Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Putnam | VI 393 Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact. Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. >Verification. N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent. >Bivalence, >Incorrigibility. Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. >Observation sentence, >Reference. Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. >Metaphyiscal realism. Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies. >Meta language, >Private language. --- I (d) 124 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again. I (d) 125 It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. I (e) 150 Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Consciousness | Husserl | Gadamer I 248 Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: According to Husserl's own statement(1), it was the a priori-correlation of experience-object and given facts, which dominated his whole life-work since the logical investigations. Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness, as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) from the real unit of consciousness of experiences and from their inner perception. In this respect, consciousness was not an "object" for him but an essential assignment (...). What was revealed in the research of this attribution was a first overcoming of "objecivism" in so far as, for instance, the meaning of words was not connected with the real psychic content of consciousness, e.g. the Gadamer I 249 associative notions that a word evokes were allowed to be confused for a longer time. Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning essentially belong to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words that we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"(2). >Phenomenology/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Ibid. Tugendhat I 165 Consciousness/Husserl: a sensual act is the imagination of objects. Categorical acts are acts of thought or the stating of facts. They are not sensual, they are differently composed than objects but they are real, if the objects are real. I 173f TugendhatVsHusserl: VsCategorical Act (categorical synthesis): instead of categorical acts he assumes a semantic form, rather than an "ideal composition": criterion: a relation exists when the appropriate sentence is true. --- Adorno XIII 61 Consciousness/Husserl/Adorno: according to Kant, a single consciousness is only founded by memory in its unity and thus uniform experience is made possible. Husserl later expresses that consciousness is itself a piece of the world. Adorno: they presuppose (...) what they first want to establish in the doctrine of idealism. Idealism/Adorno: idealism was thus a bit in the situation of Münchhausen, who wanted to pull himself out of the swamp by his plait, i.e. he must develop his constitutive forms from the individual consciousness. (See also Subjectivity/Adorno, Idealism/Adorno, Mind/Adorno, Hegel/Adorno). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Copula | Husserl | Tugendhat I 168 Copula/Husserl: Husserl separates the copula from the predicate. Formalization as a whole-part sentence: "the red is in the castle", or "the castle has redness". In the categorial synthesis a predicate statement is necessarily a relation. TugendhatVsHusserl: it is not a real composition - the castle is simply red. >Predication, >Predicates, >Attribution, >Judgment. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dasein | Heidegger | Gadamer I 261 Dasein/Heidegger/Gadamer: The fact that Dasein is concerned with its being, that it is above all distinguished from all other being by its understanding of being, does not (as it seems to be the case in "Being and Time") represent the last basis from which a transcendental questioning has to proceed. Rather, there is talk of a completely different reason that makes all understanding of being possible in the first place, and this is that there is a "there", a clearing Gadamer I 262 in being, i.e. the difference between being (German: "Seiendem") and "to be" (German: "sein"). >Nothingness/Heidegger. Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology and the analysis of the historicity of existence aimed at a general renewal of the question of being (...). Gadamer I 264 Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Before all differentiation of understanding into the different directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding is the way of being of the Da-sein ("being-there"), as far as it is "possibility" and able to be. [Task of understanding]: to clarify this structure of existence through a "transcendental analysis of existence". >Recognition/Heidegger. Gadamer I 265 Understanding/Gadamer: Now (...) due to the existential future of human existence the structure of historical understanding becomes visible only in its entire ontological foundation. Gadamer I 266 History: (...) that we only make history as far as we are ourselves, means that the historicity of human existence in all its movement of the present and of forgetting is the condition for us to be able to visualize what has been. Gadamer I 267 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [the question is] whether something can be gained from the ontological radicalization - brought by Heidegger - for the construction of a historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's intention itself was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of existence (>Historicity). According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of existence does not include a specific historical ideal of existence. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experience | Husserl | Gadamer I 71 Experience/"Erlebnis"/Husserl/Gadamer: Life is productivity par excellence for Dilthey. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of meaning is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. Husserl/Gadamer: Similarly universal is the epistemological function which is part of the term of the experience in Husserl's phenomenology. In the 5th logical Gadamer I 72 investigation (second chapter), the phenomenological concept of experience is explicitly distinguished from the popular one. The unit of experience is not understood as a part of the real stream of experience of an "I", but as an intentional relationship. The sensory unit is also here a teleological one. There are only experiences as long as something is experienced and meant in them. Husserl also acknowledges non-intentional experiences but these enter into the sense unit of intentional experiences as material moments. In this respect, Husserl uses the concept of experience as a comprehensive title for all acts of consciousness whose essential constitution is intentionality.(1) >Experience/Natorp. Gadamer I 249 Experience/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) the detail of the experience - as much as it retains its methodological significance as an intentional correlate of a constituted meaning - [is] not a final phenomenological date (...). Every such intentional experience rather always implies a two-sided empty horizon of such an experience that is not actually meant in it, but to which a current mine can be directed at any time, and in the end it is evident that the unity of the stream of experience encompasses the whole of all such thematizable experiences. Gadamer I 250 Therefore the constitution underlies the temporality of consciousness of all constitutional problems. The stream of experience has the character of a universal horizon consciousness, from which only details are really given - as experiences. >Horizon/Husserl, >Stream of Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 353 Experience/Husserl/Gadamer: [Husserl] has undertaken to elucidate the one-sidedness of the idealization of experience that is present in the sciences in always newly beginning investigations(2). [He] provides in this intention a genealogy of experience, which as experience of the life-world is still ahead of the idealization by the sciences. GadamerVsHusserl: However, it seems to me that he himself is still dominated by the one-sidedness that he criticizes. For he still projects the idealized world of exact scientific experience into the original experience of the world to the extent that he lets perception as an external, purely physical experience be the foundation for all further experience. Husserl: "Even if this sensual presence immediately attracts our practical or emotional interest, even if it is immediately present for us as something useful, attractive or repulsive - but all of this is based precisely on the fact that it is a substrate with simply sensual qualities that can be grasped by the senses, to which a path of possible interpretation leads at any time"(3). GadamerVsHusserl: Husserl's attempt to go back to the origin of experience in terms of sense and genetics and to overcome the idealization through science obviously has to struggle to a special degree with the difficulty that the pure transcendental subjectivity of the ego is not really given as such, but always in the idealization of language, which is already inherent in all acquisition of experience and in which the affiliation of the individual ego to a language community has an effect. 