Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anti-Realism Putnam
 
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Horwich I 393
Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of - "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data) - Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. - N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken - ((s) In such and such circumstances) - Still not incorrigible - the sentence does not need to be bivalent. - Soft Fact/Putnam: self-affirmation of observation statements - N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. - Therefore, no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation - If we introduce reference a la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. - Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. - Verificationism: must then also be applied in the meta language. - i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). - Otherwise, Wittgenstein private language argument applies. ---
Putnam I 124
Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. - Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: no problem for the Anti-Realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. - It must only renounce models of verification. - With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. - It can then speak about models again. ---
II 125
It can even define reference a la Tarski. ---
I 150
Anti-Realism/Truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence: justified assertibility. - Not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. - It's about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Consciousness Husserl
 
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Tugendhat I 165
Consciousness / Husserl: sensual acts: presentation of objects - categorical acts: acts of thought, stating of facts, not sensual, different composition of objects - real, if the items are real
I 173f
TugendhatVsHusserl: Vscategorical act (categorical synthesis) - instead: semantic form - rather than "ideal composition": criterion: a relation exists when the appropriate sentence is true. - - -
Adorno XIII 61
Bewusstsein/Husserl/Adorno: nach Kant wird ein einheitliches Bewusstsein durch Erinnerung in seiner Einheit erst begründet und damit einheitliche Erfahrung möglich gemacht. Husserl drückt es später so aus, dass Bewusstseine selbst auch ein Stück Welt sind.
Adorno: sie setzen (…) das voraus, was sie der Lehre des Idealismus zufolge überhaupt erst konstituieren wollen.
Idealismus/Adorno: war damit ein bisschen in der der Situation des Münchhausen, der sich an seinem Zopf aus dem Sumpf ziehen soll, d.h. er muss seine konstitutiven Formen aus dem individuellen Bewusstsein entwickeln. (Siehe auch Subjektivität/Idealismus/Geist/Hegel/Adorno).

E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Copula Husserl
 
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Tugendhat I 168
Copula / Husserl separates the copula from the predicate - formalization as a whole-part sentence: "the red is in the castle," or "the castle has redness - in the categorial synthesis a predicate statement is necessarily a relation - TugendhatVsHusserl: no real composition - the castle is simply red.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Hetero-Phenomenology Radner
 
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Daisie Radner
Heterophänomenologie: wie wir etwas über die Vögel und die Bienen lernen in
Tie I D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

Perler I 408
Hetero-phanomenology/HP/DennettVsBrentano/VsHusserl: hetero-phenomenology works from the perspective of the 3rd person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: Thesis: hetero-phanomenology can also be operated from the first person perspective.
---
I 409
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: hetero-phenomenology deals with: 1. How things appear to a subject
2. How is the experience of the subject ("how is it for the subject ...")?
Frank Jackson: treats both as equivalent:
E.g Fred: for him there are two red hues, where all the others only perceive one. How is it for Fred to see Red1 and Red2?
Radner: the question varies between (1) and (2).
In the first sense, Jackson: "How is the new color?"
In the second sense, Jackson: "if we could adapt our physiology to that of Fred, we would finally know."
E.g. M. Tye: instead of saying,
A) The color blind Jones does not know how the different colors look, we can just as well say,
B) He does not know what it is like to have the experiences characteristic of seeing the colors.
Both hang together, but problems are not always the established and reversed equally well in the sense of 1. as of 2.
---
I 410
For example, color researcher Mary/Jackson/Radner: the problem is not how red may look for Mary (probably as for us), but how her experience will be. Will it be a surprise? ---
I 411
Environment/Inner world/Radner: both can be approached from the viewpoint of the 1st and the 3rd person. ---
I 412
This distinction does not correspond to that between car and hetero-phenomenology. Hetero-Phenomenology: 1., 3. Person/environment/inner world: all combinations of questions are possible.
Environment/hetero-phanomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How do things appear to the subject?"
1. Person: E.g. "How would things appear to me if I had a sense device like that of the subject?"
Inner world/hetero-phenomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How are the experiences of the subject?"
1. Person: E.g.: "How would my experiences be if I were in the circumstances of the subject and had certain characteristics in common with it?".
---
I 413
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: E.g. he would like to know how a warning call sounds for another subject, e.g. for birds of prey like hawks or owls, which have a smaller head than us. ---
I 414
How would it be if I had no auricles and the ears were only two inches apart? Problem: I may be able to imagine other ears on my brain, but not how it would be for me with a cat brain.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Intentionality Hintikka
 
