs Idealism | Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty: sees a gap between coherence and correspondence. It is bridged by Def Reality/Peirce: "what is designated as existing in the end". Because it reduces coherence to correspondence without metaphysics or further empirical study. It is a simple reformulation (re-analysis) of "reality". RortyVsPeirce: I no longer think (as I did before) that is right. PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have the error in common that "correspondence" is a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Correspondence/Idealism: everything that corresponds to a representation has to be a representation itself (inspired by Berkeley). Therefore VsSkepticism: the world only consisted of representations anyway. >Representation/Peirce. Horwich I 448 Correspondence/Physicalism: the correspondence relation must be causal. Therefore VsSkepticism. Fodor: that's as good as saying that the correspondence theory corresponds to the reality. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Solution/PericeVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: the correspondence relation can easily connect different relata ontologically, there is no problem of "ontological homogeneity". Antirealism/PlantingaVsPeirce: does raise problems of ontological homogeneity: if objects owe their structure and if they could not exist without showing it, they also owe their existence to our creativity. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation: E.g. Peirce: "if there are stones, they will end up showing their structure" E.g. idealist: "if we had no study, there would be no stones".(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Putnam Vs Idealism | Putnam I (c) 78 RealismVsIdealism/Putnam: the idealism would transform the success of science into a miracle. >Idealism/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Idealism | Rorty Vs Idealism | III 23 RortyVsIdealism: could not imagine that perhaps nothing, not even mind or matter, self or world, have an expressable or displayable immanent nature. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Idealism | Russell Vs Idealism | IV 80 RussellVsKant/RussellVsIdealism: it is not the thinking that the truth of the sentence "I am in my room" generates (relation). (Making true; >thruthmaker). E.g. it could be that there is an earwig in the room, and neither I know about it, nor that the earwig may think these thoughts. The result is that we have to admit universals for the relations. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Idealism | Ryle Vs Idealism | I 23 RyleVsIdealism/RyleVsMaterialism/Ryle: both idealism and materialism are the answer to a question asked wrongly. Either there is mind or there is body (but not both). E.g. As if someone wanted to say: either I bought a left and a right glove, or a pair. But not both. Ryle: you can speak in a logical tone of mind and in a different tone of the body (of the existence), but these expressions do not to indicate different types of existence, because "Existence"/Ryle: is not a generic word like "color" or "sex". Rather, they show two different meanings of the word "exist". E.g. "rising" can have different meanings: "The tide is rising", "The expectation is rising", "The average age at death is rising". It would be a bad joke to say that now three things have risen. Likewise, a bad joke would be to say that primes, Wednesdays, public opinion and fleets existed. Or that both mind and body exist. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Idealism | Tugendhat Vs Idealism | II 94 "Is"/copula/identity: e.g. copula: "A is B" if either A or B is a general term ("A is a B"). Example Identity: if both A and B are singular terms. Copula/TugendhatVsIdealism/Tugendhat: the misunderstanding of the German idealists and the Greek sophists was that they interpreted the copula as saying as much as identity: "is identical with". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Idealism | Wittgenstein Vs Idealism | IV 38 Logic/inner/outer/figure/show/public/form/Tractatus: 4.0411 if we wanted to express for example, what is expressed by "(x)fx" by putting an index before "fx": "Alg. fx" Wittgenstein: then we would not know what was generalized. E.g. if we wanted to show it by an index "a": "f(xa)" we would not know the scope of the generalization designation. E.g. introducing a mark in the argument places: "(A,A).F(A,A)" that would not suffice either, because we could not determine the identity of the variables. Seeing/WittgensteinVsIdealism/Tractatus: 4.0412 for the same reason the idealist explanation of seeing spatial relations through "spatial spectacles" is not sufficient because it cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Idealism | Barrow Vs Idealism | I 43 VsIdealism: the claims of the idealist are the most radical: "the whole description of the world is determined by reason."... "including the mad idea that it would not be so"! Counter-Example: Scientists come to the same results independently of each other, sometimes in different cultures. They may have used different formalisms. Sometimes scientists get theories they do not understand. For the idealism this represents a reversal of events if theories alone are creatures of our mind. Although the idealistic view is fashionable among non-scientists today, it is basically primitive. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Locke, J. | Berkeley Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 211 Berkeley assumes that the world is perceived by God. BerkeleyVsLocke: he casts an externalist view on a whole inevitably internist position. Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsIdealism/BerkeleyVsLocke/Avramides: (18th century): Locke: "The mind has the power to assemble (set, grasp, conceive, "to frame") abstract ideas. Language/Berkeley: Locke's mistake lies in believing that language has no other function than to communicate our ideas and that every descriptive name stands for an idea. (cf. Berkeley 1710, Absch.10ff) This leads to the assumption that linguistic generalization is an expression of generalization (generality) in thought. But one only has to deny it in order not to have to postulate such generalizing powers of the mind anymore. Berkeley denied it: BerkeleyVsLocke: it is not necessary for individual names to provoke in us the understanding of ideas for which they should stand. Communication/Berkeley: is also not the main purpose of language, there are other purposes of language like e.g. evoking passion, stimulating or stopping actions that put the mind into a certain disposition. Avramides: but it took more than a century for the idealistic grip to be loosened and idealistic theories to be revealed as completely misguided. Stegmüller IV 379/380 Reality/World/Berkeley: there is an agreement that ideas exist only in the mind. (i) Question: Can there be things outside the mind that are similar to ideas? No: only an idea can be similar to an idea. (ii) BerkeleyVsLocke: he recognizes that there are ideas of secondary qualities (odors, colors, sounds, etc.) that are not images of something that exists outside our mind. Berkeley: but he gives no reasons why it should be different for the primary qualities (shape, extension, movement)! Moreover, we cannot even form the idea of a body that has only primary but not secondary qualities. (iii) Relation/Berkeley/Stegmüller: certain values of primary qualities like distance and speed are always only relative values! This shows that they exist "only in our mind". (iv) Substance/Substrate/BerkeleyVsLocke: he admits that they are the "unknown something". But "to carry" the word is nothing more than a metaphorical term. (v) Skepticism/Berkeley: if we can imagine a material world, skepticism is still possible. We will never know. (vi) Ideas/Berkeley: even if we accept an external world, our ideas cannot be explained because it is inexplicable how material bodies can affect our mind. (vii) Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: ideas are passive and causally ineffective. If there were expansion and movement similar to our ideas, they would also be passive and could not be the cause of our ideas! |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Naturalism | Feyerabend Vs Naturalism | II 45 Idealistic Theory: Reason directs practice. Problem: FeyerabendVsIdealism: the Idealist does not only want to "act rationally", he also wants his actions to yield the desired results. And these results shall not only occur under the idealization that he used, but also in the real world he inhabits. Naturalistic version: Reason receives both its content and its authority from practice. FeyerabendVsNaturalism: a tradition, a practice or institution can degenerate or be popular for the wrong reasons. Also the hopeless respect that many people have for television and science is harmful. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Realism | Carnap Vs Realism | II 195 CarnapVsIdealism/realism debate: meaningless dispute about terms. Solution/Carnao: instead: >constitution system. II 196 Def Realism: the point of view that objects are only recognized (but not produced) by our conceptual formations. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Reductionism | Dummett Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 146 DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Regularity Theory | Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory | Arm III 13 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical. Arm III 25 TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational. Arm III 159 ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind. Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency? ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon. Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities? Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Various Authors | Carnap Vs Various Authors | II 205 Content speech: expressed in pseudo-object sentences (quasi-syntactic sentences). formal speech: uses parallel syntactic phrases. CarnapVsTradition: generally used neither object nor syntactical phrases. To be scientifically useful, the sentences used should be expressed as syntactic phrases in a substantive speech. Carnap: the content of speech must not be eliminated. One must be only aware that they are used to avoid endless pseudo discussion. VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Insight/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of rules is enough! According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description is admittedly incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idealism | Pro | Graeser I 137 Cassirer / Graeser: Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Search for the phenomenon of meaningfulness: Thesis: the worlds of art, science, religion, etc. are realities of their own right. Late work: essay on man: Def man: animal symbolicum. We are able to create worlds thanks to a symbol-creating force (> Goodman). Cassirer before idealist (Hegelian) background - LangerVsIdealism (as her teacher Whitehead). |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Idealism | Pro | Habermas I 281 Nietzsche, Bataille, FoucaultVsIdealism against one of the reason itself inherent dialectic. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relations | Rorty, R. | VI 156 Relations / idealism / Rorty: Thesis: all relations are internal relations. Rorty per. All items are what they are, by virtue of its relations to all other things in the universe. Idealist: actually there is only one great object, the Absolute. (Holism). RortyVsIdealism: we need only give up the pursuit of transcendence and can keep the holism. |
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