1. Cf. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II, 365 Note.; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, 65. 2. Cf. for instance the representation in „Erfahrung und Urteil“, p. 42, and in the work on the „Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie“ p. 48ff.; 130ff. — (GadamerVsHusserl: It is a very different concept of foundation that is used here. Phenomenologically, perception seems to me to be a mere construction that corresponds to the derived concept of existence - and thus appears as a residual position of its scientific-theoretical idealization.) 3. Husserliana VI. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Fundamental Ontology | Heidegger | Gadamer I 259 Fundamental Ontology/Heidegger/Gadamer: Under the keyword of a "hermeneutics of facticity" Heidegger opposed Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and the distinction between fact and being on which it was based with a paradoxical demand. Cf. >Life/Husserl. Heidegger: The unjustifiable and inferable factuality of "Dasein", the existence, and not the pure cogito as a constitution of essence of typical generality, should be the ontological basis of the phenomenological question (...). Gadamer I 261 Gadamer: The problem of factuality was after all also the core problem of historicism - at least in the form of the critique of Hegel's dialectical precondition of "reason in history". So it was clear that Heidegger's draft of a fundamental ontology had to put the problem of history in the foreground. But it was soon to become apparent that it was not the solution of the problem of historism, that no more original foundation of the sciences at all, and indeed not, as with Husserl, a last-radical self-justification of philosophy that made up the meaning of this fundamental ontology, but that the idea of justification itself underwent a complete reversal. >E. Husserl, >Science, >Ontology. HeideggerVsHusserl: It was no longer the same what it was with Husserl when Heidegger undertook to interpret "being", "truth" and "history" from the absolute temporality. For this temporality was not that of the "or" of the transcendental primal ego. Admittedly, in the train of thought of "Being and Time" it initially sounded only like an increase in transcendental reflection, like reaching a higher level of reflection when time revealed itself as the horizon of being. The ontological lack of a basis of transcendental subjectivity, which Heidegger accused Husserl's phenomenology of, was indeed what seemed to be overcome by the reawakening of the question of being. What being means should be determined by the horizon of time. The structure of temporality thus appeared as the ontological determination of subjectivity. But it was more. >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Husserl. Heidegger's thesis was: Being itself is time. >Being/Heidegger, >Time/Heidegger, >Being, >Time. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Heidegger | Gadamer I 259 Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: Under the keyword of a "hermeneutics of factuality" Heidegger confronted Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and the distinction between fact and being on which it was based with a paradoxical demand. Cf. >Life/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Heidegger: The unjustifiable and inferable factuality of "Dasein", the existence, and not the pure cogito as a constitution of essence of typical generality, should be the ontological basis of the phenomenological question (...). Prehistory/Gadamer: The critical side of this idea was certainly not entirely new. It had already been thought of by the Young Hegelians in the way of a criticism of idealism, and in this respect it is no coincidence that Kierkegaard, who came from the spiritual crisis of Hegelianism, was taken up by Heidegger as by other critics of Neo-Kantian idealism. On the other hand, however, this criticism of idealism then as now faced the comprehensive claim of the transcendental question. Insofar as transcendental reflection did not want to leave unthought any possible motive of thought in the unfolding of the content of the mind - and this had been the claim of transcendental philosophy since Hegel - it had always included every possible objection in the total reflection of the mind. HusserlVsHeidegger: (...) Husserl [could] recognize being in the world as a problem of the horizon intentionality of transcendental consciousness, because the absolute historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to be able to identify the meaning of factuality. For this reason, Husserl, in consistent adherence to his central idea of the primordial ego, had immediately objected to Heidegger that the sense of factuality itself is an eidos, i.e. that it essentially belongs to the eidetic sphere of the universal communities of beings(1). Gadamer I 264 Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of existence ("Dasein"), the being in the world (...). >Historism/Heidegger. Gadamer I 267 Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: [the question is] whether something can be gained from the ontological radicalization brought by Heidegger for the construction of a historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's intention itself was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of existence ("Dasein"). According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of existence ("Dasein") does not imply a specific historical ideal of existence. To that extent it even claims an a priori neutral validity for a theological statement about humans and their existence in faith. Gadamer I 268 Through Heidegger's transcendental interpretation of understanding, the problem of hermeneutics gains a universal outline, indeed the addition of a new dimension. The interpreter's belonging to his or her subject, which could not find proper legitimation in the reflection of the historical school (>Hermeneutics/Dilthey), now acquires a concretely demonstrable sense, and it is the task of hermeneutics to provide the instruction of this sense. The fact that the structure of existence ("Dasein") is a cast design, that ">Dasein" is understanding according to its own consummation of being, must also apply to the understanding that takes place in the humanities. The general structure of understanding reaches its concretion in historical understanding, in that concrete ties of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. The "Dasein" that is based on one's ability to be has always "been". That is the meaning of the existential ideal of the thrownness (German: "Geworfenheit"). That all free self-behaviour to his being cannot go back behind the factuality of this being was the point of the hermeneutics of factuality and its contrast to the transcendental Gadamer I 269 constitutional research of Husserl's Phenomenology. (HeideggerVsHusserl, >Constitution/Husserl). 1. Remarkably, in all previous Husserliana there is almost no mention of Heidegger by name. This certainly has not only biographical reasons. Rather, Husserl may have found himself repeatedly entangled in the ambiguity that made Heidegger's approach to "Being and Time" appear to him at times as a transcendental phenomenology and at others as a critique of the same. He could recognize his own thoughts in it, and yet they appeared in a completely different front position, in his eyes in polemical distortion. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hetero-Phenomenology | Radner | I 408 Hetero-phanomenology/HP/DennettVsBrentano/VsHusserl: hetero-phenomenology works from the perspective of the 3rd person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: Thesis: hetero-phanomenology can also be operated from the first person perspective. >First person, >Perspective. I 409 Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: hetero-phenomenology deals with: 1. How things appear to a subject 2. How is the experience of the subject ("how is it for the subject ...")? Frank Jackson: treats both as equivalent: E.g Fred: for him there are two red hues, where all the others only perceive one. How is it for Fred to see Red1 and Red2? Radner: the question varies between (1) and (2). In the first sense, Jackson: "How is the new color?" In the second sense, Jackson: "if we could adapt our physiology to that of Fred, we would finally know." >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Experiences. E.g. M. Tye: instead of saying, A) The color blind Jones does not know how the different colors look, we can just as well say, B) He does not know what it is like to have the experiences characteristic of seeing the colors. Both hang together, but problems are not always the established and reversed equally well in the sense of 1. as of 2. I 410 For example, color researcher Mary/Jackson/Radner: the problem is not how red may look for Mary (probably as for us), but how her experience will be. Will it be a surprise? >Color researcher Mary, >F. Jackson. I 411 Environment/Inner world/Radner: both can be approached from the viewpoint of the 1st and the 3rd person. >Environment, >Interior world. I 412 This distinction does not correspond to that between car and hetero-phenomenology. Hetero-Phenomenology: 1., 3. Person/environment/inner world: all combinations of questions are possible. Environment/hetero-phanomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How do things appear to the subject?" 