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I XVII
Intentionality/Hintikka. Thesis: Intentionality has a multi-world character. Definition intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensity. Thesis: Intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ.
Chisholm: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts.
---
I 183
Definition Intentional/Intentionality/Hintikka: Thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept. Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality:
One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject.
Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano.
William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano.
---
I 188
Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world.
---
I 196
Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfy condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing") Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c).
---
I 197
E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing".

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Meaning Husserl
 
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Chisholm II 135 f
meaning / Husserl universals: their contents are incarnations of facts or documents - acts with meaning: judgment, question, hypothesis - without meaning: perception, memory - these can not be expressed! - meaning and perception belong to different spheres! - perspective: never change the meaning - II 136 - making true: on one hand propositional, on the other hand simply by name - this also contains a non-expressable part: of the object. - this part is non-propositional
Dum I 85
meaning / Husserl: the speaker fills the word with meaning - DummettVsHusserl: this is the Humpty Dumpty view
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Object Tugendhat
 
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I 37f
Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications (>Object) - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects - we do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is. ---
I 86
Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: main target. ---
I 88
E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter" but who do you mean by "Peter" - object we do not imagine it, we mean them. ---
I 102
For that we need singular term instead of pictures. ---
I 131
Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. ---
I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach - false: the sentence would correspond to a situation. ---
I 246
Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Perception Dummett
 
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I 36
DummettVsHusserl: noema not linguistically deducible.
I 52
Husserl, noema, means of perception: Vs Direct perception of "uninterpreted given conditions" Noema: he perceives by means of the noema, but does not perceive it himself nor does he capture it in any other way.
I 55
DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that slipping into idealism will be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not easily understandable. We cannot say that the subject only perceives the object indirectly, as it is mediated by the noema. because there is no concept of direct perception which we could expose to this.
I 64
There can be no vocabulary of characteristics of sensations if one considers them as something that is not affected by their interpretation as perception of an external reality. And if such a vocabulary were be possible, we could not use it.
I 94
Husserl, perception is not the act in which the meaning lies - same perception, different statement (sense) - same statement (sense), different perception Def noema: generalization of the concept of meaning "nothing more than a generalization of the idea of ​​the meaning to all the acts.
I 96f
Dummett: what exactly is the noema of sensory perception? Misses: identify the noema with sensations.
I 99
Def Hyle: sensations are described by Husserl collectively as Hyle. He understands them just like Frege. Only through the noema the act of perception gets an object. Therefore noema and meaning are something that refers to an object in the external world beyond itself.
I 99
Sensations, however, do not refer to anything, we just have them.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Phenomenalism Putnam
 
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V 240f
Phenomenalism/Mill/Putnam: we only talk about our feelings- modern form: connects to the instrumentalism: thesis: all the facts are ultimately instrumental - Bohr: science cannot find out how nature is, but what we can say about the nature. - Ethics/phenomenalism: Thesis: statements about values are emotive, not cognitive. (Non-cognitivism). CarnapVsphenomenalism/CarnapVsHusserl: translations of statements about objects in statements about feelings are actually wrong, a wrong kind of reductionism. - Feelings are private, objects are public, reading of measurements is not an experience. Phenomenalism/Putnam: Motivation: will clear out the apparent conflict between instrumental science and direct interest in nature.
---
I 42
Carnap/Putnam: (The Logical Structure of the World) Final Chapter: Sketch of the ratio of "thing-language" ("thing language" physical language) to feeling-language which is not a translation. - PutnamVsPhenomenalism: that is the old assertion that we could choose the simplest theory.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Phenomenology Chisholm
 
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 222
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: is always about possibility, i.e. about the sense, not about truth/Falsehood: E.g. Red cannot be green at the same time.
II 264
Brentano (Husserl’s teacher) precursor of phenomenology: experience of the object is simultaneously related to itself - reflective attitude.
II 269
"living world": pre-predicative - Science: only descriptive - consciousness: Brentano has never admitted the inscrutability of consciousness - he always insists on the clarity of thought.
II 272
Accepts "improper beings" with Meinong ("entia rationis").