1. Person: E.g. "How would things appear to me if I had a sense device like that of the subject?" Inner world/hetero-phenomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How are the experiences of the subject?" 1. Person: E.g.: "How would my experiences be if I were in the circumstances of the subject and had certain characteristics in common with it?". >Circumstances. I 413 Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: E.g. he would like to know how a warning call sounds for another subject, e.g. for birds of prey like hawks or owls, which have a smaller head than us. I 414 How would it be if I had no auricles and the ears were only two inches apart? Problem: I may be able to imagine other ears on my brain, but not how it would be for me with a cat brain. Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Th. Nagel. |
Radner I Daisie Radner "Heterophenomenology. Learning About the Birds and the Bees", in: Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994) pp. 389-403 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Horizon | Husserl | Gadamer I 250 Horizon/Time Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: [With the term horizon] Husserl apparently tries to capture the transition of all the excluded intentionality of meaning into the supporting continuity of the whole. After all, a horizon is not a rigid boundary, but something that wanders along with it and invites further penetration. Thus the horizon intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the >stream of consciousness, corresponds to an equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For everything given as being is given worldly and thus carries the world horizon with it. >Way of Givenness. Self-Criticism/HusserlVsHusserl: In his "Retractations to Ideas I", Husserl emphasized in explicit self-criticism that at that time (1923) he had not yet sufficiently grasped the significance of the world phenomenon(1). The theory of transcendental reduction, which he had communicated in the ideas, thus had to become more and more complicated. The mere suspension of the validity of the objective sciences could no longer suffice, because even in the completion of the "epoch", the suspension of the being of scientific knowledge, the world remains valid as a given one. In this respect, the epistemological self-contemplation that asks for the a priori, the eidetic truths of the sciences, is not radical enough. HusserlVsNew Kantianism/DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: This is the point at which Husserl could know himself in a certain harmony with the intentions of Dilthey. In a similar way, Dilthey had fought the criticism of the New Kantians, in so far as the decline to the epistemological subject was not enough for him. >Subject/Dilthey. Dilthey: "There is no real blood running in the veins of the cognitive subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct"(2) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life" and, similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, already an indicator of the later widely accepted tendency, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserl Ill, 390: "The great mistake of starting from the natural world (without characterizing it as a world)" (1922), and the more detailed self-critique Ill, 399 (1929). The concept of horizon (and horizon consciousness is, according to Husserliana VI, 267, also inspired by W. James' concept of "fringes". The impact that R. Avenarius (Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig 1912) had on Husserl's critical turn against the "scientific world" was last pointed out by H. Lübbe in the "Festschrift für W. Szilasi" (Munich 1960) (cf. H. Lübbe, Positivismus und Phänomenologie (Mach und Husserl), FS W. Szilasi, pp. 161-184, esp. p. 171 f.). 2 Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, vol. 1. p. XVIII. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Idealism | Dummett | I 56 IdealismVsSkepticism: assumptions about the external world are anyway false. I 55ff Idealism/Husserl/DummettVsHusserl: Husserl's assertion that the slide into idealism is prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not at all plausible. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, since the object is mediated by the noema. Kant and Frege are of the same opinion that every object must be given to us in a certain way. But that is why we cannot speak of indirect givenness, because the idea that an object is given, but not in a certain way, is incoherent in their view. There is nothing that can be called indirect, unless something more direct is at least conceivable. This raises the sceptical question of whether an object is there at all, if every act of consciousness has its own noema, without an external object having to be there. >Noema/Dummett, >Noema/Husserl. Dummett: Since it is an essential characteristic of Noema to be apparently directed at such an object, we have no choice but to take the view that we perceive just such an object, except in cases where we have indications to the contrary. Therefore, whenever we perceive a real object, the statement that such an object exists is justified. I 56 Dummett: The skeptic is up to this argument: he can ask how we know that we know. Idealism: From Husserl's point of view, of course, it would not be so easy to give the sceptic the idealist's answer, which is that one makes the doubts one's own, but declares them inappropriate, since what they question is untrue from the outset anyway. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Intentionality | Hintikka | II XVII Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: intentionality has a multi-world character. Def intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensionality. >Intensionality. Thesis: intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ. Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts. II 183 Def intentional/intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept. >Possible worlds. Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality: One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject. Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano. II 188 Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world. II 196 Condition c: "What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing." Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfies condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing".) Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c). >Logical necessity, >Analytical necessity. II 197 E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing". |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Intersubjectivity | Husserl | Gadamer I 254 Intersubjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: The immanent conditions of reflexively questioned consciousness do not contain the "you" directly and originally. Husserl is quite right when he points out that the "you" does not possess the kind of immanent transcendence that belongs to the objects of the external world of experience. For every "you" is an alter ego, i.e. it is understood from the "ego" and yet, at the same time, is seen as detached from it and, like the ego itself, as independent. Husserl has attempted in painstaking research to clarify the analogy of "I" and "you" - which Dilthey interprets purely psychologically through the analogy of empathy - by way of the intersubjectivity of the shared world. He was consistent enough not to restrict the epistemological primacy of transcendental subjectivity in the slightest. >Life/Husserl. At first the other is grasped as a perceptual thing, which then becomes the "you" through empathy. In Husserl, such a concept of empathy is certainly meant to be purely transcendental(1), but it nevertheless gets its orientation from the Gadamer I 255 inner being of self-consciousness and owes the orientation to the functional circle(2) of life, which far outstrips consciousness and to which it claims to go back. In truth, the speculative content of the concept of life has not been unfolded in both [Husserl and Dilthey]. See for this >Life/Yorck von Wartenburg. 