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Phenomenology Wittgenstein
 
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Hintikka I 108
HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists. ---
I 156 ff
Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects. ---
I 199ff
Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings. WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology.
Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names.
---
I 201
Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth. ---
I 202
The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore. ---
I 204
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one. ---
I 215
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.) ---
I 222
WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Predicates Husserl
 
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Tugendhat I 168f
Predicate/Husserl: meaning of the predicate. - object: the attribute! TugendhatVsHusserl: not real, the meaning of the predicate is no object, only linguistically (VsObject Theory) - instead of standing for an object: function of the predicate: characterization - unsaturated predicates, only meaningful in connection with singular term.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Representation Husserl
 
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I 36
Representational Content / Husserl: 1st sensation (perception) - 2nd phantasm (ideas) - 3rd character (conceptual, symbolic thought)
Tugendhat I 86f
Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not on an image - even Hegel, logic: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being, not an image, even Medieval results - TugendhatVsideas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them.
I 94
WittgensteinVsHusserl: he wrongly assimilated statements about the interior to those about appearance.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Signs Tugendhat
 
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I 180
Sign/TugrendhatVsHusserl: Is there not always something for special function - characterization - then the whole theory of categorical acts is purely a thought theory without regard to signs - use here the same as function - Characterization/Tugendhat: the same as classifying or distinguishing. ---
I 364
"Natural signs"/Tugendhat: signs: E.g. browning of the leaves in autumn, that it will thunder soon, etc. - no intention, no object, but facts. ---
I 482
Signs/Tugendhat: do not occur in the place of the objects, but in the place of a fictitious sign-free reference - (>Substitute). ---
I 498
The linguistic signs do not represent other functions that would be possible without them.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Skepticism Dummett
 
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I 56 f
IdealismVsSkepticism: assumptions about external world are anyway false! Noema (Husserl) is merely a means - no direct perception of independent objects (Vs skepticism).
I 55 ff
DummettVsHusserl: there is no concept of indirect perception.
I 58
Skepticism: never sure if sense corresponds to a reference - Frege: only severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

States of Affairs Tugendhat
 
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I 141
State of Affairs/TugendhatVsHusserl/TugendhatVsObject Theory (= Thesis State of Affairs = object) not every sentence corresponds to state of affairs - false "theory of objects". ---
I 161
State of Affairs- not composed like an object - State of Affairs: like attributes: "abstract objects". ---
I 164f
State of Affairs/fact/Husserl/Tugendhat: imperceptible - composition of state of affairs different than of objects - linguistically composed (thinking) - (VsObject theory) - Definition "categorical Synthesis"/Husserl: task: of the real composition of an object of components is a special, not real composition which would be constitutive for the state of affairs to distinguish. ---
I 167
TugendhatVsHusserl, Vs categorical synthesis: Heidelberg castle is castle and red - even "red" represents object. ---
I 176
TugendhatVsObject theory: it fails at the question, how the meaning of the whole sentence is given by the meanings of the phrases. There are no combinations of objects in the sentence -> compositionality). ---
I 280ff
State of Affairs/fact/Tugendhat: state of affairs as that what the sentence says: does not work, due to potential lie - identification of the states of affairs requires understanding the usage rules - the same sentence can stand for different situations, and vice versa (as Austin) - The states of affairs in deictic expressions: Classifications principle of incidents - the state of affairs also lacks the contention mode, which is part of the assertion of "p" - VsObject theory.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Terminology Husserl
 
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Chisholm II 153
Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. - Separation of files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing.
---
Hu I 19/57
Husserl: Research Strategy: Scheme part-whole - general thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. - The scheme is true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. ---
I 37
Reell/Husserl: not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. - Meaning/Husserl: what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. - We refer to an object by meaning- Meaning/Husserl: power of consciousness. - Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. ---
I 39
Noema(thought)/Husserl: a) relational sense: as intension, b) subject core as a carrier - Noesis: performance, nature of the conception sense, (Greek: noesis = perception). ---
I 53
"Principle of all principles"/Husserl: the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge. E.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method. "way of givennes to oneself". ---
I 58
Bracketing (Era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. ---
I 42 f
Definition Noesis: performance, nature of the conception sense. (Greek: the perception, comprehension). ---
I 43
Definition Noema: Greek: the idea - two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content), the "how" of the determinations. Coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions - I 44 - b) noematic object (objectively) "core", linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. ---
I 65 ff
Horizon of possibilities. (Given by any act of consciousness.) ---
I 67
Interior Horizon(/ Husserl: anticipation of the dimension of meaning - outside horizon: perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. ---
I 68
Appresentation: co-meaning. ---
I 69
Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity - truth/Husserl: tied to the process of closer definition - eidetic variation/Husserl: activated by contingencies - Constitution/Husserl: it is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. - I 45 thought/Husserl: if one understands the thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. ---
I 72
Definition kinesthesia/Husserl: the conscious moving during perception> body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence - I 85 - transcendental ego/Husserl: has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). - Intersubjectivity/Husserl: a) objects, b) social. - Objectivity/Husserl: through a variety of perspectives. - Environment/Husserl: a) set by the intentional consciousness b) set by a communicating association of people. - The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. ---
Tugendhat I 167
"syncategorematic"/Husserl:. s. expressions are not representing an object. ---
Tugendhat I 177
Husserl: main term "species": Translation of the Greek eidos: sight, appearance. (S.U .: common feature in Kant, term).
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Hintikka Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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I 183
Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka:: for both of them "orientation to an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional concept "points behind". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Frege, G. Dummett Vs Frege, G.
 
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Brandom II 74
Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them.
Brandom II 173
Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force).
Dummett I 15
Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift).
I 51
DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference.
Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference.
Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema".
DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply.
Dummett I 61
DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color.
I 63.
Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker.
I 64
Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises.
I 79
Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained.
I 90 ++ -
Language/Thinking/Perception
I 93 + -
DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation".
I 104 -
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema.
I 106
Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally)
I 122 -
DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module.
I 124 +
DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Frege, G. Husserl Vs Frege, G.
 