1. It is the merit of the Heidelberg dissertation of D. Sinn, "Die transzendentale Intersubjektivität mit ihren Seinshorizonten" in E. Husserl, Heidelberg 1958, to have recognized the methodical-transcendental sense of the concept of "empathy" that underpins the constitution of intersubjectivity, which Alfred Schütz, "Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl", Philos. Rundschau Jg. V, 1957 H. 2, had escaped. Also the representation of Heidegger by D. Sinn in the Philos. Rdsch. 14 (1967), pp. 81-182 may also be considered an excellent summary of the intentions of the late Heidegger. 2. Here, I allude to the far-reaching perspectives that Viktor von Weizsäcker's concept of the "circle of gestalt" has opened. Habermas IV 197 Intersubjectivity/Husserl/SchützVsHusserl/HabermasVsHusserl/Habermas: Husserl failed in the Cartesian meditations because of the monadological generation of the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. (1) (See Lifeworld/Schütz, Lifeworld/Habermas). Solution/Habermas: if the situation of the acting subject is interpreted as the environment of the personality system, the results of the phenomenological lifeworld analysis can be seamlessly integrated into Luhmann's observance system theory. The problem no longer occurs when the subject-object relationships are replaced by those between subject and environment. According to this idea, (...) personality systems form environments for each other. The inter-subjectivity problem, i.e. the question of how different subjects can share the same lifeworld, disappears in favour of the problem of interpenetration, how certain types of systems can form contingent, coordinated environments for each other. (2) 1. A. Schütz, das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl, Phil. Rundschau, 1957, S. 81ff; M. Theunissen, Der Andere, Berlin 1965, S. 102ff. D.M. Carr, The Fifth Meditation and Husserl’s Cartesianism, Phil Phenom,. Res. 34, 1973, p. 14ff; P. Hutcheson, Husserl’s Problem of Intersubjekctivity, J. Brit. Soc. Phenomenol, 11, 1980, p. 144ff. 2. N. Luhmann, Interpenetration, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 1977, S. 62ff. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Life | Husserl | Gadamer I 253 Life/Husserl/Gadamer: "Life" [for Husserl] is not only the "just living there" of the natural attitude. "Life" is also and no less the transcendently reduced subjectivity, which is the source of all objectivations. The title thus refers to what Husserl emphasizes as his own achievement in his criticism of the objectivist naivety of all previous philosophy. In his eyes, it consists in revealing the illusory nature of the usual epistemological controversy between idealism and realism and instead addressing the inner relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.(1) This explains the turn of the "performing life". "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(2). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which one can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if one goes back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, even the worldly behaviour of the subject has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. Gadamer I 254 Just as Dilthey (...) starts from the experience only in order to gain the concept of the psychological context, Husserl proves the unity of the stream of consciousness to be prior and essential to the detail of the experiences. (Cf. >Life/Dilthey). The thematic exploration of the life of consciousness must overcome the starting point of the individual experience, just as with Dilthey. GadamerVsHusserl: Husserl [wants to] derive the constitution of the historical world from the "life of consciousness". One asks oneself whether (...) the actual content of the concept of life is not (...) alienated by the epistemological scheme of such a derivation from last conditions of consciousness. Above all, the difficulties that the problem of intersubjectivity and the understanding of the foreign ego offer give rise to this question. >Intersubjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI, S34; S. 265f. 2. Husserliana VI, S. 116. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Lifeworld | Habermas | III 72 Lifeworld/Habermas: this is about the socio-cultural conditions of a rational lifestyle. Here we must examine the structures that enable individuals and groups to rationalize their actions. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas >Rationality/Habermas, >Group behavior. III 73 Interpretational systems and world views that reflect the background knowledge of social groups play a role here. >Background. III 107 I first introduce the concept of the lifeworld as a correlative to processes of understanding. Communicatively acting subjects always communicate in the horizon of a lifeworld. >Agreement, >Horizon. Their lifeworld is based on more or less diffuse, always unproblematic background beliefs. It saves the interpretation work of previous generations; it is the conservative counterbalance to the risk of disagreement that arises with every current communication process. >Cultural tradition. III 108 Myth/Myths/Habermas. In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual group members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation. >Worldviews. IV 189 Lifeworld/Method/HabermasVsHusserl/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the lifeworld problems (1), we can think of the lifeworld represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organized inventory of interpretative patterns. >E. Husserl. Then the context of reference no longer has to be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as a context of meaning. >Phenomenology, >Cognitive Psychology. IV 191 Lifeworld/Habermas: since the communication participants cannot take an extramundane position towards it, it has a different status than the other world concepts (the social, the subjective and the objective world), in which speakers and listeners can optionally refer to something objective, normative or subjective. This is not possible in relation to the lifeworld. With their help, the participants cannot refer to something "inter-subjective" either. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity, >Norms, >Subjectivity. IV 192 They always move within the horizon of their lifeworld and cannot refer to "something in the lifeworld", such as facts, norms or experiences. >Facts, >Experiences. The lifeworld is also the transcendental place where speakers and listeners can meet and reciprocally claim that their statements fit into the world (the objective, social or subjective world). IV 198 The phenomenologically described basic features of the constituted lifeworld can be explained without difficulty if "lifeworld" is introduced as a complementary term to "communicative action". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 205 Background/Lifeworld/Habermas: the lifeworld should not be equated with the background consisting of cultural knowledge. Instead, it is the case that the solidarity of the groups and competences of socialized individuals integrated via values and norms flow into communicative action. IV 224 Lifeworld/Habermas: when we conceive of society as a lifeworld, we assume a) the autonomy of those acting, b) the independence of culture, c) the transparency of communication. >Autonomy, >Culture. These three fictions are built into the grammar of narratives and return in a culturally biased Verstehen. >Fiction/Habermas). IV 230 Lifeworld/System/Habermas: I understand social evolution as a second-level process of differentiation: system and lifeworld differentiate, in that the complexity of one and the rationality of the other grows, not only in each case as a system and as lifeworld - but both also differentiate from each other at the same time. From a systemic point of view, these stages can be characterized by newly occurring systemic mechanisms. These are increasingly separating themselves from the social structures through which social integration takes place. Cf. >Systems. IV 273 Lifeworld/control media/communication media/language/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas), >Control media, >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Recognition. Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Language/Habermas. N.B.: thus, the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of actions. 1. E.Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg 1948; zur Kritik an den bewusstseinstheoretischen Grundlagen der phänomenologischen Sozialontologie von A. Schütz vgl. M. Theunissen, Der Andere, Berlin 1965, S. 406ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning | Dilthey | Gadamer I 230 Meaning/Dilthey/Gadamer: (...) Dilthey [thought of] Husserl's logical investigations as to be epoch-making(1) because concepts such as structure and meaning were legitimized, although they could not be derived from elements. They were now proven to be more original than these alleged elements from which and on which they were supposed to be based. Of course, Husserl's proof of the ideality of meaning was the result of purely logical investigations. DiltheyVsHusserl: What Dilthey makes of it is something completely different. For him, meaning is not a logical concept, but is understood as an expression of life. Life itself, this flowing temporality, is designed to create lasting units of meaning. Life itself lays itself out. It has a hermeneutic structure itself. Thus life forms the true basis of the humanities. Hermeneutics is not merely the romantic hereditary material in Dilthey's thinking, but results logically from the foundation of philosophy in "life". DiltheyVsHegel: Dilthey thinks of himself fundamentally superior to the "intellectualism" of Hegel precisely because of this. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Meaning | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Meaning/Husserl/Gadamer: Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning belong in essence to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence necessity, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"(1). >Consciousness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. --- Chisholm II 135 f Meaning/Husserl/Universals: the contents of universals are incarnations of facts or documents. Acts with meaning are: judgments, questions and hypotheses. Acts without meaning are: perception and memory. These cannot be expressed. Meaning and perception belong to different spheres. The perspective never changes the meaning. II 136 Making true: is on one hand propositional, on the other hand simply by names. This also contains a non-expressable part: seeing the object. This part is non-propositional. --- Dummett I 85 Meaning/Husserl: the speaker fills the word with meaning. DummettVsHusserl: this is the >Humpty-Dumpty View. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Noema | Husserl | Dummett I 52 Noema/Husserl/Dummett: Husserl generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". Def Noema 1: the object of the act of consciousness is given by its noema, it is in the nature of noema that it is directed towards an object and this explains the intentionality of the act of consciousness. Every act of consciousness must have a noema. >Intentionality/Husserl, >Consciousness/HUsserl. Dummett I 95 Def Noema 2: new explanation of sensory perception: it is filled with a noema. (This definition was introduced by Husserl in the "Ideas"). Dummett I 96 Def Noema/Husserl: a noema is the generalization of the concept of meaning; it is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of meaning to the whole field of acts. FregeVsHusserl: Husserl's concept of meaning, on the other hand, does not permit any generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction true/false, and their components as well. Everything that serves the same purpose as meaning, i.e. everything that gives off a specific means of determining an object or function, is in turn meaning and forms a component of various thoughts. Husserl: distinguishes two components of the noema of an act of consciousness: a) the part that can be expressed by words, "noematic sense", "central core of noema", b) the outer layers that cannot be expressed in such a linguistic way. The core of the different sensory experiences may be the same, but the different experiences have different layers within the full noema. Every intended thing as such (as a noematic core) is expressable by "meanings" (here obviously linguistic meanings). According to this, the noema consists in its innermost part of a sense that is linked to a linguistic expression, but in which consciousness acts without this link. Furthermore, the noema consists of further layers that cannot be expressed linguistically. Dummett: what is actually the noema of sensual perception? Wrong: to equate the noema with the sensory impressions. Dummett I 101 For Husserl (...) causality does not seem to be important. His interest in discussing noema is only in the way the perceiver perceives the object not only as an external object but as something that has certain general characteristics. >Noema/Dummett. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Object | Tugendhat | I 37f Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications. - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects. - We do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is. I 86 Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: the main target of the Analytic Philosophy is the assumption of ideas. >Imagination, >Mental states, >Mental objects, >Mentalism. I 88 E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter"? - but who do you mean by "Peter"?Objects/Tugendhat: we do not imagine them, we mean them. >Meaning (Intending). I 102 For that we need singular term instead of pictures. >Singular terms, >Pictures. I 131 Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. >Content. I 141 TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach. False: the sentence would correspond to a situation. >Edmund Husserl. I 246 Object theory/Tugendhat: Facts are conceived as objects. Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts. >Sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Perception | Dummett | I 52 Context here: Husserl, noema, means of perception: Vs Direct perception of "uninterpreted given conditions" Noema: he perceives by means of the noema, but does not perceive it himself nor does he capture it in any other way. >Noema/Husserl. I 55 DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that slipping into idealism will be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not easily understandable. We cannot say that the subject only perceives the object indirectly, as it is mediated by the noema. because there is no concept of direct perception which we could expose to this. I 64 There can be no vocabulary of characteristics of sensations if one considers them as something that is not affected by their interpretation as perception of an external reality. And if such a vocabulary were be possible, we could not use it. I 94 Husserl: perception is not the act in which the meaning lies. - There can be one perception but different statements (sense). - Or one statement (sense) and different perceptions. Def noema: generalization of the concept of meaning "nothing more than a generalization of the idea of the meaning to all the acts. I 96f Dummett: what exactly is the noema of sensory perception? Wrong: to identify the noema with sensations. >Noema/Dummett. I 36 DummettVsHusserl: the noema is not linguistically deducible. I 99 Def Hyle: sensations are described by Husserl collectively as Hyle. He understands them just like Frege. Only through the noema the act of perception gets an object. Therefore noema and meaning are something that refers to an object in the external world beyond itself. I 99 Dummett: Sensations, however, do not refer to anything, we just have them. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Phenomenalism | Putnam | V 240f Phenomenalism/Mill/Putnam: we only talk about our feelings. Modern Form: the modern form connects to the instrumentalism: thesis: all facts are ultimately instrumental. Bohr: science cannot find out how nature is, but what we can say about the nature. Ethics/phenomenalism: thesis: statements about values are emotive, not cognitive. (>Non-Cognitivism). CarnapVsPhenomenalism/CarnapVsHusserl: translations of statements about objects in statements about feelings are actually wrong; it is a wrong kind of reductionism. Feelings are private, objects are public, reading of measurements is not an experience. Phenomenalism/Putnam: motivation: phenomenalism will clear out the apparent conflict between instrumental science and direct interest in nature. --- I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: ("The Logical Structure of the World", final chapter): in this final chapter, there is a sketch of the ratio of "thing-language" ("thing language", i.e. physical language) to feeling-language which is not a translation. PutnamVsPhenomenalism: that is the old assertion that we could choose the simplest theory. >Theories/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Phenomenology | Chisholm | II 222 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: is always about possibility, i.e. about the sense, not about truth/Falsehood: E.g. Red cannot be green at the same time. >Possibilitiy, >Necessity, >Sense. II 264 Brentano (Husserl’s teacher) precursor of phenomenology: experience of the object is simultaneously related to itself - reflective attitude. >Experience, >Objects. II 269 "living world": pre-predicative - Science: only descriptive - consciousness: Brentano has never admitted the inscrutability of consciousness - he always insists on the clarity of thought. II 272 Accepts "improper beings" with Meinong ("entia rationis"). Marek, Johann Christian. Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Phenomenology | Foucault | I 389ff Phenomenology/Foucault: Husserl: shifts the transcendental analysis from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for the human to think of himself. Deepest determination of the occidental ratio reappears. Phenomenology is less a recourse than a great break. FoucaultVsHusserl: The project is broken down into a description of the experience that is unintentionally empirical, and into an ontology of the unthought which puts the primacy of the "I think" out of the way. >Husserl, >I think, >cogito, >Phenomena, >World/thinking. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Phenomenology | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 108 HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists. Cf. >Phenomenalism. I 156 ff Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects. ((s) for independency of sentences see >Atomism.) I 199ff Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings. >Colour. WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology. >Grammar. Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names. I 201 Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth. I 202 The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore. >Understanding. I 204 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one. I 215 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.) I 222 WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects. >Quantification. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Predicates | Husserl | Tugendhat I 168f Predicate/Husserl: the meaning of the predicate could be an object or an attribute. TugendhatVsHusserl: it is not real, the meaning of the predicate is not an object. It is simply drawn up linguistically (VsObject Theory). Instead of standing for an object: the function of the predicate is characterization. Predicates are unsaturated, they are only meaningful in connection with singular terms. >"Unsaturated", >Singular terms, >Predication, >Quantification over properties. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Representation | Husserl | I 36 Representational Content/Husserl: 1. sensation (perception) - 2. phantasm (ideas) - 3. character (conceptual, symbolic thought). >Content, >Content/Husserl. Tugendhat I 86f Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not to an image. Even Hegel states logically here: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being arises but not an image. TugendhatVsIdeas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them. >Imagination, >Meaning (Intending). Tugendhat I 94 WittgensteinVsHusserl: Husserl wrongly assimilated statements about the inner to those about the outer world. >Inner world, >Outer world. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Science | Heidegger | Gadamer I 263 Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered. >W. Dilthey. Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background. >E. Husserl. Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case. >Objectivism/Husserl. Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger. Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic Gadamer I 264 incomprehensibility."(1) Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Gadamer I 459 Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity. In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called I 460 experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2). Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity. >Language, >Language/Heidegger. 1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153. 2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke). Rorty II 65 Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality. Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. --- Figal I 107f Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Signs | Tugendhat | I 180 Sign/TugrendhatVsHusserl: Is there not always something for special function - characterization - then the whole theory of categorical acts is purely a thought theory without regard to signs. >Edmund Husserl. Use here the same as function. Characterization/Tugendhat: the same as classifying or distinguishing. >Classification. I 364 "Natural signs"/Tugendhat: signs: E.g. browning of the leaves in autumn, that it will thunder soon, etc. - no intention, no object, but facts. I 482 Signs/Tugendhat: do not occur in the place of the objects, but in the place of a fictitious sign-free reference. >proxy. I 498 The linguistic signs do not represent other functions that would be possible without them. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Skepticism | Dummett | I 56 f IdealismVsSkepticism: assumptions about external world are anyway false! Noema (Husserl) is merely a means - no direct perception of independent objects (Vs skepticism). Cf. >Noema/Husserl, >Noema/Dummett. I 55 ff DummettVsHusserl: there is no concept of indirect perception. I 58 Skepticism: never sure if sense corresponds to a reference - Frege: only severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Solipsism | Husserl | Gadamer I 252 Solipsism/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. The reflective "I" knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the lifeworld is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes. >Life world/Husserl. Paradoxes/Husserl: According to his belief, they dissolve when the transcendental sense of phenomenological reduction is held with real consistency and if one is not afraid of the bugbear of a transcendental solipsism. Gadamer: In view of these clear tendencies of Husserl's thought formation, it seems absurd to me to attribute to Husserl any ambiguity in the concept of constitution, an in-between of definition of meaning and creation(1). [Husserl] himself assures that, as a result of his thinking, he has thoroughly overcome the fear of the idealism of creation. Gadamer I 260 Gadamer: I would like to remind you that Husserl himself faced the problem of the paradoxes that arise from the implementation of his transcendental solipsism. HeideggerVsHusserl/Gadamer: It is therefore factually not easy to describe the point from which Heidegger could confront Husserl's phenomenological idealism. Indeed, one must even admit that Heidegger's draft of "Being and Time" had not completely escaped the realm of the transcendental problem of reflection. The idea of fundamental ontology, its foundation on the existence that is concerned with this, and the analysis of this existence seemed at first to measure only a new question dimension within transcendental phenomenology(2). And if Heidegger's methodological program was critically directed against the concept of transcendental subjectivity, to which Husserl referred back all of his final justification, Husserl would have called it a misjudgment of the radicality of transcendental reduction. He would certainly have asserted that transcendental subjectivity itself already had all the implications of substance ontology and with it the objectivism of the tradition had been overcome and eliminated. Husserl also saw himself in opposition to the whole of metaphysics. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity, >Objectivism. 1. Like E. Fink in his lecture: »L'analyse intentionnelle et le probleme de la pensée spéculative«, in Problemes actuels de la Phénoménologie, 1952. 2. Like O. Becker emphasized in the Husserlfestschrift, p. 39. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| States of Affairs | Tugendhat | I 141 State of Affairs/TugendhatVsHusserl/TugendhatVsObject Theory (= Thesis State of Affairs = object) not every sentence corresponds to state of affairs - false "theory of objects". >Attributes, >Abstract objects, >Abstractness. I 161 State of Affairs- not composed like an object - State of Affairs: like attributes: "abstract objects". I 164f State of Affairs/fact/Husserl/Tugendhat: imperceptible - composition of state of affairs different than of objects - linguistically composed (thinking) - (VsObject theory; >object theory). Def "categorical Synthesis"/Husserl: task: of the real composition of an object of components is a special, not real composition which would be constitutive for the state of affairs to distinguish. >Edmund Husserl, >Experience/Husserl. I 167 TugendhatVsHusserl, Vs categorical synthesis: Heidelberg castle is castle and red - even "red" represents object. >Predicates, >Predication, >Properties. I 176 TugendhatVsObject theory: it fails at the question, how the meaning of the whole sentence is given by the meanings of the phrases. There are no combinations of objects in the sentence. >Compositionality. I 280ff State of Affairs/fact/Tugendhat: state of affairs as that what the sentence says: this does not work, due to potential lie. Identification of the states of affairs requires understanding the usage rules. - The same sentence can stand for different situations, and vice versa (like Austin). The states of affairs in deictic expressions: Classifications principle of incidents - the state of affairs also lacks the contention mode, which is part of the assertion of "p" - VsObject theory. >Assertions, >Meaning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Substratum | Simons | Def accident/Simons: a moment that is constantly dependent on its foundation is an accident. I 306 Def substrate/Simons: the foundation of an accident is called substrate or just "substrate of the accident": DD7 (N)(x acc y ≡ N(t) N(Ext x ⊃ Ext y ∧ ~y ≤ x) ∧ ~ N E! y) Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident does exist, i.e. those that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision of two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g.: weddings, divorces, football matches. There is nothing mysterious about this. >Events, >Mereology. I 309 Def substance/Simons: a substrate that is not an accident is called a substance. DD8 (N) sub x ≡ (Ey)[y acc x ] ∧ ~(Ey)[x acc y]) I.e. a substance is a "final substrate" (ultimate). Primary substance/Aristotle/Simons: a primary substance is to be captured by it, e.g. people, chairs, stars. I 342 Substance/substrate/carrier/Simons: a substance or substrate could simply be put to rest with Husserl's foundation. SimonsVsHusserl: his analysis allows for this, but it does not include it. >Substance, >E. Husserl. I 349 It is not the statue that melts, but the substrate changes. At high temperatures there is no sculpture. Only at intermediate temperatures, "bronze and statue have the same temperature." Superposition: the superposition may diverge. >Statue/Clay. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Terminology | Husserl | Chisholm II 153 Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing. --- Husserl I 19/57 Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. I 37 Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. I 39 Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception). I 53 "Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself". I 58 Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. I 42 f Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension). I 43 Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions. I 44 b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. I 65 ff A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness. I 67 Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. I 68 Appresentation: is co-meaning. I 69 Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45 Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. I 72 Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence. I 85 Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social. Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives. Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. I 89 Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal. --- Tugendhat I 167 "Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object. Tugendhat I 177 Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Thrownness | Heidegger | Gadamer I 268 Throwness/Heidegger/Gadamer: The projecting Dasein that is based on one's ability to be has always "been". That is the meaning of the existential ideal of throwness. The fact that all free self-behavior towards its being cannot go back behind the factuality of this being was the point of the hermeneutics of factuality and its contrast to the transcendental Gadamer I 269 constitutional research of Husserl's phenomenology. (HeideggerVsHusserl). >Constitution/Husserl, >Existence/Heidegger, >Being/Heidegger, >Life. Gadamer I 268 Understanding/Existence/Heidegger/Gadamer: The fact that the structure of Dasein is a thrown draft, that Dasein is according to its own execution of being according to understanding, this must also apply to the execution of understanding that happens in the humanities. >Dasein/Heidegger. The general structure of understanding reaches its concretion in historical understanding, in that concrete ties of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. >Understanding. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brentano, Fr. | Hintikka Vs Brentano, Fr. | II 183 Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka:: for both of them "orientation to an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional concept "points behind". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Husserl Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 47 Meaning/Husserl: in any case, it is clear that according to Husserl, a full-bodied expression owes its meaning to an accompanying consciousness act. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege's principle states that the reference of an expression is that which is common to all other expressions where it is established that their substitution does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs instead of the original expression. Dummett I 48 Reference/HusserlVsFrege: Husserl on the other hand tends to the view that the reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He is certainly not equating the reference of a predicate and a concept, however, Husserl used meaning and sense synonymously. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Husserl, E. | Derrida Vs Husserl, E. | I 31 Spoken word (parole)/Derrida/Metaphysics: the spoken word is to be assigned to metaphysical thinking. DerridaVsHusserl: against ideal meaning. Husserl: he wanted to replace the psychological and coincidental moment of the "announcement" with the ideal meaning to be grasped by thinking. DerridaVsHusserl: sees a unity of idealization and voice. The ideal object is detached from any space. The voice is in time. I 32 Voice/Derrida: presence of the object as both meant and self-presence of the meaningful transcendental consciousness. This cannot be achieved through something inner-worldly, empirical. Only the voice is entitled to it. Its saying hears itself, and it leaves no trace (this is also Husserl's description of the phenomenon of the voice, which again differs from ordinary speaking!). Habermas I 205 Logocentrism/DerridaVsHusserl: Logocentrism: to assume that any subjective expression could be replaced by an objective one, unboundedness of objective reason. Phenomenology/Derrida: the metaphysical core of phenomenology is the thought of the identity of an experience certified by presence. But the model of the intention of meaning makes the temporal difference and otherness disappear, which are both constitutive for the identity of the meaning of a linguistic expression. That structure of repetition is lost, and nothing but the same can be represented. DerridaVsHusserl: he was blinded by the metaphysics that the ideality of the meaning identical with itself is only guaranteed by the living presence of the sudden, intuitively accessible actual experience in the inwardness of the purified subjectivity. Perception/Husserl: each perception is based on a structure of repetition investigated by Husserl himself, including protention and retention. DerridaVsHusserl: he has not recognized that this structure is only made possible by the symbolizing force or the representative function of the sign. Habermas I 207 Representation/Derrida: only expression and meaning taken together can represent something. And Derrida understands this as a process of temporization, as that postponement, that active absence and withholding. Habermas I 210 DerridaVsHusserl: reverses its fundamentalism: the transcendental force of origin passes from the generating subjectivity to the anonymous, historiographical productivity of writing. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Husserl, E. | Dummett Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 36 Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded. DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible. Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act." I 55 DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this. I 104 DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation". I 106 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Husserl, E. | Frege Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 47 In any case, it is clear that a substantial utterance owes its meaning, according to Husserl, to an accompanying act of consciousness. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege’s principle says that the Def reference of an expression is that, which is common to all other expressions for which it is clear that their substitution with the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs. I 48 Reference/HusserlVsFrege: in contrast, tends to the opinion that reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He certainly does not equate the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl uses meaning and sense synonymously. Dummett I 96 Def Noema/Husserl: generalization of the concept of sense, is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of meaning on the overall area of acts. FregeVsHusserl: his concept of meaning, however, does not allow a generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction t/f, and so do their components. All that fulfills the same purpose as the sense, i.e. everything that is a specific means for determining an object or a function is sense itself and forms part of various thoughts. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Husserl, E. | Habermas Vs Husserl, E. | I 201 Husserl: for him the physical character will be devalued against the importance of linguistic expression. It is transformed almost into a virtual state. HabermasVsHusserl: so you do not know precisely what the meanings should be at all expressed in terms of word characters. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Husserl, E. | Heidegger Vs Husserl, E. | Habermas I 171 Human/Husserl: for the unity of the person a substantially different constitution is required than for natural things. It exists only in the execution of intentional acts. Psychic being therefore has nothing to do with being a person. HeideggerVsHusserl: is not satisfied with this: "but what is the ontological meaning of "to accomplish"? But he sticks to the transcendental attitude of a reflexive enlightenment of the conditions of the possibility of being a person as its being in the world. Otherwise it could sink into the de-differentiating pull of life philosophical conceptual pulp. The philosophy of the subject is to be overcome by the equally sharp and systematic, but profound terminology of a transcendental existential ontology. In an original way, Heidegger brings together theoretical approaches that were previously incompatible. Def Phenomenon/Husserl: everything that shows itself to be itself. Phenomenon/Heidegger: comes only indirectly to the appearance (from the concealment). Habermas I 172 Def ontic phenomena/Heidegger: do not show themselves as what they are by themselves. Phenomenology/Heidegger: differs from the sciences in that it does not deal with a special kind of phenomena, but with the explication of what is hidden in all phenomena. The field of phenomenology is the being disguised by the existing. The model for the effort of explication, however, is not intuition, as in Husserl's case, but the interpretation of a text. Being is revealed not by intuition, but by the hermeneutic understanding of a complex context of meaning. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Husserl, E. | Russell Vs Husserl, E. | Tugendhat I 168 Copula/Husserl: Husserl separates the copula from the predicate. (RussellVsHusserl). Formalization as a whole partial sentence: "The redness is in the castle" or "The castle has redness". In the categorical synthesis a predicate statement is necessarily a relation. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Husserl, E. | Tugendhat Vs Husserl, E. | Habermas I 204 TugendhatVsHusserl: the attempt to make subjective expressions independent of situations is hopeless. Singular terms are examples of genuinely pragmatic meanings like performative expressions. Tugendhat I 141 TugendhatVsHusserl: fails to answer the question of how predicates are understood because of his object-theoretical approach. (Object Theory: Thesis: The sentence would correspond to a fact). Tugendhat I 171 TugendhatVsHusserl: the composition must not be understood as real. The only criterion is that the redness in the lock is exactly when the lock is red. I 172 Predicate/TugendhatVsHusserl: we need a whole new explanation for a predicate that cannot be an explanation of the way that the predicate stands for something. We must completely dispense with the object-theoretical explanatory model. Categorical Act/Husserl/Tugendhat: for their part are not directly demonstrable. I 173 We can only recognize you by the fact that an expression has a certain semantic form. Relation Statements/Relation/TugendhatVsHusserl: one might think that Husserl's theory could be maintained at least with relation statements, i.e. with multi-digit predictive sentences. One could put it this way: in the state of affairs, the relation of the real being together is ideally composed with the hammer on the one hand and the pair of objects style and head on the other hand. This then corresponds exactly to the composition of the attribute with the one real object in the single-digit predictive sentence. Vs: on the other hand, the same objection applies: when asked for a criterion for presenting this ideal composition, one can only answer that it exists between the real composition and the objects, if the original sentence is true. Tugendhat I 291 Conjunction/Husserl: "Conjunctive connection of names or statements". (Subject Theoretical). Statements stand for objects (facts). "And": "Together of objects". But no quantity. I 292 TugendhatVsHusserl: the problem is that we see this as spatial proximity. But we can imagine Peter and Paul as spatially separated and still make a statement that concerns them both. I 361 Synthesis/Object/Husserl: Syntheses of ways of givenness: he does not mean objects at all, but especially spatial objects. Synthesis of shadows, colors, perspectives. TugendhatVsHusserl: these are not at all ways of givenness of objects as such, but of their predicative determinations! I 362 Husserl: Object: "The pure X, in abstraction from all predicates". Tugendhat: this is too little. II 9 TugendhatVsHusserl: lost years of his life with the confrontation, which is ultimately obsolete by analytical philosophy. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Husserl, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Husserl, E. | Chisholm II 222 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl/Marek: does not exist as science, but rather phenomenological problems. Namely as sentences about what is possible and impossible. E.g. something red cannot be green at the same time. Wittgenstein: in phenomenology it is always about the possibility, that is, about the meaning, not about truth or falsity. --- Wittgenstein I 204 Phenomenology/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein's view Husserl claims, there is a third possibility next to the logical and the content one. ((s) phenomenological). WittgensteinVsHusserl: "words can be invented, but I cannot imagine anything for that." (Similar to Schlick). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Husserl, E. | Verschiedene Vs Husserl, E. | I 25 Laws of thought/Husserl has the view that these laws apply regardless of whether a person thinks them or not. > VsHusserl: "idealistic objectivism". Chisholm II 153 Indexicality/indicating act/Husserl/Mulligan/Smith: (Woodruff Smith/McIntyre) 1. the early theory delivers the "least difference": objects determine meaning 2. the Noema theory: vice versa: the act itself constitutes the object! The object no longer plays a role in the theory! II 154 McIntyre: In the indexical situation, it is not the object either, but the circumstances. (~). MulliganVs: if this is allowed for indexical situations, what else is the Noema theory supposed to explain? Even in non-indexical cases, included noemas can always be found. VsHusserl: Noema theory does not explain anything that early theory could not explain. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Husserl, E. | Peacocke Vs Husserl, E. | I 119 PeacockeVsHusserl: even here there is a confusion between the general and the particular: I/Husserl: (Logical studies, English 1970, p. 315f, retranslation) the word "I" identifies a number of people from case to case by changing meaning. I 120 Everyone has their own I presentation. That is what changes from person to person. Constitutive Role/Peacocke: 2) possible misunderstanding: the considerations regarding the constitutive role could suggest a "bundle theory of the self". But what I say is neutral with respect to a bundle theory. It is neutral, because it is part of a theory of thinking in a certain way about people and not about people as such or their nature and their individuation principles. Our approach to the constitutive role may explain why Cartesian thoughts that are arguably infallible definitely have a first person character. E.g. "I am in pain", "I have a perception of a tree", etc. Principle of Sensitivity/Peacocke: together with the individuated constitutive role: someone x is predisposed to judge that φ [x itself] in the presence of evidence that the person is with these conscious states . E.g. pain x is predisposed to judge that [x itself] is j in the presence of evidence* that the person with these conscious states, including pain, is φ. ((s) evidence* the second time) Peacocke: then you can also insert pain for φ. Point: the important thing here is the particularized constitutive role: I 121 We cannot say that a person who is in pain must be able to identify themselves through a description. The person does not have any evidence* in their state. Teh possession of the first person way of givenness of the constitutive role "the person who has these perceptions" can thus explain that you do not need a test for your own identity. Now/Peacocke: it applies again that you do not have to identify the time previously. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Hetero-Phenomen. | Dennett, D. | Perler / Wild I 408 Hetero phenomenology / h.ph. / DennettVsBrentano / VsHusserl: from the perspective of the third person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: you can also operate h.ph. from the first person perspective. |
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