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Dummett I 47
In any case, it is clear that according to Husserl, a full-bodied expression owes its meaning to an accompanying consciousness act. Reference / FregeVsHusserl: Frege s principle states that the reference of an expression is that which is common to all other expressions where it is established that their substitution does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs instead of the original expression.
Dummett I 48
reference / HusserlVsFrege: H. on the other hand tends to the view that the reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He is certainly not equating the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl used meaning and sense synonymously.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Husserl, E. Derrida Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Gesprochenes Wort (parole)/Derrida/Metaphysik: das gesprochene Wort ist dem metaphysischen Denken zuzuordnen. I 31
DerridaVsHusserl: gegen ideale Bedeutung.
Husserl: das psychologische und zufällige Moment der »Kundgabe« wollte er von der denkerisch zu erfassenden idealen Bedeutung ablösen.
DerridaVsHusserl: sieht eine Zusammengehörigkeit von Idealisierung und Stimme. Der ideale Gegenstand ist aus jeder Räumlichkeit gelöst. Die Stimme ist in der Zeit.
Stimme/Derrida: zugleich Präsenz des Objekts als gemeintes und Selbstpräsenz des meinenden transzendentalen Bewußtseins. Dies kann nicht durch etwas innerweltliches, empirisches geleistet werden. Es kommt allein der Stimme zu. Ihr Sagen vernimmt sich selbst, und es hinterläßt keine Spur (das ist auch Husserls Beschreibung des Phänomens der Stimme, daß sich vom gewöhnlichen Sprechen wiederum unterscheidet!). I 32
Logozentrismus/DerridaVsHusserl: Logozentrismus: anzunehmen, jeder subjektive Ausdruck ließe sich durch einen objektiven ersetzen, Schrankenlosigkeit der objektiven Vernunft. Habermas I 205
Phänomenologie/Derrida: der metaphysische Kern der Phänomenologie ist der Gedanke der durch Präsenz beglaubigten Identität eines Erlebnisses. Aber das Modell der Bedeutungsintention bringt genau die zeitliche Differenz und Andersheit zum Verschwinden, die beide für die Identität der Bedeutung einen sprachlichen Ausdrucks konstitutiv sind. Jene Struktur der Wiederholung geht verloren, und die nichts als dasselbe repräsentiert werden kann.
DerridaVsHusserl: er hat sich von der Metaphysik blenden lassen, daß die Idealität der mit sich identischen Bedeutung allein verbürgt ist durch die lebendige Präsenz des unvermittelten, intuitiv zugänglichen aktuellen Erlebens in der Innerlichkeit der gereinigten Subjektivität.
Wahrnehmung/Husserl: jeder Wahrnehmung liegt eine von Husserl selbst inbegriffen der Protention und retention untersuchte Struktur der Wiederholung zugrunde.
DerridaVsHusserl: er hat nicht erkannt, daß diese Struktur durch die symbolisierende Kraft oder die Stellvertreterfunktion des Zeichens erst ermöglicht wird.
Repräsentation/Derrida: nur Ausdruck und Bedeutung zusammengenommen können etwas repräsentieren. Und dies begreift Derrida als einen Prozeß der Zeitigung, als jenes Aufschieben, jenes aktive Abwesendsein und Vorenthaltensein. Habermas I 207
DerridaVsHusserl: kehrt dessen Fundamentalismus um: die transzendentale Ursprungskraft geht von der erzeugenden Subjektivität über auf die anonyme, geschichtsstiftende Produktivität der Schrift. Habermas I 210

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Husserl, E. Dummett Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Dummett I 36
Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded.
DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible.
Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act."
I 55
DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this.
I 104
DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation".
I 106
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Husserl, E. Frege Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Dummett I 47
In any case, it is clear that a substantial utterance owes its meaning, according to Husserl, to an accompanying act of consciousness. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege’s principle says that the
Def reference of an expression is that, which is common to all other expressions for which it is clear that their substitution with the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs.
I 48
Reference/HusserlVsFrege: in contrast, tends to the opinion that reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He certainly does not equate the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl uses meaning and sense synonymously.
Dummett I 96
Def Noema/Husserl: generalization of the concept of sense, is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of ​​meaning on the overall area of ​​acts. FregeVsHusserl: his concept of meaning, however, does not allow a generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction t/f, and so do their components. All that fulfills the same purpose as the sense, i.e. everything that is a specific means for determining an object or a function is sense itself and forms part of various thoughts.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Husserl, E. Habermas Vs Husserl, E.
 
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I 201
Husserl: for him the physical character will be devalued against the importance of linguistic expression. It is transformed almost into a virtual state. HabermasVsHusserl: so you do not know precisely what the meanings should be at all expressed in terms of word characters.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Husserl, E. Heidegger Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Mensch/Husserl: für die Einheit der Person ist eine wesentlich andere Konstitution gefordert als für Naturdinge. Sie existiert nur im Vollzug intentionaler Akte. Psychisches Sein hat also mit Personsein nichts zu tun
HeideggerVsHusserl: gibt sich damit nicht zufrieden: »aber welches ist der ontologische Sinn von »vollziehen«?«. Dabei hält er aber an der transzendentalen Einstellung einer reflexiven Aufklärung der Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Personseins als dessen In-der-Welt-Seins fest. Andernfalls könnte er im entdifferenzierenden Sog des Lebens philosophischen Begriffsbreis versacken. Die Subjektphilosophie soll durch die ebenso scharfe und systematische, aber eben tiefgreifende Begrifflichkeit einer transzendental verahrenden Existentialontologie überwunden werden. Dabei bringt Heidegger auf originelle Weise theoretische Ansätze zusammen, die bis dahin unvereinbar waren. Habermas I 171
Def Phänomen/Husserl: alles was sich von sich aus als es selbst zeigt.
Phänomen/Heidegger: kommt nur indirekt zur Erscheinung (aus der Verborgenheit).
Def ontische Erscheinungen/Heidegger: zeigen sich gerade nicht als das, was sich von sich aus sind.
Phänomenologie/Heidegger: unterscheidet sich von den Wissenschaften dadurch, daß sie es nicht mit einer besonderen Art von Erscheinungen zu tun hat, sondern mit der Explikation dessen, was sich in allen Erscheinungen verbirgt. Der Bereich der Phänomenologie ist das vom Seienden verstellte Sein. Als Modell für die Anstrengung der Explikation dient aber nicht, wie bei Husserl, die Intuition, sondern die Auslegung eines Textes. Nicht Intuition, sondern das hermeneutische Verstehen eines komplexen Sinnzusammenhangs entbirgt das Sein. Habermas I 172

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006
Husserl, E. Russell Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Tugendhat I 168
Copula/Husserl: separates the copula from the predicate. (RussellVsHusserl). Formalization as a whole partial sentence: "The redness is in the castle" or "The castle has redness". In the categorical synthesis a predicate statement is necessarily a relation.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Husserl, E. Tugendhat Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Habermas I 204
TugendhatVsHusserl: the attempt to make subjective expressions independent of situations is hopeless. Singular terms are examples of genuinely pragmatic meanings like performative expressions. - - -
- - -
Tugendhat I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: scheitert an der Frage, wie Prädikate verstanden werden, wegen seines object-theoretical Ansatzes. (Object theory: Thesis: Dem Satz entspräche ein Sachverhalt).
Tugendhat I 171
TugendhatVsHusserl: die Zusammensetzung darf nicht als reale verstanden werden. Einziges Kriterium: Dass die Röte im Schloss ist, ist genau dann der Fall, wenn das Schloss rot ist.
I 172
Prädikat/TugendhatVsHusserl: wir brauchen eine ganz neue Erklärung für ein Prädikat, die nicht eine Erklärung der Art sein kann, dass das Prädikat für etwas steht. Wir müssen ganz auf das object-theoretical Erklärungsmodell verzichten. Kategorialer Akt/Husserl/Tugendhat: sind ihrerseits gar nicht direkt aufweisbar.
I 173
Wir erkennen Sie nur daran, dass ein Ausdruck eine bestimmte semantische Form hat. Relationsaussagen/Relation/TugendhatVsHusserl: man könnte meinen, dass Husserls Theorie wenigstens bei Relationsaussagen durchzuhalten wäre, also beim mehrstelligen prädikativen Sätzen.
Man könnte es so sehen: im Sachverhalt ist die Relation des realen Zusammengesetztseins ideal zusammengesetzt mit dem Hammer einerseits und dem Gegenstandspaar Stil und Kopf andererseits.
Das entspricht dann genau der Zusammensetzung des Attributs mit dem einen realen Gegenstand beim einstelligen prädikativen Satz.
Vs: dagegen gilt genau derselbe Einwand: gefragt nach einem Kriterium für das Vorlegen dieser idealen Zusammensetzung, kann man nur antworten, sie bestehe dann zwischen der realen Zusammensetzung und den Gegenständen, wenn der ursprüngliche Satz wahr ist.
Tugendhat I 291
Konjunktion/Husserl: "Konjunktive Verbindung von Namen bzw. Aussagen". (Gegenstandstheoretisch). Aussagesätze stehen für Gegenstände (Sachverhalte). "Und": "Das Zusammen der Objekte". Aber keine Menge. (>Konjunktion).
I 292
TugendhatVsHusserl: problematisch dabei ist, dass wir uns das als räumliche Nähe vorstellen. Wir können uns aber Bsp Peter und Paul räumlich getrennt vorstellen und dennoch eine Aussage machen, die sie beide betrifft.
I 361
Synthesis/Gegenstand/Husserl: Syntheses of ways of givenness: er meint nicht Gegenstände überhaupt, sondern speziell räumliche Gegenstände. Synthesis von Abschattungen, Farben, Perspektiven. TugendhatVsHusserl: das sind gar keine Gegebenheitsweisen von Gegenständen als solchen, sondern ihrer prädikativen Bestimmungen!
I 362
Husserl: Gegenstand: "Das pure X, in Abstraktion von allen Prädikaten". Tugendhat: das ist zu wenig.
II 9
TugendhatVsHusserl: verlor Jahre seines Lebens mit der Auseinandersetzung, die letztlich überholt ist durch die analytische Philosophie.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Husserl, E. Wittgenstein Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Chisholm II 222
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl/Marek: does not exist as science, but rather phenomenological problems. Namely as sentences about what is possible and impossible. E.g. something red cannot be green at the same time.
Wittgenstein: in phenomenology it is always about the possibility, that is, about the meaning, not about truth or falsity.
---
Wittgenstein I 204
Phenomenology/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein's view Husserl claims, there is a third possibility next to the logical and the content one. ((s) phenomenological). WittgensteinVsHusserl: "words can be invented, but I cannot imagine anything for that." (Similar to Schlick).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Husserl, E. Verschiedene Vs Husserl, E. I 25
Laws of thought / Husserl has the view that these laws apply regardless of whether a person thinks them or not. > VsHusserl: "idealistic objectivism".
Chisholm II 153
Indexikalität/hinweisender Akt/Husserl/Mulligan/Smith: (Woodruff Smith/McIntyre) 1. die frühe Theorie liefert die "geringste Differenz": Objekte determinieren die Bedeutung
2. Die Noema Theorie: umgekehrt: der Akt selbst konstituiert das Objekt! Das Objekt spielt keine Rolle mehr in der Theorie!
II 154
McIntyre: in der indexikalischen Situation ist es auch nicht das Objekt, aber die Umstände. (~). MulliganVs: wenn das für indexikalische Situationen zugestanden wird, was soll die Noema Theorie dann überhaupt noch erklären?
Auch in nicht indexikalischen Fällen können eingeschlossene Noemata immer gefunden werden.
VsHusserl: die Noema Theorie erklärt nichts, was die frühe Theorie nicht auch erklären könnte.





Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Husserl, E. Peacocke Vs Husserl, E.
 
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I 119
PeacockeVsHusserl: even here there is a confusion between the general and the particular: I/Husserl: (Logical studies, English 1970, p. 315f, retranslation) the word "I" identifies a number of people from case to case by changing meaning. I 120 Everyone has their own I presentation. That is what changes from person to person.
Constitutive Role/Peacocke: 2) possible misunderstanding: the considerations regarding the constitutive role could suggest a "bundle theory of the self". But what I say is neutral with respect to a bundle theory. It is neutral, because it is part of a theory of thinking in a certain way about people and not about people as such or their nature and their individuation principles. Our approach to the constitutive role may explain why Cartesian thoughts that are arguably infallible definitely have a first person character. E.g. "I am in pain", "I have a perception of a tree", etc.
Principle of Sensitivity/Peacocke: together with the individuated constitutive role: someone x is predisposed to judge that φ [x itself] in the presence of evidence that the person is with these conscious states . E.g. pain x is predisposed to judge that [x itself] is j in the presence of evidence* that the person with these conscious states, including pain, is φ. ((s) evidence* the second time) Peacocke: then you can also insert pain for φ. Point: the important thing here is the particularized constitutive role: I 121 We cannot say that a person who is in pain must be able to identify themselves through a description. The person does not have any evidence* in their state. Teh possession of the first person way of givenness of the constitutive role "the person who has these perceptions" can thus explain that you do not need a test for your own identity. Now/Peacocke: it applies again that you do not have to identify the time previously.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Hetero-Phenomen. Dennett, D.
 
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Perler / Wild I 408
Hetero phenomenology / h.ph. / DennettVsBrentano / VsHusserl: from the perspective of the third person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: you can also operate h.ph. from the first person perspective.